Heidegger's "Ontological Difference" and Mahayana's "Twi-satyas" Theory

Wu Xue guo  
Associate Professor of Religion  
and Comparative Philosophy,  
Department of Philosophy,  
Nankai University

Qin Yan  
Lecturer on Religion and Literature,  
School of Arts,  
Shanxi University

The article is a comparative study on the Heideggerian and Buddhist Mahayanan philosophies. We attempt to bring them into dialogue and promote their mutual understanding through discussion of their two fundamental ideas, i.e. "Ontological Difference" and "Twi-satyas". On the one hand, Heidegger's differentiation between the Being Itself and beings, namely the differentiation between "Nothingness" and
"beingness", is similar to the Mahayana Buddhist distinction between "Sunya" and "bhava" in that both of them aim for recognition of "Nothingness" by the overcoming of obstinacy in "beingness", so we may say Heidegger's thinking has Buddhist significance. On the other hand we regard the "Twisatyas" theory of Mahayana Buddhism also as a kind of "Ontological Differentiation": Firstly, just like Heidegger's "Nothing", Sunya is the truth and essence of being; secondly, just like the Heideggerian "Differentiation", the "Twisatyas" theory also contains as its significance the deconstruction of Metaphysics; lastly, "Sunya" in Chinese Buddhism is non-fixedness (Wu Zhu or aniketa), which means freedom in the same ontological significance with Heidegger's "Nothing". The principal divergence between the Heideggerian and Mahayana theories consists in their different understanding of "Nothingness". Sunya, the Nothingness in Buddhism, is a being absolutely non-linguistic; so the difference between the two "satyas" is in fact the difference between the linguistic and the non-linguistic; To Heidegger, however, the Nothingness as Being itself is just the language itself or its essence, so the Ontological Difference is just distinction between the language essence and the beings coming into this language. Moreover Heidegger's Nothing (Nichts) is time itself, whereas the
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

Synyata of Mahayana Buddhism is totally non-temporal.

The Buddhist significance in Heidegger's Ontological Differentiation

Heidegger’s "ontological difference" (Ontologische Unterscheidung) is a distinction between Being itself and the beings(1), which makes clear that Being is not the beings (das Seiende), but is the totally other (schlechthin Andere) of everything in the world and is separated from the latter by unfathomable abyss(2). This "Being-itself" is totally without relation, unintelligible, unspeakable; in contrast with the "being" of ordinary things, it is rather "Nothing". Nevertheless this Nothing is the source of everything, so Nothing is "Nothingness" as essence (Wesen). Therefore the ontological difference is differentiation between being and nothing.

Chinese philosophers also discussed the problem about "being" and "nothing". So said Lao-tsu in Tao-Te-King, "Everything in the world originated from being(You), and being from nothing (Wu)", but it seems that this kind of thought have not reached the horizon of Ontological Difference(3). The Upanishads in ancient India have referred

海德格的「存在論差異」之佛家意涵

海德格的「存在論差異」(Ontologische Unterscheidung)旨在區別存有與存在者(1)，其厳切指出存有不等同於存在者( das Seiende)，而是與世間萬物截然不同的「他者」(schlechthin Andere)，並由玄奧莫測的渾沌與後者區隔(2)。這「存有自身」是全然無關連性、無從認知、無法言喻的；與日常事物之「存在」相較，它可謂是「無」。然而這「無」卻是萬物之本源，故而「無」在本質上是「無的狀態」，故而存有論之辨析乃在區別「存在」與「無」。

中國哲學家亦曾探討過「有」與「無」的問題。老子在《道德經》中曾云：「萬物皆生於有，有生於無。」但這種思想似乎尚未臻於存在論差異的層次(3)。古印度之《奧義書》亦曾論及二諦之差異，但其
to the distinction between two satyas too, but it has not gained an ontological meaning until Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahayana "Two satyas" are "paramārtha-satya" and "samvṛti-satya", the latter of which is ordinary experiential existence (corresponding to Heidegger's "Seiende"), i.e. "being" (bhava, or "You" in Chinese); the former is being's essential truth (corresponding to Heidegger's "essence of being"), i.e. "sunya" (emptiness, or "kong" in Chinese). So the Mahayana distinction between the samvṛti and the paramārtha is actually a differentiation between "being" and "sunya", which is similar to Heidegger's ontological difference between "being" and "nothing".

Both the Heideggerian and the Mahayana Buddhist "differentiations" have overcome the obstinacy in beings (seiende), and realized an intuition in "Nothingness" (truth of the essence of being). We know that the "Sunya" in Mahayana contains mainly three senses as follows: firstly sunya as the ultimate truth of essence of being, secondly sunya as an attitude to things (namely as negation of hetu-pratyaya or experiential existence), lastly sunya as the goal of negation. We think Heidegger's concept of Nothing contains similarly three aspects too.
Firstly, his explanation of Nothing as being’s essence corresponds with Mahayana’s elaboration of the "essence" (sva-lakṣaṇa) meaning of sunya (here "sva-lakṣaṇa" means truth and essence). Mahayana Buddhists regard Nothingness i.e. sunya as the ultimate truth of being, and Heidegger's Nothing is also the truth of being in similar sense. Heidegger thought that Metaphysics saw only being, but not Nothing which is more authentic than being. So that in Metaphysics Being was never understood as Being-Itself, but instead as the "beingness of beings" (die Seiendheit des Seienden) and Nothing, accordingly, was understood as "non-being". But in truth Nothing is never "non-being", but "the movement of the essence of Being-itself, so it is more truly being than all the other beings". So one can say that pure Nothing is pure Being, i.e. the truth of Being.

