“Critical Buddhism” (Hihan Bukkyō) and the Debate Concerning the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō Texts

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One of the main issues in the recent movement known as Critical Buddhism (hihan bukkyō) is the question of which version of the Shōbōgenzō represents Dōgen’s authentic philosophical message. Critical Buddhism has rejected the conventional emphasis on the priority of the 75-fascicle version, which contains the famous philosophical essays on “Buddha-nature” (Busshō) and “Being-Time” (Uji). Instead it emphasizes that the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō, which was written toward the end of Dōgen’s life and contains mainly practical instructions for monks in training, is the real or authentic text because of its critique of original-enlightenment thought and consistent focus on karmic causality. This paper examines the Critical Buddhist view in the light of responses by traditional Dōgen scholars. The debate is framed and evaluated in the larger context of Buddhist scholasticism and hermeneutics in which scholars try to reinterpret medieval sources from a classical or foundational standpoint and in terms of distinctively modern concerns.

The recent methodological movement in Buddhist studies known as Critical Buddhism (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教) is characterized by several far-ranging and rather controversial conclusions aimed at undermining the status quo in East Asian Buddhist orthodoxy and in the conventional scholarship on Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The Critical Buddhist scholars have sought to reexamine many of the major developments in East Asian Buddhist thought in terms of their consistency with the fundamental Buddhist philosophy of causality expressed in Pāli and early Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. Critical Buddhism is probably best known for its bold claims that “tathāgatagarbha (nyoraizō 如来藏) thought is not Buddhism” and that “Zen is not Buddhism.”¹ But the real significance of such hyperbole is its chal-

¹ See Matsumoto 1989, pp. 1–8, “Nyoraizō shisō wa bukkyō ni arazu,” originally delivered in 1984, for comments on tathāgatagarbha thought; and Itō Takatoshi (1992b) for the
Challenge to the substantialist assumptions categorized by Critical Buddhism as “dhātu-vāda” (locus- or topos-oriented viewpoints). Critical Buddhism, in other words, is a methodology for refuting viewpoints that never escape from an underlying commitment to the non-Buddhist, substantive ātman-vāda and thereby violate a cluster of principles involving causality, such as the notions of dependent origination, non-self, karmic retribution, and impermanence. Dhātu-vāda viewpoints, such as the original-enlightenment thought (hongaku shisō 本覚思想) that was so influential in medieval Japanese religion, have allowed aspects of naturalism, syncretism, and assimilation to creep into and distort Buddhist doctrines and social applications through contact and amalmagation with such indigenous traditions as Taoism, Confucianism, Shinto, shamanism, animism, and nativist ideology.

One of the linchpins of Critical Buddhism, one that has created at least a minor revolution in Dōgen studies, is a radical rethinking and reprioritizing of the relation between the two versions of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, known respectively as the “old” or “early” (kyūsō 旧草) 75-fascicle and the “new” or “later” (shinsō 新草) 12-fascicle versions. According to Critical Buddhism, the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō, which has traditionally been perceived as secondary to or an appendage of the better-known 75-fascicle text and which targets an audience of laypersons and new initiates rather than advanced monks, is crucial to the entire enterprise of overcoming various sorts of dhātu-vāda positions. Critical Buddhism, especially the scholarship of Hakamaya Noriaki, maintains that the 12-fascicle text reflects a profound change in Dōgen’s outlook and expresses a highly critical view of original-enlightenment thought as a misguided absolutization and affirmation of natural existence. In his later writings, according to Critical Buddhism, Dōgen refines his thinking on the meaning of impermanence—still rather vague in the 75-fascicle text because it is haunted by hongaku ideology—in accord with the early Buddhist doctrine of karmic causality as the key to understanding nonsubstantiality. Critical Buddhism thereby reverses the traditional textual hierarchy by assert-

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2 Hakamaya (1990, pp. 47–92) contrasts the “critical” philosophy of true Buddhism with “topical” philosophies, such as the Kyoto School of Nishida Kitarō and Nishitani Keiji, which he considers “disguised” as Buddhist.

3 The 12-fascicle text (an English translation is in Yokoi 1975) includes the following fascicles: Shukke kudoku 出家功德, Jukai 受戒, Kesa kudoku 装袈功德, Hotsubodaishin 發菩提心, Kayō shoetsu 供養諸仏, Kie butōsōbō 為依仏法僧宝, Jinshin inga 深信因果, Sanjigo 三時業, Shime 四馬, Shizen biki 四禪比丘, Ippyakuhachikōmyōmon 一百八法明門, and Hachidainingaku 八大人覺.
ing that the 75-fascicle text is a preliminary, incomplete, and therefore secondary (even dubious) body of writing, and that the 12-fascicle text exemplifies Dōgen’s essential teaching based on dependent origination, which Matsumoto Shirō insists was developed by the Buddha as “antithetical to dhātu-vāda” (1989, p. 8).

The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the views of Critical Buddhism on how the two Shōbōgenzō texts illuminate Dōgen’s critical perspective on original-enlightenment thought in terms of his attitude to causality and karmic retribution. These issues are also explored in light of the way conventional Dōgen scholars have responded to the Critical Buddhist exponents. The paper will first explain how and why the 12-fascicle text has become so important in Critical Buddhism, and then examine the current debate with traditionalist scholars who continue to assert the priority of the 75-fascicle text. In this paper I will use the term “traditional Buddhism” to refer collectively to the views of those scholars who have rebutted certain key aspects of the Critical Buddhist approach to Dōgen studies. This label is unfortunately not without qualifications, since it refers to a variety of positions, and I will distinguish two distinct traditionalist perspectives. One maintains that there is no significant change in Dōgen’s approach from his early to later writings. The other seeks a compromise by acknowledging some degree of change, though with a different and more complex rationale than argued by Critical Buddhism.4 In the concluding section, I will comment on two interrelated points in evaluating the contributions of Critical Buddhism. First, I will show some of the limitations in both the Critical and traditional positions on the Shōbōgenzō, which often fail to take into account the full religious and historical context of Kamakura Buddhism, and thereby overlook (for example) affinities between popular setsuwa 說話 literary conceptions of karma and Dōgen’s 12-fascicle text. Finally, I will consider one of the most commonly voiced critiques of Critical Buddhism: that it represents a disguised resurfacing of “militant fundamentalism” since it sets out to judge right and wrong forms of Buddhism and disavows all types of syncretism. In that context I will frame the Shōbōgenzō debate by clarifying the relation between the evaluative hermeneutics of medieval Buddhist scholasticism and the objectivity of contemporary Buddhist studies. I will also briefly discuss

