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The relationship between the earliest form of Buddhism and the various traditions that developed later has been a perennial problem in the history of Buddhist thought. As is well known to students of Buddhist philosophy, the different schools of the Abhidharma or scholastic tradition, in spite of rather significant doctrinal variations among themselves, all claimed to preserve the Buddha-word in its pristine purity. The Mahayana schools, adopting philosophical standpoints very different from those of scholasticism, upheld the view that theirs represent the true teachings of the Buddha. Many a modern scholar, after aligning himself with one or the other of these later philosophical developments, has endeavored to draw a close relationship between the school he has accepted and early Buddhism. In the present paper, I propose to show that early Buddhism, as embodied in the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese Aagamas, which are recognized by all the different schools as representing the earliest sources for the study of Buddhism, is radically different from all these schools, at least as far as their philosophical content is concerned.
Even though some of the later developed schools did not recognize all the discourses included in the Nikaayas and the Aagamas as being authoritative, fortunately there is at least one discourse that carried the stamp of authority so much that all schools of Buddhism, both Hiinayaana and Mahaayaana, studied it with veneration and respect. This is acknowledged by even a prominent Mahaayaana philosopher like Candrakiirti.[1] Moreover, this discourse deals with the most fundamental doctrine in Buddhism and, therefore, any difference that can be noted with regard to the interpretation of the ideas embodied here would indicate the difference subsisting between the early and later forms of Buddhism. The discourse is known as Kaccaayanagotta-sutta (Naagaarjuna calls it Kaatyaayanaavavaada-suutra) and is included in the Samyutta-nikaaya[2] and the Tsa A-han Ching.[3] The text of this discourse, as found in the Pali Nikaayas, is as follows:
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While the Exalted One was at Saavatthi the venerable Kaccaayana of that clan came to visit him, and saluting him sat down at one side. So seated he asked the Exalted One, saying: 'Lord, we hear the phrase "right view, right view." Now how far is there a right view?'
'This world, Kaccaayana, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence (atthitaa) and on nonexistence (natthitaa). Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the nonexistence of the world. But he, who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world.'
'The world, for the most part, Kaccaayana, is bound by approach, attachment and inclination. And the man who does not go after that approach and attachment, determination of mind, inclination and disposition, does not cling to or take up the stand, [does not think] : "This is my soul!" - who thinks: 'That which arises is just suffering, that which passes away is suffering,"- this man is not in doubt, is not perplexed. Knowledge herein is his, not merely other-dependent. Thus far, Kaccaayana, he has "right view."'
"'Everything exists" (sabba.m atthi): this is one extreme. "Everything does not exist" (sabba.m n'atthi): this is the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme the Tathaagata teaches you a doctrine by the middle [way]:- Conditioned by ignorance dispositions come to pass; conditioned by dispositions is consciousness; conditioned by consciousness is the psychophysical personality; conditioned by the psychophysical personality are the six senses; conditioned by the six senses is contact; conditioned by contact is feeling; conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is grasping; conditioned by grasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is decay-and-death, grief, suffering . . . even such is the uprising of this entire mass of suffering, But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance (arises) ceasing of dispositions. and thus comes ceasing of this entire mass of suffering.'
This discourse refers to two philosophical theories, existence or Being (atthitaa, Sk. astitaa, Ch. yu) and nonexistence or non-Being (n'atthitaa, Sk. naastitaa, Ch. wu yu). There is no difficulty in identifying these two theories,[4] The former is the traditional Upani.sadic doctrine according to which everything in this world is filled with (puur.nam) with a reality which is the ultimate ground of existence (astitva). It is the permanent, eternal and substantial "self," variously known as Aatman or Brahman. Hence the Buddha's criticism that this theory of "existence" leads to the belief in permanence (sassata, Sk. saa`svata, Ch. ch'ang yu). The other is the doctrine of the Materialists who, in spite of their doctrine of natural determinism (svabhaava-vaada), were considered to be annihilationists (ucchedavaadi) because they denied causality of moral behavior, etc. Moreover, the Materialists also denied the existence of a reality of the sort the Upani.sadic thinkers acknowledged, and hence were popularly known as "nihilists" (n'atthika-vaada). The Buddha too, while refraining from criticizing their conception of natural determinism,[5] rejected their theory as being, nihilistic primarily because of their denial of free-will
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and moral responsibility. Buddha's reasons for rejecting both these theories seem to be extremely significant.
The two extremes of existence and nonexistence were rejected because they were contrary to the perception of one who understands things as they are, namely, the perceptions of ceasing (nirodha) and arising (uppaada) respectively. Arising and ceasing, no doubt, are empirical facts and, therefore, the argument for the rejection of the two extremes is empirical. Not only did the Buddha resort to empirical arguments for the rejection of the two metaphysical extremes, but also he replaced them with an empiricist view. Thus, the "middle path" (majjhimaa pa.tipadaa, Sk. madhyamaa pratipat, Ch. chung tao) between the two extremes of existence and nonexistence is presented as causation or "dependent arising" (pa.ticcasamuppaada) which explains the pattern according to which things in the world arise and pass away. The conception of "dependence" (pratiitya) enabled the Buddha to avoid the two metaphysical assumptions regarding causation, namely, (a) the potential existence of the effect in the cause, hence the substantial connection between them or (b) the potential nonexistence of the effect and hence the absence of any connection between the cause and the effect.