Mahayana Buddhism, especially that in China, mostly understands sunya, i.e. Nothingness as being's substratum or origin (dharmabhūta or bhūta-tathatā), and regards everything to be produced from it. In Heidegger's philosophy "Nothingness", "Occurrence of Being" (Ereignis) is also

Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

第一，他將「無」詮釋為存有之本質，此點契合大乘對「空」之本質意義上之闡述（svalakṣaṇa，「自相」或作「自性」，此處作真實及本質解）。大乘佛家將「空」視為一切存在之究竟實相，而海德格的「無」在此也同樣具有存在之真實的意涵。海德格認為形而上學只關注存在而不見比存在更為真實之「無」。故形而上學從未以存有自身來理解存有，反倒將之視為「存在物之存在狀態」（die Seiendheit des Seienden）；也因而將「無」理解為「非存在」。然而事實上「無」斷非「非存在」，而是「有存有之本質的活動」，因此是比存在者更真實地存在」。故而純然之「無」可靠純然之「存有」，亦即存有之真實。

大乘佛家，尤其在中國，大抵將「空」視為存在之根本或本源（「法性」或「真如」），諸萬物皆緣此而生。在海德格的哲學中，「無」、「大道」(Ereignis) 亦是萬有之源頭。故而「無」的「深不可測」
the source of all the beings. So Nothing's "baselessness" (Abgrund) becomes conversely the "base" (Grund) of being and world. Nothing is the original openness of Being as Being, in this sense Nothing is conversely the source of "things" (beings): "from the nothing all beings as beings come to be" (8). There has been a shift of stress from "Dasein" to "Sein" in the development of Heidegger's thought. Relevantly the "Nothing" in his early thinking means Dasein's authentic "Seinkonnen", namely the original openness in which beings are revealed; whereas in his later thinking it means the "Occurrence of being" (Ereignis), i.e. the secret source of being and world.

Heidegger's Nothing, as a openness in which beings are revealed is identical with freedom. Freedom is truth of Being's essence(9). The essence of Being is the movement of interpreting revelation and projection, while the beings are the revealed and projected. As something projected the beings are somewhat inert and non-free, but the Being Itself as the action of revealing and projecting is characterized as the "non-determined", in this sense it is freedom. The essence of Heidegger's "Nothing" (Nichts) is "nihilation" (Nichten) (10). Nihilation is (Abgrund)反倒成為存在與世界之「根據」(Grund)。「無」，是存有在其自身的源始展現，依此而言「無」反倒是「萬有」（存在者）的根源：「萬物之所以存在乃源自於無。」海德格思想的發展，有一個轉變，那便是從以「此在」（Dasein）為重心轉變為以「在」（Sein）為重心的發展。詳言之，「無」在他的早期思想中意味著「此在」之確切起源（Seinkonnen、「能在」），亦即存在者萌現之源頭；而在他晚期思想中，「無」意指「大道」（Ereignis），亦即存在與世界之神秘的根源。

海德格的「無」作存在者萌現之源頭解，與自由同義。自由是有本質之真實。海德格的「無」指存在者萌現之源頭，與自由同義。自由是有本質之真實。
not elimination of beings, but the negation of obstruction and concealment of being, so
nihilation is transcendence and freedom(11). Freedom in this sense is not without simi-
larly with Mahayana Buddhist sunya. Firstly sunya is freedom because it’s free
from the fetters of beings. Secondly, Chi-
nese Buddhism emphasizes "Sunya" as "Wu
Zhu Sheng Xin" (keeping the mind moving
freely without obstacle), so it is more simi-
lar with the concept of Heidegger’s Nichten
and freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" does not
interpret sunya as an immutable being, but
as a "free moving" (Yuan Yong) essence. As freedom and movement, "Wu Zhu Sheng
Xin" is totally identical with the Heide-
ggerian "Nothing". "Wu Zhu" (aniketa, get-
ing rid of obstruction, fixedness and inertia)
overcomes our obsession (abhiniveśa) with
finite things, and brings understanding of be-
ing into the state of "Wu Ai Wu Zhi" (no
fetter, no blockage), "Zi Zai Yuan Yong" (absolutely free and perfect); We think
Heidegger’s "Nichten" is a freedom in the
same sense, it overcomes the one-sidedness
of Dasein’s understanding of being and
brings Dasein for the first time in front of
the unity of being as being(12).

(10) Nichts)之本質是「虛無」(Nichten)

Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference”
and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

(7)
Secondly, Heidegger’s discussion on Nothing aims at deconstruction of Metaphysics too, which is also “breaking with abhiniveśa (obstinacy, one-sidedness, sinking in world, indulging in practical life)” just like Mahayana’s Sunya as negation of hetu-pratyaya (i.e. as prayojana). The wisdom of “breaking with abhiniveśa” is not the patent of Buddhism or oriental spirit. For example Plato’s distinction between the sensible world and the supersensible is also a breaking with the "abhiniveśa" in sensible world. But Metaphysics always takes up a new "abhiniveśa" (with Plato, the "abhiniveśa" in supersensible world) after doing away with the old one. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction also aimed at breaking with "abhiniveśa", for reduction is "just the cancellation of the presumption of the being of the objective world" (8), which is in fact implied in the significance of the Mahayana Sunya. As the result of reduction only the transcendental consciousness that has direct evidence survives (9). In the Buddhist view, the reduction "sunyates" (nihilates) the "Jing" (artha, or world) by means of "Xin (cit, or Subject), but still saves "Xin", i.e. transcendental consciousness, so it, as "sunya", is not ultimate. The saved "Xin" as a self-adequate reality is dissolved by Heidegger into Dasein’s temporal movement (10). Therefore in hermeneutic ontology there is no

其次，海德格對「無」的探究亦是旨在解構形而上學，其亦「斷除妄執（偏執、偏頗、沉論、沉湎於凡塵世俗中）」，此正如大乘之「空」否定了因緣（亦即如同「用」，prayojana）。「斷除妄執」的智慧不是佛家或東方精神的專利。例如柏拉圖對可感知世界與超感知世界的區隔，亦是斷除對可感知世界的「妄執」。但形而上學在摒棄舊「妄執」後，總會萌生新「妄執」（就柏拉圖而言，即是對超感知世界的「妄執」）。胡塞爾的現象學還原論（reduction）亦是旨在斷除「妄執」，因為還原論「僅是取消客觀世界存有之假設」(9)，這事實上與大乘空觀之旨趣暗相應和。還原之結果，只有具直接證據之先驗意識得以留存(10)。依佛家觀點，還原乃經由「心」（心識，主體）將「境」（塵世）「空化」（虛無化），但仍存留「心」，亦即先驗意識，故而其依「空」而言，並非究竟。那被以為是實在之自我顯現的「心」，海德格將之轉化成
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

more Metaphysical Ego (Xin), but only the temporal Language movement of interpretation; in words of Buddhism, it even "suniates" the world-suniating consciousness (cit) (9), so it is "suya-suniating" (in Chinese, "kong kong"). The cit or self exists only in the temporal process of the transformation of language into the "non-self"(things), so Gadamer said language is "the most selfless"(i.e. nir-ātman in Mahayana) (17). The temporal language consciousness is essentially identical to Mahayana Yogacāra’s concept of ālaya vijñānana (18).