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4 In this article I am primarily dealing with issues in Dōgen studies and with those who have critiqued the Critical Buddhist view of the 12-fascicle text. However, there have been numerous other responses, including those by Lambert Schmithausen, Takasaki Jikidō, Hirakawa Akira, and Sueki Fumihiko (a former student of Tamura Yoshirō and a leading scholar in Tendai studies), some of which are discussed in Swanson 1993, and to which Hakamaya (1992a) has responded in part.
the broader social concerns of Critical Buddhism in light of parallel developments in Western religious thought, including liberation and deconstructionist theologies.

**Critical Buddhist Methodology vs. Traditional Approaches**

The importance of the *Shōbōgenzō* for Critical Buddhist methodology is evident from the inception of the movement, which began with a series of books in 1989 and 1990. These books, in turn, were largely based on essays delivered and published in the mid-1980s by scholars in the Buddhist Studies Department of Komazawa University in Tokyo, especially Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō. These scholars were interested in Dōgen’s view of karma as a key to evaluating the relevance of Buddhist thought for a variety of social discrimination issues affecting their own university, its affiliation with the Sōtō sect, and Japanese society as a whole. These issues include the granting of Buddhist initiation names (*kaimyō* 戒名) to the deceased based on their social rank, a practice that resulted in the unjust treatment of the outcast *burakumin* (untouchable) community and other minority or dispossessed groups.\(^5\) Buddhism in Japan had evolved over the course of history into religious institutions primarily concerned with funeral ceremonies. The Sōtō sect recently began to realize that it had been performing this social function for the lower classes in a rather reprehensible fashion. Hakamaya and Matsumoto are part of a widespread response to a sense of frustration and disappointment in Buddhism, which appeared to be an anachronistic, authoritarian, dogmatic, and socially rigid institution instead of a genuinely contemporary, progressive, and flexible advocate for justice and reform. In their attempt to find out what had gone wrong with Buddhism and how it could be corrected, the Critical Buddhists, especially Hakamaya, turned to Dōgen’s Kamakura-era critique of Sino-Japanese Buddhism for guidance.

Hakamaya has reexamined East Asian Buddhism from the lens of Dōgen’s later thought, which Hakamaya feels was subverted by subsequent developments in the Sōtō institution. Critical Buddhism holds

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\(^5\) Part of the impetus behind Critical Buddhism and other reform movements within the Sōtō sect was a widespread sense of dismay with a 1979 lecture at a world religions congress by Soyu Machida, then head of the Sōtō sect, who denied that there was Buddhist discrimination against *burakumin*. These comments caused an uproar that reverberated into many levels of the Sōtō institution, from scholarship to the ritual activities of priests. See *Los Angeles Times* 1993 and *Ishii* 1990. On the ritualized marginalization and scapegoating of the *burakumin* in Japanese society, see *Ohnuki-Tierney* 1987.
that *hongaku* thought denies causality on the basis of a nondualistic doctrine whose real aim is to assimilate local animistic-naturalistic cults, and that it thus tends to foster a false sense of equality that mitigates the need for social responsibility. Original enlightenment and related doctrines such as *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature (*bushō* 仏性) espouse an uncritical tolerance and syncretism that foster, in the name of universal, nondiscriminating compassion, such problematic viewpoints as the demand for societal harmony (*wa* 和) over individuality and a tacit compliance with militarism. These attitudes are in turn supported politically by totalitarian and nationalist ideologies as well as intellectually by *nihonjinron* 日本人論 (“Japanese-ism”) rhetoric that ends up abetting ethnic discrimination. The basic weakness of *hongaku* thought, according to the Critical Buddhists, is that ontologically it does not allow for the existence of an Other, since all things are considered to arise from the single, undifferentiated primordial dhātu or locus, and that it is thus rendered epistemologically and ethically incapable of dealing with the complex manifestations of otherness that force concrete ethical choices. As Sallie King points out in a discussion of Buddha-nature doctrine,

> the texts prized in East Asian Buddhist traditions have tended to emphasize such things as nondiscrimination [in the epistemological rather than social sense] and nonconceptual wisdom, which are difficult to reconcile with the complexities of resolving competing claims, for example, or balancing needs against resources, which require that one be very precise in distinguishing particulars, that one make informed judgments, and that one regard such activities as important and valuable. (1991, p. 170)

That is, the *hongaku* and Buddha-nature doctrines lack a basis for developing situationally specific, ethically evaluative judgments, and the result is an unreflective endorsement of the status quo. According to Hakamaya:

> Although some interpret the doctrine of original enlightenment as a theory of equality since it claims to recognize the fundamental universal enlightenment of all people, this is actually a gross misunderstanding. In fact, the doctrine of orig-

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6 For example, Richard DeMartino has commented on the fact that when he interviewed D. T. Suzuki in the mid 1960s for *The Asahi Journal* (14 March, 1965), Suzuki insisted that Buddhism practiced compassion based on “motherly love,” but seemed unwilling to acknowledge a problematic side of Buddhism in society, such as discrimination or acquiescence to militaristic nationalism.
inal enlightenment, which in a facile way requires seeking out the fundamental unified ground of enlightenment, must be considered the primary source of [social] discrimination. (1989, p. 142)

In Japan, this means accepting or even supporting the “myth of Japanese uniqueness” and related nationalist/nativist/Nihonist rhetoric that pervaded post-Tokugawa, especially prewar, intellectual life (see Dale 1986). Zen, in particular, has often hidden its support for the status quo behind what is, in effect, an elitist aestheticism based on the notion that everything reflects the Buddha Dharma (zen’itsu-buppō 全一仏法).

