

Bhāvaviveka's Syllogism as an Initial Step to Enlightenment*

Shi, Ruyuan (Chien-Yuan Hsu)
PhD candidate and Sessional instructor
The University of Calgary, Canada

Abstract

The theory of the two realities of later Madhyamaka represented by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti were influenced by the three nature theory of the Yogācāra which was inherited from the soteriological system of Early Buddhism. Within the three-natures, *paratantra* is a reinterpretation of the theory of *pratīyasamutpāda* which plays a key role in the transcendence from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa*. In order to avoid the problem of the Prāsaṅgikas, Bhāvaviveka suggested a secondary ultimate reality, i.e., the teachings in accord with non-arising to facilitate the communication between the two realities. Therefore, a practitioner is able to transfer oneself from the conventional to ultimate reality. Furthermore, Bhāvaviveka's teaching of the secondary ultimate reality includes the knowledge of

śūnyatā obtained from hearing, thinking, and meditating. Regarding these three knowledge, the logical argument, i.e., a syllogism, is a sufficient methodology to acquire the knowledge of hearing from which the other two types of knowledge can be achieved. Owing to the influence of Dīṅnāga, syllogism had been established on the basis of the two kinds of perceptions (*pramāṇa*), direct (*prayakṣa*) and inferential (*anumāna*) perceptions. In order to make the syllogism a qualified methodology, Bhāvaviveka accepted the other-dependent nature into his interpretation of the conventional. That is, the acceptance of the theory that an intrinsic nature exists in conventional existence allows for a decisive result by means of a valid syllogism.

Keyword: Syllogism, *Paratantra*, *Paramārtha*, *Saṃvṛti*, *Prāsaṅgika*

* 收稿：2011/5/30，通過審查：2011/8/14

清辯的邏輯論證

——作為通往覺悟的第一步

加拿大卡加利大學博士候選人暨約聘講師 釋如源

摘要

在後期中觀學派的發展中，清辯及月稱的二諦論明顯受到唯識三性說的影響，而唯識三性說則顯然繼承早期佛教之解脫論而成立。三性之中，依他起性是原始佛教緣起論的再詮釋，而緣起論則是從輪迴向於解脫的關鍵樞紐。為了避免月稱等隨應破派在二諦論上所面對的困境，同時也在唯識依他起性的影響之下，清辯在二諦之中另立了所謂的「隨順勝義教」以便媒介二諦之間的鴻溝。清辯的「隨順勝義教」包含有聞、思、修三慧。其中，因明的邏輯論證是有效獲得聞所成慧的根本方法，依於此便能更進一步獲得思所成和修所成慧。在陳那的因明學中，立足現、比二量的佛教因明論證具有保證思維無顛倒的效能。為了保證此因明論證的效能，清辯在世俗諦中自性有的立論下，接受了唯識依他起自性有的論點。如此，世俗諦中自性有的立論即能保證因明論證的有效性，進而完善其解脫論。¹

關鍵詞：三支立量，依他起性，勝義諦，世俗諦，應成派

¹本文已根據三位審查人的寶貴意見加以修改和增補，並謹此致上謝忱。

The debate between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti during the later development of the Madhyamaka School has always been an important topic for the Madhyamaka scholars. Although there are many divergences among Madhyamaka doctrines, the fundamental ones are in regard to the scholars' understanding of the two realities and the application of syllogism.² Some scholars claim that the divergences are philosophical and methodological distinctions.³ However, only a few people seem to be aware that these two differences are in fact the soteriological distinctions. For example, although Candrakīrti criticized syllogism as merely a methodology for debate without any relevance for one's liberation,⁴ for Bhāvaviveka, syllogism was not only a methodology for debate but also an initial step towards liberation. The purpose of this paper is to show how their different understanding of the two realities led to two different soteriologies and how Bhāvaviveka's explanation constituted a transitional process to liberation through the use of syllogism.

² Syllogism is an English translation for the three-members of Buddhist logic. It may not be a perfect English translation because Indian syllogism contains inductive cognitive elements in it. However, so far, no other better terms can replace it. G. B. J. Dreyfus & S. L. McClintock, *The Svātantrika and the Prasāṅgika Distinction* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 58.

³ Ibid., 8 ~9.

⁴ Ibid., 77.

Bhāvaviveka was a South Asian Buddhist monk whose works had been translated into classical Chinese and Tibetan probably from Sanskrit. In considering of the possibility that translation might be influenced by the translator's preconceptions, it is important to resolve the issues of translation between Sanskrit and other languages such as Chinese, Tibetan, and even English before depicting as closely as possible a picture of Bhāvaviveka's soteriology within the context of Madhyamaka thought.

Many works, both in Chinese and Tibetan, were ascribed to the sixth century Bhāvaviveka;⁵ however, according to modern research findings, only three of them are confirmed to be composed by Bhāvaviveka. The three are

- 1) *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (hereafter *MHK*) (further discussion can be found in his autocommentary, *Tarkajvālā*, hereafter *Tj*),⁶
- 2) *Prajñāpradīpa* (hereafter *PrP*),⁷ and

⁵ S. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo: the Hokuseido Press, 1980), 12~19.

⁶ M. D. Eckel, *Bhāvaviveka and His Buddhist Opponents* (London: Harvard University, 2008), 213~298.