The problem of Metaphysics consists essentially in its seeing only being but not nothing (10), which means almost the same thing as the so-called "abhiniveśa" in ontological sense by Buddhism. So the Heideggerian nothing and Buddhist sunya have the similar object to nihilate. Apart from the relation with nothing, Metaphysics understands Being as beingness (seiendheit) of beings, while the absolute idea, substance, absolute spirit and will to power, etc. all fall into its scope. So the so-called "Meta-physik" is actually still "physik" (9) in that it sees only Anwesen but not Anwesenenlassen, only Lichte(light) but not Lichtung

“此在”(Dasein)之時間性的活動(15)。故而在詮釋學本體論中，不復見形而上的自我(心)，只有時間性的語言詮釋活動：依佛家說，其甚至將萬法皆空的心識(16)也「空化」，故而是「空空」。心或自我只存在於語言轉化為「非我」(萬物)的時間過程中，故曰「高遠美說語言是「最無我的」(亦即大乘之nir-ātman, 無我) (17)。這種時間性的語言意識本質上與大乘瑜伽師地學派之阿賴耶識觀念雷同(18)。

形而上學的問題之縝結在於其只見「有」而不見「無」(19)，此與佛家在本體意涵上所謂的「執」而言幾無二致。故而海德格學說中之「無」與佛家之「空」有著同樣要摒除的對象。形而上學，排除了與「無」的關連，將存有視為存在的存在狀態(seiendheit)，諸如絕對之理念、物質、絕對之精神與意志力等，全都隸屬其範疇。

故而所謂的「形而上」(Meta-physik)
(lighten) "being" in light but not the secret nothing which leads the beings into light. It is in essence "flight from" the "nothing". Being afraid of Nothing, man always attempted to hold on to being, thence he projected a being "best qualified as being" (das seiendste Seiende), i.e. the absolute idea, the highest reality, the highest good to protect himself from the attack of Nothing and assure himself safety. Likewise the "Onto-theo-logie" of Christianity understands God as "the most absolute being", and regards the authentic nothing, i.e. the freedom, as sin; so its essence is also "flight from nothing", whereas Heidegger's fundamental ontology ought to be regarded as an attempt to cut off the way of Dasein's flight (2). In words of Mahayana Buddhist, "flight from Nothing" is abhinivesa in beings, while forcing man to face nothing is similar to Buddhist giving up "being" and realizing "sunya".

Lastly, Heidegger's analysis on nothing aimed at the revelation of the truth of Being, factually is "body" (physik) (2), because of only "being" in light but not the secret nothing which leads the beings into light. It is in essence "flight from" the "nothing". Being afraid of Nothing, man always attempted to hold on to being, thence he projected a being "best qualified as being" (das seiendste Seiende), i.e. the absolute idea, the highest reality, the highest good to protect himself from the attack of Nothing and assure himself safety. Likewise the "Onto-theo-logie" of Christianity understands God as "the most absolute being", and regards the authentic nothing, i.e. the freedom, as sin; so its essence is also "flight from nothing", whereas Heidegger's fundamental ontology ought to be regarded as an attempt to cut off the way of Dasein's flight (2). In words of Mahayana Buddhist, "flight from Nothing" is abhinivesa in beings, while forcing man to face nothing is similar to Buddhist giving up "being" and realizing "sunya".

Lastly, Heidegger's analysis on nothing aimed at the revelation of the truth of Being, factually is "body" (physik) (2), because of
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

hence it is similar to the Buddhistic "Sunya" as goal of negation (namely the "artha" aspect of "Sunya"). Twi-satyas theory lies in negating "being" and revealing "Sunya", likewise Heidegger's distinction between being and nothing consists in "highlighting Being from beings" ②. Heidegger thought that old Metaphysics always determined Being from the viewpoint of beings, which led to the forgetting of the essence of Being, and finally even this forgetting is forgotten ③. But the "Nichten"(nihilation) of "Nichts" makes the world as unity of beings indifferent, and deprives Dasein of his relation with being's unity, therefore makes him come directly in front of Being itself, i. e. Nothing, Abyss or the secret source of beings occurrence (Ereignis). Here we think Heidegger's intention agrees with that of Mahayana to negate vyavaharika "being" (bhava) and reveal paramārthika "nothing" (sunya).

The sentiment (Stimmung) in which the Nothing is revealed is anxiety. But anxiety is not an ordinary feeling. It is like the Buddhist Dhātāra. Here, as Heidegger says, "All things and we ourselves sink into indifference, .... The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this 'no

正如佛家之「空」乃至否定之目標（亦即「空」之「塵境」層面）。二諦論寓含於抑「有」而揚「空」，海德格對「存在」與「無」之辨析同樣亦在於「由存在者中彰顯出存有」 ②。海德格認為昔日之形而上學總由存在者之觀點來論斷存有，此導致忘卻存有之本質，最後甚至將此忘卻亦拋諸腦後③。而（海德格）其「無」(Nichts)的「無的狀態」(Nichten)將萬有視為不相關的群體，剝離了「此在」(Dasein)與存在之整體關係，故而令其直接面對存有自身，亦即「無」，渾沌或存有肇始之奧秘起源（大道，Ereignis）。對此我們認為海德格之意旨契合大乘的否定世俗「有」(bhava)及闡揚勝義「空」。