Although Dōgen never explicitly mentions, let alone criticizes, hon-gaku in any of his writings, he first exposed its underlying limitations in his famous “doubt” about why every Buddha has had to practice if all beings are inherently enlightened (Abe 1992; Tamura 1965, 1984; Yamauchi 1986; Ikeda 1991a). Dōgen is traditionally considered to have answered this doubt, experienced at the outset of his career, in his critique of the substantialist tendency referred to in the Shōbōgenzō as the “Senika heresy,” which maintains the existence of a permanent soul that transcends the life and death of the body. In addition, Dōgen’s doctrines of the oneness of practice and realization (shushō-ittō 修証一等) and the impermanence of Buddha-nature (mujō-busshō 無常仏性) stress the dynamic, here-and-now (genjō 現成) dimension of hongaku thought, according, especially, to the early Shōbōgenzō commentaries by Senne and Kyōgō. Moreover, in the 75-fascicle text he occasionally uses other “hon-” compound terms favorably, such as hon-shō-myōshū 本証妙修, or “original realization and marvelous practice.” Yet he constructs a creative compromise throughout his career by indirectly refuting problematic aspects of original enlightenment while reorienting its basic implications in terms of the continuing process of realization. According to the traditional view, these doctrines are expressed in fascicles such as “Genjōkan” [Spontaneous realization] and “Busshō” [Buddha-nature], which form the core of the 75-fascicle text (these are two of the first three fascicles in the standard editions). They were developed by Dōgen in the middle part of his career, especially from the mid-1230s to the early 1240s when he lived outside Kyoto and later at Eihei-ji in the Echizen mountains. The 12-fascicle version of the Shōbōgenzō, compiled posthumously by first disciple Ejō in 1255 largely from texts written in the 1250s, was primarily directed toward monks at an entry level of training, and is traditionally regarded as an extension of the 75-fascicle text that does not change or add significantly to its message.
The Critical Buddhists seek to reverse the view that the 12-fascicle text is secondary to the 75-fascicle text. Hakamaya’s claim is that in the writings of the 75-fascicle text, which embrace a holistic, naturalist perspective, Dōgen was still struggling with *hongaku* thought and unable to fully overcome its influence. Hakamaya contends that the 12-fascicle text is the product of a dramatic and decisive change of heart (*henka*) by Dōgen based on his heightened awareness of karmic causality or “deep faith in causality” (*jinshin inga* 深信因果), and comprises a sharpened, more devastating critique of *hongaku* thought. Like Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamika Buddhism, which Critical Buddhism greatly admires as exponents of true (i.e., critical not topical) Buddhism, Dōgen was now thoroughly clear and penetratingly critical about what he negated. This fundamental, decisive change in Dōgen’s attitude occurred, according to the Critical Buddhists, around 1248 when Dōgen returned from a disillusioning visit to the Rinzai Five Mountains center in Kamakura, where he had gone to preach at the invitation of Hōjō Tokiyori. This change or radical reversal (*gyakuten*) is different from, though by no means unrelated historically and spiritually to, an earlier change that occurred around 1243 when Dōgen was first leaving Kyoto (see Bielefeldt 1985). The change of the Kyoto-to-Echizen period, according to a number of modern sources Bielefeldt cites, was apparently marked by a sense of dissipation and decline in Dōgen’s writing, accompanied by an aggressively sectarian, dogmatic, and argumentative outlook in which he all too eagerly abandoned liberal social views that he had previously advocated (perhaps in pursuit of aristocratic patronage), such as support for women and laypersons in the quest for enlightenment. According to some traditional scholars (primarily of Rinzai orientation, such as Yanagida Seizan and Furuta Shōkin), the monastocentric, puritanical outlook of the 12-fascicle text can be seen as a product of Dōgen’s extended decline, while other traditionalists (primarily of Sōtō orientation, such as Kagamishima Genryū and Kawamura Kōdō) view this text as part of a renewed effort at strengthening discipline in Zen training.

According to the Critical Buddhist view, however, even the latter position does not go nearly far enough in highlighting the significance of the change that generated the 12-fascicle text. Dōgen’s state of mind following this change can be compared to his determination

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7 There is no record of Dōgen’s teaching in Kamakura other than twelve Japanese poems included in his *waka* collection. Several revisionist historians have conjectured that Dōgen made the trip at the request of patrons rather than the Hōjō, though the traditional explanation has become part of the sect’s hagiography.
when, twenty years earlier, he came back from China “empty-handed” after attaining enlightenment (according to the opening passage of Eihei kôroku 永平広録, vol. 1). Hakamaya maintains that the change does not represent a puritanical stance, but an enrichment and fulfillment of Dôgen’s spiritual quest based on a deeply moral view of cause and effect and inspired by his initial doubt about hongaku thought. Dôgen’s change is based on his understanding of the need to instruct disciples on the inviolability of karmic retribution, a process often referred to as “the karma produced is the karma received” (jigô-jitoku 自業自得, or “you get what you deserve,” in contemporary idiom). This approach undermines the original enlightenment view of Buddha-nature as a primordial endowment transcendent of bondage to karma. Hakamaya points out that in some passages of the 12-fascicle text Dôgen stresses the role of repentance or confession (sange 懺悔) in reversing negative karma and attaining transformation. However, Hakamaya also argues that Dôgen is very critical of the ritualization of sange in a variety of East Asian hongaku-based practices which promote the misconception that evil karma can be easily absolved through purification ceremonies (sange metsuzai 懺悔減災; HAKAMAYA 1992b, pp. 245–88, esp. 249). The problem with this view is that it regards all defilement and evil behavior as extraneous to the basic purity of an essentially undefilable Buddha-nature. Therefore, Dôgen’s final major change becomes the role model for the Critical Buddhists’ attempt to recover the basic Buddhist concept of causality and refute hongaku thought as a major corruption of that doctrine.