⁷ In *Prajñāpradīpa* chapter 25, Bhāvaviveka's critique of Yogācāra is missing in Chinese version. Eckel has translated the whole chapter into English from Tibetan in his work, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of

- 3) * *Karataratna* (大乘掌珍論/*Jewel in the Hand*, hereafter *KTR*)

The *MHK* is understood to be the earliest of the three texts, because the other two works make references to this text. Translated into both Sanskrit⁸ and Tibetan versions, the *MHK* is a text consisting of merely verses. Tibetan Buddhists believe that Bhāvaviveka had composed an auto-commentary called the *Tj* to interpret the verses of the *MHK*. Only a Tibetan version of the *Tj* has been found and it is confirmed to be translated into Tibetan in the eleventh century.⁹ But so far, only several chapters of this text have been translated into English.¹⁰

The *Prajñāpradīpa* is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (hereafter *MMK*). Both Chinese and Tibetan translations are available in the Chinese and Tibetan *Tripitakas*. The Tibetan translation, translated at least three

Prajñāpradīpa," *Miscellanea Buddhica* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985), 45~75.

⁸ In Shotaro Iida's *Reason and Emptiness* (p. 12), he notes that Rāhula Sāmṛtyāyana hand copied this text into Sanskrit from an incomplete manuscript found in the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. In 1937, the original text was published in *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* vol XXIII, part 1 (1937), 1~163.

⁹ W. L. Ames, PhD dissertation. *Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa: Six Chapters* (Washington: University of Washington, 1985), 36.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 77~78.

hundred years after the death of Bhāvaviveka, was done by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal¹¹ in the early ninth century;¹² in contrast, the Chinese version was translated by Prabhākaramitra in 629 CE, approximately sixty years after Bhāvaviveka's death.¹³ It is worthy of noting that as Prabhākaramitra's date of translation is closer to the time of the original text, it may be surmised that his translation does not deviate too much from the original. However, because most modern scholars are familiar with Xuanzang's much more readable translation techniques, Prabhākaramitra's translation has long been neglected by them.¹⁴ Thus far, only translations from the Tibetan source, contributed by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal, into English are available to the Western academy of

¹¹ See Ames for spelling. Ibid., 53.

¹² Ibid., 53.

¹³ According to Taoxuan's (道宣) *The List of Buddhist Texts of Tang (Datangneidianlu/大唐內典錄)*, Prabhākaramitra came to China with the Sanskrit text in 627CE, and translated it in 629 CE. See *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo* (hereafter T.) vol 55. No. 2149. Ed. Takakusu Junjiro et al (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppansha, 1924), 310c & 320c (hereafter T55).

¹⁴ Ames, *Six Chapters*, 54, "Kajiyama thought that this Chinese translation is bad, unreliable...." Kajiyama's opinion needs to be reconsidered. Many Japanese scholars may be very comfortable to read either Xuanzang or Kumārajīva's translations but not others. Moreover, Prabhākaramitra's translation so far is the earliest version of Bhāvaviveka's works. It is even more than 200 years earlier than Tibetan translation. Thus, it possesses a certain value for studying Bhāvaviveka.

Buddhism,¹⁵ but an English translation from the Chinese sources, remains unknown to the Western scholars because none are available yet.

The *Dachengzhangzhenlun* 大乘掌珍論 is available only in Chinese and probably is Bhāvaviveka's latest work of the three.¹⁶ It is a very short text, it is both a concise summary of Bhāvaviveka's philosophical system and a concise edition of *MHK*. As the *KTR* was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang around 647 or 649 CE, eighty years after Bhāvaviveka's death,¹⁷ the translation should not deviate too far from the original intent of the author. Thus far, a French translation of the Chinese text by Poussin and a Sanskrit edition reconstructed from the Chinese by N. A. Sastri are available.¹⁸ But as far as I know, there is no English translation of the full text.

¹⁵ Ibid., 77~78.

¹⁶ Z. C. Cao, M.A. dissertation, *Kongyou zhi zheng de yanjiu* (An investigation of the debate surrounding nothingness and something) (Taipei: Faguang Buddhist Culture Research Institute, 1994), 5~6.

¹⁷ Bhāvaviveka's life can be dated between 490~570 or 500~ 570 C.E. Idia, 7; William Ames, 31; Hirakawa dates Bhāviveka as 490~570. See Akira Hirakawa, *インド仏教史(Indo Bukkyōshi/The History of Indian Buddhism)*(Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1995), 205.