There cannot be any controversy regarding the message of the discourse. It is a straightforward and unequivocal statement of an empiricist theory of causation which steers clear of two metaphysical ideas of substantial permanence on the one hand, and nihilistic impermanence on the other. The "theory of dependence," in such a context, explains the causal relationship among impermanent factors of existence.
This was the "middle path" the Buddha claimed he discovered under the Bodhi-tree. It was this philosophical middle position that was the basis of the ethical path of "moderation" between the two extremes of self-mortification and self-indulgence that constitute the subject of his first discourse - the Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta.[6] In the early discourses, this middle path was never explained as something indefinable (anirvacaniiya) or as indescribable (av`acya) in any way. The only remark made is that it is "beyond the sphere of logic" (atakkaavacara, Sk. atarkaavacara), but for very specific reasons. It was a doctrine "deep, difficult to perceive, difficult to comprehend, but tranquil, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the learned," yet a ''matter not easily understood by those delighting in attachment, those rejoicing in attachment."[7] The argument seems to be that if a person is excessively attached to a certain theory, no amount of logic or dialectic could
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convince him of the truth of any other theory. Hence, to those recluses and brahmans deeply immersed in metaphysical views (di.t.thi, Sk. d.r.s.ti, Ch. chien), "dependent arising" or causal happening (paticcasamuppaada) was a difficult doctrine to accept. So much for the "middle path" in early Buddhism.
The scholastic traditions which developed theories of moments (k.sa.na) and atoms (paramaa.nu) were faced with the rather difficult task of explaining causal continuity.[8] One of the ways in which the scholiasts tried to resolve the problem of the continuity of the discrete momentary phenomena (dharma) was by accepting the dualistic theory of substance (svabhaava) and qualities (lak.sa.na). They upheld that the qualities were in a state of flux, changing every moment, while the substance remained unchanged throughout the three periods of time - past, present and future. This came to be known as the theory of "everything exists" (sarvam asti) which was upheld by the Sarvastivadins. It may be noted that this very same theory constituted one of the extremes referred to and criticized by the Buddha in the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta. The Sautraantikas certainly spared no pains in refuting this doctrine of substance (svabhaava) which they equated with the idea of 'soul' or 'self' (aatman).[9]
How did the Sarvastivadins counter this criticism? Naturally, by reinterpreting the implications of the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta. In the Vibhaa.saprabhaav.rtti, a commentary on the Abhidharmadiipa that was written in order to explicate the genuine Sarvaastivaada point of view in opposition to the ideas expressed in the Abhidharmako`sa with its Sautraantika leanings, we find this reevaluation of the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta.[10] Here the author points out that in the discourse the Buddha taught a "middle path" according to which (1) all component things (samskaaraa.h) are empty (`suunyaa.h) of falsely conceived notions such as "person" (pu.ru.sa) or "receptacle consciousness'' (aalayavij~naana) and other such imaginations, and (2) all component things are not empty and nonempty (a`suunyaa.h) of specific and general characteristics (svasaamaanyalak.sa.na). This implies that the recognition of a reality such as "person" (puru.sa) posited by the Saa^nkhya school or by the "personalists" (pudgalavaadin) of the Buddhist tradition or "receptacle consciousness" (aalaya-vij~naana) of the Yogaacaarins would contribute to a theory of permanent existence (astitva) and a denial of specific and general characteristics (svasaamaanyalak.sa.na) of dharmas, as admitted by the Sarvaastivaadins, would lead to nihilistic nonexistence (naastitva).
Specific characteristic (svalak.sa.na) of a dharma is identified with
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"substance" (dravya, svabhaava) which was looked upon by the Sarvaastivaadins as "ultimate reality" (paramaartha sat).[11] When the Maadhyamikas rejected "substance" (svabhaava) as an "ultimate reality," they were certainly rejecting the Sarvastivada conception of dharma.[12] It is therefore easy to see that in the eyes of the Sarvaastivaadins the doctrine of "emptiness" (`suunyataa) of the Maadhyamikas was none other than a theory of nonexistence or nihilism (naastitva). Thus, for the Sarvaastivaadins, the two extremes mentioned in the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta are the Yogaacaara theory of "receptacle consciousness" (aalaya-vij~naana) and the Maadhyamika conception of "emptiness" (`suunyataa).
Although the Sarvastivadins made a determined attempt to distinguish their doctrines from those of the Saa^nkhya, Yogaacaara and Maadhyamika, yet the recognition of an enduring substance (svabhaava, dravya, svalak.sa.na) as the ultimate reality of things (dharma) as opposed to their phenomenal characteristics (lak.sa.na or saamaanyalak.sa.na) placed them on the side of the "substantialists" (sad-vadii).[13] For this reason, their doctrine of causation through substance (svabhaava) was not at all different from the identity theory of causation (satkaaryavaada) of Saa^nkhya.[14] True, the Sarvaastivaadins recognized the theory of causation with twelve factors, as is done in the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta : But their theory is so closely associated with the conception of substance that it is no longer the empirical doctrine of causation in early Buddhism but a metaphysical view of the extreme form.