The examination of the 12-fascicle text, so crucial for the Critical Buddhist project, marks what is probably the first time that Dôgen’s thought has been analyzed by specialists in other schools of Buddhism, particularly Mâdhyamika and Yogacâra in India and Tibet. This in turn has elicited an enormously profuse and thoughtful response from traditional Dôgen scholars. Although Hongaku shisô hihan, the title of HAKAMAYA’S book (1989) that unveiled the new methodology, refers only to a critique of original enlightenment, the second half of the book deals almost exclusively with Dôgen’s rejec-

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8 Hakamaya also has a lengthy discussion of the role of sange in Shushõgi 修証義, a summary of Dôgen’s philosophy created by modern Sôtô priests. It is interesting to note that Dôgen’s death gatha is quite similar to that of his Chinese mentor, Ju-ching, except that Dôgen omits the phrase zaigo 潜罪 that Ju-ching uses to refer to a recognition of his own evil karma. On the other hand, Dôgen does discuss the role of repentance in light of evil karma in the 75-fascicle’s “Keiseisanshoku.” Furthermore, the topic of sange is quite important in many aspects of Buddhism and Japanese religion from T’ien-t’ai meditative practices to medieval popular Buddhist literature to the modern philosophy of Kyoto School thinker Tanabe Hajime.
tion of Zen notions such as kyöge betsuden (special transmission outside the scriptures) and sankyō itchi (unity of the three teachings of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism), and it introduces an attempt to rethink the significance of the 12-fascicle text. While his second book (1990) does not deal with Dōgen, his third book (1992b) specializes in issues concerning the composition and compilation of the 12-fascicle text. Matsumoto’s book (1989) criticizing tathagatagarbha thought, and Itō Takatoshi’s book (1992a) criticizing Chinese Buddhism, have also commented on the 12-fascicle text, at least indirectly by citing Hakamaya’s views.

Two major collections have been published in response to Critical Buddhism, involving many of the leading Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University as well as other Sōtō authorities, who have engaged in a creative dialogue with the views expressed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto. These collections contain a two-pronged exchange of ideas. One collection (NARA 1992) focuses, in an advocacy-response format, on the extensive or “meta” issues of resituating Dōgen, and Zen as a whole, in the context of the overall development of Buddhism, and includes a section on the 12-fascicle text with contributions by Hakamaya, Kawamura, and Itō Shūken. The other collection (KAGAMISHIMA and SUZUKI 1991) is an intensive textual study that probes in great detail many diverse and highly specialized aspects of each of the fascicles in the 12-fascicle text in comparison with the 75-fascicle text.9 For Critical Buddhism the extensive issues cannot be separated from the intensive issues concerning the Shōbōgenzō, though the former are perhaps better publicized.

The Debate on the Shōbōgenzō Texts

As indicated above, Critical Buddhism has raised questions about which version of the Shōbōgenzō reflects Dōgen’s intention to create a unified text and presents his authentic philosophical message. Prior to Hakamaya’s approach, scholarship on the Shōbōgenzō10 tended to focus on two areas: first, studies of the relation between the 75-fascicle text edited by Ejō and commented on by Senne (Shōbōgenzō Okikigaki 正法眼藏御聞書) and Kyōgō (Shōbōgenzō shō 正法眼藏抄) and several other early post-Dōgen versions, including a 60-fascicle text edited by fifth patriarch Giun in 1329, an 84-fascicle text edited by Bonsei in 1419, and a 28-fascicle text (n.d.) favored in certain Sōtō temples

9 See especially the bibliographical record by TSUNODA 1991.
10 An influential article cited by both Kawamura and Hakamaya is by Sugio, 1985.
known as the *Himitsu* 祕密 (secret or “concealed”) *Shōbōgenzō* (Kawamura 1980; 1987); second, studies of the Chinese (*Mana* or *Shinji* 真字) *Shōbōgenzō* collection of three hundred kōans compiled in 1235 and the Japanese (*Kana* or *Keji* 仏字) collection of Dōgen’s sermons and philosophical essays, many of them dealing with the kōan cases contained in the Chinese collection (Kawamura 1987; Ishii 1988; Heine 1994).

Kawamura (1992, p. 231) surveys several views of the function of the 12-fascicle text prevalent before the “Hakamaya thesis.” One, as mentioned above, is that there is a continuity between the texts, with the 75-fascicle version serving as the base and the 12-fascicle one as its extension. Another view is that the 75-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of *satori* and the 12-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of faith (variations of this idea identify the respective standpoints as realization and resolve-practice, transmission and salvation, reason and practice, or philosophy and morality). According to this view, both texts contribute to the goal of a 100-fascicle text that Dōgen envisioned, but was unable to achieve, shortly before his premature death in 1253. But as Hakamaya points out in his response to Kawamura’s essay, there are now two main approaches to the 12-fascicle text. One (encompassing all of the views described by Kawamura) is that the 75-fascicle and the 12-fascicle texts are essentially of equal validity though different in style and purpose, with the 75-fascicle text on a higher spiritual plane to be studied by those approaching or having already reached enlightenment and the 12-fascicle text serving a more practical, introductory function for novice initiates; taken together they contribute eighty-seven fascicles to the envisioned one hundred, and constitute in themselves an 87-fascicle text. The Critical Buddhist view, as described above, is that the 12-fascicle text reflects a decisive change of heart and constitutes the authentic *Shōbōgenzō*, with the 75-fascicle text seen as a preliminary and unfinished version of somewhat questionable value (Hakamaya 1992c).

