

的，因為它超越了語文和知識。它不受知識、文字、名稱和觀念的影響。因為它是超經驗的，缺少一切客觀性，它無關於實質和品質、統一和分歧。法稱在「論關係」一文中批評實在論者的理論，他堅持個別殊相（即「最高實體」）與任何事物都無關，因為它既不含有且又超越「關係」的四個特性——依賴、互貫、相關和因果。這種個別殊相是瞬間的、即時的、運動的意識，每一刻都在毀滅。這個「意識」是「最高實體」。它基本上是非對立的、自明的意識，不含一切雜質，是吾人知識的最根本，超越整個主客的對立性。

法稱強調，當我們認知一個外在物體時，我們只是認知它的各種屬性，而非它的實體——「物體本性」（即個別殊相），因為後者不具任何屬性，不曾以認知的客體出現。它不是在認知和判斷的階段被認識，因為我們對一個客體的了解，是基於得自五官的不同感覺資料。所以，當我們仔細檢查外在客體的性質以後，我們發現，它們的本質（即這種「當下一刻」的個別殊相）既非統一，也非分歧，更不是推論性知識的對象，所以是不可述說的。

虛幻的認識

對於客體的虛幻認知，產生自過去經驗所累積的知識。它可以分為二種：一、覺受的經驗，二、無始的經驗。依據後者，由於我們在前世所累積的過去印象、習慣和業，我們把世界誤認為實體，所以就傾向於造業；但世界的分歧並非由於客觀現象的複雜性。依據前者，由於超越幻象的力量，於是產生了客觀世界的幻象。即使個別殊相在基本上是非對立的、自明的意識，但由於我們的無明，它以主和客、自我和世界的對立形式出現。所以，法稱認為，由於意識的顯現，方有主體和客體之分，故整個客體世界只是一種外象而已。在證明意識本身以客體出現之後，法稱強調，客體現象並不能透過無始無明而被認為是真實的。他把這種虛幻的認識比喻作一個被魔術所惑的人，視線模糊，將小陶片和砂礫看成是錢幣和鑽石。他進一步強調，只有未開悟的人和愚昧的人才會相信客體的外界存在。內在的主體或認知者，是跟外界客體一樣不真實的。「主體」的觀念是自我觀念，是一切煩惱的根本原因。在充分了解主客的二分法和分歧的世界不過是心的產物之後，一位開悟的人就可以走普通人的路，正如大象閉起眼睛走在世界的塵埃中。

NEWS HIGHLIGHTS

BAUS Dedicating the Kuan Yin Hall, Transmitting Five Precepts for Laymen

Torch of Wisdom – The Buddhist Association of the United States plans to transmit the five precepts for laymen May 11 to 13. This is to dedicate the Kuan Yin Hall of the Chuan-yen Monastery and to celebrate Rev. Hsien Ming's taking abbacy of the Monastery.

This bodhisattva precepts transmitting will be presided over by Rev. Ming Chi, Rev. Hsien Ming, Rev. Jen Chun, Rev. Hu Lin and Rev. Fa Wan. Application will be accepted until April 25. Address: The Temple of Enlightenment, 3070 Albany Crescent, Bronx, New York 10463, U.S.A. Tel: (212) 884-9111.

20) Ibid. III. 353.

21) “Mantrādyupa-plutākṣanām yathā mṛcchakalādayaḥ. Anyathaivā vabhasante tadrūparahitā api” – Ibid. III. 355.

22) Ibid. II. 196.

23) “tadupekṣita tattvārthaiḥ kṛtvā gajanimīlanam. kevalam lokabuddhyaiva bāhyachintā pratanyate” – Ibid. III. 219.

法稱作品中的「共相」與「殊相」哲學

印度賽巴巴著 · 蓮 眞譯

目前，歷史家和學者都一致同意，法稱是公元第七世紀的人物。他著有因明作品多篇，對佛教邏輯學有相當貢獻。

共相與殊相

就像中世紀印度邏輯學之父陳那，法稱也否認「宇宙觀念」之有效性，諸如，在一些非佛教的傳統裏，永恒的造物主上帝被認為是這個世界的起因。他說，「上帝」不能夠被認為是「共相觀念」，因為他的永恒存在無法以推理知識來證明，他不能夠因為他不可改變的性質而被認為是宇宙之因。

法稱否認共相的實質性，因為它們只不過是心理思惟的產物，並不能代表外界的實質性。依據他的說法，我們的超越幻象是我們對於共相之實質產生錯覺的原因。「共相」的理解力，不是直接獲得的，而是來自於五官。這種間接的理解力，是從推論或想像而得來的。他認為，「共相」的觀念並非實際存在的，它只是一種錯誤的心理觀念，產生於心理對殊相的區分。爲了把一群屬於某一種類的殊相，從其他種類的殊相劃分開來，於是就鑄造了「共相」。它是吾人想像的結果，涵蓋了「個別殊相」的實質。實在論者主張共相和殊相是互依的，法稱則否認這種看法，他

