The Lion’s Roar in Early Buddhism —  
A Study based on the *Ekottarika-āgama* Parallel to the *Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta*

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Abstract
In the present article, I investigate the nature of the lion’s roar in early Buddhist discourse. After surveying occurrences of lion’s roars in the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, I examine more closely the lion’s roar attributed to the Buddha in the *Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta*, based on an annotated translation and comparative study of its *Ekottarika-āgama* counterpart.

Keywords: 
Early Buddhism, Comparative Studies, *Ekottarika-āgama*, Lion’s Roar, Pāli Discourses

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早期佛教之「獅子吼」—
《增壹阿含經》與相應於《獅子吼小經》之研究

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摘要
此文將研究在早期佛教經典中有關「獅子吼」之性質，並在考察巴利尼柯耶與漢譯阿含經出現獅子吼之處後，更詳細檢視佛陀之無畏獅子吼在《獅子吼小經》之譯注與其相應於《增壹阿含經》的比較研究。

關鍵字：早期佛教、比較研究、《增壹阿含經》、獅子吼、巴利經典
The Nature of a Lion’s Roar

The image of a lion’s roar is a recurrent motif in the discourses collected in the four main Pāli Nikāyas and their counterparts in the Chinese Āgamas. Most of these instances are related to the Buddha or his disciples, though in a few cases lion’s roars made by those outside of the Buddhist dispensation can be found, in which case the attempted lion’s roar usually miscarries.

An example of such a case can be found in the Pāṭika-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya and its Dīgha-āgama parallel, which report how the naked ascetic Pāṭikaputta, after making a public announcement of his impending defeat of the Buddha in a contest of magical powers, failed to show up at the gathering where this contest was to take place. When even after being repeatedly invited to come he still was unable to face the Buddha, the messenger sent to fetch him concluded that Pāṭikaputta’s earlier proclamation had not been a true lion’s roar, but instead was comparable to a jackal trying to imitate a lion.¹

A similar judgement was passed on the wanderer Sarabha, who after disrobing as a Buddhist monk had declared in public that he had left the Buddha’s dispensation, having reached realization in regard to the teachings of the Buddha. When invited by the Buddha in front of a congregation of wanderers to specify what he had realized, Sarabha was unable to reply. His companions thereon compared his inability to substantiate his earlier claim to a jackal trying to roar a lion’s roar.²

These two instances bring out a central nuance of the image of a lion’s roar, in that one should be able to substantiate such a proclamation in a debate situation. As Manné (1996, 32) explains, lion’s roars are “utterances which the speaker is willing to defend in public”, in line with “the Vedic tradition of challenges in debate”.

Additional detail about what makes up a true lion’s roar can be gathered from the Kassapasīhanāda-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya and its parallels, which depict various possible criticisms of a lion’s roar. These are that someone roars a lion’s roar in an empty place, instead of amidst the assemblies, or that the roar is made without real self-confidence.³ A lion’s roar

¹ DN 24 at DN III 24, 17 and DĀ 15 at T 1, 69a5, cf. also SHT IV 32 folio 17 R4-5 in Sander (1980, 120). Another claim to defeat the Buddha, which also ends unsuccessfully (though in this case the debater did face and discuss with the Buddha), is according to EĀ 37.10 at T 125, 716a26 a lion’s roar, though the same qualification is not made in the parallel versions MN 35 at MN I 233, 24 and SĀ 110 at T 99, 36b16.
² AN 3.64 at AN I 187, 35; SĀ 970 at T 99, 250c5; SĀ² 204 at T 100, 450a20; cf. also folio 169b in Pischel (1904, 817).
³ DN 8 at DN I 175, 1 and DĀ 25 at T 1, 104b3; cf. also SHT VI 1296 in Bechert (1989, 70); and fragments Hoernle 149/Add. 98 R6-8 and Pelliot bleu 340 R6-9 in Hartmann (1991, 151-152). DN 25 at DN III 57, 19 concludes an occasion where the Buddha confronts the allegation that he might be afraid of facing assemblies with the remark that by rejecting such insinuations the
fails to command respect not only if one is unable to defend the claim one has made, as illustrated in the examples above, but also if one is not able to satisfy and inspire others with one’s explanations.

A number of discourses highlight that the basis for the Buddha’s self-confidence when making a lion’s roar was in particular his possession of the ten powers and of the four intrepidities of a Tathāgata. The close relationship of these qualities to the Buddha’s lion like nature becomes particularly evident in a Sanskrit fragment of a Daśabala-sūtra, which has a drawing of a winged lion after each of the Buddha’s powers.

In the Mahāśāhanāda-sutta a listing of the ten powers and four intrepidities comes as part of a lion’s roar made in reply to a wrong allegation made by the former Buddhist monk Sunakkhatta, somewhat similar in nature to the above discussed instance of the ex-monk Sarabha. Such occurrences thus further underline the significance of the lion’s roar in a debate situation.

