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RECONSIDERING THE WHITEHEADIAN CRITIQUE OF HUAYAN TEMPORAL SYMMETRY IN LIGHT OF FAZANG'S VIEWS

As interest in Huayan thought among Western scholars has grown over the last few decades, a number of individuals have noted similarities between A. N. Whitehead's ideas of reality as a process of arising actual occasions and Huayan doctrines concerning the interdependent arising of *dharmas*. Comparisons of the two systems do show striking similarities, but as Steve Odin has pointed out, one area of noteworthy difference may be their views of temporal passage.¹ There seems to be clear agreement among Whitehead scholars that his view requires temporal asymmetry such that the present arises as a creative advance toward an open future. In contrast, Huayan is well known for advocating a symmetrical view of reality, and the Huayan view of time, it has been argued, is no exception. On this basis some have suggested that in accounting for and even requiring an open future, Whitehead's views effectively allow for a free advance of becoming that may not be possible within the context of Huayan views. But is this the case?

By examining sections of Fazang's works that specifically deal with tense and temporal passage, we will see that the typical view of Huayan as advocating a temporally symmetrical notion of passage is only partially accurate. Even further, it is apparent in light of that material that the Whiteheadian critique of Huayan is partly inaccurate as well. It is this latter point that may mean Huayan views allow for a type of becoming that Whitehead's cannot. To see how this is the case, it will be helpful to briefly summarize the Whiteheadian critique before focusing on key elements of Fazang's view.

I. THE WHITEHEADIAN CRITIQUE OF HUAYAN VIEWS

Drawing on the work of Charles Hartshorne, Steve Odin has argued that Huayan notions of temporal passage differ from Whitehead's in

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the basic fact that passage in Whitehead's view is "internal at one end and external at the other."² Put another way, Whitehead understands present actualities as internally manifesting an inherited past while externally open to the future.³ As Whitehead notes, "Thus each actual entity . . . experiences a future which must be actual, although the completed actualities of that future are undetermined."⁴ Accordingly, Hartshorne holds that this sort of asymmetry accounts for the freedom experienced in the present moment as both an expression of the past as well as projection of possible futures.⁵

From this perspective the problem with Huayan thought is that it is symmetrical in such a fashion that both "ends" (past and future) are closed. This charge is partly a product of the fact that in Huayan thought any event is understood as causally related to future and past events such that causes and effects are simultaneously established.⁶ Even further, however, in Huayan thought causation is understood as flowing in both temporal "directions." These ideas are the basis for Huayan assertions that all events simultaneously contain and are contained by all other events. As Steve Odin expresses it, in Huayan Buddhism, "to be means to be included by, as well as to include, all other actualities, past, present, and future alike."⁷

It would appear then that the Huayan doctrines of symmetrical and simultaneous mutual interpenetration and intercontainment entail a closed and established future. If so, it seems the sort of creativity possible in Whitehead's view cannot be part of the Huayan system. As Odin notes:

The polemic here is that the Huayan theory of total non-obstructed interpenetration and unhindered mutual containment with its underlying symmetrical infrastructure has accounted for complete ontological togetherness, . . . but at the expense of all creativeness, novelty and freedom. Each *dharma* can be exhaustively factored or reductively analyzed into its causal relations and supportive conditions without remainder. By definition, total determinism is entailed by such a view in that each *dharma* is simply an effect of its manifold causes.⁸

As it turns out, a key to this issue is the matter of temporal flow. Whitehead's understanding of time as flowing asymmetrically toward an open future may provide an opportunity for creative becoming that Huayan notions of symmetrical temporal flow preclude. The important question for us here, then, is, Does Fazang advocate temporally symmetrical passage? In order to answer this question, we can begin by considering his definition of time.