認為「殊相」並不需要「共相」才能證明其存在，因為殊相先天上就是獨成一類的。因此在感官認知的時候，「殊相」自然就從其他一切同質和異質的事物區分開來，而是以特定的形式被認識的。

法稱對於「殊相」的定義是：心影依其親密性和疏遠性而有所不同的事物。依據達摩陀拉的註解，「殊相」是認知的客體，當客體接近時則產生清晰的意識，當客體遙遠時則產生模糊的意識，所有外物都是以同樣方式來經驗的。「個別殊相」只是代表最高的實質，因為產生結果的效率或能力才是它的要素。換言之，效率是實際和最高的存在。存在者即效率，效率者即真實。真實者是瞬間的，或時刻在改變的。反之，不改變者是無效率的，是不真實的。法稱把「殊相」這個名詞使用在三個意義方面：第一，它是「如是存在」的，意指它是先於主和客、理解者和被理解者各種分類的階段。其次，它是個別的或極端的或堅固的殊相，是純粹的基礎，是存在，處於時空之中，除了「理解者和被理解者」的觀念之外，超越一切心理的建構。這是效率的時刻。第三，因為它的實體就是本身的特殊實質，所以我們把它了解成個別的殊相。

法稱認為，「個別殊相」是非概念性

ignorance it appears in the dual form of subject-object, the self and the world.¹⁸ Therefore, Dharmakīrti contends that the whole world of objects which is the manifestation of consciousness as subject and object is only an appearance.¹⁹ After proving that consciousness itself appears as an object, Dharmakīrti asserts that it is not known that through what beginningless ignorance the objective phenomena are considered as real.²⁰ He compares this illusory cognition with the blurred vision of those who are enchanted by magic see small potsherds and pebbles as coins and diamonds respectively.²¹ He further affirms that only the unenlightened and not the wise believe in the external existence of objects. The internal subject or percipient is as unreal as the external object. The notion of the 'subject' is the ego-notion and is the root cause of all suffering.²² Having fully known that the subject-object dichotomy as well as the world of diversity is the super-imposition of mind and nothing else, an enlightened being follows the ways of common men, just as the Elephant walks in the dust and the dirt of the world by closing its eyes.²³

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- 2) Rahula Sankrtyayana, Pramāṇa-Vārtika with Pramāṇa-Vārtika-bhāṣya by Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara Gupta (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jaiswal Research Institute, 1953) II. 12-28.
- 3) "So 'numānasya visayah" – See. Chandra Shekhar Shastri, Nyāya-Bindu by Dharmakīrti (Benaras: Kashi Sanskrit Granthamala, 1954 2nd edn.) I. 17.
- 4) Rahula Sankrtyaya, Op. cit., I. 70-74.
- 5) Ibid. I. 139.
- 6) Ibid. 69-71.
- 7) Chandra Shekar Shastri, Op. cit., I. 13.
- 8) Chandra Shekar Shastri, Nyāya-Bindu-Tika by Dharmottara (Banaras: Kashi Sanskrit Granthamala, 1954, 2nd edn.) p. 16, lines 15-18.
- 9) "Arthakriyāsāmarthya-lakṣaṇatād astunaḥ" – Nyāya-Bindu, I. 15.
- 10) "Prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittam Prakṛtyā gantavomalāḥ" – Pramāṇa-Vārtika, II. 209.
- 11) "Paricchedontaram yonyam bhāgo bahiriva sthitah jñānas yābhedino bheda pratibhāso hyupaplavah" – Ibid. III. 213.
- 12) Ibid. III. 202.
- 13) "Darśanopādhi-rahitas-yāgrahāt tadgrāhe grāhāt. Darśanaṃ nīlanirbhāsaṃ, nārtho bāhyosti kevalaḥ." Ibid. III. 336.
- 14) Ibid. I. 80, 85-88, 90, 93, 129, 136; IV. 183-84.
- 15) "Idam vastu-balāyātām yad vadanti vipścītaḥ. Yathā yathā 'rthās cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā" – Ibid. III. 210.
- 16) Ibid. III. 336.
- 17) See. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. II (Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1958) pp. 367-68, fn. 3.
- 18) "Avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātma viparyāsita darśanaḥ Grāhyagrāhaka-sāmvitti bheda-vāniva lakṣyate" – Pramāṇa-Vārtika. III. 354.
- 19) "Tasmānnārtheṣu na jñāne sthūlābhasas tadātmanah. Ekatra-pratisiddhatvād bahuṣvapi na sambhavaḥ. – Ibid. III. 212.

that which is real. The real is momentary or change. On the contrary, the changeless is inefficient which is unreal. Dharmakīrti uses the term 'particular' in three senses: Firstly, as 'existence as such' (Sanmātram or Sattāmātram) it denotes a stage which precedes all categorisation into subject and object, apprehender and apprehension (or being apprehended). Secondly, as the unique or extreme or concrete particular (kincididam), as the pure basis, as existence localised in Space-time (ksana) transcends all mental constructions (nāmajātādi-kalpanāpodha) except the conception of 'apprehender and apprehension (Grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanāpodha). It is the moment of efficiency. Thirdly, as its substratum is the particular thing (or essence)-in-itself (Svalakṣaṇa) it is understood in the sense of unique particular.