In contrast, the Sautraantikas, while upholding a theory of moments (k.sa.na), vehemently denied the existence of any substance or substratum (svabhaava or dravya). The Sautraantikas, who refused to recognize two separate moments, static (sthiti) and decay (jaraa), but considered them to be one characteristic (ekam eva lak.sa.nam),[15] certainly would not accept the concept of "specific characteristic" (svalak.sa.na) which was identified with the permanent and eternal substance (svabhaava, dravya). But as empiricists who recognized the nonconceptual grasp of the external objects at the first moment of perception (pratyaksa), they upheld, or, at least, spoke of "specific characteristics" (svalak.sa.na)[16] without identifying them with substance (svabhava). (This confirms our view, stated earlier, that for the Sarvaastivaadins, the nihilists' - naastika - were represented by the Maadhyamikas, and not the Sautraantikas.)
The Sautraantika denial of substance (svabhaava) should have made them the faithful representatives of early Buddhism - hence their claim to be the upholders of the tradition of the discourses (suutrapramaa.nikaa).[17] They were,
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no doubt, nonsubstantialists. But, unfortunately, their theory of non-substantiality (anaatmavaada, ni.hsvabhaavavaada) was presented in the background of a metaphysical theory of moments and hence they were unable to account for causality (pratiityasamutpaada). This theory of discrete momentary phenomena compelled them to accept a causal principle which involved metaphysical assumptions. They maintained that a nonexistent phenomenon arises during one moment and passes away into nonexistence during the next, without enduring even for one moment, because it has no substantial existence.[18] This view shared all the salient features of the nonidentity theory of causation (asatkaaryavaada) of the Vai`se.sika school. Not only did the theory fail to account for the momentary arising of the effect, but also it implied the complete annihilation (vina`sa) of the effect immediately after its arising. Thus, while the Sarvaastivaada attempt to explain causation in the background of a theory of moments led them to a substantialist position, the Sautraantika doctrine of nonsubstantiality (anaatma, ni.hsvabhaava) placed them in the position of annihilationists (ucchedavaadii).
It is now possible to examine the''middle path" as enunciated in the Maadhyamika school of Buddhism. The doctrines of the two Abhidharma schools, Sarvaastivaada and Sautraantika, undoubtedly served as the immediate philosophical background of Maadhyamika thought. Although these two schools with their theories of causation provided the setting necessary for the Maadhyamika dialectic, Maadhyamika philosophy should not be considered a mere reaction to these two schools. On the contrary, this school at least in its undeveloped form, had independent existence before Naagaarjuna organized it into a coherent system. This undeveloped stage is represented by the Praj~naapaaramitaa literature, and especially by the Vajracchedikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa.
Here we need to digress a little from the discussion of the middle path. The concept of Buddha is the most important topic of discussion in the - Praj~naapaaramitaa literature. Buddha Gotama was a historical person. The discourses of the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese Aagamas afford us ample evidence of that.[19] He influenced the life and thought of the people of India during his time to such an extent that superhuman qualities came to be attributed to him, not only after his death but even while he was alive. These qualities - intellectual, moral and even physical - soon raised him to the position of a divine being (deva) in the eyes of his followers. The result was that the followers themselves became puzzled as to the real nature of the Buddha's personality. When the question regarding the Buddha's personality was raised,
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the Buddha himself answered that he was neither a man (manussa), nor a water spirit (gandhabba), not a powerful demoniac spirit (yakkha), nor even a god (deva) or a Brahma, but that he was only a Buddha.[20] Similar questions were being raised even two centuries after his death, during the reign of Asoka, the Maurya, in the third century B.C.[21] Thus, it became one of the most important and relevant topics of discussion in the history of Buddhist thought.
The passing away of the Buddha created a big vacuum in the lives of his followers and admirers. The Mahaaparinibbaanasuttanta which relates the incidents in the last days of the Buddha's life seems to indicate this. To perpetuate the memory of the Buddha, the Buddha himself recommended to his followers four places of pilgrimage.[22] The desire of the faithful followers to have the Buddha as an object of worship contributed to the development of the conception of an eternal spiritual body (dharmakaaya) of the Buddha.
In the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese Aagamas, the question whether the Buddha exists after death was regarded as a metaphysical question and was left unanswered. It was left unanswered not because, as some Buddhist scholars seem to think, the Buddha continued after death in a transcendental form, hence indefinable and indescribable, but because there was no way of knowing (na pamaanam atthi) on the basis of personal experience whether he continues or not.[23] But in the Mahaayaana tradition, especially as embodied in texts like Mahaavastu, Lalitavistara and Saddharmapu.n.dariika-suutra, Buddha came to be looked upon as one who remained forever (sadaa sthita),[24] and his parinirvaa.na came to be considered a mere illusion.[25] The Buddha became a supramundane and immortal person. His body (rupakaaya) could not represent his real nature. Therefore, the Vajracchedikaa maintains: "The Tathaagata is not to be recognized by means of the marks on his body."[26] The real body of the Buddha is the spiritual body (dharmakaaya). The Buddha's real body is not only spiritual but cosmic as well. While the spiritual body is identified with all the constituents of the universe (sarva dharma), it is also considered to be the same as the ultimate (tathataa). Running through the entire Praj~naapaaramitaa literature is the conflict between the nondual (advaya) absolute reality, the dharmakaaya, and the pluralistic phenomenality. To resolve this conflict we find the Vajracchedikaa adopting the all important standpoint that ultimate reality is beyond description.