¹⁸ T30, 268~278. de La Vallée Poussin, Louis, "Madhyamaka, II. L'auteur du Joyan dans la main. III." *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* (Bruxelles) 2 (1932-

Other than the *MHK*, the rest of Bhāvaviveka's works are available in either Tibetan or Chinese translations. As a result, the sources for the study of Bhāvaviveka's original ideas are very limited. Nevertheless, Bhāvaviveka's concepts can be found in other sources such as Candrakīrti's *Prasannapāda* (hereafter *PSP*, preserved in both Sanskrit and Tibetan) in which passages from Bhāvaviveka's *PrP* are cited to illustrate many of Bhāvaviveka's ideas. Thus, the *PSP* is an important auxiliary text for a comparative contextual study of Bhāvaviveka's concepts. Moreover, most scholars who study Bhāvaviveka focus only on Tibetan sources despite the fact that the Tibetan translations are much later than the Chinese translations, as explained earlier, it is necessary to pay closer attention to the Chinese translations. This paper will mainly rely on the Chinese sources, in particular, the *Dachengzhangzhenlun* (*KTR*), and other auxiliary sources in order to portray Bhāvaviveka's religious practice— i.e., syllogism as an initial step to liberation. The reasons for using the *KTR* as main source are 1) so far, *KTR* is the only text that does not have either original Sanskrit or Tibetan version among the three texts and thus, has been ignored by western scholars, and 2) the text itself

33), 60~138. Also, N. A. Sastri recomposed Sanskrit from Chinese in his work, *Karatalaratna* (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), 33~104.

provides a relatively clear logical path toward liberation comparing with the other two texts.¹⁹

The Madhyamaka concept of practice can be summarized into a single prescriptive statement: “it is a path from the conventional reality to the ultimate reality.” This can be substantiated by the statement made from the ninth to the tenth verses in Nāgārjuna's *MMK*, XXIV.9-10.²⁰

ye 'nāyor na vijānanti vibhāgam̐ satyayor dvayoḥ /

te tattvaṁ na vijānanti gambhīraṁ buddhaśāsane //

vyavahāram anāśritya pramārtho na deśyate /

paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇaṁ nādhigamyate //²¹

Those who do not understand the distinction between these two realities,

¹⁹ Since the other two texts are relatively extensive comparing to *KTR*, Bhāvaviveka's brief religious practice— i.e., syllogism as an initial step to liberation can be easily singled out from *KTR*.

²⁰ Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., “Mūlamadhyamakakarikas de Nagarjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti” (hereafter *PSP*) *Bibliotheca Buddhica IV* (St-Petersbourg, 1903-1913).

²¹ *PSP* XXIV.8. p. 494, lines 4-5 and lines 12-13

They do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha's doctrine.

An ultimate [reality], which does not rely on the conventional [reality], has not been taught. Not understanding the ultimate reality, *nirvāṇa* is not attained.

The above passage alludes to three soteriological methods. First, one has to know the difference between the two realities as taught in the doctrines of the Buddha. That is, one has to be able to identify what is the conventional reality and what is the profound ultimate reality. After identifying their differences, it is necessary to realize the importance of relying on the conventional reality to achieve the ultimate reality and further to obtain *nirvāṇa*. In such a process towards liberation, it is noticeable that the method is of three sequential steps: conventional → ultimate → *nirvāṇa*. Before discussing further the process to liberation, it is important to examine Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's definition of the two realities.

According to Candrakīrti's interpretations found in the *PSP*, ultimate reality is explained in such reasoning: "Since it is an object and it is ultimate, it is an ultimate object (*paramārtha*). Since that which is true, it is an ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*)."²² Herein,

²² *PSP* XXIV.8. p. 494 line 1 *paranaś cāsau arthaś ceti paramārthaṃ / tad eva satyaṃ paramārtha-satyaṃ /*

Candrakīrti considers the ultimate reality to be an ultimate object. Candrakīrti continues to explicitly distinguish the so-called 'ultimate object' from the conventional reality by defining the conventional reality (*saṃvṛtisatya*) in view of three categories: 1) the obscuration of the true nature of things due to ignorance, 2) reciprocal dependence, and 3) social conventions involving languages and translations.²³

Among the three categories, the first needs to be analyzed, because the understanding of it leads to the primal step to liberation. From a linguistic analysis, the term *saṃvṛti* is derived from the root $\sqrt{vṛ}$ meaning 'cover' and the prefix *sam*, means 'totally.' Literally, *saṃvṛti* means 'to cover totally' or 'to obscure'. For Candrakīrti, the natures of the conventional and ultimate realities are totally opposite. Ultimate reality refers to the true nature of things which can be perceived only with transcendent wisdom, whereas, conventional reality refers to the obscuring of the true nature of things owing to ignorance. Here, by defining the two realities in the above manner we can see a basic problem pertaining to transcendence. In other words, how is it possible for a person to transcend from the conventional

²³ I. C. Harries, *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1991), 113.

reality to the ultimate reality? Evidently, there is an unbridgeable gap between the two realities in the light of Candrakīrti's definitions.²⁴

For Bhāvaviveka, the conventional reality and the ultimate reality are co-dependently related according to his three-fold explanation. In chapter 24 of the *PrP*, Bhāvaviveka defines the conventional reality as: 1) worldly language, and 2) phenomena that lack intrinsic nature and are empty, yet are real for ignorant sentient beings who still have perverted views of the world (i.e. have not yet realized the true nature of things).²⁵ In the *KTR*, he further claims that 3) conventional existence is that which the mortals mutually experience, because they collectively accept it as the conventional reality and because the conventional reality is accepted as existent owing to its coming into being co-dependently.²⁶ In short, the reality of the worldly experience, including language, becomes an existent reality for those sentient being who are not yet awakened, even though such a reality is derived from their attachments produced from ignorance. Based on the reasoning that sentient beings are prone to mistakenly perceive things in the manner that they seem to appear due to their ignorance, the definitions given by both Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka are not very different from each other.