II. FAZANG'S VIEW OF TIME

In a manner that clearly reflects the influence of earlier Buddhist schools, and subsequent Mādhyamaka analysis of those ideas, Fazang defines time entirely in terms of *dharmas*. For example, he says:

Because time lacks any sort of a different essence, it is established based on *dharmas*, and since *dharmas* interfuse and interpenetrate, times are also thus.⁹

And also:

These above various mixed things pervade the ten times and are manifested as being simultaneous and different because time and *dharmas* are not distinct from each other.¹⁰

In this context *dharmas* should be understood as dependently arising events. According to this view, individual events lack any inherent, self-existent nature because they exist only in terms of their relations. In short, to be a *dharma* is to be a set of relative spatio-temporal relationships. In addition, we might note that for Fazang, *dharmas* are temporal not in the sense that they exist “in” time, but rather “as” time. Given that *dharmas*, and hence time, are defined in terms of dependent relations, how does Fazang understand the past, present, and future?

III. THE THREE TENSES

In the “Ten Time Periods” chapter of his *Sanbao zhang*, Fazang provides an explanation of the three tenses. His discussion begins with the past.

This (section on) the meaning of the ten time periods is composed of two parts. The first establishes (the ten periods). That is to say, (of the ten, the time) in the past when *dharmas* have yet to fade away is called the “past-present.” (At that time,) when looking towards the past, it is referred to as the “past-past.” (But, then,) when looking towards the now present, this (present moment) is not yet existent. Therefore (at that time,) we call the now present the “past-future.” These three periods, as one time, are located in the past.¹¹

According to Fazang, the past has three subspects. He calls the past that is already and completely gone the “past-past” (*guoqu guoqu*). However, he also tells us that from the perspective of past time, there are aspects of presentness and futurity, respectively referred to as the “past-present” (*guoqu xianzai*) and “past-future” (*guoqu weilai*). Given that the terms used to denote the three tenses are mutually exclusive, what can he mean by speaking of a “past-present” or “past-future?”

We will notice that while the phrase “past-present” might make sense if we consider it a reference to some point that presently is past, but once was present, such phrases have two key qualities about them. First, the phrase itself implicitly requires some means to temporally situate the referent. Because the terms “present” and “past” are mutually exclusive, combining them creates an ambiguity that can only be clarified with explicit or implicit reference to another temporal point. As a result, the whole idea of the “past-present” only makes sense if we know at what time the sentence token is situated.¹² This means that the notion of tense overlaps (e.g., the “past’s present”) is itself dependent upon a tense for comprehension. Fazang seems to have implicitly recognized this as evidenced by the fact he occasionally provides explicit temporal situators. For example, expressions like “when looking towards the past . . .” and “when looking towards the now-present . . .” provide a temporal frame of reference that orients the reader. It is also clear he does not always use such situators. Several points about this fact seem important.

First, even where Fazang was careful to situate his assertions, the need for additional reference points creates an infinite regress. Where Fazang says, for example, “when looking towards the past . . .”, he means, “From our perspective now, it is so.” Of course, the sentence itself is tensed and hence is subject to the same requirement for constant orientation. The moment after the sentence is uttered it no longer has the status of being present. That means yet another reference must be established when referring to the reference and so on *ad infinitum*.¹³ This problem emerges because the tenses are being used to define one another.

Second, for Fazang this ambiguity and its resulting implications are not just features of the descriptive system, they are a product of and reflect the ontological one. As we saw above, from Fazang’s perspective everything is a *dharma* and *dharmas* are inherently temporal. That means even a description of the characteristics of *dharmas* is itself just another *dharma*. In short, there is no essential difference from Fazang’s perspective between verbal descriptions of time (*dharmas*) and time itself (*dharmas*). In a certain sense, then, Fazang did not have to provide explicit temporal situators because the mere fact of a description’s status as *dharma* means it is tensed.

Third, it is clear from his descriptions that being tensed means being relatively tensed. As he notes, the “now-present” is the “past-future” from the perspective of an earlier *dharma*. The key point about this idea is that it suggests a *dharma*’s temporal status is determined by its relationships with other *dharmas*. Even further, any and potentially all *dharmas* act as situators because the tense of a particular *dharma* is not a quality inherent in/to the event, but rather a

quality generated only by that event's relationship to some other event.

