

「緣起」等的影響。龍樹的中論觀世諦品第二十四說：「諸佛依二諦，爲衆生說法；一以世俗諦、二第一義諦。若人不能知，分別於二諦，則於深佛法，不知真實義。若不依俗諦，不得第一義；不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」這正是把中觀的態度表露無遺。唯有獨斷論者才會以爲自己所主張的思想模式是唯一的真理，這樣一來，把經驗的事實與「最後實在」截然劃分爲二，儘管在「最後實在」的園地裏，他們能滿足自己玄想式的思想，但却無法把經驗界在實在界的關係交待清楚。

(下期續完)

## 慧炬新書介紹

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### 射藝中的禪：

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射藝的目的不在實用，而是藉以鍊心而契入諸法實相，故應視爲純藝術的昇發，以達「無藝之藝」。

本書的作者赫立格爾先生，是一位德國哲學家，曾在日本講學，他一面學習射藝，希望以此認識禪。本書可謂爲一本精彩的小書，作者將其經驗，作了一番極富啓發性的敘述，透過他深入淺出的表達方式，更能令讀者了解。

### 人類的宗教——佛學篇：

赫士唐·史密斯教授著  
舒吉譯·32開·定價三十元

這本「人類的宗教」，係作者對各種宗教精義與長處，作一深入淺出的比較，經由生動的文筆描述，所以在美國頗受普遍的歡迎，許多大學都用它作「宗教學史」，或比較宗教學的入門參考書。

### 原始佛典選譯：

亨利·克拉克·華倫著·顧法嚴教授譯·32開本·定價四十元。

作者選譯巴利文藏經之精華譯成英文，書名「佛典選譯」，暢銷歐美學術界數十年，譯筆生動，堪稱信、雅、達。本書可增進讀者對南傳佛典，及原始佛典的了解。

觀派則是以理智的直覺——般若波羅蜜來完成此一工作。中觀派絕不如唯物論者之否認精神的實在性，而中觀派所說的「真實」亦不是空無虛幻，而是要把不完美與有限性滌盡無遺。

中觀派辯證法的目標乃是以精神為依歸；亦即是一個海濶天空、不受分別、二邊執著干擾的心靈，亦唯有這樣才能遠離煩惱、情慾、執著、瞋恨。為什麼呢？龍樹菩薩中論觀法品第十八很明白的表示：「業煩惱滅故，名之為解脫；業煩惱非實，入空（則）戲論滅。」般若就是涅槃——自由自在的境界，般若圓滿了一切道德宗教的目標；這不是一種精神主義的表現嗎？在般若智慧的普照之下，這是一個和諧的人格，就個人而言，般若調和了吾人內在在不同層次人格的衝突；就團體而言，般若使人們的相互敵對鬥爭得以消解無形。在般若的智慧中，以自我為中心的邪見不復存在，一切的一切都是那麼的和諧。

儘管如此，中觀派的主張與經驗活動乃是毫無衝突。中觀派並不反對常識或科學，因為這些無非是吾人探究現象界事實的成果。中觀派乃是主張善惡、同異、實體、因果、思想範疇等並不足以描述「最後的真實」。何以故？因為現象界乃是相互緣起、彼此關涉而有的。中觀派並不否認這些概念用以解釋經驗界事實的效用，甚且說如果沒有這些則追求所謂的「最後真實」是不可能的。何以故？因為吾人俱是落在時空的存在中，而在時空中即無法脫離