「無」所顯現的情緒（Stimmung）是焦慮。然而焦慮並非尋常に情感，那如同佛家的禪定。對此，誠如海德格所云：「萬物與我們自己都寓於不相關的存在狀態中，存在者全都漸次消退，令我們籠罩在焦慮中，備受壓迫。我們無

(11)
hold on things' comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing” (5). Dhyāna also requires the student to be "away with difference, away with concept of human, away with Egoism" and perceive theauthentic sunyata (Nothingness). Moreover the so-called "indifference" is neither ordinary existence of beings, nor an emptiness with all things annihilated, but is characterized as "non-being, non-emptiness"; similarly the Buddhist "sunyata intuition" is not an absolute elimination of being either, but aims at the "non-being, non-emptiness" too. Moreover Heidegger’s nothing is formless, unthinkable, so it cannot be held on like beings; that is in accordance with the negating spirit of Buddhist too. Lastly just as it is with Mahayana’s "intuition in sunya", so Heidegger’s realization of nothing is also "speechless", because in Nothing being’s unity disappears, both the objects of speech and the being’s relation which makes speech possible come into silence. The situation finds its analogous expression in a phrase of Chinese Taoism "Great speech is without voice, great being is without form". (6) 從掌握森羅萬象。存在者不斷流逝，唯獨這種『無從掌握森羅萬象』籠罩我們並盤桓不去。焦慮揭示了無。」(5) 禪亦要求弟子「摒棄差別相，斷離人身觀，去除我執」，以參悟自性清淨之「空性」。再者，所謂的「無差別」， 既不是存在者尋常之存在，亦不是萬物寂滅的空無，而是具有「非有非空」之特質；佛家之「空觀」亦同樣不是絕對斷絕存有，而是亦旨在「非有非空」。再者，海德 格之「無」是不具形相、不可思 惟，故而無法將之視同存在者； 此與佛家之否定精神亦相契合。 最後，就如大乘之「空觀」，海德 格對「無」之領會亦是「不可言說」 的，因為在「無」時，存在之整體性消失了，言語的對象以及使言 語成為可能的存在之關連皆已寂 然。此與中國道家所云之「大音希 聲，大象無形」(6) 可謂異曲同工。
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

The Twi-satyas theory as an "Ontological Differenciation"

What are the twi-satyas? Nāgārjuna said in Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā:

"The Buddhas teach the people dharma according to Twi-Satyas, the one is the experiential (samvrti-satya); The other is the ultimate (paramārtha-satyas). If one does not know the distinction between the two satyas, he would not understand the true meanings of Buddha's deep dharma" (13).

And Pīṇgalanetra's commentary on it is: "The samvrti-satya is that all things are empty but ordinary people owing to wrong understanding produce untrue dharmas and look upon them as true. The saints know their wrongness and look upon all dharmas as empty and without origin, so it is paramārtha-satya, namely the truth." (13) "Satya" means teaching, theory or truth. In Mahayana Buddhism the Twi-satyas are not only two methods of teaching, but also two sense-dimensions of being. The paramārtha-satya is the original truth of being, i.e. tathātā or dhammatā, also

(13)

青目（或音譯賓伽羅、賓頭羅伽）對此之譯釋為：「世俗諦者。一切法性空。而世間顛倒故生虛妄法。於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性。故知一切法皆空無生。於聖人是第一義諦名為實。」

(13) 諦，指教法、理法，或真理。大乘佛家之二諦不只是兩種教法，亦是兩種知見層次之存有。勝義諦是存有之真理，亦即真如
called "sunya" or "sunyata"; while the samvrti-satyas means experiential beings, it is the being projected by human convention and custom, also called "being" or "vyavaharika being". We think the distinction between "sunya" and "being" is similar in spirit to Heidegger’s differentiation between "Nothing" and "being".

The Buddhist Twi-satyas theory converted the differentiation of Upanishads between the para-Brahman (the higher Brahman) and the apartha-Brahman (the lower Brahman) into distinction between sunya and being, hence raised it onto the ontological level. Sunya is the truth and essence of being, but is different from ordinary beings (the vyavaharika), it is the "totally other" of all beings. Rather than ranked as "being" (bhava), it would better be called "Nothingness" (while the "being" as asanta-bhāva, i.e. wrong existence is conversely produced from "sunya" by vitatha, i.e. wrong understanding).

Just as it is with Heidegger’s differentiation, so the twi-satyas theory is brought forth in order to reveal the realm of Nothingness as opposite to being (bhava). The Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is a speech-less, formless dark principle. Sunya as Nothingness is neither a real "being" as Vorhandenheit (the present existence), nor "non-

或法性，或稱為「空」或「空性」；而世俗諦則意指著體驗之存有，其為依人類習俗投射之存有，亦稱為「有」或「世俗有」。我們認為對「空」與「有」之分別，與海德格對「無」與「存在」之辨析，乃言殊而旨同。

佛家之二諦論將《華嚴經》關於上梵及下梵之分別轉化為「空」與「有」之分別，因此將其提昇至存有論之層次。「空」是存在的真實與本質，但與世俗之存在者不同，它是與存在者「截然不同的它者」。與其將之歸為「有」，不如稱之為「空」（而「有」之所以為妄有，亦即虛妄之存在，則是因為妄想顛倒，執「空」為「有」）。

正如海德格的辨析，二諦論之提出亦是為了彰顯與「有」相對的「空」界。「空」是無法言詮、不具形相的幽玄本質。「空」與「無」一樣，既不是當下現成狀態的存有者（Vorhandenheit），亦不是否定
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

being” as negation of Vorhandenheit, but "non-being, non-emptiness" as in the case with Heidegger. In sectarian Buddhism the Sarvāstivādins held on to "being" theory, i.e. realism, regarding all dharmas as ultimate "bhava" (being); on the other hand the Vaipulyists held on to "empty" theory, i.e. nihilism, regarding all dharmas as absolute "abhāva" (emptiness). The Mahayana Buddhists view both as wrong. They think that true sunya falls neither on the side of "being", nor on the side of "non-being". That is called the "Middle Way". The true sages "love neither sunya nor non-sunya" (3). Afterwards the San-lun school in China developed out of Nāgārjuna’s twi-satyas the "Four-fold Twi-satyas", in the fourth (the highest) fold of which it is understood that everything can be spoken of is sama-bhāti-satyas, only the "speechless, unintelligible" essence is the absolute truth (paramārth-satyas) (4).