²⁴ Ibid., 118.

²⁵ T30, 125a.

²⁶ “此中世間同許有者自亦許為世俗有故，世俗現量生起因緣，亦許有故” (T30, 268c).

Regarding the definitions of the ultimate reality, Bhāvaviveka in chapter 24 of the *PrP* continues to explain as follows:²⁷

What is the so-called the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*)? Respose: Because it is the ultimate and the object (meaning), it is called ‘ultimate object.’ Moreover, because it is the ‘highest non-discriminating wisdom,’ (*nirvikalpajñāna*)²⁸ and the true object, it is called ‘true meaning.’ The [word] ‘truth’ means no any cause-conditions can be [its] defining-characteristics. When one dwells in the truth [and realizes] the objective external world by means of non-discriminating wisdom [this] is called the ultimate reality. The wisdom obtained by means of hearing (*śrutamayī*), thinking (*cintāmayī*), and meditating (*bhāvanāmayī*) and by the teachings in accord with non-arising in order to remove the assertions that something arises etc. is called ‘ultimate reality.’

²⁷ “第一義者云何？謂是第一而有義故，名第一義。又是最上無分別智，真實義故，名第一義。真實者：無他緣等為相。若住真實所緣境界無分別智者名第一義。為遮彼起等，隨順所說無起等及聞、思、修慧，皆是第一義” (T 30, 125a).

²⁸ 無分別智(*wufenbiezhi*) or 無分別慧(*wufenbiehui/nirvikalpajñāna*) is translated as non-discriminating wisdom which is the direct insight into the truth of all existences in meditation.

According to the above passage, Bhāviveka explicates the term 'paramārtha' in three different ways by means of a linguistic analysis. He clarifies firstly that *paramārtha* is understood as a *karmadhyārya* compound in which both object (*artha*) and ultimate (*parama*) refer to the object (*viśya*) of perception and not to the mind that perceives the object. Secondly, he clarifies that the word *paramārtha* indicates a *tatpuruṣa* compound in which the object (*artha*) is an object and the ultimate (*parama*) refers to the subject, i.e. the non-discriminating wisdom. Finally, he clarifies that *paramārtha* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound that functions as an adjective from which the meaning of 'correspondence to the ultimate' is derived.²⁹ In summary, Bhāvaviveka's understanding of the definition of the word 'ultimate reality' indicate three connotations: 1) from an ontological perspective, the term 'the ultimate' or 'the object' refers to the true nature of things; 2) from an epistemological perspective, the term 'non-discriminating wisdom' refers to how the Buddhist sages view reality;³⁰ and 3) the teachings in accord with non-arising is the ultimate reality. In TJ, Bhāvaviveka's own commentary of the *MHK* according to Tibetan tradition, there is similar analysis.³¹

²⁹ Iida, 83.

³⁰ T30, 125b.

³¹ There are some articles which refer and analyze this passage of *PrP* while discussing Bhāviveka's theory of two realities. See Iida, 83. C. Lindter, "Bhavya, the Logician," *Viśva Bharati Annal* 2 (1990), 33. M. Nasu, "the Connection

From the above analysis, some scholars have suggested that Bhāvaviveka had established two categories of ultimate realities instead of one in his system. According to them, the first category indicates the true ultimate reality (that encompasses the first and second definitions) which is the transcendence of the worldly experience, languages and so on. The second category refers to the 'the teachings in accord with non-arising is the ultimate reality' (the secondary ultimate reality) which is the vehicle to remove the obscuration caused by ignorance and to achieve the 'true' ultimate reality. Such a vehicle includes "cultivation" (i.e., the practice) of the three wisdoms: the listening to the Buddha's teachings (*śrutamayī*), the cognizing of the Buddha's teachings (*cintāmayī*), and the practice of meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*). It is noteworthy that Bhāvaviveka's final definition of the ultimate reality as a 'the teachings in accord with non-arising' or "vehicle" is what distinguishes him from Candrakīrti. With Bhāviveka's interpretations of the ultimate reality, the transition from conventional reality to the ultimate reality is now feasible.

between Ultimate Truth (Paramārthasatya) and Analysis (Vicāra) in Bhāviveka's Theory of Two Truths (*satyadvaya*)" *Buddhism in Global Perspective* vol. II (New Delhi: Somaiya Publication Pvt Ltd, 2002), 46. Kumagai Seiji, "Bhāviveka's theory of Absolute Truth" *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* Vol.59, No.3 (2011), 1187~1191.

As mentioned earlier, the teachings in accord with non-arising through which the true ultimate reality can be achieved consist of the cultivation of the three wisdoms. According to the *KTR*, the initial step in obtaining wisdom through hearing, *śrutamayīprajñā*, requires logical reasoning, i.e. a syllogism. It further indicates that the purpose of composing the *KTR* is to propagate the knowledge of removing the unrighteous view and obtaining of non-discriminating wisdom. After explaining the importance of the *śrutamayīprajñā*, the *KTR* provides a syllogism to prove that the teaching of *śūnyatā* instigates the *śrutamayīprajñā*.³² Hence, for Bhāvaviveka, syllogism is an initial step to bridge the two realities.³³

To obtain the transcendental non-discriminating wisdom, ..., one should rely on the wisdom obtained from hearing (*śrutamayīprajñā*) which is able to remove the self-nature of all objects of perceptions. Due to this reason, ...I composed the *Treasure in Hands (Karatalaratna)* in order to make them [the people] realize true emptiness easily and enter the true nature of existences quickly.