This digression from the discussion of the middle path is necessary to understand the Maadhyamika position. The Maadhyamikas, as their name
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implies, claim to follow the middle path. But the first Mahaayaana text which refers to the middle path and which is often quoted by the Maadhyamikas themselves is the Kaa`syapaparivarta of the Ratnakuu.ta-suutra. It is a formative text of the Mahaayaana school that came to be looked upon with great respect by most Mahaayaana teachers and represents, according to our understanding, a statement of the transition from early Buddhism to Maadhyamika. Here we come across what appears to be two versions of the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta, but with a different interlocutor. - Kaa`syapa. One of these versions is more faithful to the original Kaccaayanagotta-sutta. It reads:
"[Everything] exists." Kaa`syapa, is one extreme. "[Everything] does not exist,"Kasyapa, is the second extreme. In between these two extremes, Kaa`syapa, is the middle path, because it is the correct perception of things ....[27]
The middle path is further defined in terms of the twelvefold chain of causation in its progressive and regressive orders. By preserving this version, the Kaa`syapaparivarta, though an extremely important Mahaayaana text, seems to vouch for the authenticity of the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta as found in the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese Aagamas. Here, as in the Nikaaya and Aagama statement, the two metaphysical theories are rejected and a middle position embodying a causal description of the phenomenal world is presented.
The second version found in the Kaa`syapaparivarta, though dealing with a middle path between two extremes, is very different from the above. This statement reads:
"Self" (aatma ), Kaa`syapa. is one extreme. "No-self" (nairaatmya) is the second extreme. In between these two extremes is the middle position that is formless, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, signless and nonconceptual. This, Kaa`syapa, is called the middle path, the correct perception of things.[28]
Although the two extremes, 'self and 'no-self' may relate to the two extremes, existence and nonexistence mentioned in the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta, yet the statement as such is conspicuous by its absence in the Nikaayas and the Aagamas. There is no doubt that this second version is an innovation attempting to explain the development of the doctrine. While the Hindu schools as well as Sarvaastivaada accepted a theory of 'self' (aatma) or something bordering on a theory of 'self,' the Sautraantika school of Buddhism adamantly held on to a theory of 'no-self' (nairaatmya or ni.hsvabhaava). Naturally, the Mahaayaana doctrine of ultimate reality, equated in the early Mahaayaana with the Buddha's spiritual body, had to represent the "middle" position.
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But this middle position is not phenomenal. It is transcendental; hence the use of the negative characteristics to describe it.
In the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa , Nagarjuna refers to the Kaatyaayanaavavaada-suutra (=Kaccaayanagotta-sutta) and maintains that in this context the Buddha rejected the two extremes of existence (asti) and nonexistence (naasti).[29] A faithful disciple like Candrakiirti was, therefore, compelled to look at this Kaatyaayanaavavaada-suutra. After observing that this discourse is studied in all the schools of Buddhism, he quotes a section of the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta in some original version (not in the Kaa`syapaparivarta version mentioned above).[30] But when he had to comment on the middle path he ignores all the versions which refer to the twelve-fold formula of causation and switches on to the second version from the Kaa`syapaparivarta that has very little in common with the Kaccaayanagotta-sutta and which describes the middle path in negative terms.[31]
The Kaa`syapaparivarta, therefore, is an invaluable text that explains one of most controversial subjects in the history of Buddhist thought, namely, the transition from early Buddhism to Mahaayaana. While preserving a statement of an empirical theory of causation presented in the background of two metaphysical ideas, it also puts forward a conception of a linguistically transcendent middle path, thereby relating itself to the Praj~naapaaramitaa doctrine of the indefinable and indescribable ultimate reality.
Let us examine this ''transcendentalism '' in more detail. Transcendentalism, as pointed out earlier, developed gradually in the Mahaayaana tradition in connection with the conception of Buddha and reached its culmination in the Praj~naapaaramitaa literature. On the other hand, the Abhidharma scholiasts, engrossed with the doctrines of moments and atoms, presented metaphysical theories of causation in their attempt to explain the phenomenal world. Both these trends convinced Naagaarjuna of the futility of depending on linguistic conventions (sa.mv.rti) as a means of explaining reality (paramaartha), except as a means of an end.