The Twi-satyas theory, just like Heidegger's "Differentiation", also aims at deconstruction of Metaphysics. There is Metaphysics in the East as well as in the West. Like their counterpart in the West, the eastern Metaphysicians also hold on to "being" (bhava) and don’t see "Nothingness" (sunya). So the Twi-satyas theory aims to deconstruct the "being" of things and reveal the "Nothingness" (i.e. sunya which is the essence of the truth of being), which is similar with Heidegger's deconstruction of

當下存在的「非有」，而是如海德格所謂之「非有非空」。部派佛教之說一切有部堅執「有」論，亦即實有，認為「法體恆有」；而方等部派則倡揚「空」論，認為諸法皆為「非有」。大乘佛家則認為兩者皆非。他們認為真正的空既不偏「有」，亦不偏「非有」，此之謂「中道」。真正的聖賢「不愛空不愛有」(2)。爾後中國的三論宗由龍樹的二諦論發展出「四重二諦」，其第四重（最高境界）乃以能言詮者悉為世俗諦，唯「言亡慮絕」者為實義諦(3)。

二諦論就如海德格之「存在論差異」，亦是旨在解構形而上學。西方有形而上學，東方亦然。東方的形而上學家亦如西方形而上學家，執於「有」而不見「空」。故而二諦論意在解構「有」而闡揚「空」(亦即法性真如)，此與海德格解構西方形而上學不謀而合。
Universal Gate Buddhist Journal, Issue 21

Western Metaphysics.

Metaphysics is just "abhiniveśa". According to Buddhism the "abhini̇vēśas" include abhiniveśa in being (dharma) and abhiniveśa in self (ātman). In Indian thoughts, Hinayana Buddhism and the Brahman Vaiśeṣika school etc. are experiential realism, while the philosophy in later Upanishads and Bhagavadgītā etc. is transcendent metaphysics, both of them are "dharma abhiniveśa". Very similarly to the case with Heidegger, the Buddhists also take the understanding of the temporality of being as their starting point in deconstruction of dharma abhiniveśa. The dharma abhiniveśa of Hinayana and Tirthaka (the non-Buddhists) is mostly holding on "dharma as real, dharma's being as eternal", i.e. they think dharmas are eternal substances without time. But Buddha has said that "all phenomena are transitory"(anityāḥ sarva-saṃskārāḥ), so revealed phenomena as momentarily appearing and disappearing and having no eternal existence; again Mahayana's "occurrence theory" (pratitya-samutpāda vāda), e.g. the ālaya pratitya-samutpāda of vijñāpti mātratā, also emphasizes that all beings appear in the temporal continuous running (samta-prortti) of being. Moreover the manner of Mahayana's negation of self-abhiniveśa is analogous to that of Heidegger's deconstruction of subjectivism. We have pointed out that the
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

ālaya vijñāna concept of Vijñaptimātratā school dissolved the non-temporal Ego of Saṃkhya and Vedānta into the self-transforming, eternal running movement of time. So the Buddhist Karma theory is an expression of their understanding about the temporality of existence: it makes clear that the essence of man is not an immutable consciousness but is formed by his past life, which reminds us of the explanation of the historicity of human being by hermeneutic philosophy. The dissolution of Ego in the horizon of time or its disappearance in karma’s movement is the same.

Moreover, Sunya-vada deconstructed the old Brahman theology, just as the Heideggerian "Nothing" theory did to the Christian scholastic theology. Heidegger’s "Ontological Difference" negates the God concept of Christian "Onto-theo-logie" as the highest being, the eternal transcendent absolute far beyond the world, thence forces man to face Nothing squarely. In Indian thoughts it is in later Upanishads that a Metaphysics about Brahman’s supersensible world is at first established, thereafter the Bhagavadgītā, identifying Brahman with God, introduced the upanishadic Metaphysics into theology, therefore the then Indian theism also was an Onto-theo-logie. The twi-satyas theory contains deconstruction of this theism. Mahayana regards "non-difference, non-duality (advaita), middle way" as the

中。故而佛家之「業」（Karma）論

乃表達他們對無常變異之領悟：

此論闡明人的本質並非一成不變

的意識，而是由於他的前生薰習而

成，那令我們想起詮釋論哲學對

人類史實性之解釋。自我溶入時

間的境域，或在「業」的活動中消

失，兩者毫無二致。

再者，「空」論解構昔日之婆

羅門教神學，就如海德格之「無」

論解構基督教的經院派神學。海

德格的「存在論差異」否定基督教

「本體神學」中將上帝視為至高無

上之存在、遠非凡俗所能企及的

亙古先驗之觀念，因此迫使人類

正視「無」。在印度思潮中，後期

之《奧義書》中關於大梵之超感知

世界為其形而上學的濫觴，隨後

《薄伽梵歌》將大梵視為神，將

奧義書式之形而上學導入神學，故

而當時的印度有神論亦為一種本

體神學。二諦論包含了對這種有

(17)
true understanding of dharma required by twi-satyas theory, so it "sunyated" (deconstructed) the transcendental intelligence. Moreover Mahayana Buddhism is also against Hinayana’s opposition of Nirvāṇa and world and its flight from world to nirvāṇa, but insists on "neither sticking to world, nor to nirvāṇa" (1), because all dharmas are one, indifferent; consequently the division between noumenon and phenomenon is broken. The deconstruction of the transcendental world requires man to return from the ideal "heaven" to the world of real life. In words of Mahayana, it is "realizing sunyata just in the rupa" (rūpaṃ śūnyata, śūnyata iva rūpaṃ); in words of Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is "returning to the earth again" (2).