人認識「最後實在」的「架構形上學」，這可說是實證主義的一種。

不過，他們這種反駁並沒有任何新的意義，龍樹及其繼承者早就已對這種反駁有所討論。表面上看來，實證主義與中觀派的辯證法所否認的與所排斥的並無差別，不過二者却有兩點根本的差異：實證主義排斥了任何意義的形上學，而認為形上學純是無的放矢，因為實證主義論者認為必須是經驗上可證驗的命題才具有意義可言，而唯有透過感覺觀察所得的資料才是真實的；實證論者不僅不知而且也沒有利用超越性的概念，所以在本質上他們可說是一種唯物論者。中觀派之所以反對「思辯形上學」並不是說沒有超越性的「真實」可言，而是着眼在思辯形上學錯把經驗界中的概念用來推定「真實」，亦即是說教條式的思辯形上學在方法上犯了錯誤；思辯形上學不該把僅在現象界為真的思想範疇拿來推斷超越性的存在。中觀學者主張要探究真正的「真實」必須除去種種不當的方法與獨斷性的推論。中觀派所處的情況恰與康德相似，康德所用的「超越辯證法」乃是直接用以反對思辯形上學（如理性心理學、宇宙論、神學等），這不是說康德不相信神的真實性與靈魂的自由、不死性，而是為了除去把本來不屬於神或靈魂的概念加諸於神或靈魂身上的錯誤方法。至於康德與中觀派的差異我們在前面已經談過，亦即是康德以非理智性的模式——信仰與「實踐理性」來瞭解「真實」，而中



事物內在的本質。而般若直覺悟性的智慧便是超越這種分別，打消由理性所形成的種種概念所引起的情執，所以般若亦可名之為「無二邊空」。

從上所述，所謂的「絕對」在本質上不只是具有超越性而且是不離世俗的。為什麼說具有超越性呢？因為這不是經驗語詞所能描述的「無分別智」。為什麼說是不離世俗呢？因為「真實」絕不是離開世間而可得，而是「如實的認識此一世間」——就世間的眞象而論世間當下即是吾人所追求的「真實」，而不再受理性之思維分別的干擾。如果認清這一層面，則吾人對中觀派所常用的負面的、否定的語言即不再狐疑莫解了。總之、「真實」絕不是吾人用了什麼巧妙的方法使它再生，事實上並沒有一種知識能使我們賦予「真實」再生。錯誤的概念一經除去，當下即是「真實」，中觀派辯證法的效力即是在於破邪，而破邪即是顯正——彰顯何者是「真實」。

2.空不是實證主義，因為它有精神上追求的目標。

以上的說明或許無法讓反對中觀派的人士滿意，因為他們可以說：你的邏輯或許是無懈可擊，但你的邏輯却毫無目標可言。在他們眼中看來，中觀派的辯證法乃是用以掩飾「空」的膚淺，而且中觀派與今日所謂的「邏輯實證論」及印度當時的唯物主義等等實證主義並沒有什麼差別。他們這種看法無非是站在反宗教、反形上學的立場而論，不過持平之論是這樣的：中觀派拒絕了各種所謂能使吾

不是意謂著排斥「真實」存在的可能性。相信黑格爾學說的人可能會認為：缺乏思維限定與無法通過理性得知的事物根本是不存在的。但是除非吾人假設：「真實」即是理性，而不是其他的東西，這種反對的說法才言之成理。那麼這種假設是否為正確的呢？很明顯的，除非吾人所知道的只有「真實」即是理性，但實際上理性——思維分別並不足以代表吾人所有的認知模式。對中觀學者而言，否定全部的「思維模式」——一邊之見即是般若——一種直覺的悟性。般若即是「絕對」，即是「真實」，而般若的智慧乃是不二，無分別的。

如果般若是一種直覺的悟性，而且是積極的，那麼中觀學者何以要把它與「空」結合，而且又以否定式的辯證法來達到體悟般若的方法呢？會提出這種問題的人，代表著他對絕對主義之理則的無知。除了不執著於外相之外，吾人實在無法瞭解何者是「真實」：所謂「真實」即是隱含在外相之內的真實；而唯有除去包括在真實外面的外衣才能彰顯真實為何物。而直覺的悟性並非離開思維分別另外建立的一種模式，因為倘若如此，則便有兩種不同的認知模式，如此則那一個是正確的即難以決定。但是思維分別本質上即無法彰顯真實，何以故？因為它是以概念模式來分別、區分事物。理性的精神即在於「二邊」分別，亦即是主張「不是此便是彼」，與「此不是彼，彼不是我」