Yet, the nuance of a challenge in debate does not exhaust the implications of the image of a lion’s roar. Several discourses that relate the Buddha’s lion’s roar to his possession of the ten powers and four intrepidities indicate that the content of his lion’s roar is a teaching on Buddha had roared a lion’s roar; a qualification not made in the parallel versions DĀ 8 at T 1, 49b22; T 11, 224b22 and MĀ 104 at T 26, 595c7.

The ten powers feature as the grounds for the Buddha’s lion’s roar e.g. in AN 10.21 at AN V 33, 7; AN 10.22 at AN V 37, 6; SĀ 348 at T 99, 98a14; SĀ 684 at T 99, 186c16; SĀ 701 at T 99, 189a8 (cf. also SĀ 702 and 703); EĀ 46.4 at T 125, 776b15; T 780, 717c14; T 781, 718c18; T 802, 747b13 (with a different power at 747c17); cf. also the short statements in SĀ 1227 at T 99, 335c5; SĀ 54 at T 100, 392b18 and EĀ 51.3 at T 125, 816c8. AN 6.64 at AN III 417, 13 then lists six powers as the basis for the Buddha’s lion’s roar, as do SĀ 686 at T 99, 187b28 and SĀ 687 at T 99, 187c14. According to Endo (2002, 20), the development of the notion of ten powers “seems to have had an intermediate phase where only six powers of the Buddha are mentioned”. A set of five powers, again as the basis for the Buddha’s lion’s roar, occurs in AN 5.11 at AN III 9, 15. For Sanskrit fragments relevant to the ten powers cf. e.g. Chung (2009); de La Vallée Poussin (1911, 1063-1064); Lévi (1910, 443-444); Sander (1987, 181-192); SHT VI 1220R and 1457R in Bechert (1989, 15 and 143); SHT IX 2018, 2066 and 2162 in Bechert (2004, 41, 82 and 119); Waldschmidt (1932, 209-225) and Waldschmidt (1958). The four intrepidities are presented on their own as the grounds for the Buddha’s lion’s roar in AN 4.8 at AN II 9, 3 and EĀ 27.6 at T 125, 645b28 (with a different intrepidity at 645c7). Only three intrepidities occur in the case of the above quoted AN 3.64 at AN I 186, 33. Sanskrit fragments referring to the four intrepidities are e.g. SHT IV 623 folio 5 in Sander (1980, 252); SHT VI 1504 in Bechert (1989, 166); and SHT IX 2323 in Bechert (2004, 173).

Table I in Waldschmidt (1958, 386-387).

5 MN 12 at MN 69, 31, with a counterpart in T 757, 592c2.
the impermanent nature of the five aggregates of clinging.\(^7\) The delivery of such a lion’s roar instils fear in others, especially among devas who are of long life, as it makes them realize that even their existence is bound to come to an end.\(^8\) Thus in these contexts the lion’s roar stands for a revelation of truth in general.\(^9\) Such teachings are lion’s roars because they instil fear, similar to the fear experienced by other animals on hearing an actual lion’s roar.

According to Brekke (1999, 450), “the function of the Buddha in the simile of the lion is to create fear through his teaching ... and when this fear is effectively translated into religious motivation one will strive to attain nirvāṇa”. Similarly Heim (2003, 546) notes that “the Tathāgata delivering his teaching ... in exactly the same way that a lion’s roar causes brutes of the forest to quake in fear ... suggests that some fear is valuable, in that it can replace complacency with urgency”.

This salutary aspect of the lion’s roar would be relevant to situations that go beyond facing an opponent in debate. Instead, here the lion’s roar stands for a teaching strategy whose purpose is to stir up a sense of urgency and thereby lead others towards liberation. This thus complements the image of the lion’s roar in early Buddhist discourse, which, besides the defensive function of meeting a challenge in a debate situation, also has the positive function of promoting the progress of a disciple on the path to awakening.

The lion imagery in a teaching context receives additional detail in a discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya, which explains that a lion, after having roared its lion’s roar, sets out hunting in a careful manner. Similarly the Tathāgata, on roaring the lion’s roar of his teachings, does so in a careful manner.\(^{10}\) The imagery of a lion is in fact recurrently associated with the Buddha,

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\(^7\) SN 12.21 at SN II 28, 1; SN 12.22 at SN II 28, 17; EĀ 46.3 at T 125, 776a21.

\(^8\) SN 22.78 at SN III 85, 20; AN 4.33 at AN II 33, 21 (here the teaching delivered is on the nature of personality, sakkāya, its arising, its cessation, and the path to its cessation).

