

*Heidegger's "Ontological Difference"
and Mahayana's "Twi-satyas" Theory*

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Difference" and
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Theory**

**海德格的「存在論差異」
與大乘之「二諦」論**

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The article is a comparative study on the Heideggerian and Buddhist Mahayanian philosophies. We attempt to bring them into dialogue and promote their mutual understanding through discussion of their two fundamental ideas, i.e. "Ontological Difference" and "Twi-satyas". On the one hand, Heidegger's differentiation between the Being Itself and beings, namely the differentiation between "Nothingness" and

本文旨在對海德格學說與大乘佛學做比較學研究。我們意欲經由探討兩者之基本理念，亦即「存在論差異」與「二諦」，使兩者交流，並促進兩者之相互理解。在一方面，海德格對存有自身與存在者，亦即「無」與「存在狀態」之剖析，與大乘佛家對「空」與

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"beingness", is similar to the Mahayana Buddhist distinction between "Sunya" and "bhava" in that both of them aim for recognition of "Nothingness" by the overcoming of obstinacy in "beingness", so we may say Heidegger's thinking has Buddhist significance. On the other hand we regard the "Twi-satyas" theory of Mahayana Buddhism also as a kind of "Ontological Differentiation": Firstly, just like Heidegger's "Nothing", Sunya is the truth and essence of being; secondly, just like the Heideggerian "Differentiation", the "Twi-satyas" theory also contains as its significance the deconstruction of Metaphysics; lastly, "Sunya" in Chinese Buddhism is non-fixedness (Wu Zhu or aniketa), which means freedom in the same ontological significance with Heidegger's "Nothing". The principal divergence between the Heideggerian and Mahayana theories consists in their different understanding of "Nothingness". Sunya, the Nothingness in Buddhism, is a being absolutely non-linguistic; so the difference between the two "satyas" is in fact the difference between the linguistic and the non-linguistic; To Heidegger, however, the Nothingness as Being itself is just the language itself or its essence, so the Ontological Difference is just distinction between the language essence and the beings coming into this language. Moreover Heidegger's Nothing (Nichts) is time itself, whereas the

「有」之思辨遙相呼應，因兩者皆旨在經由破除對「存有」的執著而證悟「空無」，故而我們可說海德格的思想具佛家旨趣。另一方面，我們將大乘佛家之「二諦」論亦視為是一種「存在論差異」：首先，「空」就如海德格的「無」，是存有之真理及本質；其次，「二諦」論就如海德格學說之「存在論差異」，其意旨亦涵蓋了對形而上學的解構；最後，中國佛家將「空」稱為「無住」，意謂自在，此與海德格的「無」具相同之本體論意涵。海德格學說與大乘思想之主要歧異在於兩者對「空無」之不同認知。佛家的「空」是全然無法言詮的存有；故而二「諦」之分野事實上就在於「依言」與「離言」之差別；然而，對海德格而言，作為存有自身的「無」，正是語言自身或其本質，故而存在論差異只是對「語言的本質」與「進入這種語言的存在者」之判別。再者，海德格之「無」即時間自身，而大乘佛家之「空性」則是全然無時間性的。

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Sunyata of Mahayana Buddhism is totally non-temporal.

The Buddhist significance in Heidegger's Ontological Differentiation

Heidegger's "ontological difference" (Ontologische Unterscheidung) is a distinction between Being itself and the beings^①, which makes clear that Being is not the beings (das Seiende), but is the totally other (schlechthin Andere) of everything in the world and is separated from the latter by unfathomable abyss^②. This "Being-itself" is totally without relation, unintelligible, unspeakable; in contrast with the "being" of ordinary things, it is rather "Nothing". Nevertheless this Nothing is the source of everything, so Nothing is "Nothingness" as essence (Wesen). Therefore the ontological difference is differentiation between being and nothing.

Chinese philosophers also discussed the problem about "being" and "nothing". So said Lao-tsu in *Tao-Te-King*, "Everything in the world originated from being(You), and being from nothing (Wu)", but it seems that this kind of thought have not reached the horizon of Ontological Difference^③. The Upanishads in ancient India have referred

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海德格的「存在論差異」(Ontologische Unterscheidung)旨在區別存有與存在者^①，其剴切指出存有不等同於存在者(das Seiende)，而是與世間萬物截然不同的「他者」(schlechthin Andere)，並由玄奧莫測的渾沌與後者區隔^②。這「存有自身」是全然無關連性、無從認知、無法言喻的；與日常事物之「存在」相較，它可謂是「無」。然而這「無」卻是萬物之本源，故而「無」在本質上是「無的狀態」，故而存有論之辨析乃在區別「存在」與「無」。

中國哲學家亦曾探討過「有」與「無」的問題。老子在《道德經》中曾云：「萬物皆生於有，有生於無。」但這種思想似乎尚未臻於存在論差異的層次^③。古印度之《奧義書》亦曾論及二諦之差異，但其

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to the distinction between two satyas too, but it has not gained an ontological meaning until Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahayana "Two satyas" are "paramārtha-satya" and "saṃvṛti-satya", the latter of which is ordinary experiential existence (corresponding to Heidegger's "Seiende"), i.e. "being" (bhava, or "You" in Chinese); the former is being's essential truth (corresponding to Heidegger's "essence of being"), i.e. "sunya" (emptiness, or "kong" in Chinese). So the Mahayana distinction between the saṃvṛti and the paramārtha is actually a differentiation between "being" and "sunya", which is similar to Heidegger's ontological difference between "being" and "nothing".

Both the Heideggerian and the Mahayana Buddhist "differentiations" have overcome the obstinacy in beings (seiende), and realized an intuition in "Nothingness" (truth of the essence of being). We know that the "Sunya" in Mahayana contains mainly three senses as follows: firstly sunya as the ultimate truth of essence of being, secondly sunya as an attitude to things (namely as negation of hetu-pratyaya or experiential existence), lastly sunya as the goal of negation^④. We think Heidegger's concept of Nothing contains similarly three aspects too.

在大乘佛教興起前未能獲致本體論之意涵。大乘之「二諦」乃：真諦 (paramārtha-satya, 或作勝義諦、第一義諦) 與俗諦 (saṃvṛti-satya, 或作世俗諦、世諦), 後者是日常經驗意義的存在 (相當於海德格所謂的「存在者」Seiende), 亦即中文的「有」; 前者則是存在之究竟真實 (相當於海德格所謂的「存有的本質」) 亦即中文的「空」。故而大乘之俗諦與真諦的分野, 事實上是「有」與「空」之差別相, 此正如海德格對「存在」與「無」的存有論上的辨析。

海德格學說與大乘真俗二諦之判別皆已破除對存在者之執著, 並對「空無」(真如或存有之本質) 有所領悟。我們知道大乘之「空」總約之具有以下三大要旨: 第一, 空乃諸法之究竟實相; 其次, 空乃照見森羅萬象之態度 (亦即對因緣或世俗存在之否定); 最後, 空乃否定之目標^④。我們認為海德格「無」的觀點亦蘊涵三種層面。

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Firstly, his explanation of Nothing as being's essence corresponds with Mahayana's elaboration of the "essence" (sva-lakṣaṇa) meaning of sunya (here "sva-lakṣaṇa" means truth and essence). Mahayana Buddhists regard Nothingness i.e. sunya as the ultimate truth of being, and Heidegger's Nothing is also the truth of being in similar sense. Heidegger thought that Metaphysics saw only being, but not Nothing which is more authentic than being. So that in Metaphysics Being was never understood as Being-Itself, but instead as the "beingness of beings" (die Seiendheit des Seiendes) ⑤; and Nothing, accordingly, was understood as "non-being". But in truth Nothing is never "non-being", but "the movement of the essence of Being-itself, so it is more truly being than all the other beings" ⑥. So one can say that pure Nothing is pure Being, i.e. the truth of Being ⑦.