(Syllogism:)

³² Lindtner thinks that what is obtained through syllogism is *cintāmayī*. *Bavya the Logician*, 34.

³³ “然證出世無分別智...要藉能遣一切所緣自性聞慧。...為欲令彼易證真空速入法性故。略製此掌珍論” (T 30, 268b).

Truly,³⁴ composited existence³⁵ is empty,
because it is causally produced.³⁶ It is like an illusion.

³⁴ Herein, the word ‘truly’ is the synonym of the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*). See the following explanation. The original Chinese 真性 (Zhenxing) should be directly translated as ‘true-nature’ in English. However, this could be confused with the concept of self-nature which is refused by Bhāvaviveka in the text. Thus, here, this translation employs Poussin’s French translation ‘vérité’ (‘truth’ in English) for the Chinese 真性 (Zhenxing.) See de La Vallée Poussin, Louis, —Madhyamaka, II. L’auteur du Joyan dans la main. III. || *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques (Bruxelles)* 2 (1932-33), 70.

³⁵ *saṃskṛtadharmā* and *asaṃskṛtadharmā* can be translated “conditioned dharma” and “unconditioned dharma”. Edgerton, F. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. vol. II. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers), 1998, 543. In Chinese translation, 有為 (*youwei*) means “active”. Thus, it can be translated as “active dharma” and 無為 (*wuwei*) “inactive dharma”. However, *saṃskṛta* is a ppp. and is derived from *saṃ* + *√skri* that means “put together”, “constructed”, or “completely formed” etc. Therefore, herein, *saṃskṛta* is translated as “composite” and *asaṃskṛta* “non-composite”. See also, M. Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. (New York: Oxford University, 1988), 1120.

³⁶ 緣生 (*yuansheng*) means ‘*pratītyasamutpanna*.’ The Sanskrit term *pratītyasamutpāda* which is in Pali, *paṭiccasamuppāda* and 緣起 in Chinese, is often translated as interdependent co-arising in English. It indicates the casual relationship of relevant existences, and hence, this term is simply translated as ‘causality.’ Therein, *pratītyasamutpanna* indicate the phenomena produced by mean of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and thus, it can be translated into casual productions. See J. Macy, *Mutual Causality Buddhism and General Systems Theory* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 34.

Non-composited existence possesses no reality,
[because] it is not produced. It is like the sky-flower.

In his work, *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (hereafter *SDV*), Jñānagarbha, the later commentator and successor of Bhāvaviveka, defends Bhāvaviveka's syllogistic analysis of *paramārtha* by claiming that *paramārtha* is indeed ultimate because the logical reasoning by which it has been established cannot be contradictory.³⁷

Based on Bhāvaviveka's metaphysical theory of conventional existences, cognition is said to be without any contradiction once it is logically reasoned. For Bhāvaviveka, in order to avoid being criticized as nihilist, one has to accept that conventional phenomena have their own intrinsic natures.³⁸ In other words, the perception/measure (*pramāṇa*) of the conventional reality has to be real for a person who has not yet realized the true nature of things. In

³⁷ Nasu, 48

³⁸ "Because composite existence such as eyes, etc. are subsumed in conventional reality and people such as cowherds etc. commonly perceive composite existences such as eyes etc. to be substantial existences, in order to avoid the contradiction with our own claim that direct perception is commonly perceived, [the word] 'truly' is used to single out the differences to establish our thesis" (眼等有爲世俗諦攝，牧牛人等皆共了知眼等有爲是實有故勿違如是自宗所許現量共知，故以「真性」簡別立宗。T30, 268c).

support of Bhāvaviveka's argument, we find that Dinnāga, on the basis of two necessary perceptions: direct (*pratyakṣa*) and inferential (*anumāna*), also claims that a valid syllogism should not be contradictory.³⁹

To elaborate further, the Buddhist syllogism consists of three members which are a thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*). A thesis has to include a subject (*dharmin*) and a predicate (*sādhya*).⁴⁰ The reason is that the argument must guarantee the predicate to be a true statement regarding the subject, and the example must be a common experience which is accepted by both side of the debate in order to achieve a valid process of reasoning. According to Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*, a valid reason should fulfill three requirements: 1) the first requirement is called *pakṣadharmatva* in which the "inferring property" (smoke *sāadhanadharmā*) has to be present in the subject (mountain of the thesis); 2) the second requirement is called *sapakṣe sattavam* in which the "inferring property" (smoke) must be a property of whatever possesses (stove) the inferred property (fire *sādhyadharmā*). That which possesses the inferred property (fire) are classified as the *sapakṣa* (the similar locus); 3) the third requirement is called *vipakṣe 'sattvam* in which the "inferring property" (smoke) should be absent from that which does not possess the "inferred property" (fire)

³⁹ A. Hirakawa, *The History of Indian Buddhism* (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1979), 265-270.