\(^9\) The close relationship of the lion’s roar with proclaiming a truth is reflected in MĀ 137 at T 26, 645b22, which in its counterpart to a passage on the nature of the Tathāgata as one who speaks the truth (cf. AN 4.23 at AN II 24, 2), exemplifies the truthfulness of the words of a Tathāgata with his roaring a lion’s roar before any assembly. Though the lion’s roar is thus in a way also a proclamation of truth, it does not seem to share the magical potency often associated with public asseverations of truth, on which cf. also Brown (1968), Burlingame (1917), Hopkins (1932, 317-323), Lüders (1959, 487-505) and Wayman (1968).

\(^{10}\) AN 5.99 at AN III 122, 8: sakkaccam yeva Tathāgato dhammam deseti. Wiltshire (1990, 172) notes that “the metaphor of the lion’s roar does not occur in conjunction with pacceka-buddhas since they do not teach”, which further corroborates the importance of the teaching aspect in the conception of a lion’s roar. A rather extended teaching by the Buddha in DN 26 at DN III 79, 5 receives the title “a lion’s roar discourse on the wheel-turning king”, Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta, though Ḅ, C̣ and Ṣ only have the title Cakkavatti-sutta.
and besides the nuances of royalty and carefulness also conveys a sense of aloofness and independence.\(^{11}\)

Though the lion imagery is thus closely related to the Buddha, lion’s roars can also be made by a disciple.\(^{12}\) Thus a monk and on another occasion a nun indicate that they intend to announce their attainment of the final goal in front of the Buddha as their lion’s roar.\(^{13}\) The disciple most

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\(^{11}\) Cf. e.g. Sn 107, 5: *durāśadā hi te bhagavanto sīhāya*, which indicates that those like the Buddha are difficult to approach like lions. Brekke (1999, 448) comments that the nuances underlying this image are that a “lion ... is aloof, separate and completely detached”. According to Sn 48.51 at Sn V 227, 14, a lion is reckoned foremost among animals due to his superior strength, speed and courage. These qualities would thus make the lion an obvious choice as a symbol of royalty and supremacy, in fact Bareau (1960, 248) notes that a range of Vinayas present the motif of a lion as the most prominent image to be used for adorning Buddhist *stūpas*. A famous example of the use of this motif is the lion capital from Sārnath, cf. e.g. Huntington (1985, 47 fig. 4.5). This capital features four addorsed lions with open jaws, as if just about to roar a lion’s roar, standing on a drum adorned with a wheel right beneath their forefeet. This pillar was apparently still witnessed in situ by Xuán-zàng 玄奘, cf. T 2087, 905b23, translated in Beal (2001, 46). Bareau (1971b, 17) explains that though the lion was “not only rare in India but most likely unknown in the middle basin of the Ganges where Buddha spent all his life, this animal plays an important role in Indian symbolism ... the lion symbolizes royalty”. The same image also played a role in the Jaina tradition, where the lion was the animal chosen to represent Mahāvīra, cf. Schubring (2000, 24). Deo (1956, 560) notes instances where other Jainas, because of their skill at debating, are also acclaimed as lions. In fact, as a symbol of kingship, supremacy etc. the lion is a recurrent motif in a many cultures.

\(^{12}\) The ability to roar a lion’s roar is explicitly associated with all arahants in Sn 22.76 at Sn III 84, 4 and its parallel MĀ 120 at T 26, 610a5. SĀ 1101 at T 99, 289c24 associates the ability of disciples to proclaim a lion’s roar with their insight into the four noble truths (cf. also SĀ² 97 at T 100, 408b16, though in this case the lion’s roar of the four noble truths is made by the Tathāgata). In SĀ 911 at T 99, 228c10 and SĀ² 126 at T 100, 421c20 a lay disciple’s proclamation before the king, made to dispel the rumour that Buddhist monks are allowed to accept gold or silver, is also qualified as a lion’s roar; the same is the case for Anāthapindika defeating the views held by other wanderers in SĀ 968 at T 99, 249a24 and SĀ² 202 at T 100, 448c27; or for a proclamation he makes before the Buddha in SĀ 1241 at T 99, 340a25. EĀ 17.1 at T 125, 582a9 even speaks of a lion’s roar when Rāhula asks the Buddha about how to practice mindfulness of breathing. According to a listing of eminent disciples in AN 1.14 at AN I 23, 24, Piṅdola Bhāradvāja was foremost among monks who roar a lion’s roar. The listing of eminent disciples in EĀ 4.3 at T 125, 557b19 reckons him instead foremost in defeating outsiders. For a study of various tales related to Piṅdola Bhāradvāja cf. Lévi (1916, 205-275), Ray (1994, 151-162) and Strong (1979).

\(^{13}\) Th 175 and Thī 332. However, not all declarations of having attained the final goal are reckoned as lions’ roars, cf. also the discussion in Katz (1989, 29-31).
frequently associated with the image of the lion’s roar appears to be Sāriputta. One of the lion’s roars by Sāriputta is made in order to defend himself against a wrong allegation by another monk, who has raised the accusation that Sāriputta had slighted him. Another instance occurs after Sāriputta has successfully answered a question by the Buddha, though at first he had been uncertain about how to reply to it. Once the Buddha had left, Sāriputta gave vent to his self confidence by telling his companions that he felt ready to face any question the Buddha might want to ask him. Notably, in both instances it is not Sāriputta himself, but his companions who reckon his proclamations to be a lion’s roar.