Fourth, for Fazang the relative relationships that generate tense between *dharms* is always the two-place relationship of "earlier than-later than."¹⁴ To see how this applies to his thought, we might first note that as his explanation of the tenses proceeds to the present and future he divides them into three subtenses just as we saw with the past above. Together his nine subdivisions of time can be schematically represented as follows:

| | | | | | |
|------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| PAST | past----- | Past | present----- | Past | future |
| | | : | | | |
| | | : | | | |
| | Present | past----- | PRESENT | present----- | Present |
| | | : | | | |
| | | : | | | |
| | | Future | past----- | Future | present----- |
| | | | | | FUTURE |
| | | | | | future |

Based on the set of relationships he has identified it seems clear Fazang understands any particular *dharma* as tensed in two ways. First, every *dharma* is tensed relative to the present. Second, every *dharma* is tensed relative to other events situated relative to the same present. We will quickly note these are not the same functions. For example, saying Fazang's birth is past at the very least tells us it is past relative to this sentence token. It does not, however, situate Fazang's birth relative to some other similarly and relatively past event such as Nāgārjuna's birth. In that case though, saying Fazang's birth is the past-present or past-future relative to Nāgārjuna's birth immediately indicates their temporal relationship as well as both their relationships to the referent present. In both cases though the fundamental relation is always that of "earlier than-later than." Even further, at no point does Fazang say some other relation is more fundamental. In fact, throughout his discussion of the tenses, as well as his explanation of the existence of *dharms* and the flow of causal influence, he consistently reduces complex relations to more fundamental bipolar ones. This tendency is so pronounced it seems Fazang understands such two-place relations as the basic and irreducible feature of temporal interdependency.

One implication of this idea is that since tense is established by a two-place relation set, a change in the set may well produce a change in a *dharma*'s tense. So, for example, relative to my birth, Fazang's birth is "earlier than" and past. Relative to Nāgārjuna's birth, Fazang's birth is "later than" and future. In a sense, one might say, the *dharma* of his birth is both past and future. In fact he does affirm this idea.

There are two aspects to the mutually encompassing [nature of the three time periods, namely:] mutual identity and mutual interpenetration. These two aspects attain completion due to the mutual causation of dependent origination and the interpenetration of the *dharmadhatu*.

First, concerning the mutual causation of dependent origination, as with past-present *dharmas*, when they have yet to fade, then they are the present. But, viewing them from the present-present, they are the present-past. For this reason, those *dharmas* are both present and past. But, because the viewpoint is different, (their presentness and pastness) do not mutually oppose one another. Furthermore, the present-present is itself the present because it has yet to fade away. Looking at it from the past-present, it is the past-future. Or, looking at it from the future-present, it is also the future-past. So, these *dharmas* are present, past, and future.¹⁵

Not only is Fazang saying any particular *dharma* is past, present, and future depending on the relationship that establishes its tense, it is also clear that for any given two-place set the tense and relative relationship of the *dharmas* is fixed. Fazang carefully notes for example that the present-present is the past-future “when looking at it from the past-present.” Nowhere does he say, for example, that the present-present is the past-past “when looking at it from the past-present.” In short, within a given two-place relation, the tenses of the *dharmas* in question are fixed even as the very same *dharmas* may take on a different tense within the context of another pairing. This basic fact of Fazang’s view is crucial to the point and we will return to it shortly.

IV. THE EXISTENCE OF DHARMAS

In addition to clarifying the relative nature of tenses, Fazang’s discussion of the nine time periods includes an important observation about the relationship between the tenses and the existence of *dharmas*. He states:

In each of these nine (periods), each of the three presents exists, while the six pasts and futures do not exist.¹⁶

He elaborates on this idea by saying:

If those (earlier *dharmas*) did not fade, then these (present *dharmas* would) not exist. Furthermore, the existence of the past-present causes the nonexistence of the past-past. This is because if this (moment) does not exist, then that (earlier moment) would not fade away. Furthermore, the existence of the past-present causes the nonexistence of the past-future. Because those (past-present *dharmas*) have yet to fade, they cause these (future *dharmas*) to not yet exist. In addition, the nonexistence of this past-future, causes that past-present to come to exist. This is because if these exist, those