Mahayana Buddhism, especially that in China, mostly understands sunya, i.e. Nothingness as being's substratum or origin (dharmabhūta or bhūta-tathatā), and regards everything to be produced from it. In Heidegger's philosophy "Nothingness", "Occurrence of Being" (Ereignis) is also

第一，他將「無」詮釋為存有之本質，此點契合大乘對「空」之本質意義上之闡述 (svalakṣaṇa, 「自相」或作「自性」，此處作真實及本質解)。大乘佛家將「空」視為一切存在之究竟實相，而海德格的「無」在此也同樣具有存在之真實的意涵。海德格認為形而上學只關注存在而不見比存在更為真實之「無」。故而形而上學從未以存有自身來理解存有，反倒將之視為「存在物之存在狀態」(die Seiendheit des Seiendes) ⑤；也因而將「無」理解為「非存在」。然而事實上「無」斷非「非存在」，而是「存有自身之本質的活動，因此是比存在者更真實地存在」。⑥故而純然之「無」可謂純然之「存有」，亦即存有之真實 ⑦。

大乘佛家，尤其在中國，大抵將「空」視為存在之根柢或本源（「法性」或「真如」），謂萬物皆緣此而生。在海德格的哲學中，「無」、「大道」(Ereignis)亦是萬有之源頭。故而「無」的「深不可測」

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the source of all the beings. So Nothing's "baselessness" (Abgrund) becomes conversely the "base" (Grund) of being and world. Nothing is the original openness of Being as Being, in this sense Nothing is conversely the source of "things" (beings): "from the nothing all beings as beings come to be" ⑧. There has been a shift of stress from "Dasein" to "Sein" in the development of Heidegger's thought. Relevantly the "Nothing" in his early thinking means Dasein's authentic "Seinkönnen", namely the original openness in which beings are revealed; whereas in his later thinking it means the "Occurrence of being" (Ereignis), i.e. the secret source of being and world.

Heidegger's Nothing, as a openness in which beings are revealed is identical with freedom. Freedom is truth of Being's essence ⑨. The essence of Being is the movement of interpreting revelation and projection, while the beings are the revealed and projected. As something projected the beings are somewhat inert and non-free, but the Being Itself as the action of revealing and projecting is characterized as the "non-determined", in this sense it is freedom. The essence of Heidegger's "Nothing" (Nichts) is "nihilation" (Nichten) ⑩. Nihilation is

(Abgrund) 反倒成為存在與世界之「根據」(Grund)。「無」，是存有其自身的源始展現，依此而言「無」反倒是「萬有」(存在者)的根源：「萬物之所以存在乃源自於無。」⑧海德格思想的發展，有一個移轉，那便是從以「此在」(Dasein)為重心轉變為以「在」(Sein)為重心的發展。駭言之，「無」在他的早期思想中意味著「此在」之確切起源(Seinkönnen，「能在」)，亦即存在者萌現之源頭；而在他晚期思想中，「無」意指「大道」(Ereignis)，亦即存在與世界之神秘的根源。

海德格的「無」作存在者萌現之源頭解，與自由同義。自由是存有本質之真實。⑨存有的本質是一種存有作為自我闡釋的開顯與投射之活動，而存在者則是其萌現與投射。存在者身為投射物，是略顯遲滯而非自由的，不過存有自身作為開顯及投射之行動，則具「非限定的」性格，依此而言是自由的。海德格的「無」

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not elimination of beings, but the negation of obstruction and concealment of being, so nihilation is transcendence and freedom^⑩. Freedom in this sense is not without similarity with Mahayana Buddhist sunya. Firstly sunya is freedom because it's free from the fetters of beings. Secondly, Chinese Buddhism emphasizes "Sunya" as "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" (keeping the mind moving freely without obstacle), so it is more similar with the concept of Heidegger's Nichten and freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" does not interpret sunya as an immutable being, but as a "free moving" (Yuan Yong) essence. As freedom and movement, "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" is totally identical with the Heideggerian "Nothing". "Wu Zhu" (aniketa, getting rid of obstruction, fixedness and inertia) overcomes our obsession (abhiniveśa) with finite things, and brings understanding of being into the state of "Wu Ai Wu Zhi" (no fetter, no blockage), "Zi Zai Yuan Yong" (absolutely free and perfect); We think Heidegger's "Nichten" is a freedom in the same sense, it overcomes the one-sidedness of Dasein's understanding of being and brings Dasein for the first time in front of the unity of being as being^⑪.

(Nichts)之本質是「虛無」(Nichten)^⑩。虛無不是剔除存在者，而是排除存在之障礙與屏蔽，故而虛無是先驗及自由的^⑪。依此而言，自由與大乘佛教之「空」不無雷同之處。第一，「空」是自在，因其不受存在者之束縛。其次，中國佛家強調「空」乃「無住生心」(心靈自在馳騁了無罣礙)，故與海德格的虛無及自由之觀念更是聲氣相投。「無住生心」並非將「空」詮釋為一成不變之存在，而是一種「活動自如」(圓融)的本質。「無住生心」具有自由與行動的本質，故與海德格的「無」若出一轍。「無住」(aniketa，了無罣礙、無執著、無滯泥)破除我們對五蘊假合的妄執，並將對存有的理解帶入「無礙無羈」、「自在圓融」的境界；我們認為海德格的「虛無」(Nichten)是具同樣意旨之自由，其破除了「此在」(Dasein)對存有的偏頗認知，並讓「此在」首度面對存有之為存有的完整性^⑫。

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Secondly, Heidegger's discussion on Nothing aims at deconstruction of Metaphysics too, which is also "breaking with abhiniveśa (obstinacy, one-sidedness, sinking in world, indulging in practical life)" just like Mahayana's Sunya as negation of hetu-pratyaya (i.e. as prayojana). The wisdom of "breaking with abhiniveśa" is not the patent of Buddhism or oriental spirit. For example Plato's distinction between the sensible world and the supersensible is also a breaking with the "abhiniveśa" in sensible world. But Metaphysics always takes up a new "abhiniveśa" (with Plato, the "abhiniveśa" in supersensible world) after doing away with the old one. Husserl's phenomenological reduction also aimed at breaking with "abhiniveśa", for reduction is "just the cancellation of the presumption of the being of the objective world" ⑬, which is in fact implied in the significance of the Mahayana Sunya. As the result of reduction only the transcendental consciousness that has direct evidence survives⑭. In the Buddhist view, the reduction "suniates" (nihilates) the "Jing" (artha, or world) by means of "Xin (cit, or Subject), but still saves "Xin", i.e. transcendental consciousness, so it, as "sunya", is not ultimate. The saved "Xin" as a self-adequate reality is dissolved by Heidegger into Dasein's temporal movement ⑮. Therefore in hermeneutic ontology there is no