Other lion’s roars proclaimed by Sāriputta express his deep conviction that nobody, be it in the past or in the future, could surpass the Buddha in respect to being awakened. The Buddha was quick to point out that this proclamation was made without being grounded in actual knowledge of the qualities of other awakened ones in past and future times.

An instance where the Buddha teaches his disciples how to roar a lion’s roar can be found in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta. This instance seems to be the only record of the Buddha actually formulating the contents of what his disciples should proclaim as their lion’s roar in a situation of being challenged by contemporary wanderers and recluses. Moreover, the Ekottarika-āgama parallel to the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta presents this lion’s roar with significant differences, which warrant a closer study of this particular case and its import for assessing the nature of a lion’s roar in early Buddhist thought. In what follows, the relevant Ekottarika-āgama discourse will be translated, followed by a comparative study of the lion’s roar taught according to this discourse and its parallels by the Buddha to his disciples.

The discourse in question forms part of an Ekottarika-āgama whose translation appears to have been undertaken during the period 384-385 of the present era by Zhú Fóniàn 竹梵念, based on what probably was a Prākrit original of so far undetermined school affiliation.

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14 The qualification of this defence as a lion’s roar occurs in AN 9.11 at AN IV 374, 15; MĀ 24 at T 26, 452c17 and EĀ 37.6 at T 125, 712c23.

15 SN 12.32 at SN II 55, 26; fragment S 474 folio 18 R8 in Tripāṭhi (1962, 55); MĀ 23 at T 26, 452b3 and SĀ 345 at T 99, 95c7.

16 A proclamation made by Mahākassapa in SĀ 1143 at T 99, 302c12 and SĀ 2 118 at T 100, 417c7 is only qualified as a lion’s roar by the reciters of the discourse.

17 This proclamation is reckoned by the Buddha to be a lion’s roar in DN 16 at DN II 82, 8; DN 28 at DN III 99, 127; SN 47.12 at SN V 159, 11; DĀ 18 at T 1, 76c5; T 18, 255a25; SĀ 498 at T 99, 130c13. In EĀ 38.10 at T 125, 725b4, a proclamation by King Pasenadi of the faith inspiring qualities of the Buddha and his disciples is also recognized as a lion’s roar, though the qualification of being a lion’s roar is not used in the parallel discourses MN 89 at MN II 124, 24; AN 10.30 at AN V 69, 24 and MĀ 213 at T 26, 797b16; nor in a parallel preserved in the Kṣudrakavastu of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1451, 238b21, with its Tibetan counterpart in D ’dul ba, tha 86a4 or Q de 82b8.

18 MN 11 at MN I 63-68.
transmitted by Dharmanandin. Besides the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta from the Majjhima-nikāya, another parallel version can be found in the Madhyama-āgama translated by Gautama Saṅghadeva during the period 397-398, based on what was probably a written Prākrit original stemming from a Sarvāstivāda transmission lineage.

Translation of EĀ 27.2

1. [I] heard thus. At one time the Buddha was at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, the park [given by] Anāthapiṇḍika. At that time a large group of monks had entered Sāvatthī. This large group of monks had the following reflection: “It seems still too early in the morning for us to collect alms, let us approach the village of the heterodox wanderers who [follow a] different practice for some discussion.” Thereupon this large group of monks approached the village of the heterodox wanderers. Having arrived they exchanged greetings [with the heterodox wanderers] and sat down to one side.

3. Then the wanderers who [follow a] different practice asked the monks: “The recluse Gotama proclaims this teaching to [his] disciples: ‘Monks, you should completely learn this teaching, entirely realize and understand it, and having realized and understood it, you should all together act accordingly!’ We also proclaim this teaching to [our] disciples: ‘You should completely learn this teaching, entirely realize and understand it, and having realized and understood it, you should all together act accordingly!’ What is the difference

19 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 643c-644b; for a more detailed discussion of the somewhat complex issue of the translators and school affiliation of this collection cf. Anālayo (2009); on the language of the original Waldschmidt (1980, 137) comments that the Ekottarika-āgama was translated “from some Middle Indic or mixed dialect of Prakrit with Sanskrit elements”.


21 For ease of comparison I adopt the paragraph numbering used in the English translation of the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta in Nāṇamoli (2005, 159-163). For the same reason, I also employ Pāli terminology (except for anglicized terms like ‘Dharma’ and ‘Nirvana’), without thereby intending to take a position on the original language of the Ekottarika-āgama.

22 MN 11 at MN I 63, 24 gives the same location, whereas MĀ 103 at T 26, 590b6 places the discourse at Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country.