(must) have already faded away. For this reason, due to the not-yet-existent (status) of these (future *dharmas*), those (present *dharmas*) attain the state of not-yet-faded.¹⁷

Here we see that the existence of *dharmas* is a function of their tense. Accordingly, the relative existence of *dharmas* is determined by the two-place relation between the *dharma* acting as present referent and tenses, and the *dharmas* it so tenses. As a result, there is a sense in which any given *dharma* is either existent or not depending on the set of relations used to tense it. For Fazang this also means any given *dharma* is both existent and not.

We will note though that just as with tense the existence or nonexistence of *dharmas* does not change within the context of a given set of relationships. So, while Fazang does say, for example, that the existence of the past-present causes the nonexistence of the past-future, and the existence of the present-present causes the nonexistence of the past-present, he never says those facts change within the confines of a given relationship. In short, while the past-present, for example, is relatively existent and nonexistent, within a given set of relations it is simply existent or nonexistent.

This aspect of his view suggests the entire field of *dharmas* (*dharmadhātu*) does exist because there is at least one set of relations for which each *dharma* is present and therefore existent. Even so, it is also the case for Fazang that the status of a particular *dharma* as present is not ontologically privileged. This means even as there is a sense in which every *dharma* is present, there is an equally important sense in which every *dharma* is not present. Furthermore, while Fazang tells us Buddhas understand the simultaneous establishment of causes and effects, present, past, and future, he never suggests that understanding, an understanding we might consider insight into the relative nature of *dharmas*, means the present existence of the entire *dharmadhātu* takes ontological precedence over the present nonexistence of the *dharmadhātu*.

This means, as we saw above with tense, that for any given *dharma*, the future and past are always nonexistent. It is also important to note that “nonexistent *dharmas*” does not mean *dharmas* characterized by the peculiar quality of being nonexistent, but the nonexistence of *dharmas* that might otherwise exist. Because the nonexistent future and past are then not comprised of a set of *dharmas*, they are open to *karmic* influence. In addition, because the existence/nonexistence of *dharmas* is a function of two-place relations and does not change for/within a given set, the future and past are always open for every *dharma*. This idea that the future and past are both open and subject to *karmic* influence is further emphasized in Fazang’s explanations of causation.

V. CAUSATION

Fazang discusses causation in many places throughout his works and a consistent characteristic of those explanations is he reduces causal relations to two-place sets that mirror those we have seen above. A good example of his view is found in the following passage from the *Sanbao zhang*.

Specifically speaking there are also four elements (of passage to consider here). Because (preceding *dharmas* are) extinguished and (subsequent ones) cut off from the preceding, (antecedent) *dharmas* do not extend to (subsequent) *dharmas*. (So,) fundamentally they do not move (from one to another) and do not endure either. (But) because (the preceding) drew forth the subsequent and (the subsequent is) dependent upon the preceding, each position is not severed from the other.

... 1. (The aspect of) “cut-off from the preceding” in the subsequent moment refers to (the subsequent as) an existent moment. 2. The “destruction” of the preceding moment refers to (the preceding as) a nonexistent (moment). 3. The “based on the preceding” aspect of the subsequent moment refers to (the subsequent’s status as) not (yet) existent. 4. And the “draws forth the subsequent” (aspect) of the preceding moment refers to (its status as) not nonexistent. 5. Because the first two (i.e., #1 and #2) are not separate (from one another), they both exist. 6. Because the latter two (i.e., #3 and #4) are not separate, they are both destroyed (i.e., nonexistent). 7. Because existence and destruction lack any obstructions, the previous six points combine to constitute one unobstructed flowing.¹⁸