其次，海德格對「無」的探究亦是旨在解構形而上學，其亦「斷除妄執（偏執、偏頗、沉淪、沉湎於凡塵俗世中）」，此正如大乘之「空」否定了因緣（亦即如同「用」，prayojana）。「斷除妄執」的智慧不是佛家或東方精神的專利。例如柏拉圖對可感知世界與超感知世界的區隔，亦是斷除對可感知世界的「妄執」。但形而上學在摒棄舊「妄執」後，總會萌生新「妄執」（就柏拉圖而言，即是對超感知世界的「妄執」）。胡塞爾的現象學還原論（reduction）亦是旨在斷除「妄執」，因為還原論「僅是取消客觀世界存有之假設」⑬，這事實上與大乘空觀之旨趣暗相應和。還原之結果，只有具直接證據之先驗意識得以留存⑭。依佛家觀點，還原乃經由「心」（心識，主體）將「境」（塵世）「空化」（虛無化），但仍存留「心」，亦即先驗意識，故而其依「空」而言，並非究竟。那被以為是實在之自我顯現的「心」，海德格將之轉化成

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more Metaphysical Ego (Xin), but only the temporal Language movement of interpretation; in words of Buddhism, it even "sunyates" the world-sunyating consciousness (cit) ⑩, so it is "sunya-sunyating" (in Chinese, "kong kong"). The cit or self exists only in the temporal process of the transformation of language into the "non-self"(things), so Gadamer said language is "the most selfless"(i.e. nir-ātman in Mahayana) ⑪. The temporal language consciousness is essentially identical to Mahayana Yogacāra's concept of ālaya vijñāna ⑫.

The problem of Metaphysics consists essentially in its seeing only being but not nothing ⑬, which means almost the same thing as the so-called "abhiniveśa" in ontological sense by Buddhism. So the Heideggerian nothing and Buddhist sunya have the similar object to nihilate. Apart from the relation with nothing, Metaphysics understands Being as beingness (seiendheit) of beings, while the absolute idea, substance, absolute spirit and will to power, etc. all fall into its scope. So the so-called "Metaphysik" is actually still "physik" ⑭, in that it sees only Anwesen but not Anwesenlassen, only Lichte(light) but not Lichtung

「此在」(Dasein)之時間性的活動 ⑮。故而在詮釋學本體論中，不復見形而上的自我(心)，只有時間性的語言詮釋活動；依佛家說法，其甚至將萬法皆空的心識 ⑯也「空化」，故而是「空空」。心或自我只存在於語言轉化為「非我」(萬物)的時間過程中，故而。高達美說語言是「最無我的」(亦即大乘之 nir-ātman，無我) ⑰。這種時間性的語言意識本質上與大乘瑜伽師地學派之阿賴耶識觀念雷同 ⑱。

形而上學的問題之癥結在於其只見「有」而不見「無」 ⑲，此與佛家在本體意涵上所謂的「執」而言幾無二致。故而海德格學說中之「無」與佛家之「空」有著同樣要摒除的對象。形而上學，排除了與「無」的關連，將存有視為存在者的存在狀態 (seiendheit)，諸如絕對之理念、物質、絕對之精神與意志力等，全都隸屬其範疇。故而所謂的「形而上」(Meta-physik)

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(lighten) ⑳, only "being" in light but not the secret nothing which leads the beings into light. It is in essence "flight from" the "nothing". Being afraid of Nothing, man always attempted to hold on to being, thence he projected a being "best qualified as being" (das seiendste Seiende), i.e. the absolute idea, the highest reality, the highest good to protect himself from the attack of Nothing and assure himself safety. Likewise the "Onto-theo-logie" of Christianity understands God as "the most absolute being", and regards the authentic nothing, i.e. the freedom, as sin; so its essence is also "flight from nothing", whereas Heidegger's fundamental ontology ought to be regarded as an attempt to cut off the way of Dasein's flight ㉑. In words of Mahayana Buddhist, "flight from Nothing" is abhiniveśa in beings, while forcing man to face nothing is similar to Buddhist giving up "being" and realizing "sunya".

Lastly, Heidegger's analysis on nothing aimed at the revelation of the truth of Being,

事實上仍是「形體」(physik)㉒，因其只見在場的 (Anwesen) 而不見不在場的 (Anwesenlassen)，只見「光」(Lichte)，而不見「澄明」(Lichtung，照亮)㉓，只見「存在」於光中，而不見將存在者引領入光中之奧祕空無。這在本質上「逸離」了「無」。人類由於對「無」心懷畏懼，總試圖掌握存在，因而設想出一種「最有資格存在」的存在 (das seiendste Seiende)，亦即至理、至真、至善，以保護其免於受到「無」的攻擊，確保安全無虞。基督教的「本體神學」亦將上帝視為「最絕對之存有」，將本然真實之「無」，亦即自由，視為罪惡；故而其本質亦是「逸離了無」，而海德格的基礎存在論應當被視為試圖防堵「此在」(Dasein) 逸離的途徑 ㉔。依大乘佛家之言，「逸離了無」就是對實有的妄執；而迫使人類面對「無」，則正如同佛家摒棄了「有」，證悟到「空」。

最後一點，海德格對「無」之剖析，旨在揭櫫存有之真實，此

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hence it is similar to the Buddhistic "Sunya" as goal of negation (namely the "artha" aspect of "Sunya"). Twi-satyas theory lies in negating "being" and revealing "Sunya", likewise Heidegger's distinction between being and nothing consists in "highlighting Being from beings" ⑳. Heidegger thought that old Metaphysics always determined Being from the viewpoint of beings, which led to the forgetting of the essence of Being, and finally even this forgetting is forgotten ㉑. But the "Nichten"(nihilation) of "Nichts" makes the world as unity of beings indifferent, and deprives Dasein of his relation with being's unity, therefore makes him come directly in front of Being itself, i. e. Nothing, Abyss or the secret source of beings occurrence (Ereignis). Here we think Heidegger's intention agrees with that of Mahayana to negate vyavaharika "being" (bhava) and reveal paramārthika "nothing" (sunya).

The sentiment (Stimmung) in which the Nothing is revealed is anxiety. But anxiety is not an ordinary feeling. It is like the Buddhist Dhyāna. Here, as Heidegger says, "All things and we ourselves sink into indifference, The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this `no

正如佛家之「空」乃否定之目標（亦即「空」之「塵境」層面）。二諦論寓旨於抑「有」而揚「空」，海德格對「存在」與「無」之辨析同樣亦在於「由存在者中彰顯出存有」㉒。海德格認為昔日之形而上學總由存在者之觀點來論斷存有，此導致忘卻存有之本質，最後甚至將此忘卻亦拋諸腦後㉑。而（海德格）其「無」(Nichts)的「無的狀態」(Nichten)將萬有視為不相關的群體，剝離了「此在」(Dasein)與存在之整體關係，故而令其直接面對存有自身，亦即「無」，渾沌或存有肇始之奧祕起源（大道，Ereignis）。對此我們認為海德格之意旨契合大乘的否定世俗「有」(bhava)及闡揚勝義「空」。

「無」所顯現的情緒 (Stimmung) 是焦慮。然而焦慮並非尋常之情感。那如同佛家的禪定。對此，誠如海德格所云：「萬物與我們自己都寓於不相關的存在狀態中... 存在者全都漸次消退，令我們籠罩在焦慮中，備受壓迫。我們無

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hold on things' comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing" ②⑤. Dhyāna also requires the student to be "away with difference, away with concept of human, away with Egoism" and perceive the authentic sunyata (Nothingness). Moreover the so-called "indifference" is neither ordinary existence of beings, nor an emptiness with all things annihilated, but is characterized as "non-being, non-emptiness"; similarly the Buddhist "sunya intuition" is not an absolute elimination of being either, but aims at the "non-being, non-emptiness" too. Moreover Heidegger's nothing is formless, unthinkable, so it cannot be held on like beings; that is in accordance with the negating spirit of Buddhist too. Lastly just as it is with Mahayana's "intuition in sunya", so Heidegger's realization of nothing is also "speechless", because in Nothing being's unity disappears, both the objects of speech and the being's relation which makes speech possible come into silence. The situation finds its analogous expression in a phrase of Chinese Taoism "Great speech is without voice, great being is without form". ②⑥