The debate generated on issues concerning the relation between the 12-, 28-, 60-, 75-, 84-, and 87-fascicle versions (as well as other early versions, including 83- and 89-fascicle texts, plus an 88-fascicle text that combines the 60- and 28-fascicle versions) reflects an effort to come to terms with and overcome two long-standing, mutually reinforcing misconceptions concerning the composition of the *Shōbōgenzō*. The first misconception is that the *Shōbōgenzō* consists of ninety-five fascicles, which is the number included in many modern editions, most notably the paperback version published by Iwanami Bunko (Etō 1939–1943). The second misconception is that these ninety-five fascicles were the ones intended for the projected 100-fascicle text. The modern 95-fasci-
cle edition is actually based on a Tokugawa-era invention that was supported by a so-called definitive Meiji-era edition. The aim of the first 95-fascicle edition published in 1690 by Közen was to collect, after years of confusion about the exact nature of the founder’s writings, all of the available Shōbōgenzō materials, which consisted primarily of Dōgen’s informal (jishū 異衆-style) lectures in contrast to the more formal (jōdō 堂-style) lectures collected in the Eihei kōroku 永平広録. This text was reissued in 1811 by Gentō and again in 1906 as the official Sōtō sect edition, known as the Daitōzans Eihei-ji edition. The 95-fascicle edition, however, made no attempt to recreate the structure or intentionality of Dōgen’s original manuscript and is thus of no help in reconstructing what Dōgen projected for the 100-fascicle version.

Influenced by the textual studies of Mizuno Yaoko, Hakamaya organizes the versions of the Shōbōgenzō into three categories: the concealed manuscript, or the 28-fascicle text; the posthumously edited manuscripts, primarily including the 60-fascicle and 75-fascicle texts; and the 12-fascicle text, which he argues is the collection compiled by Dōgen himself and which reflects the innermost thoughts of Dōgen in his final teachings. Hakamaya also considers the 12-fascicle text to have been a “concealed” text. Thus, Critical Buddhism rejects the traditional emphasis on the priority of the 75-fascicle version, which contains most of the famous philosophical essays, including, in addition to those previously mentioned, “Uji” (being-time), “Shōji” (birth-death), and “Zenki” (total dynamism). The 12-fascicle text lacks the creative rhetoric and metonymic wordplays for which Dōgen has often been praised by modern philosophers, and it has been seen as puritanical and socially conservative because of its contents, which center on practical instructions for monks emphasizing external symbols and ritual. But the important point for Critical Buddhists is that in fascicles such as “Jinshin inga” (deep faith in causality) and “Sanjigo” (karmic retribution through the past, present, and future), this text, unlike other Shōbōgenzō versions, stresses the irrevocability of karma and causality in a way consistent with early Buddhist thought. The 12-fascicle text argues repeatedly for the law of retribution (gōhō or goppō 業報), by which good deeds will create beneficial karma leading to positive consequences; indeed, any good deed can reverse evil and result eventually in redemption. Conversely, evil deeds necessarily beget negative karma and lead to rebirth in one of the three evil

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11 Some of the confusion concerning the different versions is traceable to Tokugawa-era disputes between Tenkei Denson, who supported the 60-fascicle text, and Manzan Dōhaku, who supported the 75-fascicle text.

realms (hell, hungry ghosts, or animals). According to the “Sanjigo”
fascicle the effects of karmic retribution are felt in present and future
lives, and for Hakamaya the literal view of karma offers a blueprint for
social responsibility.

The 12-fascicle text, according to Critical Buddhism, is also consist-
tent in its refutation of original-enlightenment thought, which tends
to deny causality because of an uncritical tolerance and syncretism
and which is therefore rendered invalid as a basis for evaluative, ethi-
cal decision-making. For example, the “Shizen biku” [Fourth-stage
monk] fascicle specifically negates hongaku tendencies that have crept
into Zen thought, such as Hui-neng’s doctrine of kenshô 見性 (seeing
into [one’s own] nature), which may suggest a hypostatization of a pri-
mordial, substantive “nature” (shô 性). “Sanjigo” explicitly refutes the
view of karma endorsed by T’ang Chinese Ch’an master Chang-sha,
who suggests the possibility of transcending karmic consequences. In
the 12-fascicle text, Dôgen also demonstrates a willingness to critically
revise his earlier thinking with regard to causality and original
enlightenment. In the “Bukkyô” [Buddhist teachings] fascicle of the
75-fascicle text, for instance, Dôgen associates the twelve links of
dependent co-arising with the preliminary pratyekabuddha stage rather
than the final bodhisattva stage of realization, thus implying that there
is a level of insight beyond causality. In a similar vein, in the “Gyôji”
fascicle of the 75-fascicle text Dôgen argues that the cosmological
principle of gyôji 行持, or the sustained exertion of all human and nat-
ural phenomena, is more fundamental than dependent origination.

But throughout the 12-fascicle text, it is clear that only “deep faith in
causality” (jinshin inga)—a phrase repeated over two dozen times—is
correct and that any subtle denial of causality is in error. Indeed, in
“Shizen biku” Dôgen specifically criticizes the hongaku-oriented identi-
fication of mountains and rivers with ultimate reality—a view that he
frequently expresses in the 75-fascicle text—as an example of the sub-
stantialist Senika heresy.

Furthermore, the 12-fascicle text refutes a variety of non-Buddhist
standpoints that have overly influenced Zen doctrine. For example,
Dôgen argues that the philosophies of Confucius and Lao Tzu, which
have been mixed with Buddhism to form the syncretic sankyô itchi ideology, fail to understand causality. He also repudiates an assortment of
local folk religions and supernatural beliefs all too frequently assimilated by East Asian Buddhist sects, including Zen. Dôgen’s critique
brings to mind the refutation of Vedic ritualism and magic from the
standpoint of causal logic as expressed in the Tevijja Sutta of the Digha
Nikâya. Hakamaya cites the following passage in the “Kie-buppôsôbo”
**Shōbōgenzō Fascicles and Texts**