Diagramming the aspects mentioned above gives us a set of relationships that look something like this:

| | |
|--|---|
| Preceding Moment: ----- | Subsequent Moment: |
| Now destroyed, past, and nonexistent ----- | Cut-off, present now, and existent |
| The preceding moment draws forth the subsequent and is not nonexistent ----- | The subsequent moment will be based on what came before and is not yet existent |

As we consider this notice that not only do these qualities establish dichotomous relationships between and, we might say, across the two moments, they also establish pairs within each moment. So, for Fazang each moment is existent and nonexistent based on its relative relationship to the *dharmas* that precede and follow it. Furthermore, Fazang points out how such two-place relations reflect a future oriented flow of causation. As he notes, for any present moment it is based on the preceding and so is a product of and reflects a particu-

lar *karmic* inheritance. Even though from the present moment's perspective that past moment is nonexistent, its particular *karmic* impetus finds expression in and as the present. In addition, the present moment has the quality of "drawing forth the subsequent" and hence is an expression/manifestation of a *karmic* impetus that is directed toward the future. In a certain sense then it seems accurate to say Fazang understands any particular present as a recipient, reflection, and generator of *karmic* "vectors" that are future directed. Whichever moment we choose as the reference point, those vectors "come" from the past and are "headed" to the future.

Of course this is not a complete picture of his views because Fazang also advocated the idea that causation flows in both directions. For example, consider the following passage:

Question: At present my body constitutes a future Buddha. Does that (future) Buddha save my present body by causing it to cultivate practice or not?

Answer: It does save you by causing you to cultivate practice.

Question: But that Buddha is what I attain by cultivating practice. How then can it save me now by causing me to practice?

Answer: If that Buddha does not save you, the body now does not become a Buddha. So, when that Buddha saves me, then I can practice to become that same Buddha.

Question: How can this be?

Answer: If we follow with the logic of dependent origination, if there is not that (future) Buddha, then there is no me now. And if there is no me now, then there is not that Buddha. So, we know it is thus. (And just as the future exists in dependent) opposition to the present, it is also thus to the limits of the past.¹⁹

The important point for us here is that Fazang affirms the idea that subsequent and future events causally influence preceding and past ones. In short, causation also flows from the future to the past. This particular part of Huayan thought seems to suggest there is an existent future that dependently arises with preceding *dharma*s. But we might note that Fazang describes the above situation in ways that reflect his other discussions rooted in two-place relations. Assuming his views are consistent, these ideas must fit with the earlier ones concerning the relative tense and existence of *dharma*s. If we combine them, we get a set of relations something like this:

Dharma A: Not a Buddha-----*Dharma* B: A Buddha

As the present-present it is existent, cut off, based on the preceding and has the power to "draw forth the subsequent" and establish the preceding.

As the present-future it is nonexistent and without power because its future existence is dependent upon the present-present's power to draw forth the subsequent.

As the present-past it is -----As the present-present it is
 nonexistent, without power,
 and has been destroyed
 but as such is dependent on the
 present-present.

existent, and has the power to
 draw forth the subsequent and
 establish the preceding. It is
 also based on the preceding it
 requires a past to be a present.

What we see here is the present *dharma* of a practitioner manifests a future-directed *karmic* impetus that provides for the possibility of and draws forth a presently nonexistent future *dharma* as Buddha. A present *dharma* as Buddha, however, is both an expression of a past *karmic* inheritance (practice) and also an active creator of that particular nonexistent past (practice). In a sense, the past depends on the present just as the present depends on the past. As a quick aside we might note that assuming Bradford Wallack is correct, this notion is very similar to Whitehead's idea that the past is only determinate given a particular present.²⁰ In any case, these points about Fazang's view suggest a number of ideas—that is, (1) the past influences the future; (2) the future reflects the past; (3) the future influences the past; and (4) the past reflects that future.

If we expand the outline above to include the various possibilities of directed *karmic* influence and the three tenses, the number of relation sets for any particular *dharma* multiplies.