從掌握森羅萬象。存在者不斷流逝，唯獨這種『無從掌握森羅萬象』籠罩我們並盤桓不去。焦慮揭示了無。」②⑤禪亦要求弟子「摒棄差別相，斷離人身觀，去除我執」，以參悟自性清淨之「空性」。再者，所謂的「無差別」，既不是存在者尋常之存在，亦不是萬物寂滅的空無，而是具有「非有非空」之特質；佛家之「空觀」亦同樣不是絕對斷絕存有，而是亦旨在「非有非空」。再者，海德格之「無」是不具形相、不可思惟，故而無法將之視同存在者；此與佛家之否定精神亦相契合。最後，就如大乘之「空觀」，海德格對「無」之領會亦是「不可言說」的，因為在「無」時，存在之整體性消失了，言語的對象以及使言語成為可能的存在之關連皆已寂然。此與中國道家所云之「大音希聲，大象無形」②⑥可謂異曲同工。

*Heidegger's "Ontological Difference"
and Mahayana's "Twi-satyas" Theory*

**The Twi-satyas theory as an
"Ontological Differentiation"**

二諦論之「存在論差異」

What are the twi-satyas? Nāgārjuna said
in Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā :

何謂二諦？龍樹於《中論》中
云：

*"The Buddhas teach the people
dharma according to Twi-Satyas,
the one is the experiential
(samvṛti-satya); The other is the
ultimate (paramārtha-satyas). If
one does not know the distinction
between the two satyas, he would
not understand the true meanings
of Buddha's deep dharma" ⑳.*

諸佛依二諦 為眾生說法
一以世俗諦 二第一義諦
若人不能知 分別於二諦
則於深佛法 不知真實義㉑

And Piṅgalanetra's commentary on it is
:"The samvṛti-satya is that all things are
empty but ordinary people owing to wrong
understanding produce untrue dharmas and
look upon them as true. The saints know
their wrongness and look upon all dharmas
as empty and without origin, so it is
paramārtha-satya, namely the truth." ㉒
"Satya" means teaching, theory or truth. In
Mahayana Buddhism the Twi-satyas are not
only two methods of teaching, but also two
sense-dimensions of being. The
paramārtha-satya is the original truth of
being, i.e. tathatā or dharmatā, also

青目（或音譯賓伽羅、賓頭
羅伽）對此之註釋為：「世俗諦
者。一切法性空。而世間顛倒故
生虛妄法。於世間是實。諸賢聖
真知顛倒性。故知一切法皆空無
生。於聖人是第一義諦名為實。」
㉒諦，指教法、理法，或真理。
大乘佛家之二諦不只是兩種教
法，亦是兩種感知層次之存有。
勝義諦是存有之真理，亦即真如

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called "sunya" or "sunyata"; while the samvṛti-satya means experiential beings, it is the being projected by human convention and custom, also called "being" or "vyavaharika being". We think the distinction between "sunya" and "being" is similar in spirit to Heidegger's differentiation between "Nothing" and "being".

The Buddhist Twi-satyas theory converted the differentiation of Upanishads between the pāra-Brahman (the higher Brahman) and the apara-Brahman (the lower Brahman) into distinction between sunya and being, hence raised it onto the ontological level. Sunya is the truth and essence of being, but is different from ordinary beings (the vyavaharika), it is the "totally other" of all beings. Rather than ranked as "being" (bhava), it would better be called "Nothingness" (while the "being" as asanta-bhāva, i.e. wrong existence is conversely produced from "sunya" by vitatha, i.e. wrong understanding).

Just as it is with Heidegger's differentiation, so the twi-satyas theory is brought forth in order to reveal the realm of Nothingness as opposite to being (bhava). The Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is a speech-less, formless dark principle. Sunya as Nothingness is neither a real "being" as Vorhandenheit (the present existence), nor "non-

或法性，或稱為「空」或「空性」；而世俗諦則意味著經驗之存有，其為依人類習俗投射之存有，亦稱為「有」或「世俗有」。我們認為對「空」與「有」之分別，與海德格對「無」與「存在」之辨析乃言殊而旨同。

佛家之二諦論將《奧義書》關於上梵及下梵之分野轉化為「空」與「有」之分別，因此將其提昇至存有論之層次。「空」是存在的真實與本質，但與世俗之存在者不同，它是與存在者「截然不同的它者」。與其將之歸為「有」，不如稱之為「空」（而「有」之所以為妄有，亦即虛妄之存在，則是因為妄想顛倒，執「空」為「有」）。

正如海德格的辨析，二諦論之提出亦是為了彰顯與「有」相對的「空」界。「空」是無法言詮、不具形相的幽玄本質。「空」與「無」一樣，既不是當下現成狀態的存在者 (Vorhandenheit)，亦不是否定

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being" as negation of *Vorhandenheit*, but "non-being, non-emptiness" as in the case with Heidegger. In sectarian Buddhism the Sarvāstivādins held on to "being" theory, i. e. realism, regarding all dharmas as ultimate "bhava" (being); on the other hand the Vaipulyists held on to "empty" theory, i. e. nihilism, regarding all dharmas as absolute "abhāva" (emptiness). The Mahayana Buddhists view both as wrong. They think that true sunya falls neither on the side of "being", nor on the side of "non-being". That is called the "Middle Way". The true sages "love neither sunya nor non-sunya" ⑳. Afterwards the San-lun school in China developed out of Nāgārjuna's twi-satyas the "Four-fold Twi-satyas", in the fourth (the highest) fold of which it is understood that everything can be spoken of is *saṃvṛti-satya*, only the "speechless, unintelligible" essence is the absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya*) ㉑.

The Twi-satyas theory, just like Heidegger's "Differentiation", also aims at deconstruction of Metaphysics. There is Metaphysics in the East as well as in the West. Like their counterpart in the West, the eastern Metaphysicians also hold on to "being" (*bhava*) and don't see "Nothingness" (*Sunya*). So the Twi-satyas theory aims to deconstruct the "being" of things and reveal the "Nothingness" (i. e. *sunya* which is the essence of the truth of being), which is similar with Heidegger's deconstruction of

當下存在者的「非有」，而是如海德格所謂之「非有非空」。部派佛教之說一切有部堅執「有」論，亦即實有，認為「法體恆有」；而方等部派則倡揚「空」論，認為諸法皆為「非有」。大乘佛家則認為兩者皆非。他們認為真正的空既不偏「有」，亦不偏「非有」，此之謂「中道」。真正的聖賢「不愛空不空」㉑。爾後中國的三論宗由龍樹的二諦論發展出「四重二諦」，其第四重（最高境界）乃以能言詮者悉為世俗諦，唯「言亡慮絕」者為勝義諦㉒。

二諦論就如海德格之「存在論差異」，亦是旨在解構形而上學。西方有形而上學，東方亦然。東方的形而上學家亦如西方形而上學家，執於「有」而不見「空」。故而二諦論意在解構「有」而闡揚「空」（亦即法性真如），此與海德格解構西方形而上學不謀而合。

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Western Metaphysics.