截然劃分，而無法除去這種二邊的表面之見，直接探索

且無法避免一切見解在本質上的缺陷。要除去這種衝突唯有超越這些一邊之見，因為這些一邊之見本身即是阻礙吾人悟性的因素，並且使真理成為虛渺不可得的幻相，所以要體悟何者是真理必先放棄偏狹的一邊之見。那麼中觀派用什麼方法來除去這些一邊之見呢？從中觀的論式中我們很清楚的看出：中觀乃是指指出其他見解（所謂外道或佛教教內的其他部派）在本質上的誤謬或邏輯上的不可能，以證明該見解為錯誤的，這種方法即是一般所謂的「歸謬證法」，而且中觀學者評破的對象不只是正面的見解，還包括反面或調和的見解。

從這種辯證的過程中，唯一合理的結論是：「真實」乃是超越一切言詮思維分別，且無法以經驗世界的名詞來表達的。還有，中觀這種辯證的方法絕不能視之為否認一切真理的虛無主義。如前所述，中觀對真理的態度乃是「非義理架構」的批評心智，這絕不能與「沒有真理」的虛無心態相混。任何一種合理的絕對主義必然會排斥經驗對「真實」所作的種種「限定」；因為種種「限定」作用必然是經驗界的。吾人總是習慣於用種種經驗上所得來的規範來認定事物是不存在的，其實事務本質並非不存在；另一種則是認為由感官所認知的落於時空之世界是真實的，並且執著只有這樣的才是真實的。

中觀學者很明白的說不可把「空」認為即是「不存在」，因為除非吾人可以認定「真實」與「思維分別」是同一的，那麼中觀學者說思維分別無法體悟何者是真實，並



# 中觀思想的評價(上)

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編者按：本文譯自穆帝所著「佛教根本哲學」第十四章。

## I 空是絕對主義而不是虛無主義或實證主義

1. 中觀思想的核心是在其辯證的方法與精神，而這種方法與精神乃是由印度「有我」與「無我」兩大傳統思想之先天不可避免的衝突中演化而來。「有我」是由奧義書中得來的概念，而「無我」則是釋尊的教法。尅實的說，中觀的辯證法乃是從理性的二律背反衝突中——即「是」與「不是」的相對——所表現的悟性。中觀把二律背反的對立性提高到另一批判的層次，這可說是當下即是解決此一衝突的不二法門。前面我們已經說過，中觀的辯證法乃是將巴利文及其他譯本佛典中所暗示的釋尊教法抽出加以整理而成，而中觀的思想路線乃是處中道而行、並且嚴厲的批評各種不同的見解（特別是部派阿毘達磨的思想），此處不再贅述。

耆那教與黑格爾皆試圖以調合的方法解決此一理性的二律背反衝突。因為他們都認為此一衝突乃是源於一邊之見，所以只要把這兩個一邊之見予以調合即可除去對立衝突。不過依中觀學者的看法，這種調合還是一邊之見，而

the person is not divided in himself; nor does he divide himself from others. The internal conflict between various levels of personality and the external conflict of one's good as antagonistic to the good of others are both resolved. This is possible in the advaita or advaya, where all our faculties and interests are unified as Brahman or Prajñāpāramitā. It is possible *only* in advaita, for that alone abolishes private standpoints and interests, which make for the ego-centric outlook. In the last analysis, the ego is the root of the unspiritual; the universal is the spiritual. Śūnyatā, as the negation of all particular views and standpoints, is the universal *par excellence*.

Not only has the Mādhyamika dialectic the spiritual for its objective, it is not also incompatible with any empirical activity. It is not opposed to commonsense or science, where our aim is to know and handle things presented to sense in the phenomenal sphere. The categories of thought, causality, substance, identity and difference, good and bad etc., are certainly not applicable to the ultimately real, being relative; but the Mādhyamika does not deny their utility as patterns of explanation in the empirical region. It is the dogmatic theorist with his insistence upon the sole truth of his particular conception of the real who makes empirical activity impossible.<sup>9</sup> Transcendental ideality (unreality) and empirical reality well go together.