**Fascicles:**

- **A**6=Zazenshin, Shunjū, Baika, Senjō, Tashintsū, Ōsakusendaba
- **B**19=Shinfukatoku, Raitaitokuzui, Sansuikyō, Den’ei, Bukkyō, Shisho, Sesshinosesshō, Shohōjissō, Butsudō, Mitsugo, Bukkyō, Menjū, Busso, Sanjūshichihon bodaibumpō, Zanmai-ōzanmai, Tenbōrin, Daishugyō, Jishōzanmai, Shukke
- **C**50/51=remaining fascicles of 94 fascicles (51 fascicles when including Gyōji II, as in the 60-fascicle version): Genjōkōan, Makahannyaharamitsu, Bussō, Shinjingakudō, Sokushinzebutsu, Gyōbuttsuigi, Ikkyō myōju, Kobusshin, Daigo, Zazengi, Kainzanmai, Kūge, Kōmyō, Gyōji I, Immo, Kannon, Kōkyō, Uji, Juki, Zenki, Tsuki, Gabyō, Keiseianshoku, Butsukōjō, Muchūsetsumu, Kankin, Shoakumakusa, Dōtoku, Jinzū, Arakan, Kattō, Hakujushi, Sangaiyuishin, Mūjōeppō, Hosshō, Darani, Senmen, Jippō, Kenbutsu, Hensan, Ganzei, Kajo, Ryūgin, Soshiseiraii, Hotsumujōshin, Udonge, Nyorai-zenshin, Kokū, Ho-u, Ango
- **D**=Hokke-ten-hokke
- **E**=Bodaisat-shishōbō
- **F**7=Sanjigo, Shime, Hotsubodaishin, Kesa kudoku, Shukke kudoku, Kuyō shobutsu, Kie buppōsōbō
- **G**4=Jukai, Jinshin inga, Shizen biku, Hachidainingaku
- **H**=Ippyakuhachihōmyōmon
- **I**5=(Beppon) Shinfukatoku, (Beppon) Butsukōjō, (Beppon) Butsudō, Shōji, Yuibutsu yobutsu

*Text considered to have been compiled by Dōgen himself*

*Editions compiled after Dōgen’s death (75-fascicle text contains A6-B19-C50 and 60-fascicle text contains C51-D-E-F7)*

*Various fascicles prior to Dōgen’s compilation of the text (A-B-C-D-E-F-I)*

*Fascicles considered [by Hakamaya] to have been “concealed”*

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*The 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts belong together to form an 87-fascicle text, and the 60-fascicle and 28-fascicle texts belong together to form an 88-fascicle text.*
[Taking refuge in the three jewels] fascicle to suggest that the antiquated, goal-oriented animistic tendencies Dōgen refuted continue to infect modern Japan:

We should not act like those who, awe-struck, vainly take refuge in mountain deities and spirits or worship at non-Buddhist shrines, for it is impossible to gain release from suffering in this way…. The wise person does not engage in such practices, for they only increase suffering and obstruct beneficial rewards. One must not take refuge in erroneous ways but clearly repudiate them. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 418)

In addition to the thematic and stylistic unity revolving around practices based on karmic retribution, an important feature of the 12-fascicle text noted by both Critical Buddhist and traditional scholars is its sequential integrity, especially when contrasted with the 75-fascicle text, which was arranged by Ejō primarily to reflect the chronological order in which the fascicles were composed. Each fascicle in the 12-fascicle text deals systematically with a stage in the process of realization, beginning with departure from home (shukke) and receiving the precepts (jukai), and moving on to such topics as awakening the bodhi-seeking mind (hotsubodaišin), paying homage to the Buddhas (kuyō shobutsu), repentance and purification of karmic conditioning (jinshin inga), the fourth stage of a monk’s meditation (shizen biku), and finally the equanimity and compassionate outflows of the bodhisattva’s attainment (hachidainingaku, the eight features of the enlightened person). The entire text forms a complete and persuasive religious document explicating the path from the initial impulse and determination to practice to the culmination and after-effects of realization, and it is to be studied by a disciple at the appropriate stage in the quest.

The Rewritten Fascicles

One of the main points of evidence the Critical Buddhists used to support the priority of the 12-fascicle text is Dōgen’s apparent rewriting of several fascicles in the 75-fascicle or 60-fascicle texts to express a new, more authentic standpoint for the 12-fascicle text.¹³ This textual

¹³ Some of the debate revolves around a cryptic colophon to the Hachidainingaku fascicle written by Ejō and discovered in 1930 in a manuscript in Yōkō-ji temple. Ejō speaks of Dōgen’s desire to create a 100-volume text (the only reference to such an idea) by rewriting all the fascicles, and he mentions the need to honor the “twelve fascicles” (or it could be read as the “twelfth fascicle”) as being consistent with Šākyamuni’s teachings (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 496).
issue, which supposedly captures the essence of Dōgen’s new intentionality, is crucial to the metatextual concerns of Critical Buddhism. There are five rewritten fascicles, listed below according to their order in the 12-fascicle text:

a) “Shukke” [Home departure] first written in 1246, no. 75 in the 75-fascicle text, rewritten as “Shukke kudoku” [Merits of home departure] and compiled by Ejō in 1255, no. 1 in the 12-fascicle text (also no. 58 in the 60-fascicle text);

b) “Den’e” [Transmission of the robe], 1240, no. 32, rewritten as “Kesa kudoku” [Merits of the robe] in 1240, no. 3 (no. 41);

c) “Hotsumujōshin” [Awakening the supreme mind], 1244, no. 63, rewritten as “Hotsubodaishin” [Awakening the bodhi-mind] in 1244, no. 4 (no. 34)—in some editions both versions are called “Hotsubodaishin”;

d) “Daishugyō” [Great cultivation], 1244, no. 68, rewritten as “Jinshin inga” [Deep faith in causality], compiled by Ejō in 1255, no. 7 (not in 60-fascicle text but no. 26 in the 28-fascicle text, with “Daishugyō” no. 17);

e) “Sanjigo” [Karmic retribution through the past, present, and future], 1253, in the 60-fascicle but not in the 75-fascicle text, rewritten as “Sanjigo” in 1253, no. 8 (no. 8).