Metaphysics is just "abhiniveśa". According to Buddhism the "abhiniveśas" include abhiniveśa in being (dharma) and abhiniveśa in self (ātman). In Indian thoughts, Hinayana Buddhism and the Brahman Vaiśeṣika school etc. are experiential realism, while the philosophy in later Upanishads and Bhagavadgītā etc. is transcendent metaphysics, both of them are "dharma abhiniveśa". Very similarly to the case with Heidegger, the Buddhists also take the understanding of the temporality of being as their starting point in deconstruction of dharma abhiniveśa. The dharma abhiniveśa of Hinayana and Tīrthaka (the non-Buddhists) is mostly holding on "dharma as real, dharma's being as eternal", i.e. they think dharmas are eternal substances without time. But Buddha has said that "all phenomena are transitory" (anityāḥ sarvasaṃskāraḥ), so revealed phenomena as momentarily appearing and disappearing and having no eternal existence; again Mahayana's "occurrence theory" (pratītyasamutpāda vāda), e.g. the ālaya pratītyasamutpāda of vijñāpti mātratā, also emphasizes that all beings appear in the temporal continuous running (samta-prortti) of being. Moreover the manner of Mahayana's negation of self-abhiniveśa is analogous to that of Heidegger's deconstruction of subjectivism. We have pointed out that the

形而上學只是「執」。依佛家說法，「執」包括法執與我執。在印度思想中，小乘佛教與婆羅門教之勝論學派等隸屬經驗實在論，而後期之《奧義書》及《薄伽梵歌》等之哲思則類屬先驗形而上學，兩者皆為「法執」。佛家與海德格之論點極為雷同，解構法執時亦發軔於體悟存有之無常。小乘與外道（非佛家）之法執大體上是堅執於「諸法實有，法體恆有」，亦即，他們認為諸法是亙古不滅的物質。然而世尊曾言「諸行無常」，依此闡論諸行萬象皆為倏忽萌生轉瞬即逝，無亙古長存者；大乘之「緣起論」，例如唯識宗之阿賴耶緣起說，亦強調眾生皆現身於次第輾轉相續 (samta-prortti) 的「有」中。再者，大乘「去我執」之方式與海德格的解構主觀論亦如出一轍。前已述及，唯識宗之阿賴耶識觀將數論學派與吠檀多學派中無關時間的自我溶入生生不息、輾轉相續的韶光流變

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ālaya vijñāna concept of Vijñaptimātratā school dissolved the non-temporal Ego of Saṃkhyā and Vedantā into the self-transforming, eternal running movement of time. So the Buddhist Karma theory is an expression of their understanding about the temporality of existence: it makes clear that the essence of man is not an immutable consciousness but is formed by his past life, which reminds us of the explanation of the historicity of human being by hermeneutic philosophy. The dissolution of Ego in the horizon of time or its disappearance in karma's movement is the same.

Moreover, Sunya-vada deconstructed the old Brahman theology, just as the Heideggerian "Nothing" theory did to the Christian scholastic theology. Heidegger's "Ontological Difference" negates the God concept of Christian "Onto-theo-logie" as the highest being, the eternal transcendent absolute far beyond the world, thence forces man to face Nothing squarely. In Indian thoughts it is in later Upanishads that a Metaphysics about Brahman's supersensible world is at first established, thereafter the Bhagavadgītā, identifying Brahman with God, introduced the upanishadic Metaphysics into theology, therefore the then Indian theism also was an Onto-theo-logie. The twi-satyas theory contains deconstruction of this theism. Mahayana regards "non-difference, non-duality (advaita), middle way" as the

中。故而佛家之「業」(Karma)論乃表達他們對無常變異之領悟：此論闡明人的本質並非一成不變的意識，而是由他的前生熏習而成，那令我們想起詮釋論哲學對人類史實性之解釋。自我溶入時間的境域，或在「業」的活動中消失，兩者毫無二致。

再者，「空」論解構昔日之婆羅門教神學，就如海德格之「無」論解構基督教的經院派神學。海德格的「存在論差異」否定基督教「本體神學」中將上帝視為至高無上之存在、遠非凡俗所能企及的亙古先驗之觀念，因此迫使人類正視「無」。在印度思潮中，後期之《奧義書》中關於大梵之超感知世界為其形而上學的濫觴，隨後《薄伽梵歌》將大梵視為神，將奧義書式之形而上學導入神學，故而當時的印度有神論亦為一種本體神學。二諦論包含了對這種有

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true understanding of dharma required by twi-satyas theory, so it "sunyated" (deconstructed) the transcendent intelligence. Moreover Mahayana Buddhism is also against Hinayana's opposition of Nirvāṇa and world and its flight from world to nirvāṇa, but insists on "neither sticking to world, nor to nirvāṇa" ③①, because all dharmas are one, indifferent; consequently the division between noumenon and phenomenon is broken. The deconstruction of the transcendent world requires man to return from the ideal "heaven" to the world of real life. In words of Mahayana, it is "realizing sunyata just in the rupa"(rūpaṃ śūnyata, śūnyata iva rūpaṃ); in words of Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is "returning to the earth again" ③②.

The negation of "being" aims to manifest sunya. Some scholars pointed out that "karma" in Buddhism, just as "essence of technology" in Heidegger, is the cause of concealment of being ③③. Both Western Metaphysics and Eastern "bhava"(being) theories concealed the original truth of Being, so they must be negated. But obviously the Buddhist negation is more thoroughgoing. Mahayana looks upon all beings as non-substantial and thence their existence (sva-bhāva) as empty, so we must nihilate them and realize "all dharmas are nothing, all hetu-pratyayas are empty" ③④,

神論的解構。大乘將「無別、不二、中道」視為二諦論對法性不可或缺的正見，故其將先驗之智「空化」(解構)。再者，大乘佛家對小乘之反對涅槃及塵世，及其遁離塵世進入涅槃，亦逐一破斥，而力倡應「不住世間，不住涅槃」③①，因為萬法一如而圓融；故而本體與現象間之藩籬亦消弭於無形。解構先驗世界的先決條件是人類得由理想的「天國」回歸凡塵俗世。依大乘之言，此為「色即是空」；依尼采與海德格之言，此為「再度回歸塵世」③②。

否定「有」旨在闡揚空。若干學者指出，佛家之「業」就如海德格之「科技之本質」，是隱蔽存有的肇因③③。西方之形而上學與東方之「有」論皆障蔽了存有之本質，故應予以駁斥。然而佛家顯然更是予以通盤否定。大乘認為萬法皆無實體，因此其法體 (sva-bhāva，或作自性、自相) 為空，故而我們必須否定之，並解悟到「一切法本無，因緣皆悉空」③④，

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and finally come to the state of "having nothing". This "having nothing", however, does not mean nihilism, but aims at the realization of sunyata, i.e. the truth of dharma. All are sunya(empty), while only the clear, taintless substratum as sunyata is real. Nevertheless the reality of the substratum is not the Metaphysical reality, substance, i.e. ātman, but the true Being manifested after the nihilation of ātman.