The negation of "being" aims to manifest sunya. Some scholars pointed out that "karma" in Buddhism, just as "essence of technology" in Heidegger, is the cause of concealment of being (3). Both Western Metaphysics and Eastern "bhava" (being) theories concealed the original truth of Being, so they must be negated. But obviously the Buddhist negation is more thoroughgoing. Mahayana looks upon all beings as non-substantial and thence their existence (sва-bhāva) as empty, so we must nihilate them and realize "all dharms are nothing, all hetu-pratyayas are empty" (4).

The negation of "being" aims to manifest sunya. Some scholars pointed out that "karma" in Buddhism, just as "essence of technology" in Heidegger, is the cause of concealment of being (3). Both Western Metaphysics and Eastern "bhava" (being) theories concealed the original truth of Being, so they must be negated. But obviously the Buddhist negation is more thoroughgoing. Mahayana looks upon all beings as non-substantial and thence their existence (sва-bhāva) as empty, so we must nihilate them and realize "all dharms are nothing, all hetu-pratyayas are empty" (4).
and finally come to the state of "having nothing". This "having nothing", however, does not mean nihilism, but aims at the realization of sunyata, i.e. the truth of dharma. All are sunya(empty), while only the clear, taintless substratum as sunyata is real. Nevertheless the reality of the substratum is not the Metaphysical reality, substance, i.e. ātman, but the true Being manifested after the nihilation of ātman.

The "Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra" explains sunya as "keeping the mind moving freely without obstacle" (In Chinese, "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin") \( \textcircled{5} \). Chinese Buddhism always understands "non-abhiniveśa" and "sunya" from the point of "non-obstruction, non-blockage", so it realized throughout the spirit of "Wu Zhu"(aniketa, non-fixedness). "Wu Zhu" is ontologically similar to Heidegger's "Nichten" as freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" in Chinese Buddhism means keeping the mind free from abhiniveśa and keeping it moving naturally, running smoothly without fetter. In words of Chan, it is "no blockage in mind," "sticking to neither the exterior nor the interior, going and coming freely, getting rid of abhiniveśa thoughts and realizing non-obstruction" \( \textcircled{6} \). Not only those ideas stick to the mistaken, but also those stick to "the correct" must be gotten rid of, hence eventually the complete freedom of spirit is necessary. The "Wu Zhu" is ontologically similar to Heidegger's "Nichten" as freedom.

Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

最後臻於「則見一切空」之境。然而，這種「一切空」並不意味著排除主義，而在參悟空性，亦即真如。諸法皆空，唯有自性清淨的空性為真如。然而，真如並不是形而上學之實在、實體，亦即「我」，而是在否定我之後所體現的存有實相。

《金剛般若波羅蜜經》將「空」作「無住生心」解 \( \textcircled{5} \)。中國佛家總由「無礙無著」的觀點來理解「無執」與「空」，故而得以徹悟「無住」的精神。「無住」之自由意旨與海德格的「無」(Nichten) 有類似之存有論意涵。中國佛家所謂之「無住生心」意指心靈自在，遠離執著，隨緣放曠，無礙無礙。依禪宗而言則是「心不染著」，「內外不住」。去來由自由。能除執心。通達無礙。\( \textcircled{6} \) 不僅要斷除邪見之執念，也要斷除「正見」之執念，如此終可參透自在解脫之般若三昧。此種自由既不是理性抑制感性（如康德），亦不是違背率性的懲行，而是斷除無明妄執，敞開
realized. This freedom is neither autocracy of reason over the senses (as in Kant), nor reckless fool action, but removing the concealment (avidyā, abhiniveṣā) and keeping an openness for the truth of being (bhūttatathatā); the so understood freedom is in ontological sense totally similar with Heidegger’s understanding of Nothing. Maybe that is the reason why Heidegger was so interested in Chan Buddhism!

Nothingness or Sunya never belongs to beings, so it cannot be exposed by means of language. The Chinese Xuan Xue (theory about Tao) often says: "When the fish are gotten, the net can be given up; when the meaning is gotten, the speech can be given up"; the Indian Upanishads also said that words are only "weariness of speech" and the ultimate truth is unspeakable; and the European mystics sighed over the limitations of language too. We must also admit the Nothingness of Heidegger and Mahayana Buddhism as unspeakable because it does not belong to the sphere of being and has no relation of being with world. Mahayana believes everything speakable is vyavaharika "being" but not paramārthika "sunya". Being is conversely produced from "sunya" by virtue of abhūta-parikalpa(wrong understanding), while abhūta-parikalpa is senseless speech of ordinary man. Therefore being is only a prod-

「無」或「空」不曾隸屬於存在者，故而無法言詮。中國之玄學（道家之學說）常謂：「得魚而忘筌，得意而忘言」；印度的《奧義書》亦謂說語僅是「徒勞脣舌」，至理無言；歐洲之神祕主義論者亦為語言的侷限而喟然嘆嘆。我們也必須承認海德格的「無」與大乘佛家的「空」都是無法言詮的，因為其不歸屬於存在之範疇，也無關乎世間之存在。大乘佛家相信凡是能言詮者皆為世俗「有」，而非勝義「空」。諸法空寂，凡夫以虛妄分別，種種戲論故，倒「空」為「有」。職是之故，「有」僅為語言的產物，而「空」則是離言真如。故而佛教可謂是「言
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

We believe that, the similarities between the Heideggerian and Buddhist thoughts are mainly due to (besides their common logic of thinking) the direct or indirect influences of oriental tradition on Heidegger. Firstly, Heidegger’s Ontological difference was inspired by Christian mysticism, and today’s scholars have found that there have been a number of ties between medieval mysticism and Indian Upanishadic mysticism; secondly Heidegger could get in touch with and take use of the achievements in Oriental study in the 19th century and the first two or three decades of the 20th century. Heidegger's differentiation between Being and beings has benefited from Rudolf Otto, a theologian in Marburg, Heidegger's saying that Being is "the absolutely other" (schlechthin Andre) of beings was borrowed from Otto, and Otto's expression was inspired by Buddhist and Indian thought.