Of these fascicles, two cases—(b) and (c)—stand out because they were rewritten around the time of their original composition in the 1240s. Case (b) exhibits the most overlapping and even unity between the two versions. Traditional scholars acknowledge that “Den’e” was probably composed as a draft for the version included in the 12-fascicle text, thereby lending credence to the arguments of the Critical Buddhists. In regard to case (c), however, in which the two versions were first delivered on the same winter evening at Yoshimine-dera in 1244 (prior to the Kamakura visit), the traditional view has been that the “Hotsumujōshin” is intended for advanced monks while “Hotsubodaishin” is for novices. Critical Buddhism reverses this by suggesting that the latter demonstrates a clearer and deeper refutation of hongaku thought. “Hotsumujōshin” uses hongaku-style rhetoric to identify the one-mind or all-encompassing mind with each and every aspect of the concrete phenomenal world, including the human and natural realms, but “Hotsubodaishin” departs from hongaku thought in

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14 Iro Shūken (1991, p. 378) also points out an affinity on the topic of reading and interpreting sūtras with the 75-fascicle “Nyoraizenshin” (complete body of Tathāgata).
emphasizing that the process of life-death during each moment invariably bears karmic consequences. In cases (a) and (d), the new versions were written in the post-Kamakura period of the 1250s: (a) is the last fascicle in the 75-fascicle text and the first in the 12-fascicle text, and the two fascicles in (d) offer different interpretations of the famous “Pai-chang’s wild fox” kōan. Finally, case (e), composed in the last year of Dōgen’s life, is the latest of all these writings and the only one of the rewritten fascicles for which the initial version is not included in any extant edition of the 75-fascicle text.

The interpretation of case (d) of the rewritten fascicles expresses as much as any other single argument in their repertoire the heart of the Critical Buddhists’ view of Dōgen’s concept of karma and its relevance for overcoming dhūtavāda viewpoints in East Asian Buddhism as a whole. The two versions both begin by citing the famous “wild fox” kōan originally included in Pai-chang’s recorded sayings and also cited in a variety of kōan collections, including the Mumonkan (no. 2) and the Shōyōroku (no. 8), transmission of the lamp histories such as the Tenshō kōtōroku and Shūmon rentōeyō, kōan commentaries, and dozens of Sung-era recorded sayings texts. The importance of this kōan for Dōgen is demonstrated by his use of it in his own kōan collection, the Shinji/Mana Shōbōgenzō, and his commentary on it in the Shōbōgenzō zuimonki and in several passages in the Eihei kōroku, including a verse commentary in the ninth volume. According to the narrative of the source kōan, a monk has been transfigured into a fox for five hundred lifetimes as a punishment for expressing a misunderstanding of causality: in response to a disciple’s inquiry, he maintained that even a person of great cultivation (daishugyō 大修行) does “not fall into causality” (furaku inga 不落因果). The monk is released from this fate, and the fox corpse is buried with Buddhist rites, through the “turning word” (ittengo 一轉語) of Pai-chang, who maintains the virtue of “not obscuring causality” (fumai inga 不昧因果). The fundamental paradox of this kōan is that by verbally denying causality the monk is victimized by karma, yet by Pai-chang’s affirming its impact he gains release. Yet, as the commentary by Dōgen and other Zen masters indicates, there are several problematical points in interpreting the kōan, including the final fates of the monk (does he continue to transmigrate or attain full nirvāṇa?), and the fox spirit. Dōgen also ponders the idea that the fox might have deceived Pai-chang into believing it was really a monk, in which case its corpse should not have received a Buddhist burial.

On the other hand, the basic message of the kōan about the inviolability of karmic causality, as indicated by the phrase fumai inga,
seems quite clear. Yet most commentaries on the kõan case, including those in the two kõan collections, highlight the provisionality and ultimately the indistinguishability of the *furaku* *inga* and *fumai* *inga* responses. Dõgen, in the earlier “Daishugyo” fascicle, seems to echo that view:

Because causality necessarily means full cause and complete effect, there is no reason for a discussion concerning “falling into” or “not falling into,” “obscuring” or “not obscuring” [causality]. If “not falling into causality” is incorrect, then “not obscuring causality” is also incorrect. Nevertheless, because of a fundamental misunderstanding, [the old man] was first transfigured into a wild fox body and then released from being a wild fox. And although “not falling into causality” was incorrect in the age of Buddha Kāśyapa, it may not be incorrect in the age of Buddha Śākyamuni. Although “not obscuring causality” released the wild fox body in the current age of Buddha Śākyamuni, it may not have been effective in the age of Buddha Kāśyapa. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, pp. 232–33)

Both fascicles dealing with this kõan are critical of the Senika heresy, which advocates a “return” to an original nature or source and sees the release from the fox body as a symbol of the monk resuming his true nature. Yet, whereas “Daishugyo” refuses to criticize the old man’s view of *furaku* *inga*, “Jinshin inga” repudiates Dõgen’s position of a decade before in which he equated causality and the transcendence of causality. In the later work he asserts quite emphatically that only *fumai* *inga* is accurate and that *furaku* *inga*, which amounts to the denial of causality (*hotsumu* *inga* 撥無因果), is mistaken.