Set A:

| | | |
|---|---|----------------------|
| Past -----> | Present -----> | Future |
| The nonexistence of a particular <i>dharma</i> acting as a cause | An existent effect acting as a cause | A nonexistent effect |

Set B:

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Past<----- | Present<----- | Future |
| A nonexistent effect | An existent effect acting as a cause | The nonexistence of a particular <i>dharma</i> acting as a cause |

Set C:

| | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Past<----- | Present -----> | Future |
| A nonexistent effect | A cause of the past and future | A nonexistent effect |

Set D:

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| Past -----> | Present<----- | Future |
| The nonexistence of a particular <i>dharma</i> acting as a cause | The existent effect of a past and future | The nonexistence of a particular <i>dharma</i> acting as a cause |

We notice that even as it is true from Fazang's perspective that causation flows in both directions, for a given set of events with a relative tense and existence, the flow of *karmic* vectors is always asymmetrical. In the case of sets A and B, the present is an expression of a particular nonexistent cause and also the causal impetus for a possible though as yet nonexistent effect. In short, whichever way the causal vectors are directed, for sets A and B the cause end is closed while the effect end is open. For these sets the asymmetrical flow of causation proceeds from a closed cause to an open though possible effect. Of course sets C and D illustrate different possibilities with the present effecting an entirely open past and future (C) or manifesting a particular closed past and future (D). Regardless of the combination, however, a particular set reflects and creates a situation in which the events are *karmically* related in such a fashion that the flow of influence between any two events is always unidirectional.

Because it contravenes common notions of time's passage, perhaps the difficult part of this temporal flow equation is the effect to cause element. However, as we see above, within a given set causation is always oriented from cause to effect. In short, what appears to be a past effect of a present cause only appears as such from the perspective of a set reflecting a different *karmic* vector.

This basic feature of his views allows Fazang to say things like "the future Buddha makes this practice of becoming that Buddha possible" without in the least implying that the future for the practitioner is now closed and determined. In fact, as we see above, it is both a closed and open future. Since the present *dharma* of a given set is always existent, and *karmic* influence flows asymmetrically for every set, as the active causal agent the present "has power" (*youli*) to influence a nonexistent past and future. In that case the past and future are "without power" (*wuli*) and therefore able to receive the influence of an active present. Of course for a different causal relationship the same is true in reverse so every *dharma* is acting to create a future and past while also being acted upon.

Of course we might immediately object that the sets above are not sets of different *dharmas* but different aspects of the relationship between the same *dharmas*. Given that, it must be the case that the future and past are closed. But drawing this conclusion requires assigning ontological primacy to one aspect of a *dharma's* complex set of relations. For his part, Fazang does not tell us one aspect or the other is so privileged. He never tells us, for example, that the relations represented above by any particular set are more fundamental than the others. The same is also true for the relationship between the entire collection of sets and the individual members. In short, it is no less accurate according to Fazang to say set A is the case than to say sets A–D are collectively the case. This suggests the temporal

symmetry we see between the sets above does not have ontological priority in Fazang's thought over the temporal asymmetry we see within any particular set.

We will quickly note however he does tell us certain forms of understanding about these sets are more accurate than others, but this distinction is not rooted in ontological issues so much as epistemological ones. For example, he tells us these more complex and subtle aspects of reality are only evident "from a position of completed practice"²¹ and are "understood in accordance with wisdom."²² Furthermore, for the enlightened he says there is no "before and after"²³ and all passage is found in a "single instant."²⁴ What he does not tell us though is that such understanding means temporal symmetry is more fundamental than temporal asymmetry. In fact when it is framed this way it is clear such a claim would immediately contradict his other views. So, in the end what does all this tell us about the Whiteheadian critique that Huayan views of temporal symmetry entail a closed and determinate future?

VI. CONCLUSION

First, it appears the critique that any *dharma* can be exhaustively reduced to its relations past, present, and future is only partly accurate. As we see above, considering a given *dharma* across a range of relations such as represented by sets A–D does suggest there is a sense in which it can be so reduced. But, because a *dharma* is always a *dharma* within a particular two-place set relation and, hence, exists as the boundary between a nonexistent past and future, it is apparently also the case that every *dharma* cannot be so reduced. In that sense the future, for example, is an open range of *karmic* possibilities, not a given set of existent realities. For every *dharma* then the future is open, and *karmic* influences are free to advance in new and, we might even say, creative ways. This is why Fazang affirms the idea that practitioners can in fact become Buddhas.