The "Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra" explains sunya as "keeping the mind moving freely without obstacle" (In Chinese, "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin") ③⑤. Chinese Buddhism always understands "non-abhinveśa" and "sunya" from the point of "non-obstruction, non-blockage", so it realized throughout the spirit of "Wu Zhu"(aniketa, non-fixedness). "Wu Zhu" is ontologically similar to Heidegger's "Nichten" as freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" in Chinese Buddhism means keeping the mind free from abhiniveśa and keeping it moving naturally, running smoothly without fetter. In words of Chan, it is "no blockage in mind," "sticking to neither the exterior nor the interior, going and coming freely, getting rid of abhiniveśa thoughts and realizing non-obstruction" ③⑥. Not only those ideas stick to the mistaken, but also those stick to "the correct" must be gotten rid of, hence eventually the complete freedom of spirit is

最後臻於「則見一切空」之境。然而，這種「一切空」並不意味著虛無主義，而在參悟空性，亦即真如。諸法皆空，唯有自性清淨的空性為真如。然而，真如並不是形而上學之實在、實體，亦即「我」，而是在否定我之後所體現的存有實相。

《金剛般若波羅蜜經》將「空」作「無住生心」解③⑤。中國佛家總由「無礙無羈」的觀點來理解「無執」與「空」，故而得以徹悟「無住」的精神。「無住」之自由意旨與海德格的「無」(Nichten)有類似之存有論意涵。中國佛家所謂之「無住生心」意指心靈自在，遠離執著，隨緣放曠，無羈無礙。依禪宗而言則是「心不染著」，「內外不住。去來自由。能除執心。通達無礙。③⑥」不僅要斷除邪見之執念，也要斷除「正見」之執念，如此終可參透自在解脫之般若三昧。此種自由既不是理性抑制感性(如康德)，亦不是鹵莽率性的愚行，而是斷除無明妄執，敞開

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realized. This freedom is neither autocracy of reason over the senses (as in Kant), nor reckless fool action, but removing the concealment (avidyā, abhiniveśa) and keeping an openness for the truth of being (bhūta-tathatā); the so understood freedom is in ontological sense totally similar with Heidegger's understanding of Nothing. Maybe that is the reason why Heidegger was so interested in Chan Buddhism!

Nothingness or Sunya never belongs to beings, so it cannot be exposed by means of language. The Chinese Xuan Xue (theory about Tao) often says: "When the fish are gotten, the net can be given up; when the meaning is gotten, the speech can be given up"; the Indian Upanishads also said that words are only "weariness of speech" and the ultimate truth is unspeakable³⁷; and the European mystics sighed over the limitations of language too. We must also admit the Nothingness of Heidegger and Mahayana Buddhism as unspeakable because it does not belong to the sphere of being and has no relation of being with world³⁸. Mahayana believes everything speakable is vyavaharika "being" but not paramārthika "sunya". Being is conversely produced from "sunya" by virtue of abhūta-parikalpa(wrong understanding), while abhūta-parikalpa is senseless speech of ordinary man. Therefore being is only a prod-

胸懷接受真如；這種對自由之體認就存有論而言與海德格對「無」之認知同一不二。或許正因如此海德格才會對禪宗如許熱衷！

「無」或「空」不曾隸屬於存在者，故而無法言詮。中國之玄學（道家之學說）常謂：「得魚而忘筌，得意而忘言」；印度的《奧義書》亦謂話語僅是「徒勞脣舌」，至理無言³⁷；歐洲之神祕主義論者亦為語言的侷限而喟然嗟嘆。我們也必須承認海德格的「無」與大乘佛家的「空」都是無法言詮的，因為其不歸屬於存在之範疇，也無關乎世間之存在³⁸。大乘佛家相信凡是能言喻者皆為世俗「有」，而非勝義「空」。諸法空寂，凡夫以虛妄分別，種種戲論故，倒「空」為「有」。職是之故，「有」僅為語言的產物，而「空」則是離言真如。故而佛教可謂是「言

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uct of language, while Sunya is the absolute truth outside of Language. So Buddhism is called a religion "without speech", Śākyamuni "the King of Silence". The Bodhi-sattvas of great intelligence ought to nihilate all the senseless speech and realize with prajñā wisdom the languageless truth (tathatā), this is what is called "tasting it like a dumb" by "Mahayana-saṃuparigraha-sāstra".

Conclusion

We believe that, the similarities between the Heideggerian and Buddhist thoughts are mainly due to (besides their common logic of thinking) the direct or indirect influences of oriental tradition on Heidegger. Firstly, Heidegger's Ontological difference was inspired by Christian mysticism, and today's scholars have found that there have been a number of ties between medieval mysticism and Indian Upanishadic mysticism³⁹; secondly Heidegger could get in touch with and take use of the achievements in Oriental study in the 19th century and the first two or three decades of the 20th century⁴⁰. Heidegger's differentiation between Being and beings has benefited from Rudolf Otto, a theologian in Marburg, Heidegger's saying that Being is "the absolutely other" (schlechthin Andere) of beings was borrowed from Otto, and Otto's expression was inspired by Buddhist and Indian thought⁴¹.

語道斷」的宗教，釋迦牟尼則為「能仁寂默」。睿智的菩薩應當遣除戲論，依般若智慧了悟離言真如，此即《攝大乘論》所云之「如啞求受塵」。

結論

我們相信海德格學說與佛家思想之所以如許類同，主要是基於（除了兩者的思想邏輯相同外）東方傳統對海德格直接或間接的影響。首先，海德格的「存在論差異」是衍生自基督教神祕主義，而當今之學者已發現中古神祕主義與印度的奧義書派神祕主義³⁹間有諸多脈絡可尋；再者海德格對十九世紀及二十世紀前二十至三十年間的東方研究之成果或曾涉獵並善加運用⁴⁰。海德格對「存有」與存有物間之辨析曾受惠於德國馬堡大學的神學家魯道夫奧圖，海德格對存有是存在者的「截然不同的它者」(schlechthin Andere)

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On the other hand we think a comparative research should not only see the common aspects of both sides, but also their differences. Although both the Ontological Differentiation and Twi-satyas theory aim to nihilate "being" and realize "Nothingness", but their understanding of Nothingness is not wholly the same one. The Buddhist Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is an absolutely non-linguistic being (in Indian Buddhism, it is mostly still an absolutely non-spiritual being), a dark indifferent essence which is "speechless, unthinkable" (totally opposed to language and thought), so the distinction of the Two Satyas is in fact that between the linguistic and the non-linguistic (Sunya is unspeakable, because it is just the opposition of language). But in Heidegger's thought Nothingness, i.e. the Being Itself is in essence language, "Language is the house of being" ④②; that Being is "unspeakable" is just because it is language itself or its essence, Language can say anything, except itself④③. Relevantly, the Nothingness or Ereignis of Heidegger is time; whereas the sunya of Buddhism, remaining the same one from no beginning, is absolutely non-temporal. Moreover though the Buddhist negation of substance by vir-

之說法，是採借自奧圖，而奧圖之論點則脫胎於佛家與印度思想。④①

然者我們認為比較學之研究不應僅見兩者相泯互融之層面，亦應探究其各異其趣之觀點。雖然存在論差異與二諦論皆旨在否定「存在」，證悟「空無」，然而兩者對「空無」之認知並非全然一致。佛家的「空」是一種絕對離言的存有（在印度佛教中，那大體而言仍是一種完全非精神的存有），是一種「言亡慮絕」（完全排除了語言與思惟），渾沌、圓融的本質，故而二諦之區隔事實上在於依言與離言（空是無法言詮的，因為它與語言背道而馳）。然而在海德格的思想中，「無」，亦即存有自身，本質上是語言，「語言是存有的家園」④②；存有之所以「不可說」乃因其本身就是語言，或者是語言的本質，語言什麼都能表達，唯獨無法說出它自身④③。駭言之，海德格的「無」或「大道」就是時間，而佛家的「空」則為無始

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tue of momentariness of beings shares a common Logic with Heidegger's deconstruction of the metaphysical concept of reality by means of being's temporality, yet the Buddhist attitude is "negation without affirmation": "momentariness" (anityah) is vyavahara-satya, i.e. the existent state of ordinary beings, while the essence of Being (paramārtha-satya) is the absolutely timeless sunyata or bhūta-tathatā; that is quite contrary to Heidegger's viewpoint. Heidegger used the concept of temporality to negate the Metaphysical being, meanwhile "affirmed" temporality as Being's essence, so his attitude is "affirmation with negation".