語道斷」的宗教，釋迦牟尼則為「能仁寂默」。慧智的菩薩應當遣除戲論，依般若智慧了悟離言真空，此即《攝大乘論》所云之「如啞求受塵」。

Conclusion

我們相信海德格學說與佛家思想之所以如許類同，主要是基於（除了兩者的思想邏輯相同外）東方傳統對海德格直接或間接的影響。首先，海德格的「存在論差異」是衍生自基督教神祕主義，而當今之學者已發現中古神祕主義與印度的奧義書派神祕主義間有諸多脈絡可尋；再者海德格對十九世紀及二十世紀前二十至三十年間的東方研究之成果或曾涉獵並善加運用。海德格對「存有」與存有物問之辨析曾受惠於德國馬堡大學的神學家魯道夫奧圖，海德格對存有是存在者的「截然不同的它者」（schlechthin Andre）
On the other hand we think a comparative research should not only see the common aspects of both sides, but also their differences. Although both the Ontological Differentiation and Twi-satyas theory aim to nihilate "being" and realize "Nothingness", but their understanding of Nothingness is not wholly the same one. The Buddhist Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is an absolutely non-linguistic being (in Indian Buddhism, it is mostly still an absolutely non-spiritual being), a dark indifferent essence which is "speechless, unthinkable" (totally opposed to language and thought), so the distinction of the Two Satyas is in fact that between the linguistic and the non-linguistic (Sunya is unspeakable, because it is just the opposition of language). But in Heidegger's thought Nothingness, i.e. the Being Itself is in essence language, "Language is the house of being" ②; that Being is "unspeakable" is just because it is language itself or its essence, Language can say anything, except itself③. Relevantly, the Nothingness or Ereignis of Heidegger is time; whereas the sunya of Buddhism, remaining the same one from no beginning, is absolutely non-temporal. Moreover though the Buddhist negation of substance by virtue of its"说法, is a metaphor from ontic, while ontic is a different point from Buddhist and Indian thought.④

Next, we believe that the study on religious similarities does not only see the common aspects of both sides, but also their differences. Although both the Ontological Differentiation and Twi-satyas theory aim to negate "being" and realize "Nothingness", but their understanding of Nothingness is not wholly the same one. The Buddhist Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is an absolutely non-linguistic being (in Indian Buddhism, it is mostly still an absolutely non-spiritual being), a dark indifferent essence which is "speechless, unthinkable" (totally opposed to language and thought), so the distinction of the Two Satyas is in fact that between the linguistic and the non-linguistic (Sunya is unspeakable, because it is just the opposition of language). But in Heidegger's thought Nothingness, i.e. the Being Itself is in essence language, "Language is the house of being" ②; that Being is "unspeakable" is just because it is language itself or its essence, Language can say anything, except itself③. Relevantly, the Nothingness or Ereignis of Heidegger is time; whereas the sunya of Buddhism, remaining the same one from no beginning, is absolutely non-temporal. Moreover though the Buddhist negation of substance by virtue of its
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

The momentariness of beings shares a common Logic with Heidegger’s deconstruction of the metaphysical concept of reality by means of being’s temporality, yet the Buddhist attitude is "negation without affirmation": "momentariness" (anityah) is vyavahara-satya, i.e. the existent state of ordinary beings, while the essence of Being (paramārtha-satya) is the absolutely timeless sunyata or bhūta-tathatā; that is quite contrary to Heidegger’s viewpoint. Heidegger used the concept of temporality to negate the Metaphysical being, meanwhile "affirmed" temporality as Being’s essence, so his attitude is "affirmation with negation".

Moreover although Heidegger’s interpretation of Nothing is formally also a deconstruction of Metaphysics abhinivesa, this deconstruction means only overcoming of the one-sidedness of Metaphysics, but not the absolute negation of worldly life. The purpose of the Heideggerian discussion on Nothing is not to come to the Buddhist emptiness (sunyā) or non-action (vyūpasāma), on the contrary it is to let Being develop itself more freely.

Nevertheless, Chinese Buddhism is quite

空，無古如一，是絕對無時間性的。再者佛家籍著諸行無常來否定實體，與海德格藉著存在的時
間性來解構形而上學的真實觀，
兩者的邏輯雖然如出一轍，然而
佛家的態度是「不帶肯定之否
定」：「無常」為俗諦，亦即一般
存在者之現狀，而存有之本質（真
諦）則是全然無時間性之空性或真
如；此與海德格的觀點大相違
庭。海德格運用時間性的觀念否
定傳統形而上學的存有論，同時
「肯定」時間性為「存有」之本質，
故而他的態度是「帶有否定的肯
定」。

再者，雖然海德格對「無」的
見解亦是對形而上學之妄執的解
構，然而此種解構僅意味著破除
形而上學的一偏之見，而非全盤
否定凡塵俗世。海德格探討「無」
的目的不在於達佛家之「空」，
或寂滅，反倒是於讓「存有」更
自由地自我發展。

然而，中國佛教與印度佛教

(23)
different from that of India, in that it insists on the identity of "Xin" (cit or consciousness) and "Xing" (tathā or truth), "Li" (bhūta-tathā or essence) and "Shi" (dharma or phenomenon); their "sunya" is no longer anything non-spiritual, passive, immutable, but consciousness, truth and freedom of existence (Wu Zhu, Wu Ai); Moreover their teaching (e.g. as in Chan), insisting that "the ordinary consciousness is truth", completely negated the negation of ordinary life, which makes it more in harmony with Heidegger than Indian Buddhism. Maybe here lies the reason why Heidegger, lacking of Schopenhauerian warmth for Indian thought, was so fond of the teachings of Chan Buddhism!

【Note】

① With reference to Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Stuttgart: Neske, 1997), P. 110.


③ Here "Nothing", as the first cause of "being", is actually another "being" (Seiende).
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

4 Namely Sunyas sva-Lakṣaṇa (essence), prayojana (activity, function) and artha (object, value). See Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā XXIV (Nanjing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu 1944). Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti have given different interpretation to this Kārikā. Our explanation basically agrees with that of Candrakīrti, because we think it is more objective than that of Bhāvaviveka.

5 Beitraege Zur Philosophie, P. 266.

6 ibid., P. 266.

7 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.

8 ibid., P. 110.

9 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main:Vittorio Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.

10 Basic Writings, P. 105.

11 ibid.

12 ibid.