(To be Continued)



unconditioned, the categories of thought that are true within phenomena alone. To safeguard the purity of his tattva (Real) it is necessary for the Mādhyamika to deny the pretensions of dogmatic metaphysics. His position is akin to that of Kant. Kant's Transcendental dialectic is directed against speculative metaphysics (against Rational Psychology, Cosmology and Theology) not because he did not believe in the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality of the Soul, but because he wanted to make them safe from the unwarranted ascriptions of pure Reason. The difference between the two, as has been pointed out previously, is that Kant seeks to realise these noumenal realities in a non-intellectual mode—Faith and practical Reason; the Mādhyamika does it in Intellectual Intuition—Prajñāparamitā. The Mādhyamika is spiritual to the core. His absolute is not void but devoid of finitude and imperfection. It is nothing but Spirit.<sup>7</sup>

The objective of his dialectic is spiritual; it is to free the mind of all vikalpa by resolving the antas, alternatives. By this, freedom from kleśas—passions, attachment and aversion—is achieved; for the kleśas have their root in vikalpa or false construction.<sup>8</sup> Prajñā is Nirvāna—the state of freedom. It is also the attainment of Buddha-hood; Prajñā-pāramitā is Tathāgata, the *Ens realissimum*. Prajñā consummates the moral and the religious ideal; it is spiritual. The spiritual is a state of undivided personality:

your logic ends in nothing." To him the dialectic may possibly appear to be an elaborate game designed to cover up the hollowness of the void (*Śūnya*). There is nothing to distinguish the *Mādhyamika* system from positivism, like that of Logical Positivism of the present age, or the forth-right materialism of old.<sup>5</sup> All these are anti-metaphysical and anti-religious in their objective. With his rejection of all views, of all constructive metaphysics which give us access to the ultimately real, the *Mādhyamika* is a species of positivism.

The objection is by no means new. It had been raised against *Nāgārjuna* and his successors, and has been answered by them.<sup>6</sup> Though the external form of denial and refutation may be common to positivism and the *Mādhyamika* dialectic, they have two totally different and opposite objectives. The positivist denies the significance of metaphysics, calling it sheer nonsense even, because for him all significance is confined to the propositions that are empirically verifiable, such as those of science. For him, the sense-given is, in the last resort, the only real; he has neither use for nor knowledge of the transcendent. He is a materialist at heart. The *Mādhyamika* rejects speculative (dogmatic) metaphysics, not because there is no real that is transcendent, but because by its defective procedure dogmatic metaphysics wrongly understands the transcendent in terms of the empirical modes; it illegitimately extends, to the

real; for it looks at it through conceptual patterns, through differentia and distinction; it sunders and distorts the real. Buddhi<sup>4</sup> (Reason) is therefore characterised as samvrti the veil that covers the real. And the soul of buddhi is in the 'antas', in the 'is' and 'not-is' attitudes or a combination of them. To know the real, then, we have necessarily to remove the function of buddhi, i.e. negate the 'antas' or attitudes of 'is' and 'not-is'. Prajñā is very rightly taken as the Śūnyatā of drsti, the negation of concepts (antadvaya-śūnya).

This allows us to understand the nature of the absolute as at once transcendent and immanent. It is transcendent as it is beyond the categories of thought, untouched by empirical predicates (catuskotivinirmukta, nirvikalpa); it is immanent, as it is not another thing beside the world, but is the world itself known truly, without the distorting medium of buddhi. It is no accident then that the Mādhyamika uses the language of negation. The real is not to be brought into existence *de novo*; nor can a knowledge of it be taken as a new acquisition. Misconceptions alone require to be removed. And this function the Dialectic performs; that alone is its function.