The Muulamadhyamakakarikaa represents one determined attempt to deny the reality of arising (utpaada) and ceasing (nirodha). This seems to have been necessary if one were to hold on to the Mahaayaana conception of dharmakaaya as the eternal and permanent reality,also known as tathataa, paramaartha sat, etc. Fortunately, for Naagaarjuna, the Sarvaastivaadins and the Sautraantikas have created the "conflict in reason" by explaining causality in such a metaphysical way that he either had to accept arising (utpaada) of things on the
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basis of an underlying substance or substratum (svabhaava) (i.e., the satkaarya-vaada of the Sarvaastivaadins) or was compelled to deny a substance and therefore arising too (i.e., the logical conclusion of the Sautraantika asatkaaryavaada). The theory of moments did not permit Naagaarjuna to accept arising and passing away without positing a substance.
Not only was he unable to explain arising and passing away, he was not in a position even to accept relativity as embodied in the statement: "When this exists, that exists" (asmin satiidam bhavati).[32] This means causation of any sort could not be explained without falling into one of the two extremes, existence and nonexistence. It is this selfsame idea that Candrakiirti was attempting to substantiate by repeatedly quoting a quatrain from what was known to him as Anavataptah.rdaapasa.mkrama.na-suutra :
whatever is born of causes is unborn for it has no arising through substance. That which is dependent on causes is empty. He who understands emptiness is diligent.[33]
This is supplemented by two quotations, (a) from the Ma~nju`sriipaarip.rcchaa and (b) from Aaryadhyaayitamu.s.ti-suutra. These quotations are found at the end of his commentary to the very important chapter of the Kaarikaa on the "Examination of the Noble Truths" (Aaryasatyapariik.saa).[34] Both quotations explain the manner in which one should try to comprehend the four Noble Truths. The latter maintains:
By him, Ma~nju`srii, who has seen all dharmas as unborn, unsatisfactoriness is understood. For him who has seen all dharmas as unproduced arising is eliminated. By him who has seen all dharmas as completely extinguished nirvana is realized. By him who has seen all dharmas as absolutely empty the path has been cultivated.
This is the very opposite of the argument in the early discourses where things were considered to be unsatisfactory primarily because they are impermanent (anicca), which is a synonym for arising and passing away (uppaadavaya-).[35] As the eight negations indicate, not only arising (utpaada) and ceasing (nirodha), but also permanence (`saa`svata) and annihilation (uccheda), identity (ekaartha) and difference (naanaartha), coming (aagama) and going (nirgama) are concepts not applicable to reality.[36] Thus not only the metaphysical concepts like permanence and annihilation, but even nonmetaphysical concepts like arising and ceasing cannot be applied to reality. The Praj~naapaaramitaa doctrine of the indescribability of ultimate reality finds perfect philosophical justification here. The nature and function of language appear in a different light. Conventional terms (sammuti), which in early
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Buddhism were symbols agreed upon by popular consent to denote the various experiences or combinations of experiences, are now looked upon as deceptive veils (vara.na) concealing in every way (samantaad) the true nature of things: hence sa.mv.ti.[37] Even the dichotomy between knowledge and the object of knowledge (j~naanaj~neya) (not subject and object) is valid only at this level. Ultimate reality is free from such dichotomy.[38] This ultimate reality (paramaartha) is independent, peaceful, nonconceptual, and is to be experienced (vedya) (now known j~neya) for or within oneself (pratyaatma) by the wise one. It cannot be indicated [as this or that] nor can it be known [naj~naayate).[39]
Thus, the Maadhyamikas deny the ability to know ultimate reality as an objective phenomenon. The dichotomy between knowledge and the known is emphatically denied. But the possibility of realizing the nature of ultimate reality within oneself is recognized. This seems also the conclusion of the very important chapter on the "Examination of Elements" (Dhaatupariik.saa) of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa which emphasizes the pacification of the object (dra.s.tavya-upasama),[40] rather than the pacification of views (d.r.s.tiupasama), implying thereby that the latter could not be achieved without achieving the former. This also explains the basic difference between early Buddhism and Maadhyamika thought as far as another of the important concepts is concerned, namely, the concept of prapaa~nca.
The term papa~nca in early Buddhism is understood as "obsession." Hence, papa~ncopasama as a definition of nibbaana implies pacification of all obsessions. A person who has eliminated these obsessions can continue not only to know things in the external world as they are (yathaabhuuta) but also to use the linguistic conventions (sammuti) without overstepping their limits, i.e., without using them to designate things not given in experience. For example, he will be able to use the term 'self' (atta, Sk. aatman) as a reflexive pronoun without implying by this the existence of a transempirical entity, permanent and eternal. This is because he has eliminated the root of all obsessions, namely, craving (ta.nhaa).
Hence, papa~ncavuupasama becomes a synonym for di.t.thi-vuupasama, "pacification of all views," where di.t.thi refers to the manner of seeing. For this purpose it is not necessary to attain dra.s.tavyopasama or pacification of the object, i.e., the complete elimination of the object from one's understanding. But in the Maadhyamika system, since there is a recognition of an ultimate reality (paramaartha) which is nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) as opposed to the
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conventional (sa.mv.rti), prapa~nca comes to mean conceptual proliferation. For this reason, the Maadhyamikas will not be able to entertain the very idea of 'object,' hence dra.s.tavyopasama. It is extremely significant to note that this pacification of the object is presented by Naagaarjuna as a middle position between the two extremes of existence (astitva) and nonexistence (naastitva). How far this position is related to the Yogaacaara standpoint that the object (aalambana) is not real seems to be an interesting question.