Secondly, because present *dharmas* do not simply inherit the past, but also actively create it, it appears the idea that the Huayan view entails a closed past is also only partly accurate. Since Fazang allows for a flow of *karmic* influence from present to past, it seems the past constantly awaits a particular present and takes form as a consequence of that present. From this perspective it also appears Fazang's views allow for an ongoing "creative advance" toward an open past that may not be the case in Whitehead's thought.

Third, and finally, the idea that Fazang specifically, and perhaps Huayan more generally, advocated temporal symmetry is a bit mis-

leading. In light of the above information, it seems more accurate to characterize this philosophy of time as a form of “asymmetrical symmetry,” or “symmetrical asymmetry.”

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ENDNOTES

1. Steve Odin, *Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration vs. Interpenetration* (Albany: SUNY, 1982).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
4. A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936), pp. 327–328.
5. Odin, p. 77.
6. For example, consider the following passage from his *Huayanjing yihai baimen*.
 “. . . results are not different than causes. And together, the fulfillment of the cause is called the result. Because causes are not different than results, together, the perfection of the result is called the cause. If the cause did not attain the result, the result is then not a result. If results did not attain the cause, causes are not causes. Each is simultaneously established because they are not separate or different. For this reason, when one first puts forth the mind [to seek enlightenment, that causal moment] also completes correct enlightenment.”
 T. 45, #1875, p. 631c.
7. Odin, p. 75.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.
9. *Huayanjing zhigui*, T. 45, #1871, p. 590c.
10. *Huayan wujiao zhang*, T. 45, #1866, p. 506c. Also see Francis H. Cook’s *Fa-tsang’s Treatise on the Five Doctrines: An Annotated Translation*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1970. v. 2, p. 519.
11. *Huayanjing ming fa pin nei li sanbao zhang*, T. 45, #1874, pp. 621c–622a.
12. For more on this, see Richard Gale, ed., *The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967).
13. This idea of an infinite regress of tense overlaps led the modern Western time theorist J. M. E. McTaggart to reject the reality of time. J. M. E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, in *Philosophical Studies*, S. V. Keeling, ed. (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1934), pp. 110–131.
14. For more on this, see Gale, p. 67, and also Adolf Grunbaum, “The Status of Temporal Becoming” in Gale, *The Philosophy of Time*, p. 322.
15. *Sanbao zhang*, T. 45, p. 622a.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 622a–b.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 618b.
19. *Huayanjing wenda*, T. 45, #1873, p. 604b–c.
20. F. Bradford Wallack, *The Epochal Nature of Process in Whitehead’s Metaphysics* (Albany: SUNY, 1980), p. 201. Wallack states that Whitehead’s epochs “. . . have no actual and determinate past until they become actualities themselves.”
21. *Wujiao zhang*, T. 45, p. 506b. Cook, v.2, p. 512.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Dacheng qixinlun yiji*, T. 44, #1846, p. 259b. Also see *An English translation of Fa-tsang’s Commentary on the Awakening of Faith*, trans. Dirck Vorenkamp (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), pp. 148–149.
24. *Ibid.*

CHINESE GLOSSARY

Dacheng qixin lun yiji

大乘起信論義記

dharmas 法

dharmadhātu 法界

Fazang 法藏

guoqu guoqu 過去過去

guoqu xianzai 過去現在

guoqu weilai 過去未來

Huayan 華嚴

Huayan wujiao zhang

華嚴五教章

Huayanjing wenda 華嚴經問答*Huayanjing yihai baimen*

華嚴經義海百門

Huayanjing zhigui 華嚴經旨歸*Sanbao zhang* 三寶章

wuli 無力

youli 有力

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