Universal Gate Buddhist Journal, Issue 21

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20–21)

Husserl said: "The sense of transcendental reduction is that it can only take Ego and not the others as the beginning of being" (Cartesianische Meditationen, P. 31; see also Cairns' translation, P. 30).

The process is similar to the Buddhist negation of "man-abhinivesa". Zimmermann has written a book on Heidegger, whose title is "Eclipse of the self", which means a gradual process to overcome egoism, where "inauthenticity is an intensification of everyday egoism; authenticity is a diminution of it" (Zimmermann, Eclipse of the Self (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981), P.47.) The process is the dissolution of the Ego as immutable substance, self-understanding or self-adequate subjectivity into temporal language movement.

Here Gadamer commented: "Heideggers thesis is: being itself is time, thence all the subjectivism of modern Philosophy is exploded" (H. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit Und Methorde (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1986), P. 243.)

Cairns' 之譯本：Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20–21)

胡塞爾說：「先驗還原論在於它能以純粹自我，而非他者，作為存有之起源。 (Cartesianische Meditationen, P. 31; 另請參閱 Cairns' 之英譯本 P. 30)

此過程類似佛法之否定「人執」，Zimmermann 曾撰書論海德格，書名為《自我之蝕》(Eclipse of the self)，意謂逐漸破除我性的過程，其中存在的本真的確定性隨著日常「我性」的強弱而消長。(Zimmermann, Eclipse of the Self (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981), P. 47.) 此過程乃是自我由不變的實體、自我認知或顯現之主體，解消為時間性的語言活動的過程。

高達美對此評道：「海德格的命題是：存有本身就是時間，在此意義下，所有現代哲學之主觀主義皆因此而崩潰瓦解。」(H. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit Und Methorde (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr,

(26)
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference”
and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory


The ālaya vijñāna is not an "Ego". It is not an eternal substance, but is always converting itself into world, and is always changed by our everyday understanding and behavior, therefore its existence is "temporal". Moreover the "self" of Heideggers Philosophy is Language, while ālaya vijñāna in Yogacāra school is also called "manojalpa vijñāna". i.e. language consciousness; both Heidegger and Yogacāra school attribute the occurrence of being (in Buddhism "pratītya-samutpāda") to Language movement. So Heideggers interpretation of Nothing and the work of Mahayana don’t only have the same purpose, but also have reached the similar end.

18 Basic Writings, P. 106.


(27)
Universal Gate Buddhist Journal, Issue 21


4 *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, PP. 19.

5 *Basic Writings*, P. 103.

6 In order to describe the experience of Nothing, Heidegger cited a passage from Knut Hamsun’s poem "The Road Leads On": "Here he sits between his ears and all he hears is emptiness. An amusing conception, indeed. On the sea there were both motion and sound, something for the ear to feed upon, a chorus of waters. Here nothingness meets nothingness and the result is zero, not even a hole. Enough to make one shake one’s head, utterly at a loss" (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, P. 27.)

7 *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* with the Commentary by Piṅgalanetra. X X IV (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1944.)

8 Ibid.


9a 同註②。

9b 無著《順中論》（南京：金陵刻經處，1932）

7《中論》青目譯。第XXIV品（南京：金陵刻經處，1944）
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

Ji Zang, *Da Chen Xuan Lun* I. Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1944.

Mahayana Buddhism has throughout kept the inquiry on the essence of being in its originality. In western thought, however, the inquiry has been transformed into the inquiry on the reason (Grund) of the being of beings at the beginning, and modern science understands reason simply as causality of natural forces, consequently the reason interpretation was changed into a rationality explanation which is determined by practical need of technological production. Whereas according to Mahayana, both the reason interpretation and rationality explanation are limited in vyavaharika (concerning only the beings), only the paramārthika (authentic thinking and being) reveals the truth of essence of being: The paramārthika and the vyavaharika, the śūnya and the being are sharply different. Therefore it avoided the confusion of the essence inquiry with reason explanation, and assured the ontological inquiry its purity.

Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā X VI


(29)

Jian Yi, Ru Da Cheng Lun.

Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra (Trans by Kumārajīva) (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932).

Hui Neng, "on prajñā, "Tan Jing (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1942).

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad IV, 4, 21 (from: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Oxford University Press, 1995.)

Nevertheless the meaning of the two "Nothingness"s is somewhat different, thence the reasons for their "unspeakability" are different too.

It is because the repeated foreign invasions and the active propaganda of native religions led to cultural mixing-together. As a result the Greek king Menandros and the Kuśāna king Kaniska became famous patrons of Buddhism, and a number of foreign rulers had been converted to other


堅意，《入大乘論》卷一，(大正藏)第三十二冊。

鳩摩羅什譯，《金剛般若波羅蜜經》(南京：金陵刻經處，1932)

恊能，《壇經·般若品》(南京：金陵刻經處，1942)

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad IV, 4-21 (from: The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Oxford University Press, 1995.)

然而兩種「空無」之意義略相出入，它們的「無法言説」之原因也因而互異。

由於不斷遭到外國入侵，加以當地宗教之大力宣揚，而形成文化融合。結果希臘之彌蘭陀王與月支國迦膩色迦王成為佛教著名的護法，許多外國統治者也都皈依其他的印度宗教。

參見: R.C. Majumdar, Ancient
Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

Indian religions (With reference to: R.C.Majumdar, Ancient India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), P. 166; Benimadhab Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy (Calcutt: University of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420. etc.)


Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117-118.

Although Heidegger has said in an occasion that the "sunya" of Buddhism is "the same with" his "Nothing" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 108-109), we would rather think such an expression as originated from his misunderstanding of Buddhism.

India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), P. 166; Benimadhab Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy (Calcutt: University of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420. etc.


Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117-118.

Although Heidegger has said in an occasion that the "sunya" of Buddhism is "the same with" his "Nothing" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 108-109), we would rather think such an expression as originated from his misunderstanding of Buddhism.

Although Heidegger has said in an occasion that the "sunya" of Buddhism is "the same with" his "Nothing" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 108-109), we would rather think such an expression as originated from his misunderstanding of Buddhism.

(31)