⁴⁰ Ames, *The Svātantrika and the Prasāṅgika Distinction*, 45.

and that which does not possess the “inferred property” is called *vipakṣa* (dissimilar locus).⁴¹

The above syllogism can be understood to contain the operation of two processes of perceptions – i.e., direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Take the following proposition for example:

p has/is r because of q, for example s.

The connection between p and r is derived from the reason q, and thus, the phrase, “p has/is r because of q” is based on inference; but the relations that obtains between “p and q” and “r and q” are based on direct perceptions. The three requirements of a valid reason prove the relation between p & q and the relation between r & q through direct perception. The first requirement is to promise the truth of the statement ‘if p then q’ ($p \supset q$) by means of a direct perception. The second and third requirements establish the promise that the statement ‘if q then r’ is true by means of direct perception of the example of s. Thus, the logical principle is like the Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) in modern logic.⁴²

$p \supset q$ (direct perception)

$q \supset r$ (direct perception)

$\therefore p \supset r$ (inferential perception)

Let's take the proposition, “the mountain has fire because of smoke, for example a stove” as an example to demonstrate this logic formula. ‘p’ represents “smoky mountain”, and ‘r’ represents ‘fire.’ ‘q’ represents ‘smoke’ and ‘s’ is ‘a stove.’ Then this syllogism can be demonstrated as a Hypothetical Syllogism, excepting that in modern logic the example ‘s’ is not used:

P (mountain) \supset q (has smoke) (all people can perceive smoke on the mountain)

q (has smoke) \supset r (fire) (from our experience, whatever has fire must have smoke, just like s = a kitchen stove, and hence, whenever there is smoke there must be fire)

P (mountain) \supset r (fire) (a inference derived from the above two parts).

⁴¹ Eckel, *Bhāvaviveka*, 55.

⁴² D. Bonevac, *Simple Logic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 305.


Therefore, according to Diñnāga's syllogism, on the basis of the two perceptions, as long as the reason fulfills the requirements as mentioned earlier, it should be a sound argument. Despite the fact that this logical argument may be based on conventional reality, it functions as a tool to obtain a decisive result. Hence, when it is used to argue the teaching of *śūnyatā*, for Bhāvaviveka, it can remove ignorance and thus one is able to obtain *śrutamayīprajñā* which is considered to be the teachings in accord with non-arising which is the ultimate reality. Thus, Bhāvaviveka believed that syllogism is the first step to liberation and is a reasonable interpretation to Nāgārjuna's soteriological process: convention → ultimate → *nirvāṇa*.

Despite Bhāvaviveka's critique against the Yogācāra, he also borrowed some of its philosophical and soteriological theories. Over the past centuries, the Madhyamaka tradition has been thought of as a school that strongly emphasizes theory but not practice. Even though a tradition like Asaṅga's Yogācāra School has been viewed as one that has balanced both theory and practice, Bhāvaviveka's doctrine should be understood to reflect his intent of changing the general perception of the Madhyamaka tradition. From his doctrines, it is evident that he had adopted the Yogācāra's model of practice into the theory of soteriology within the Madhyamaka tradition. The best evidence of this can be found in his introduction of a secondary

ultimate reality (i.e., the teachings in accord with non-arising) as a bridge between the two realities.

Before discussing further the soteriology of the Madhyamaka tradition, it is important to have a brief overview of the development of the Buddhist soteriology from Early Buddhism to the Mahāyāna period. In Early Buddhism, soteriology lies within the three fold concepts of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *pratītyasamutpanna*, and *nirvāṇa*. *Pratītyasamutpāda*, or the law of causation, is the basic principle that Buddhists hold. *Pratītyasamutpanna*, also known as the 12 fold-causal-link operating within the law of causation, refers to the worldly phenomena including the continuing cycle of birth-and-death. *Nirvāṇa* refers to the transcendent state wherein the cycles of birth-and-death cease to exist once the law of causation is fully realized. In order to achieve *nirvāṇa*, one has to completely understand the function of the law of causation and its relations with the cycle of birth-and-death (*pratītyasamutpanna*) and the complete extinction of the cycle of birth-and-death (*nirvāṇa*). For ignorant sentient beings, the cycle of birth-and-death (*pratītyasamutpanna*) continues to exist based on the law of causation. However, if one fully realizes the law of causation, one is able to stop the cycle of the life-and-death and become liberated from it.⁴³ The relations can be illustrated as follows:

⁴³ C. Y. Hsu, M.A. dissertation, *the Eight-negation of Pratītyasamutpāda in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Calgary: the University of Calgary, 2007), 23~24.



When Mahāyāna Buddhism arose, the principle of *pratīyasamutpāda* was replaced by a new idea called *śūnyatā* on the basis of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (hereafter *PPs*), because the proponents of this text considered this new idea to be the most profound teaching of the Buddha. The Mahāyāna proponents explicated *śūnyatā* as the ultimate reality transcending all phenomena, and thus it was considered to be central to all Buddhist teachings. With the rise of Mahāyāna's new idea, a conflict regarding the philosophy of soteriology between Early Buddhism and Mahāyāna Buddhism began to occur. From the soteriological perspective, it seems that the *PPs* did not provide a clear explanation about a path to liberation.