In the light of what has been stated above, I propose to analyse the meaning and significance of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa statement of the middle path. It runs thus:
whatever dependent arising is, that we call emptiness. That (i.e., emptiness) is a dependent concept and that itself is the middle path.
(Ya.h pratiityasamutpaada.h `suunyataa.taa.m pracak.smahe. Saa praj~naptir upaadaaya pratipat saiva madhyamaa)[41]
Candrakiirti's assistance in unraveling the rather abstruse meaning of this quatrain is extremely valuable. We have already referred to the Maadhyamika argument that whatever is caused or is dependently arisen is really uncaused or unborn because it does not arise as a result of 'substance' (svabhaavenaanut-patti). Causation cannot be explained without admitting a substance. But a substance does not exist in reality. Therefore, causation or dependent arising is empty. But what about this emptiness (`suunyataa) itself? Is emptiness (`suunyataa) an empty and misleading concept (sa.mv.rti), like 'substance' (svabhaava)? This is the last thing the Maadhyamikas would want to admit. In fact, a major portion of the chapter on "The Examination of the Noble Truths" (Aaryasatyapariik.saa) is devoted to a refutation of the view that 'emptiness (`suunyataa) is 'nothingness' or 'nihilism' (naastitva). Thus, the Maadhyamikas are forced to accept at least one concept that is 'dependent' or 'denotative' (upaadaaya praj~napti), and that is `suunyataa. `Suunyataa is not a mere empty concept (sa.mv.rti) but the ultimate truth (paramaartha satya), and therefore, the use of the term upaadaaya praj~napti instead of sa.mv.rti to refer to it (although of course, the terms sammuti, in its original meaning, and pa~n~natti were used synonymously in early Buddhism). It is identical with tathataa, dharmakaaya, Buddha, and even pratiityasamutpaada (in spite of the earlier criticism), all of which were transcendental and hence described in negative characteristics only. It is also what has to be experienced or felt (vedya) for oneself (pratyaatman) with the attainment of perfect enlightenment (samyaksambodhi).
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Does this mean that 'emptiness' (`suunyataa) is substantial? The Maadhyamika reply will certainly be in the negative. Emptiness is not substantial in the same way as substance is substantial. Similarly, emptiness is not empty in the same way as substance is empty. Emptiness is empty of conceptual proliferation (prapa~nca`suunya) and, therefore, nonconceptual (nirvikalpa). This is the significance of another oft-quoted statement defining ultimate reality:
Independent, peaceful, conceptually nonproliferated, nonconceptual, nondiversified -- this is the characteristic of reality (tattva).
(Aparapratyaya.m `saanta.m aprapa~ncita.m nirvikalpam anaanaartham etat tattvasya lak.sa.na.m.)[42]
Now we are in a position to analyse the nature of the middle path (madhyamaa pratipat) referred to in the quatrain quoted earlier. Of the two extremes, there seems to be difficulty in identifying the first, i.e., existence (astitva). For Naagaarjuna and for all the Maadhyamikas, "existence" meant the existence of a substantial entity (an aatma or svabhaava) in phenomena (dharma). "Nonexistence" (naastitva), therefore, would mean the absence of any such substantial entity, in other words, absolute nonexistence or nihilism. The middle path that steers clear of these two extremes is, therefore, the reality (tathataa, paramaartha sat) that transcends all linguistic expression (sa.mv.rti). This explains the Maadhyamika, or even the Mahaayaana, characterization of the middle path with negative epithets such as formless, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, signless, nonconceptual. This is not at all different from the philosophy of the Praj~naapaaramitaa which emphasizes the linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality (paramaarthasatya).
T. R. V. Murti is credited with having written the most authoritative account of Maadhyamika philosophy. His interpretation, therefore, has in some way or other influenced the understanding of the doctrines of this school. Unfortunately, in spite of the excellent analysis of Maadhyamika ideas by Murti, one mistaken interpretation on his part has prevailed in the Western understanding of Maadhyamika philosophy. The mistaken interpretation is of the following quatrain:
Existence and nonexistence are two extremes.
Purity and impurity - these too are extremes.
Therefore, having given up the two extremes.
The wise one takes no position in the middle.
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(Astiiti naastiiti ubhe 'pi antaa
suddhii asuddhiiti ime 'pi antaa
tasmaad ubhe anta vivarjayitvaa
madhye 'pi sthaana.m na karoti pa.n.dita.h.)[43]
The conclusion which Murti arrives at on the basis of this statement is expressed in the following quotation: "It may be thought that in avoiding the two extremes, the Maadhyamika takes a middle position in between the two. No; he does not hold any middle position. Or, the middle position is no position;..."[44] this analysis seems to be the basis of the very popular view: - "Maadhyamika position is no position."