Moreover although Heidegger's interpretation of Nothing is formally also a deconstruction of Metaphysic abhiniveśa, this deconstruction means only overcoming of the one-sidedness of Metaphysics, but not the absolute negation of worldly life. The purpose of the Heideggerian discussion on Nothing is not to come to the Buddhist emptiness (sunya) or non-action (vyupaśama), on the contrary it is to let Being develop itself more freely.

Nevertheless, Chinese Buddhism is quite

空，亙古如一，是絕對無時間性的。再者佛家藉著諸行無常來否定實體，與海德格藉著存在的時間性來解構形而上學的真實觀，兩者的邏輯雖然如出一轍，然而佛家的態度是「不帶肯定之否定」：「無常」為俗諦，亦即一般存在者之現狀，而存有之本質（真諦）則是全然無時間性之空性或真如；此與海德格的觀點大相逕庭。海德格運用時間性的觀念否定傳統形而上學的存有論，同時「肯定」時間性為「存有」之本質，故而他的態度是「帶有否定的肯定」。

再者，雖然海德格對「無」的見解亦是對形而上學之妄執的解構，然而此種解構僅意味著破除形而上學的一偏之見，而非全盤否定凡塵俗世。海德格探討「無」的目的不在於達到佛家之「空」，或寂滅，反倒是在於讓「存有」更自由地自我發展。

然而，中國佛教與印度佛教

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different from that of India, in that it insists on the identity of "Xin" (cit or consciousness) and "Xing" (tathatā or truth), "Li" (bhūta-tathatā or essence) and "Shi" (dharma or phenomenon); their "sunya" is no longer anything non-spiritual, passive, immutable, but consciousness, truth and freedom of existence (Wu Zhu, Wu Ai); Moreover their teaching(e.g. as in Chan), insisting that "the ordinary consciousness is truth", completely negated the negation of ordinary life, which makes it more in harmony with Heidegger than Indian Buddhism. Maybe here lies the reason why Heidegger, lacking of Schopenhauerian warmth for Indian thought, was so fond of the teachings of Chan Buddhism!

大異其趣，中國佛家強調「心」（心性或意識）、「性」（實相或真實）、「理」（真如或本質）、「事」（法性或現象）之同一；他們的「空」不再是非精神的、消極的、一成不變的，而是實存意義上的意識、真理及自在（無住，無礙）；再者，他們的教義（例如禪宗）強調「平常心是道」，這完全否定了對凡塵俗世的否定，此令其較印度佛教更能與海德格契合。或許正因如此，海德格無叔本華那股對印度思想的熱衷，對禪宗佛法則情有獨鍾！

【Note】

- ① With reference to Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*(Stuttgart: Neske, 1997), P. 110.
- ② Martin Heidegger, *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.
- ③ Here "Nothing", as the first cause of "being", is actually another "being" (Seiende).

【註釋】

- ① 參閱Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*(Stuttgart: Neske, 1997), P. 110.
- ② Martin Heidegger, *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.
- ③ 此處「無」當成「存在」的「第一因」，事實上是另一種「存在」(Seiende)。

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- ④ Namely Sunyas sva-Lakṣaṇa (essence), prayojana (activity, function) and artha (object, value). See *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* XXIV (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu 1944). Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti have given different interpretation to this Kārikā. Our explanation basically agrees with that of Candrakīrti, because we think it is more objective than that of Bhāvaviveka.
- ④ 亦即自相空(本質義)、用(活動義、作用義)、境(對象義、價值義)。參見《中論頌》XXIV(南京:金陵刻經處,1944)。清辨論師與月稱論師曾經針對此頌提出不同的詮釋。我們的解釋,基本上是附和月稱論師的,因為我們認為月稱論師的論點比清辨論師的論點較為客觀。
- ⑤ *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*, P. 266.
- ⑤ *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*, P. 266.
- ⑥ *ibid.*, P. 266.
- ⑥ 同註⑤, 第二六六頁。
- ⑦ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.
- ⑦ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.
- ⑧ *ibid.*, P. 110.
- ⑧ 同註⑦, 第一一〇頁。
- ⑨ Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main:Vittorio Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.
- ⑨ Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main:Vittorio Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.
- ⑩ *Basic Writings*, P. 105.
- ⑩ *Basic Writings*, P. 105.
- ⑪ *ibid.*
- ⑪ 同註⑩。
- ⑫ *ibid.*
- ⑫ 同註⑪。
- ⑬ E. Husserl. *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), P. 22. See also Cairns' translation: *Cartesian Meditations*
- ⑬ E. Husserl. *Cartesianische Meditationen*(Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), P. 22. 參見

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- (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977),
PP. 20~21)
- ⑭ Husserl said: "The sense of transcendental reduction is that it can only take Ego and not the others as the beginning of being" (*Cartesianische Meditationen*, P. 31; see also Cairns' translation, P. 30).
- ⑮ The process is similar to the Buddhist negation of "man-abhinivesa". Zimmermann has written a book on Heidegger, whose title is "Eclipse of the self", which means a gradual process to overcome egoism, where "inauthenticity is an intensification of everyday egoism; authenticity is a diminution of it" (Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981), P.47.) The process is the dissolution of the Ego as immutable substance, self-understanding or self-adequate subjectivity into temporal language movement.
- ⑯ Here Gadamer commented: "Heidegger's thesis is: being itself is time, thence all the subjectivism of modern Philosophy is exploded" (H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit Und Methode* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986), P. 243.).
- Cairns' 之譯本: *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20~21)
- ⑭ 胡塞爾說: 「先驗還原論在於它能以純粹自我, 而非他者, 作為存有之起源。(Cartesianische Meditationen, P. 31; 另請參閱 Cairns' 之英譯本 P. 30)
- ⑮ 此過程類似佛家之否定「人執」, Zimmermann 曾撰書論海德格, 書名為《自我之蝕》(Eclipse of the self), 意謂逐漸破除我性的過程, 其中存在的本真的確定性隨著日常「我性」的強弱而消長。(Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981), P. 47.) 此過程乃是自我由不變的實體、自我認知或顯現之主體, 解消為時間性的語言活動的過程。
- ⑯ 高達美對此評道: 「海德格的命題是: 存有本身就是時間, 在此意義下, 所有現代哲學之主觀主義皆因此而崩潰瓦解。」(H. G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit Und Methode* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr,

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1986), P. 243)

⑰ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke Band2*(Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986), PP. 125 ~ 126.

⑰ Hans Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke Band2*(Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986), PP. 125~126.

⑱ The ālaya vijñāna is not an "Ego". It is not an eternal substance, but is always converting itself into world, and is always changed by our everyday understanding and behavior, therefore its existence is "temporal". Moreover the "self" of Heidegger's Philosophy is Language, while ālaya vijñāna in Yogacāra school is also called "manojalpa vijñāna". i.e. language consciousness; both Heidegger and Yogacāra school attribute the occurrence of being (in Buddhism "pratītya-samutpāda") to Language movement. So Heidegger's interpretation of Nothing and the work of Mahayana don't only have the same purpose, but also have reached the similar end.