Having realized the flaw of the *PPs*' principle of *śūnyatā*, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* began to reinterpret the teaching of *śūnyatā* by introducing the notions of the three natures (*svabhāva-traya*). What this meant was that the author of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*

arranged all teachings of the historical Shakyamuni chronologically. The first period of teaching, consisted of the teachings found in the Early Buddhist texts (*Āgama* and *Nikāyas*), wherein the Buddha taught the teaching of existence (*astivāda*), i.e., *pratīyasamutpāda*. In the second period of teaching, the Buddha taught the *PPs* in which by the teaching of *śūnyatā* (non-existence) Buddha rejected the previous teachings wherein the teaching of no-self-nature of person (*pudgala-nairātmya*) was emphasized but not the teaching of no-self of elements (*dharmā-nairātmya*). In the third period of teaching, that also was the highest teaching of all three periods according to the author of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, the Buddha introduced the teaching of a tri-fold intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatraya*) and critiqued the inadequacy of the teaching of *śūnyatā*, i.e., the teaching of *niḥsvabhāvātā* (non-existence of self-nature).⁴⁴

From the soteriological point of view, the three-fold intrinsic natures are, in fact, the Mahāyāna reinterpretation of the three fold concepts mentioned above, in regard to the Early Buddhist soteriology.

The transformation from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa* can be found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*:

⁴⁴ E. Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* (Louvain: *L'Explication des Mysteres*, 1935), 85. It was translated from Chinese version which is in T16, 697b.

All characteristics of existences, in summary, are of three kinds. Which are the three? First is *parikalpita-svabhāva*. The second is *paratantra-svabhāva*. The third is *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva*.

What is the *parikalpita-svabhāva* of all dharmas? It is the nature on the basis of which all *dharmas* are conventionally designated, are distinguished, and on the basis of which language arises.

What is the *paratantra-svabhāva* of all dharmas? It is the nature of *pratītyasamutpāda* on the basis which all dharmas are produced. That is: 'because this exists, that exists;' 'because this occurs, that occurs.' In other words, [it refers to the twelve-limbed *pratītyasamutpāda* beginning with] 'due to ignorance, there is action' all the way up to 'owing to cause there is suffering.'


What is the *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva* of all dharmas? It is the equanimity (*upekṣa*) and suchness (*tathātā*) of all dharmas.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ 謂諸法相略有三種，何等爲三：一者遍計所執相，二者依他起相，三者圓成實相。云何諸法遍計所執相？謂一切法名假安立自性差別，乃至爲令隨起言說。云何諸法依他起相？謂一切法緣生自性，「則此有故彼有，此生故彼

As shown above, the other-dependent-nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) is the same as *pratītyasamutpāda* expounded in Early Buddhism. Similar to the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the Yogācārins claim that the arising of all phenomena (*sarva-dharma*) is due to the other-dependent nature. Next, the imagined-nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) corresponds to conventional reality and is an explanation for people's attachment to and falsely conceptualizing phenomena. Finally, in contrast to the imagined-nature, *pariṇiṣpanna*, meaning 'perfect', 'reality', or 'truth,' refers to ultimate reality obtained when all the false conceptions and attachments are removed from what constitutes the other-dependent nature.⁴⁶ Among the three natures, the other-dependent nature, just like *pratītyasamutpāda*, is the pivotal principle from which both the imagined and the perfect natures operate. In short, the theory of the three natures is developed from the three fold concepts in regard to the Early Buddhist soteriology that can be illustrated as follows:

生，謂：無明緣行，乃至招集純大苦蘊」。云何諸法圓成實相？謂一切法平等真如。

⁴⁶ G. M. Nagao, *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*. Trans. Kawamura, L. S. (New York: State University of New York, 1991), 62.



Influenced by the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, both Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's definitions of the two realities – i.e., the conventional and the ultimate – are very closely aligned with the imagined and perfect natures.

In explaining conventional reality, Candrakīrti argued that it referred to the obscuration of the nature of things by ignorance; similarly, Bhāvaviveka stated that it was the sentient beings' production of illusory attachment on the basis of perversion. The idea of attachment and obscuration of the natures refers to what has been explained in Yogācāra as the imagined nature.

As for the understanding of the ultimate reality, both Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka explain it in a manner similar to the explanation found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* because they suggest that transcendent non-discriminating wisdom with its object is the true nature of things. Hence, it is evident that in the later development of Madhyamaka, the theory of the two realities was strongly influenced by the theory of the three natures.

For the Yogācāra School, other-dependent nature acts as a pivotal ground for the transcendence from the delusive world to ultimate liberation. This idea is very important, because it allows transformation to take place which otherwise would not be possible. That is to say, the other-dependent nature functions as a link connecting the two realities. Having realized the inadequacies of the Prāsaṅgikas's interpretations of the Buddhist soteriology⁴⁷, Bhāvaviveka accepted the theory of the other-dependent nature to further elaborate his theory of the secondary ultimate reality.⁴⁸ The role of the teachings in accord with non-arising", just like the other-dependent nature, acts as a bridge between the conventional and ultimate realities. Therefore, it can be concluded that Bhāvaviveka's religious practice had been influenced by the three-nature theory of Yogācāra.

⁴⁷ Harris, 118.