Unfortunately, Murti's seems to be a rather strange conclusion. To say that one should give up two extremes and also the middle position is not tantamount to saying there is no middle position. If it does, it certainly seems to be a confusion (viparyaasa) not only of linguistic usage but also of logic. It is one thing to say that one should not grasp on to a middle position;yet another to say that there is no middle position. In fact, strange as it may seem, Murti himself then goes on to say, on the basis of the passages from the Kaa`syapaparivarta and the Maadhyamikav.rtti quoted earlier, that the middle position is transcendental in that it is beyond concept and speech.[45] This interpretation of Maadhyamika philosophy by Murti has caught the fascination of many a Western scholar who got involved in the study of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, especially Ch'an or its Japanese counterpart - Zen. Ch'an is generally understood as denying any form of transcendentalism even though it seems to contribute to a theory of linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality. The influence of Maadhyamika thought on the development of Ch'an goes uncontroverted. Therefore, Murti's interpretation of Maadhyamika philosophy as a doctrine of "no position" has received wide acceptance, especially because it harmonizes with the current interpretation of Ch'an.
In addition to the above unwarranted analysis of the Maadhyamika statement, the interpretation of Maadhyamika philosophy as one of "no position" seems to stem from the undue emphasis on, or, more specifically, the wrong understanding of the purpose of, the reductio ad absurdum (praasa^ngika) method adopted by Naagaarjuna. It is true that in the refutation of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence Naagaarjuna utilized the reductio ad absurdum method of not accepting any one of the views, but merely using one to refute the other. His use of this method was confined to a refutation
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of the phenomenal reality only. But he does not appear to have used it in order to reject the two truths, phenomenal or conventional (sa.mv.rti) and ultimate (paramaartha), though these in some way may be taken to constitute two extremes like 'purity' and 'impurity' referred to in the above quatrain quoted from Candrakiirti. On the contrary, he emphatically asserted the existence of ultimate reality or truth (paramaartha sat), though he held it to be beyond conceptual thinking. Everything else, existent or nonexistent, fall under the category of conventional (sa.mv.rti).
In conclusion, it may be said that the last major school of Indian Buddhism - Yogaacaara as represented in the Madhyaantavibhaaga (Examination of the Middle Path and the Extremes) to Maitreya - openly admitted the existence (sat) of the middle position between the two extremes of existence (sat) and nonexistence (asat).[46] Existence, for them, was of 'constructive ideation' (abhuutaparikalpa, i.e., ideation with regard to nonexistent phenomena). Nonexistence was of substance (dravya = svabhaava). In between these two extremes, says Vasubandhu in his Madhyaantavibhaagaha.sya, is existence (sattva) of emptiness (`suunyataa), which is the middle path between absolute emptiness (ekantena `suunya) and absolute non-emptiness (ekantenaa`suunya). This, according to Vasubandhu, is in conformity with the Praj~naapaaramitaa statements such as: "All is neither empty nor nonempty."[47]
This analysis of the middle path creates another problem, If absolute emptiness is one extreme and absolute non-emptiness is another, what could be the middle position? The Maadhyamikas maintained that the middle position is nonconceptual and therefore, indefinable and indescribable. But for the Yogaacaarins, this is existence, i.e., transcendental existence (paramaartha sat). If so, what remains is the phenomenal which the Maadhyamikas had treated under the conventional (sa.mv.rti). For the Yogaacaarins, this is not a sensible position, for the phenomenal is not always identical with the conventional considered to be absolutely empty (`suunya). On the other hand, there are conventions that are absolutely empty, hence abhuutaparikalpa, i.e., mere conceptual construction. There are, on the other hand, conventions that embody phenomenal reality. This third level of truth or reality is substantial (dravyata.h sat), although it is not identical with the Sarvaastivaada "substance" (svabhaava). It is comparable to the Sautraantika conception of "specific characteristic" (svalak.sa,na) (discussed above).[48] The recognition of this third level of truth or reality seems to have been prompted by the need to accommodate the phenomenal reality which the Maadhyamikas denied
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when they considered all concepts (except those such as `suunyataa indicating the ultimate reality) to be empty and unreal. Hence the Madhyaantavibhaaga statement refers to the three degrees of truth - (1)sat or existence, i.e., ultimate reality (paramaartha sat). (2) asat or nonexistence,i.e., emptiness with regard to substance (svabhaava) or self (aatman), i.e.. conceptual construction and (3)sot or existence, i.e., existence of specific characteristics (svalak.sa.nata.h sat). These were the very same degrees of truth embodied in the more popular triple - (l)the ultimate (parini.spanna). (2) the conceptual (parikalpita) and (3) the relative (paratantra) respectively. This middle position is rather unique in that it is not a middle position between two rejected extremes, but a third position.
These different interpretations of the middle path in the later Buddhist schools would certainly enable the unprejudiced scholar to trace the manner in which the Buddhist doctrine underwent development throughout the centuries since its first enunciation by Siddhaartha Gautama at Buddhyagayaa.
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1. Maadhyamikav.rtti (Madhyamakakaarikaas), (abbr. MKV) ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin, St. Petersburg: The Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1903-1913. p. 269. Ida~n ca suutram sarvanikaayesu pathyate.