23 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 643c5: 吳學村, where one would rather expect a reference to a park inhabited by outside wanderers, 吳學園, or to their place, 吳學所.

24 Adopting the 宋, 元 and 明 variant 論義 instead of 論義.

25 Adopting the 宋, 元 and 明 variant without 已在一面坐.

26 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 643c7: 道人, literally “men of the path”.

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between the recluse Gotama and us? What is there that is superior or inferior? That is to say, he proclaims teachings and we also proclaim teachings, he instructs and we also instruct.”

When the large group of monks had heard this question, they expressed neither agreement nor disagreement, but right away got up from their seats and left. Then this large group of monks, deliberating among themselves, said [to each other]: “We should go and report this matter to the Blessed One.”

At that time, the large group of monks entered Sāvatthī to collect alms and, having eaten and put away their robes and bowls, with the sitting mat over their left shoulders they approached the Blessed One, paid respect [by bowing down] with their heads at his feet, and sat down to one side. Then the large group of monks reported this issue in full to the Blessed One.27

5. At that time, the Blessed One told the monks: “If those heterodox wanderers pose such a question, you could employ this rejoinder to reply to them: ‘Is there a single final goal or are there many final goals?’ If those Brahmins are capable of giving an unbiased answer, then they should answer like this: ‘There is a single final goal, there are not many final goals.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘Regarding that final goal, is the presence of sensual desires the final goal or is the absence of sensual desires the final goal?’ [They should answer like this:] ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, the absence of sensual desires is reckoned as the final goal.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘How is it, regarding that final goal, is the presence of ill-will the final goal or is the absence of ill-will the final goal?’ [They should answer like this:] ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, the absence of ill-will is the final goal, the presence of ill-will is [certainly] not the final goal.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘How is it, is the presence of delusion the final goal or is the absence of delusion the final goal?’ [They should answer like this:] ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, the absence of delusion is the final goal.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘How is it, regarding that final goal, is the presence of craving the final goal or is the absence of craving the final goal?’ [They should answer

27 The beginning part of MN 11 and MĀ 103 differs considerably, for a discussion of which cf. below.

28 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 643c22 here switches from the earlier 外道/異學 to 梵志, whereas the parallel versions MN 11 and MĀ 103 consistently refer to paribbājakas 異學 in this section. Such variation in translation terminology of what would probably have been a single term in the Indic original appears to be a regular trait of the Ekottarika-āgama. Zürcher (1991, 288) explains that in early translations in general “there is a strong tendency to avoid the monotonous effect of ... verbatim repetition ... by introducing a certain amount of diversification and irregularity”, as a result of which “in the same translated scripture we often find various alternative forms and longer or shorter versions of the same cliché.”
like this:] ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, the absence of craving is the final goal.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘How is it, regarding that final goal, is the presence of clinging the final goal or is the absence of clinging the final goal?’ [They should answer like this:] ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, the absence of clinging is the final goal.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘How is it, regarding that final goal, is it [to be attained] by one who is wise or by one who is not wise?’ [They should answer like this:] ‘Regarding what is to be is reckoned as the final goal, it is [to be attained] by one who is wise.’

[Again, they should be asked:] ‘[Regarding] this final goal, is the final goal for one who is quarrelsome or is the final goal for one who is not quarrelsome?’ [They] should answer like this: ‘Regarding what is reckoned as the final goal, that final goal is for one who is not quarrelsome.’

6. Monks, there are these two views. What are the two views? That is to say, the view of existence and the view of non-existence.

7. Any recluse or Brahmin who does not understand the origin and the result of these two views will consequently have sensual desire, ill-will, delusion, craving, and clinging in the mind, he will be one who lacks wisdom, his mind will be quarrelsome and he will not take part in practice that is in conformity [with the teachings]. Such a person does not become liberated from birth, old age, disease, death, worry, dejection, suffering, vexation, and multifarious kinds of distress; he will not be liberated from dukkha.

8. Any recluse or Brahmin who understands [these two views] according to reality will not have delusion or ill-will in the mind and will be continuously taking part in practice that is in conformity [with the teachings]. [Such a person] will consequently attain liberation from birth, old age, disease and death, here and now, I say, [he cuts off] dukkha at its basic root. Thus, monks, there is this sublime teaching, which is reckoned an unbiased teaching. All those who do not practice this unbiased teaching will succumb to five views.

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29 In its series of enquiries, MĀ 103 at T 26, 590c16 presents craving and clinging together. MN 11 at MN I 65, 1, however, agrees with EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 643c28 in treating these two as separate queries.

30 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 644a4 reads เร, which judging from the sequence of its presentation is the counterpart to paṭiviruddha in MN 11 at MN I 65, 7.

31 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 644a5: 彼當作是說, which in the original occurs in the middle of the reply, probably through some accidental shift of text.