⁴⁸ "That is to say that eyes etc. produced by causality are subsumed in the conventional reality and their self-natures are existent. ... If from the perspective of this meaning, it is said that the other-dependent-self nature (*paratantra*) does exist, then it would be a right teaching. Such a self-nature is accepted by us" (謂因緣力所生眼等，世俗諦攝，自性是有，…若就此義說依他起自性是有，則爲善說。如是自性我亦許故 T30, 272b).

In conclusion, the theory of the two realities of later Madhyamaka represented by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti were influenced by the three nature theory of the Yogācāra. From the soteriological aspect, the theory of the three natures was inherited from the soteriological system of Early Buddhism. Within the theory of the three-natures, the other-dependent nature is a reinterpretation of the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* which plays a key role in the transcendence from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa*. In order to avoid the mistakes of the Prāsaṅgikas, Bhāvaviveka suggested a secondary ultimate reality, i.e., the teachings in accord with non-arising to facilitate the communication between the two realities. Therefore, the practitioners are able to transform themselves from the conventional reality to the ultimate reality.

In the *PrP*, Bhāvaviveka's teaching in accord with non-arising includes the knowledge of *sūnyatā* obtained from hearing, thinking, and meditating. Regarding these three knowledge, the logical argument, i.e., a syllogism, is a sufficient methodology to acquire the knowledge of hearing from which the other two types of knowledge can be achieved. Owing to the influence of Dīñnāga, syllogism had been established on the basis of the two kinds of perceptions (*pramāṇa*), direct (*prayakṣa*) and inferential (*anumāna*) perceptions. In order to make the syllogism a qualified methodology, Bhāvaviveka accepted the other-dependent nature into his interpretation of the conventional. That is, the acceptance of the

theory that an intrinsic self-nature exists in conventional existence allows for a decisive result by means of a valid syllogism.

Bibliography

- Ames, W. L. Trans. "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* : A translation of Chapter One." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21 (1993).
- _____. PhD dissertation. *Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa: Six Chapters*. Washington: University of Washington, 1985.
- Bhāvaviveka. Xuan Zang trans. *Dachengzhenzhanglun* 大乘掌珍論. *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*. vol 30. No. 1578. Ed. Takakusu Junjiro et al. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppansha, 1924.

_____. *Boruodenglun* 般若燈論. *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*. vol 30. No. 1578. Ed. Takakusu Junjiro et al. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppansha, 1924.

Cao, Z. C. M.A. dissertation, *Kongyou zhi zheng de yanjiu* (An investigation of the debate surrounding nothingness and something). Taipei: Faguang Buddhist Culture Research Institute, 1994.

D. Bonevac, *Simple Logic*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Dreyfus, G. B. J. & McClintock, S. L. *The Svātantrika and the Prasāṅgika Distinction*. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003.

Eckel, M. D. *Bhāvaviveka and His Buddhist Opponents*. London: Harvard University, 2008.

_____. "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of *Prajñāpradīpa*," *Miscellanea Buddhica*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985.

Harries, I. C. *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism*. New York: E.J. Brill, 1991.

Hirakawa, Akira. *The History of Indian Buddhism*. Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1979.

_____. 法の縁起 (*Hō no Engi / The Origin of Dharma*). Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1990.

Huntington, C. W. "Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?" in *The Svātantrika and The Prasāṅgika Distinction*. Boston: Wisdom Publication, 2003.

Iida, Shotaro. *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism*. Tokyo: the Hokuseido Press, 1980.

Kalupahana, D. J. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006.

Kumagai Seiji, "Bhāvaviveka's theory of Absolute Truth" *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* Vol.59, No.3 (2011).

Lamotte, L. *Samādhinirmocana Sūtra*. Louvain: *L'Explication des Mysteres*, 1935.

Lindter, C. "Bhavya, the Logician," *Vishva Bharati Annal* 2 (1990), 30~ 50.

Macy, J. *Mutual Causality Buddhism and General Systems Theory*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Nagao, Gadjin M. *Mādhyamīka and Yogācāra*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Nakamura, Hajime. ナーガールジュナ (*Nāgārjuna*). Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1975.

Moran, P. *Hegel and the Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1988.

Nasu, M. "the Connection between Ultimate Truth (Paramārthasatya) and Analysis (*vicāra*) in Bhāviveka's Theory of Two Truth (*satyadvaya*)" *Buddhism in Global Perspective* vol. II. New Delhi: Somaiya Publication Pvt Ltd, 2002.

Poussin, Louis de La Vallée. "Madhyamaka, II. L'auteur du Joyan dans la main. III. Joyau dans la main." *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* (Bruxelles) 2, 1932-33.

_____. Ed. "*Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*" *Bibliotheca Buddhica IV*. St-Petersbourg, 1903-1913.

Robinson, R. H. *Early Mādhyamika in Indian and China*. London: the University of Wisconsin, 1967.

Sastri, N. A. *Karatalaratna (The Jewel in Hand)*. Santiniketan: Vishva-Bharati, 1949.

Taoxuan. *Datangneidianlu/大唐內典錄 (The List of Buddhist Texts of Tang)*. *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*. vol 55. No. 2149. Ed. Takakusu Junjiro et al. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppansha, 1924.

Walser, J. *Nāgārjuna in Context: Mahāyāna Buddhism & Early Indian Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

Yuwen, Y. 阿含要略 (*Ahanyaolüe / The Abstracts of Āg*). Taipei: Dongchu, 1993.