## 2. *Śūnyatā is not Positivism*: it has a spiritual goal.

The critic of the Mādhyamika may not be easily satisfied. "Your logic," he might say, "is impeccable; but



consider Sūnyatā as abhava, non-existence.<sup>3</sup> To deny the accessibility of the real to thought is not to deny the real, unless we assumed the identity of the real with thought. A Hegel might urge that what lacks thought-determinations and is inaccessible to Reason is nothing. The objection has force only when you have accepted, assumed, that the Real is Reason and nothing else. And what will justify this assumption? It may be said that we know nothing else beside this, and that provides the justification for the criterion of the real. But thought does not exhaust the modes of our cognition; nor is it the prius. For the Madhyamika, the total negation of thought-modes is Prajñā—Intuition. Prajna is Absolute, as the Real and the knowledge of it are non-dual (advaya), non-different.

If Prajñā is Intuition and is, therefore, positive, why should the Mādhyamika identify it with Sūnyatā, and use the negative method of the Dialectic to attain this end? The objection betrays ignorance of the logic of absolutism. We cannot know the real except by negating appearance: the real is the *reality of the apparent*, and only as we tear off the superficial vestures in which it is clothed do we know the real, not otherwise. Intuition is not one other mode of knowledge beside thought; if it were so, we should have two alternative, even complementary, modes of knowing. And nothing can then decide between their rival claims. But thought is inherently incapable of revealing the

does not escape the predicament inherent in all views.<sup>1</sup> To get rid of the Conflict, then, we have to transcend all views and standpoints that cramp our understanding and make reality an appearance. Every view must be given up to reach the real as it is. The rejection is done by exhibiting the inherent, but unnoticed, contradiction present in every thesis to the upholder of the thesis on principles and arguments acceptable to him; it is done by *prasanga* or *reductio ad absurdum* arguments. Not only affirmative views, but negative ones and even a conjunction of them, are negated by the Mādhyamika dialectic.

The one legitimate conclusion that can follow from this procedure is that the Real is transcendent to thought, and that it cannot be conceived in terms of the empirical. The dialectic should not be taken, as is done by the uninformed, as the denial of the Real—Nihilism. As we have pointed out before, the 'no-doctrine-about-the-real' attitude of the Mādhyamika is confounded with the 'no-reality' doctrine. Any consistent absolutism has necessarily to exclude empirical determinations of the real; and all determinations are empirical. This may appear to men accustomed to assess things with the norm of the empirical as non-existent; but it is not non-existent in itself. The objection assumes that the spatio-temporal world perceived by the senses is real, and that that alone is real.<sup>2</sup>

We are explicitly warned by the Mādhyamikas not to

## I SUNYATA IS ABSOLUTISM. NOT NIHILISM OR POSITIVISM

1. Dialectic is the pivot of the Madhyamika system. And this could emerge as the inherent and inevitable conflict developed between the ātma and anātma traditions, one drawing its inspiration from the Upanisads and the other from the teachings of Buddha. Dialectic is the consciousness of the antinomical conflict of Reason in the opposition of the two 'moments'—'is' and 'not-is'; it is at once their resolution by arising to a higher plane of critical awareness. It has been shown that the Mādhyamika dialectic is but the systematic form of the suggestions already found in the teachings of Buddha as embodied in the Pali and other Canons. The Mādhyamika develops his characteristic 'middle-position', which is really no position, by a trenchant criticism of the various systems and points of view especially of the Ābhidharmika system. All this has been treated at sufficient length, and it is not proposed to cover the ground over again.

The Jaina system and Hegel attempt to resolve the antinomical conflict in Reason by synthesising the viewpoints and evolving a new system incorporating the views. For them the conflict is engendered by one-sidedness, and this, they aver, is removed in a synthesis. For the Mādhyamika, the synthesis of views is but another view, and it



■ 2 中英文摘 ■



THE  
MADHYAMIKA SYSTEM  
—AN ESTIMATE

(I)

by T. R. V. Murti

Translated into Chinese  
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(**Editor's note:** *This is the 14th chapter of T. R. V. Murti's "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism".*)