32 MN 11 at MN I 65, 11 continues with another query not found in MĀ 103, whether the final goal is for one who enjoys and delights in conceptual proliferation, papañcārāma papañcārata. On the significance of papañca cf. the detailed study by Nāṇananda (1971).

33 MN 11 at MN I 65, 17 and MĀ 103 at T 26, 591a8 note that those who hold one of these two views will oppose those who adopt the other view.

34 EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 644a15: 五見. From the context it remains unclear what is intended by
9. Now I shall explain the four [types of] clinging. What are the four [types of] clinging? They are reckoned to be: clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, clinging to rules, and clinging to a self. These are reckoned to be the four [types of] clinging.

10. There may be recluse or Brahmins who thoroughly understand the notion of ‘clinging to sensual desires’, [yet], although they understand the notion of clinging to sensual desires, it does not follow that therefore they thoroughly discern the notions of all [types of] clinging. They begin by discerning the notion of clinging to sensual desires, but then do not discern the notions of clinging to views, clinging to rules and clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluse or Brahmins are not able to discern the notions of these three types of clinging. This is the reason.

11. There may be recluse or Brahmins who in an attempt to thoroughly discern all [types of] clinging discern clinging to sensual desires and clinging to views, [yet they] do not discern clinging to rules and clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluse or Brahmins are not able to discern these two [types of] clinging.

12. There may be recluse or Brahmins who in an attempt to be able to thoroughly discern all [types of] clinging are, however, not endowed with [such ability], as they are [only] able to discern clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, and clinging to rules, but they do not discern clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluse or Brahmins are not able to discern clinging to a self. That is the reason why these recluse or Brahmins as well [in their attempt] to thoroughly discern all [types of] clinging are, however, not endowed with [such ability]. These are reckoned the four [types of] clinging. What is the significance, what is the distinctive mark, [in regard] to what are reckoned the four [types of] clinging? [It is that] they arise because of craving.

35 In regard to the fourth type of clinging, MN 11 at MN I 66, 2 instead speaks of clinging to a doctrine of self, attavādupādāna. MĀ 103 at T 26, 591a22, however, agrees with EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 644a16 in reading 我受. The corresponding expression ātmopādāna can be found in fragment S 474 folio 12 R6 in Tripāṭhī (1962, 43) (where the original apparently reads ātmopādāna). For a discussion of the significance of this difference in regard to the formulation of the fourth type of clinging cf. Anālayo (2008).

36 This short statement on craving being the characteristic underlying all four types of clinging is without a counterpart at this juncture in MN 11 and MĀ 103, which instead continue directly with the theme of the proper teacher and only turn to craving etc. at a later point, where EĀ 27.2 also comes back to this theme and treats it in more detail, cf. § 16.
13. Like this, monks, this is a sublime teaching [that leads to] proper discerning. If one does not practice [discerning] all of these [types of] clinging, [then] one is not reckoned as unbiased. The reason is that the significance of the teachings is not easy to comprehend, not easy to understand, compared with the significance of what is not Dharma, what has not been proclaimed by a fully awakened Buddha.37

14. Monks, you should know, the Tathāgata is able to thoroughly discern all [types of] clinging in their entirety. Because of being able to discern all [types of] clinging in their entirety, in accordance with [the Dharma],38 he is able to discern clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, clinging to a self and clinging to rules.39 For this reason the Tathāgata thoroughly discerns all [types of] clinging, in accordance with the Dharma, not in contradiction to it.

16. Because of what do these four [types of] clinging arise? These four [types of] clinging arise because of craving, because of craving they grow, [whereby] this clinging comes into operation. [Therefore], one should not allow any clinging to arise.40

17. Not having given rise to any clinging,41 one is not afraid. Not being afraid, one attains Nirvana, knowing according to reality: ‘Birth and death have been extinguished, the holy life has been established, what had to be done has been done, there is no more existence to be experienced [in the future]’. Like this, monks, there is this sublime teaching. If one understands it according to reality, then one is endowed with all teachings, with the root of the practice of the teachings. This is the reason. Because this teaching is superbly sublime, proclaimed by all Buddhas, it is devoid of deficiency or taint in regard to any form of practice.42

Therefore, monks, [in such a teaching] there exists a first grade recluse, a second grade recluse, a third grade recluse and a fourth grade recluse. Beyond [these] there is no further recluse that is superior, that could surpass these. [You] can roar a lion’s roar like this.”43 The monks heard what the Buddha said, were delighted and acted accordingly.