2. Samyutta-nikaaya, ed. M. Leon Feer, London: Pali Text Society, 1960, 2.16-17.
3. Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe. Tokyo: Taisho Shuppan Company. 1924-1934. 2.85c.
4. See my Causality. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. 1975, pp. 5-53.
5. See my explanation of this problem at Causality, P. 41.
6. Samyutta-nikaaya 5.420.
7. Majjhima-nikaaya, ed. V. Trenckner, London: Pali Text Society, 1948, 1.167; Taisho 1.77c-778a.
8. See Causality, pp 67-88.
9. Sphu.taarthaabhidharmako`savyaakhyaa (abbr. Sakv) of Yasomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo: The Publication Association of Abhidharmako`savyaakhyaa, 1923-1936, p. 362, svabhaavata ity aatmatah.
10. Abhudharmadipa with Vibhaa.saaprabhaav.rtti, ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959, p. 270.
11. Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967, p.341, Kaaya.m svasaamaanyalak.sa.naabhyaa.m pariik.sate, vedana.m citta.m dharma`s ca. Svabhaava evai.saa.m svalak.sa.na.m. Saamaanyalak.sa.na.m tu anityataa sa.msk.rtaanaa.m
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du.hkhataa saa`sravaanaa.m sunyata'naatmate sarvadharmaanaa.m, Sakv. p. 524, paramaarthasat svalak.sa.nena sat ity artha.h. Also ibid., dravyata.h svalak.sa.nata.h sad dravya sad iti. See p. 529, svabhava evai.saa.m svalak.sa.nam.
12. See MKV pp. 260-291 where the heat of fire (agner au.s.nya.m) is described as "substance" (svabhaava) as well as "specific characteristic" (svala.k.sa.na).
13. In fact, the Sarvaastivaadins claimed themselves to be 'substantialists' (sad-vadii), see Vibhaa.saprabhaav.rtti, p. 258.
14. See Causality, pp. 148-152.
15. Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya P. 76 attributes this view to some "other" (anya) [school], but Ya`somitra identifies the school as the Sautraantika, see Sakv p. 139, anye punar aahur iti Sautraank[t]ikaa.h.
16. See T. I. Stcherbatsky, Buddhit Logic, New York: Dover, 1962, II, p. 312.
17. Sakv p.11.
18. `Sik.saasamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, St. Petersburg: The Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1879-1902, p. 248, iti hy abhutva bhavati bhutva prativigacchati svabhavarahitatvat. See also Causality, pp. 151-154.
19. See article on "Buddha," in Encyclopedia of Buddhism, vol. 3.
20. Anguttara-nikaaya, ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, London: Pali Text Society, 1955, 2.38-39; Taisho 2. 28a-b.
21. Kathaavatthu, ed. A. C. Taylor, London: Pali Text Society, 1894-1897, 18.1-4.
22. Diigha-nikaaya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London: Pali Texts Society, 1838, 2. 140.
23. See my Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, (October 1975), chapter 7;also Causality, pp. 178-180.
24. Saddharmapu.n.dariika-suutra, ed. U. Wogihara and C. Tsuchida, Tokyo: The Seigo Kenkyu-kai, 1934-1936, p. 271.
25. Ibid. p. 272.
26. Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa, ed. and tr. E. Conze, Serie Orientale Roma 13, Rome: Institute italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957, p. 56.
27. Kaa`syapaparivarta of the Ratnakuu.ta-suutra, ed. A Stael-Holstein, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926, p. 90.
28. Ibid. p. 87.
29. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa 15.7.
30. MKV,pp. 269-270.
31. Ibid. p. 270.
32. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa 1.10.
33. MKV,pp. 239, 500, 504,
ya.h pratyayair jaayati sa hy ajaato,
no tasya utpaadu svabhaavato'sti.
Ya.h pratyayaadhiinu sa `suunya ukto
ya.h `suunyataa.m jaanati so'pramatta.h.
34. MKV,pp. 516-517.
35. Samyutta 1. 191; 3.146; Taisho 2.153c.
36. M MKV, p.3.
37. Ibid. p. 492.
38. Ibid. p. 493. See also p. 135.
39. Ibid.
40. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa 5.7.
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41. Ibid. 24.18.
42. Ibid. 18.9; See also MKV, 491, 493.
43. MKV,pp. 135. 270.
44. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970, p. 129.
45. Ibid. Sec note 4.
46. Madhyaantavibhaaga 1.2. See Madhyaantavibhaagabhaa.sya, ed. G. M. Nagao, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964, p. 18. na `suunya.m naapi caa`suunya.m tasmaat sarva.m vidhiiyate satvaad asatvaat satvaac ca madhyamaa pratipac ca saa.
47. Madhyaantavibhaagabhaa.sya , p. 18.
48. Sakv p. 524, Trividha.m hi Yogaacaaraanaa.m sat, paramaartha sa.mv.rti-sat dravya-sac ca. Dravyata.h svalak.sa.nata.h sad dravya-sad iti. Note the nonuse of the term svabhaava to define dravya, although, defining the Sarvaastivaada conception, Ya`somitra said (p. 529): svabhaava evai.saa.m svalak.sa.na.m (See note 11).