



Project  
**MUSE**<sup>®</sup>  
*Scholarly journals online*

within the multiplicity that is Asia. We will discover a credo. And I believe we will also discover the basis for a new morality.

Ōe and Ishihara were once literary friends, but their differing views have made them implacable enemies. Ishihara considers Ōe to be a traitor to the state while Ōe deems his rival to be a dangerous fascist, yet, as Nathan notes, both consider themselves to be moralists and both “are driven by a quest for the substantial sense of self that has eluded Japan since the earliest days of modernization.” After Nathan left Ōe’s residence, he met Ishihara, the powerful governor of Tokyo, walking alone down the street. He muses, “Leaving one and encountering the other in the space of a few minutes, I felt that I had traveled between the poles of the ambivalence that continues to be a troubling condition of contemporary Japanese life.”

Nathan is not entirely pessimistic about Japan’s future. He notes, for example, the expanding relationship between Japan and China, in terms not only of trade but also of cultural relationships and exchanges. Japan’s economy is seeing a noticeable revival, and much of the nation’s creative genius is as productive and proficient as ever. Nathan’s Japan is clearly a nation breaking away sharply from its past and trying desperately to find its own unique identity, but where it will go is anybody’s guess.

One cannot ignore Japan, which still has the world’s second largest economy. One must also understand what is going on in Japan today, and reading Nathan provides us with many helpful clues.

*Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra’s Collection of Views on Yoga.* By Christopher Key Chapple, with a new translation of Haribhadra’s *Yogadr̥ṣṭisamuccaya* by Christopher Key Chapple and John Thomas Casey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. 170.

Reviewed by **Fujinaga Sin** Miyakonojo Kosen (Miyakonojo National College of Technology)

Among the Jaina philosophers, Haribhadra (700–770) must be one of the most studied by both Indian and non-Indian scholars, with examinations of his work going back to the early days of research on Indian thought in Europe. For example, *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, with introduction and notes by F. L. Pullé, was published in Florence in 1887. Traditionally, over one thousand books are attributed to Haribhadra. Besides commentaries on the *āgamas*, his writings also cover almost all other aspects of Jaina philosophy. The *Yogadr̥ṣṭisamuccaya* (hereafter *YDS*), as the title suggests, discusses aspects of yoga in Jainism with reference to other schools of Indian philosophy. The book under review here, *Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra’s Collection of Views on Yoga*, by Christopher Key Chapple, consists of seven chapters of essays on the *YDS* and its author, a new English translation with Sanskrit text, and notes, a bibliography, and an index.

In the first chapter, which deals with the writings of Haribhadra, especially the *YDS*, the author reviews opinions on his dates and agrees with the view that he lived

in the eighth century. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between Haribhadra and Patañjali as well as their thoughts concerning yoga. This chapter is probably the most important one in the book. Two “lost yogas,” the Vedāntin Yoga of Bhagavad-dasa and the Buddhist Yoga of Bhāskara, are explored in chapter 3. These are identified, as the chapter title indicates, as Vedānta yoga and Buddhist yoga.

In chapter 4, on the philosophical background of the various yogas, the author points out that although Haribhadra was familiar with the thought of other schools, he proclaimed the Jaina tenet of realism and criticized Buddhist momentariness and Vedāntin monism. These criticisms may be related to the two yogas dealt with in the previous chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the notion of purity in Patañjali and Haribhadra, and chapter 6 deals with Haribhadra’s criticisms of tantric yoga. In the last chapter Christopher Chapple examines Haribhadra’s thoughts on yoga from a sociological standpoint; Chapple also assigns contemporary yoga movements to four groups in accordance with the types of yogins mentioned in the *YDS*.

The author points out that in the Jaina tradition the word “yoga” fundamentally stands for any actions by living beings and the behavior required of pious Jainas (p. 28). In the *YDS*, however, Haribhadra uses this word to denote activities involved in reaching higher stages of spiritual awareness. This unique usage of the word shows Haribhadra’s attitude toward “reconciling [the] Yoga” of Jainism and that of other schools, especially that of Patañjali.

Among the contributions made by this book to Jaina studies and Indology are (1) a clear explanation of the relationship between *guṇasthāna* in Jainism and Patañjali’s Yoga system and (2) an attempt to recover the lost yogas, that is, the Buddhist yoga and Vedāntist yoga mentioned in the *YDS*. These two topics will be examined in more detail below.

### *Guṇasthāna and Yoga*

Patañjali’s yoga system in essence is regarded as a course of spiritual purification. The Jainas also have a similar system, known as *guṇasthāna*, which consists of fourteen stages of spiritual development. This idea of *guṇasthāna* does not appear in the earlier canons, so it must be a comparatively new development in the history of Jainism. By the time of Haribhadra, *guṇasthāna* must have been popular among the Jainas as he explicitly uses the term in the *YDS* and tries to allot stages to each of eight limbs or *aṅgas* in Patañjali’s system. Christopher Chapple explains their relationship and illustrates this with tables. A similar approach was attempted by K. K. Dixit in the introduction to his *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and Yogaviṃśikā* (Ahmedabad, 1970). Chapple, however, has done this more comprehensively, providing us with a clearer view of *guṇasthāna*. Students of Jainism may be tempted to prove that the Jainas borrowed the idea of spiritual development from Patañjali and reformed it as *guṇasthāna*.