⑱ 阿賴耶識不是一種「自我」。它不是一種恆有的實體，而是不斷將自己轉化入世界，也不斷因我們每天的認知與行為而改變，故而它的存在是「短暫」的。再者，海德格哲學中的「自我」是語言，而瑜伽行學派之阿賴耶識亦稱為「意言」，亦即語言意識；海德格與瑜伽行學派皆將「存在之發生」(緣起)歸諸於語言活動。故而海德格對「無」的詮釋及大乘之經文不僅具同樣目的，也達到了同樣的目標。

⑲ *Basic Writings*, P. 106.

⑲ *Basic Writings*, P. 106.

⑳ Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), P. 17.

⑳ Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), P. 17.

㉑ See Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*(Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1976), PP. 72-74.

㉑ 參見 Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*(Tuebingen: Max

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- Niemeyer Verlag, 1976), PP. 72-74.
- ②② Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland*(München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994), P. 191.
- ②③ *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*, P. 465.
- ②④ *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, PP. 19.
- ②⑤ *Basic Writings*, P. 103.
- ②⑥ In order to describe the experience of Nothing, Heidegger cited a passage from Knut Hamsun's poem "The Road Leads On" : "Here he sits between his ears and all he hears is emptiness. An amusing conception, indeed. On the sea there were both motion and sound, something for the ear to feed upon, a chorus of waters. Here nothingness meets nothingness and the result is zero, not even a hole. Enough to make one shake one's head, utterly at a loss" (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, P. 27.)
- ②⑦ *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* with the Commentary by Piṅgalanetra. X X IV (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1944.)
- ②⑧ Ibid.
- ②⑨ Asaṃga, *Shun Zhong Lun*. Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932.
- ②② Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland*(München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994), P. 191.
- ②③ *Beitraege Zur Philosophie*, P. 465.
- ②④ *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, PP. 19.
- ②⑤ *Basic Writings*, P. 103.
- ②⑥ 海德格為了描述「無」的經驗，引述 Knut Hamsun 的〈沿路而行〉這首詩：「他坐在此豎耳聆聽，唯聞空無。真是引人入勝的念頭。海上有波浪翻湧與濤聲，大飽耳福，波濤合聲詠唱。在此無與無交會，結果是零，連個洞都沒有。足以令人搖頭，全然茫然。」 (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, P. 27.)
- ②⑦ 《中論》青目釋。第XXIV品（南京：金陵刻經處，1944）
- ②⑧ 同註②⑦。
- ②⑨ 無著《順中論》（南京：金陵刻經處，1932）

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③⑩ Ji Zang, *Da Chen Xuan Lun* I. Nan
Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1944.

Mahayana Buddhism has throughout kept the inquiry on the essence of being in its originality. In western thought, however, the inquiry has been transformed into the inquiry on the reason (Grund) of the being of beings at the beginning, and modern science understands reason simply as causality of natural forces, consequently the reason interpretation was changed into a rationality explanation which is determined by practical need of technological production. Whereas according to Mahayana, both the reason interpretation and rationality explanation are limited in vyavaharika (concerning only the beings), only the paramārthika (authentic thinking and being) reveals the truth of essence of being; The paramārthika and the vyavaharika, the śūnya and the being are sharply different. Therefore it avoided the confusion of the essence inquiry with reason explanation, and assured the ontological inquiry its purity.

③⑪ *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* X VI

③⑫ Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*
(New York: The Macmilian Company,
1916), P. 88.

③⑩ 吉藏《大乘玄論》I. (南京：金陵刻經處，1944) 大乘佛家一向孜孜於窮究存有原初之本質。然而，在西方思想中這種探究最初是對存在者之存在根據(Grund)的探討，到了現代科學則僅以偶發之自然力量來解釋這種存在之根據，導致對「原因(存在根據)」之理解轉為唯理的解釋，取決於科技產物的實際需要。然而依大乘佛家而言，存在根據之理解與唯理的解釋皆受制於世俗諦(只涉及存有物)，唯有勝義諦(真實之思想與存有)能闡示存在的本質。勝義諦與世俗諦，空與存有，是迥然不同的。故而其避開了因存在根據之解釋所造成的本質探究的困惑，以確保對存有論探討之純淨。

③⑪ 《中論》XVI。

③⑫ 尼采，《查拉圖斯特拉如是說》
(New York: The Macmilian
Company, 1916), P. 88.

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- ③③ See Akihiro Takeichi, "On the Origin of Nihilism", *Heidegger and Asian Thought*(Ed by G.Parkes) (Honolulu: University of Hawaii,1987), PP. 183-185.
- ③④ Jian Yi, *Ru Da Cheng Lun*.
- ③⑤ *Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*(Trans by Kumārajīva) (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932).
- ③⑥ Hui Neng, "on prajñā," *Tan Jing* (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1942).
- ③⑦ Brihad-Araṇyaka Upanishad IV. 4. 21 (from: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, Oxford University Press, 1995.)
- ③⑧ Nevertheless the meaning of the two "Nothingness"s is somewhat different, thence the reasons for their "unspeakability" are different too.
- ③⑨ It is because the repeated foreign invasions and the active propaganda of native religions led to cultural mixing-together. As a result the Greek king Menandros and the Kuṣāna king Kaniṣka became famous patrons of Buddhism, and a number of foreign rulers had been converted to other
- ③③ 參見 Akihiro Takeichi, "On the Origin of Nihilism", *Heidegger and Asian Thought*(Ed by G.Parkes) (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987), PP. 183-185.
- ③④ 堅意，《入大乘論》卷一，《大正藏》第三十二冊。
- ③⑤ 鳩摩羅什譯，《金剛般若波羅蜜經》(南京：金陵刻經處，1932)
- ③⑥ 惠能，《壇經·般若品》(南京：金陵刻經處，1942)
- ③⑦ Brihad-Araṇyaka Upanishad IV·4·21(from: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, Oxford University Press, 1995.)
- ③⑧ 然而兩種「空無」之意義仍略有出入，它們的「無法言詮」之原因也因而互異。
- ③⑨ 由於不斷遭到外國入侵，加以當地宗教之大力宣揚，而形成文化融和。結果希臘之彌蘭陀王與月支國迦膩色迦王成為佛教著名的護法，許多外國統治者也都皈依其他的印度宗教。參見：R.C.Majumdar, *Ancient*

*Heidegger's "Ontological Difference"
and Mahayana's "Twi-satyas" Theory*

Indian religions (With reference to:
R.C.Majumdar, *Ancient India*(Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass,1982), P. 166;
Benimadhab Barua, *A History of Pre-
Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*
(Calcutt: University of Calcutt Press,
1921), P. 420. etc.)

India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1982), P. 166; Benimadhab Barua,
*A History of Pre-Buddhistic In-
dian Philosophy* (Calcutt: Univer-
sity of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420.
etc.

④① See J. L. Mehta, "Heidegger and
Vedānta", *Heidegger and Asian
Thought*, P. 24.

④① 參見 J. L. Mehta, *Heidegger and
Vedānta*, *Heidegger and Asian
Thought*, P. 24.

④① Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*
(Oxford University Press, 1936), P.
30.

④① Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*
(Oxford University Press, 1936),
P. 30.

④② *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, PP. 117-118.

④② *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, PP. 117-
118.

④③ Although Heidegger has said in an
occasion that the "sunya" of Bud-
dhism is "the same with" his "Noth-
ing" (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, PP.
108-109), we would rather think
such an expression as originated
from his misunderstanding of
Buddhism.

④③ 雖然海德格曾一度說過佛家的
「空」如同他所謂的「無」(*Unter-
wegs zur Sprache*, PP. 108-109),
我們寧可認為這種說法是出於
他對佛法的誤解。