37 MN 11 at MN I 66, 32 and MĀ 103 at T 26, 591b3 differ in so far as they describe the inefficacy of placing confidence in a teacher who does not understand all four types of clinging. They thereby come back to a point made in their introductory section, where the Buddha had taught four principles to the monks, the first of which is confidence in their teacher.
38 At this point, EĀ 27.2 at T 125, 644b5 only reads 則與相應, but two lines later EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b7 has the reading 則與法共相應, which would also fit the present instance.
39 Notably at this point the sequence has changed, with clinging to rules mentioned last.
40 MN 11 at MN I 67, 17 continues tracing the condition for the arising of clinging from craving via feeling, contact, the six sense-spheres, name-and-form, consciousness and formations to ignorance. MĀ 103 at T 26, 591b11 proceeds directly from clinging to ignorance, without mentioning any of the intervening links.
41 Adopting the 宋, 元, 明 and 聖 variant reading 已 instead of 以.
42 This passage is without counterpart in the two parallel versions.
43 MN 11 does not conclude with a lion’s roar, which it only has at the beginning of the discourse, at MN I 64, 1. MĀ 103 has its version of the lion’s roar here and also at the beginning of the
Comparison of the Lion’s Roar in EĀ 27.2 and in its Parallels

A considerable difference between the Ekottarika-āgama version and its two counterparts manifests right away with the beginning of the discourse, where the Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions do not report an actual encounter between the monks and heterodox wanderers. Instead, according to them the Buddha delivered the present instruction to prepare the monks in case they should be challenged by heterodox wanderers. Thus in these two versions, the challenge posed to the monks is just a hypothetical one, not something that actually happened.44

The nature of the challenge also differs in the Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions, as the imaginary heterodox wanderers query the claim made by the monks that only among them can the four types of true recluse be found, while other dispensations are devoid of these. On hearing this – and one might think quite reasonably – the heterodox wanderers question the basis for such a proclamation.

According to the Buddha’s instruction, the monks should reply by proclaiming that the Buddha had taught them four principles as a basis for their proclamation. These four principles are:

• they have confidence in their teacher
• they have confidence in their teaching
• they are practising their moral obligations
• they live in harmony with and feel affection for other disciples of the Buddha.45

On hearing this – and one might again think quite reasonably – the heterodox wanderers state that the same applies to them as well, in that they have confidence in their own teacher etc. When faced with this reply, the monks should come out with the series of questions about the nature of the final goal.

Compared with the Ekottarika-āgama account, this progression seems somewhat artificial. It would be beside the point to present confidence in one’s own teacher, etc., as a ground for making a claim in a discussion with those who follow a different teacher. Instead of presenting such an argument, one would expect the Buddha to be able to devise more intelligent ways of preparing his monks for such a situation. Unlike the quite reasonable queries made by the

44 MN 11 at MN I 64, 2 and MĀ 103 at T 26, 590b10.
45 In relation to the third principle, MĀ 103 at T 26, 590b21 adds that they also have confidence in regard to their moral obligations 信戒德具足, something that, though not mentioned explicitly in MN 11 at MN I 64, 13, would be to some degree implicit in the circumstance that they were willing to fulfil them.
heterodox wanderers, the four principles to be employed by the Buddhist monks do not seem to be particularly convincing assertions.\textsuperscript{46}

The same is also the case for the claim that these four principles are intended to defend. This is, in fact, the lion’s roar that is found in all versions, though the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} account differs in that it has this lion’s roar only at its conclusion. In the two parallel versions, the lion’s roar stands at the beginning of the discourse, that is, according to them the Buddha started the delivery of this particular teaching by encouraging his monks to roar a lion’s roar, and the remainder of the discourse is an explanation of what the monks can base themselves on when making such a proclamation.

Besides the positioning within the discourse, the nature of the lion’s roar also differs. In the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} account, the lion’s roar simply affirms that in a teaching based on understanding all types of clinging the four true recluses can be found. As a discourse in the \textit{Anguttara-nikāya} clarifies, the reference to the four true recluses stands for those who have reached the four levels of awakening.\textsuperscript{47}

The lion’s roars in the \textit{Cūḷasūkhāda-sutta} and the \textit{Madhyama-āgama} version, however, go a step further than the one in the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} discourse. After affirming the existence of the four types of true recluse in their own dispensation, according to these two versions the monks should also proclaim, as part of their lion’s roar, that the dispensations of others are devoid of true recluses.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} version of the lion’s roar does not have the somewhat derogatory remark found in the parallel versions, in spite of the fact that in its account the occasion for the lion’s roar is an actual encounter with and a challenge by others. In contrast, in the two parallel versions the adversaries are only imagined. Moreover, in the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} discourse the lion’s roar comes as a natural climax at the end of the discourse, whereas its positioning at the beginning of the other versions conveys a considerably more provocative impression. In sum, the lion’s roar in the \textit{Ekottarika-āgama} breathes a considerably less competitive spirit than its counterparts.

\textsuperscript{46} Manné (1996, 21) comments that “it is difficult to see how these points support the challenge, the \textit{sīhanāḍa}, at the beginning of this sutta”.

\textsuperscript{47} AN 4.239 at AN II 238, 7; cf. also the \textit{Mahāparinibbāna-sutta} and its parallels, which clarify that the four types of true recluses can only be found in a teaching that involves the practice of the noble eightfold path: DN 16 at DN II 151, 15; DĀ 2 at T 1, 25a26; T 6, 187c7; T 7, 204a5; and fragment 485 no. 216 Rb-c in Waldschmidt (1950, 75); cf. also Bareau (1971a, 104) and Waldschmidt (1948, 230).