According to Dharmakīrti, this 'unique particular' is non-conceptual as it transcends language and intellect. It is not infected by intellect, words, names and concepts. Since it is trans-empirical and is short of all objectivity, it is unrelated to probandum and probans, substance and qualities, unity and difference. While criticising the realist theory of relations in his 'Tract on Relations' (Sambandha Parīkṣa), Dharmakīrti insists that the unique particular (i.e. Ultimate Reality) is not related to anything because it is devoid of, as well as above all the four characteristics of 'relation', viz., dependence (pāraṅtantrya), interpenetration (Rūpaśleṣa), relativity (parāpekṣa) and causality (kāryakāraṇa-bhāva). This unique particular is momentary, instantaneous, kinetic consciousness which is being annihilated at every moment. This Consciousness is the Ultimate Reality. It is essentially non-

dual, self-luminous consciousness which is free from all impurities,¹⁰ the very basis of our knowledge and transcends the whole subject-object duality.¹¹

Dharmakīrti affirms that when we perceive an external object, we only perceive its various attributes, but not the 'object as such' (i.e. unique particular) which is its substratum,¹² because the latter never appears as an object of perception devoid of all the attributes.¹³ It is not cognised both at the stage of perception as well as at the stage of judgment because our comprehension of an object is based on different sense-data acquired through the five sense-organs. Thus when the nature of external objects are closely examined we find that their substratum, i.e. this unique particular which is a 'point-instant' is neither unity nor difference nor the object of discursive intellect¹⁴ and is therefore indescribable.¹⁵

ILLUSORY COGNITION

Illusory perception of objects is produced by accumulated knowledge of former experience (vāsanā pūrvam jñānam). It is of two kinds: (1) Anubhava Vāsanā. (2) Anādi Vāsanā. According to the latter owing to our past impressions, habits and samskaras accumulated in our previous existence, we misconceive the world as reality and are consequently prone to act; but the diversity of the world is not due to the multiplicity of objective phenomena.¹⁶ According to the former, due to the force of transcendental illusion, the illusion of the objective world is created.¹⁷ Even though the unique particular is essentially non-dual self-luminous consciousness, due to our

THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'UNIVERSALS' AND 'PARTICULARS'

IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S WORKS

by V.V.S. SAIBABA, Translated into chinese by chen-huang Cheng

There is now a consensus among historians and scholars that Dharmakīrti lived sometime in 7c.A.D.¹ He made a profound contribution to Buddhist logic through his works like the Pramānavārtika, the Nyāya-Bindu, the Sambandhaparīkṣa and the Vādanīyāya.

UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS

Like his predecessor Dīnāga the father of medieval of Indian Logic Dharmakīrti also denies the validity of "universal ideas" (Sāmānya lakṣana) such as the Eternal Creator God who is conceived in some of the non-Buddhist traditions as the cause of this world. According to him 'God' cannot be considered as an 'universal idea' because his eternal existence cannot be proved by inferential knowledge and he cannot be regarded as the cause owing to his unchangeable nature.²

Dharmakīrti denies the reality of the universals (Vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ) as they are merely mental constructions which do not represent the external reality. According to him our transcendental illusion is the cause of our misconception about their reality. The knowledge of the 'universal' is not direct, but is obtained only through sense-organs. This indirect knowledge is derived from inference or imagination.³ For him, the idea of 'universal' is not really existent, but is only a

false mental notion produced out of the mental distinction among particulars.⁴ In order to differentiate a group of particulars belonging to a genus from all other particulars of other genres, the 'universal' is coined.⁵ It is the result of our imagination which covers the reality of 'unique particulars' (Svalaksana).⁶ Refuting the realist's contention of interdependence of universals and particulars, Dharmakīrti holds that the 'particular' is not in need of the 'universal' in order to prove its subsistence, because the particulars are exclusive by nature. Hence at the time of sense-perception, a 'particular' is naturally differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things and is apprehended in a definite form.

Dharmakīrti defines a 'particular' as something whose mental image varies according to its nearness and remoteness.⁷ According to Dharmottara's Commentary on the Nyāya-Bindu, the 'particular' is the object of perception which produces a clear flash of consciousness when it is near and a dim flash when it is at a distance and all externality is experienced in the same manner.⁸ The 'unique particular' only represents the ultimate reality, because efficiency or the capacity to produce the effect is its essence.⁹ In other words, the real and the ultimately existent (Paramārthasat) is the efficient. The existent is efficient and the efficient is