### *The Lost Yogas*

In verse 16 of the *YDS*, Haribhadra implicitly refers to three yoga systems by using the terms *yama*, *kheda*, and *adveṣa*. One of these must be the one proclaimed by

Patañjali. The identification of the other two remains a problem. A commentary on this verse quotes two unknown verses:

*khedodvegaksepotthānabhrāntyanamudrugāsaṅgaiḥ /  
yuktāni hi cittāni prapañcato varyen matimān //  
adveṣo jijñāsā śuśruṣā śrāvaṇabodhamīmāṃsāḥ /  
pariśuddhā pratipattiḥ pravṛttir aṣṭāgikī tattve //*

And in the same portion of the commentary we come across the names of three persons: Bhagavat Patañjali, Bhadanta Bhāskara, and Bandhu Bhagavaddatta. The author claims that the two verses quoted above present the thoughts on yoga of the two philosophers, namely Bhadanta Bhāskara and Bandha Bhagavaddatta, respectively (pp. 40, 47). Based on a discussion of Bhanda Bhagavaddatta's thought, the author concludes that the latter belongs to the school of Advaita Vedānta (p. 46). This conclusion seems very likely to be true.

The author proceeds to identify the philosopher Bhadanta Bhāskara as a Buddhist (pp. 46–52). Two reasons are given for this identification: “all of his [Bhadanta Bhāskara's] terminology is couched in negative language” (p. 51), and “he makes the centrality of suffering . . . the key to his argument” (ibid.).

These reasons, however, seem somewhat tenuous. First, Buddhism does not have a monopoly on using negative language; this is a general tendency in Indian thought. There is no need to mention the negative expressions in the Upaniṣads, and we know that the basic principle for the conduct of the Jainas is mostly expressed in negative language: *ahiṃsā*, *amṛta*, *asteya*, *brahma*, and *aparigraha*. It is well known that Buddhism emphasizes that this world essentially consists of pain or suffering. The Jainas share the same view. In the Jain canons, the miseries of the world are often described, and Umāsvāti mentions several types of suffering in the ninth chapter of the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*.

This reviewer would hesitate to identify Bhadanta Bhāskara as a Buddhist, based on the two reasons mentioned above. Of course, this possibility cannot be denied completely; he may well have been a follower of Buddhism. To prove this, we need firmer evidence.

There are many references to Buddhist thought in this book. However, I find no reason to attribute momentariness, which is criticized by Haribhadra in verses 193–197 of the *YDS*, to the Sarvāstivādins (e.g., see pp. 60–61). All Buddhists maintain the momentariness of things.

Before we conclude, let us turn briefly to the new English translation of the *YDS* in this book, which the author prepared jointly with John Thomas Casey. In this translation, they introduce new terms such as *total freedom* for *ayoga*, which usually has “disjunction” as an English equivalent (p. 101). This is a good idea and this kind of innovation shows the translators' deep consideration of the meaning of the text and its contents.

No book can be completely free from misprints. It is a pity, however, that this book contains more errors than one might expect. We hope that these will be corrected in the second edition. As an example, one of the editions of the *YDS* men-

tioned by the translators is that edited by Luigi Suali and published in Bhavnagar in 1911 (p. 100). To the best of my knowledge, however, this should have been stated as the edition published in Bombay in 1912 as a part of the Devchand Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhara Fund Series (c.f., e.g., H. D. Velankar, *Jinaratnakośa* [Poona 1944], p. 321).

Finally, it would have been worth noting that the Jainas have shown great interest in Patañjali's yoga system. Haribhadra's thoughts in the *YDS* as shown in this book are evidence for this interest. In addition, Yaśovijaya, a Jaina philosopher of the seventeenth century, expressed his interest in Patañjali's yoga by writing a commentary on the *Yoga Sūtra*. Moreover, our contemporary, Paṇḍit Sukhlal Sanghvī, edited the *Yoga Sūtra* with a detailed introduction (*Yogadarśan tathā Yogaviṃśik* [Ahmedabad, 1991]).

*Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History*. Edited by Susan Mann and Yu-yin Cheng. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 310.

*Women in Daoism*. By Catherine Despeux and Livia Kohn. Cambridge, MA: Three Pines Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 296.

Reviewed by **Zhou Yiqun** Valparaiso University

Anyone who looks for a quick taste of what is exciting and important about the research of the past two decades on Chinese women's history should pick up the reader edited by Susan Mann and Yu-yin Cheng. In eighteen chapters, each with a translator's preface and an introduction to the selected text, *Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History* covers the period from the Tang to the Qing (when the Confucian orthodoxy steadily became entrenched), includes twelve genres, foregrounds women's own voices, and repeatedly introduces the non-Han peoples to the spotlight. The guiding standard for the choice of the diverse, rich, and in many cases new historical materials in the book is that they form a "dialogue" with and provide a "counterpoint, critique, or confirmation" of Confucian values and norms about gender roles (p. 5). The clearheaded and balanced attention to not only "counterpoint" and "critique" but also "confirmation" produces a dynamic and nuanced picture of Chinese gender relations that is radically different from the old stereotypes and yet remains firmly grounded in the reality of a society where Confucianism provided the most important system of values and institutions against which almost all other ideas and practices in traditional China have to be understood.

The most crucial confirmed point is perhaps the high value set on family and household in Confucianism, which serves here to explain the considerable power and influence that Chinese women were able to wield despite their confinement in the inner quarters. The funerary biographies by Chen Liang (chapter 4), Luo Rufang (chapter 6), and Zhang Xuecheng (chapter 14), all eminent Confucian scholars, com-