\textsuperscript{48} MN 11 at MN I 63, 29: “the dispensations of others are devoid of [true] recluses”, \textit{suññā parappavādā sanaṇehi aṅñe} (B’ reads \textit{sanaṇehi aṅñehi} and S’ \textit{sanaṇehi aṅñehi}). MĀ 103 at T 26, 590b13: “other dispensations are all empty and devoid of [true] recluses and Brahmins”, 异道一切空無沙門、梵志. Of the versions of the \textit{Mahāparinibbāna-sutta}, only T 6, 187c8 does not have such a remark. The same type of remark can also be found in AN 4.239 at AN II 238, 8; SĀ 979 at T 99, 254b12 and SĀ² 110 at T 100, 413c11.
This would better accord with the lack of competitiveness other discourses attribute to the Buddha.\(^4\) According to a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*, the Buddha quite explicitly proclaimed that he did not dispute with others, only others might dispute with him.\(^5\) For evaluating the nature of the lion’s roar a Buddha might teach to his disciples, a telling indication can be gathered from an injunction given in the *Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel on the proper modes of speech to be employed when teaching. The two versions agree that one should avoid disparaging others, and instead just teach the Dharma.\(^5\) This injunction seems to stand in some degree of contrast to the type of lion’s roar found in the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. According to these discourses, the Buddha actually encouraged his disciples to proclaim that the dispensations of others are just devoid of true recluse.

When evaluated within the context of other passages that present the Buddha or his disciples roaring a lion’s roar, the lion’s roars in the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallels stand out even more for their unusual nature. According to other discourses the Buddha and Sāriputta, in cases of actually being defamed by others, respond by simply proclaiming what is true on their side as their lion’s roar, without getting involved in counterattacking. This is particularly evident in the instance where Sāriputta is accused by one of his fellow monks of having slighted the latter. Without in any way referring to the other monk, according to the different records of this event Sāriputta simply illustrates the humble nature of his mind with various similes, making it clear that for one like him it is not possible to undertake the type of action of which he has been accused.\(^5\) The three accounts of this incident agree that as a result of Sāriputta’s lion’s roar the other monk comes forward and asks to be forgiven for his wrong accusation. This incident reveals the power of the lion’s roar in being a non-contentious but at the same time fearless proclamation of truth.

In sum, then, it seems that in the case of the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallels, the type of lion’s roar found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version fits better with the implications of a lion’s roar reflected in other discourses. Based on an actual challenge by others, the Buddha teaches his disciples that they should respond to such a challenge by first establishing common ground with their challengers through ascertaining the nature of the final goal. Once agreement

\(^4\) As Freiberger (2000, 5) points out, to declare that the teachings of others are devoid of [true] recluses implies “that the ideal of ‘what an ascetic ought to be’ is realized only in the Buddhist saṅgha”, which does seem to spring from a competitive attitude. In contrast, Wijebandara (1993, 98) notes that a “characteristic of the Buddha’s attitude is its unpolemic nature”, which he relates to the circumstance that “the Buddha did not believe that to win in argument meant one held a correct view”. I already drew attention to the contrast between the lion’s roars in EĀ 27.2 and its parallels in Anālayo (2005, 6-7).

\(^5\) SN 22.94 at SN III 138, 26: nāhaṃ ... lokena vivadāmi, loko ... mayā vivadati; and SĀ 37 at T 99, 8b16: 我不與世間諍，世間與我諍。MN 139 at MN III 231, 27 and MĀ 169 at T 26, 701c17.

\(^5\) AN 9.11 at AN IV 374, 25; MĀ 24 at T 26, 453a4 and EĀ 37.6 at T 125, 713a9.
on the nature of the final goal has been reached, they should proceed to point out that progress towards this final goal requires insight into all four types of clinging. This much clarified, they may then conclude with a lion’s roar that the four stages of spiritual perfection are to be found in a teaching that is based on insight into these four types of clinging.

In contrast, the Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions start off with a lion’s roar that has a derogatory nuance to it and then try to back this up with arguments that do not fulfil this purpose. In contrast to their presentation of the type of lion’s roar a Buddha would teach his disciples, the main aspects of a lion’s roar in other early Buddhist discourses appear to be a fearless proclamation of a truth in a way that is not derogatory. Its main functions are therefore to clarify wrong allegations and to present one’s position in a debate situation, or else to stir up a sense of urgency as a teaching method aimed at encouraging progress on the path to liberation.
## Abbreviations

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Manné, Joy. 1996. Sīlanāda - The Lion’s Roar or What the Buddha was Supposed to be Willing to Defend in Debate. *Buddhist Studies Review* 13(1):7-36.