The single greatest limitation of the monks of Sung China today is that they do not realize that “not falling into causality” is a false teaching. It is a pity that even though they encounter the true Dharma of the Tathāgata correctly transmitted from patriarch to patriarch, they accept the views of those who would deny causality. They must awaken right away to the principle of causality. The expression “not obscuring causality” of the current head monk of Mt. Pai-chang demonstrates that he never denied causality. It is clear that practice, or cause, leads to realization, or result. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 433)

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15 According to the Mumonkan verse, in SHIBAYAMA 1974, p. 34:

Not falling, not ignoring:/Odd and even are on one die./Not ignoring, not falling:/Hundreds and thousands of regrets!
Summary of the Critical Buddhists’ Position

Next I will sum up the main arguments of Critical Buddhism before considering the responses of the traditional scholars. The central point of Critical Buddhism, particularly the Hakamaya thesis, is that in the 12-fascicle text Dōgen abandons and refutes his previous association with original enlightenment rhetoric and stresses the role of causality. That is, his philosophy of Zen undergoes a transformation from a metaphysical view that draws unwittingly from animism or naturalism and seeks a single source of reality (dhātu) beyond causality to a literal, strict karmic determinism that emphasizes a moral imperative based on the fundamental condition that karmic retribution is active in each impermanent moment. Whereas the metaphysical view is based primarily on a transcendental contemplative awareness, the literal view requires a wisdom born of study and knowledge. One of the main features of the later writings, especially noticeable when comparing the rewritten fascicles to their earlier versions, is Dōgen’s extensive use of Buddhist texts. Thus, the Critical Buddhists maintain that the philosophy of religion in the 12-fascicle text is characterized by intellectual life and scholarly learning through textual study rather than the intuitionism and suppression of discourse that is expressed, for example, in the “Bendōwa.” In other words, the later text marks a transition from “zazan only” (shikan-taza) and “original realization and marvelous practice (honshō myōshū) to “honor prajñā” (hannya sonchō) and “faith in causality” (jinshin inga) (ISHII 1990, p. 227).

The overall aim of Critical Buddhism involves more than a simple reinterpretation of the Shōbōgenzō. The aim is to use Dōgen’s change of heart as a starting point from which to challenge the hongaku orthodoxy that has perpetuated social discrimination and tacitly supported the status quo on the basis of claims of epistemological nondiscrimination and ontological dynamism. This challenge in turn involves rethinking the meaning of the nonduality of saṃsāra (which is causal) and nirvāṇa (which transcends causality). If we reflect back on the origins of the debate concerning the relation between these two dimensions, the Abhidharma analysis of the dharmic factors of phenomenal existence draws a strict dichotomy between conditioned (samskṛta) dharmas, which are bound by the cause-effect process, and unconditioned (asamskṛta) dharmas, which are not bound by cause-effect. While the aim of early Mahāyāna sūnyavāda philosophy (Mādhyamika school and Prajñāpāramitā sūtras), according to most East Asian interpretations, is to demonstrate the inseparability or indistinguishability of the realms of the conditioned, or causal, and the unconditioned, or noncausal, this raises a delicate but crucial
issue pursued by subsequent schools of thought: When causality and noncausality are equalized, which side of the nondualistic equation—the side of causality or the side of noncausality—is stressed in understanding spiritual freedom? In other words, does the equalization suggest the naturalist heretical position (jinen-gedo 自然外道) that causality is considered from the standpoint of fundamental reality to be a part of noncausality, a position that might imply that one is inherently free from the effects of causality and thus does not have to attain purification by overcoming discrimination? Or does it suggest the equally problematic nihilistic position that noncausality is equalized on the side of causality, which implies that one can never attain freedom from causality no matter how much effort is exerted, and that there is thus no motivation to reverse the tendency toward social discrimination? In either case, the moral implications of the inevitability of karmic retribution and the need for repentance in the genuine sense are lost.

According to Critical Buddhism, the hongaku view reflected in Zen thought and expressed in the 75-fascicle Shōbōgenzō actually compounds the conceptual and moral dilemmas implicit in the naturalist position. The hongaku view, by identifying ultimate reality with concrete phenomena, asserts nonduality from the standpoint of causality swallowing up noncausality and at the same time being swallowed up by it (since it does not necessarily require spiritual purification). Thus there is no genuine freedom or nondiscrimination as claimed under the banner of universal freedom and equality. What occurs instead is an acceptance of things as they are without moral authentication or evaluative judgment. Thus the real problem is not simply a matter of identifying polarities or of shifting the conclusion from one side to the other, but of equalizing them in such a way that the moral component of karmic causality is highlighted rather than concealed. If the morality of cause-effect is obscured because it is overly influenced by an emphasis on noncausality, then genuine noncausality cannot be attained. For the Critical Buddhists, Dōgen resolves this dilemma by asserting in “Jinshin inga” that “the law of causality is clear and impersonal (or selfless; watakushi nashi)” (Terada and Mizuno 1972, p. 437) in the sense that it is universal and inviolable, and yet that it has an eminently subjective quality (“deep faith”) in that the freedom of noncausality can be attained only in and through the continuing process of moral purification perfected within the realm of causality (Matsumoto 1991, p. 234). This recalls the Mādhyamika (Mūlamadhyama-kārikā 25: 9–10) view that nirvāṇa is found in terms of causality—nirvāṇa occurs in the midst of saṃsāra and not as an escape from it,
yet is attained only through a fundamental change of perspective rather than the mere acceptance of causal relations. However, Dôgen’s approach is based not on a nonrelational freedom from karma, but on an eminently flexible and polymorphous process in which the stages of practice and realization, while often simultaneous and overlapping, occur in irreversible sequence.¹⁶

The Responses of Traditional Scholars

While nearly all traditional scholars acknowledge the basic merit and even “sensational” impact of the issues raised by Critical Buddhism, they express mixed reactions concerning the long-term significance of this new methodology. Kagamishima Genryû, one of the most senior and prominent scholars in Dôgen studies and the man who wrote the introduction to Jûnikanbon Shôbôgenzô no shomondai, admits that there can be no turning back from some of the liberating effects of Critical Buddhism. He points out, for example, how far scholarship has progressed since Tokugawa-era scholar Tenkei Denson—known for his early but idiosyncratic commentary on the Shôbôgenzô—argued rather dogmatically that the “Daishugyô” fascicle is the true version while the “Jinshin inga” must be false. Yet Kagamishima also sounds a cautionary note, appraising Critical Buddhism as an overemphatic and rather biased (henchô 偏重) approach to be contrasted with what he considers the more reasonable, mainstream compromise position of Ishii, Sugio Gen’yü, Shimizu Hideo, and others. The compromise position (which Kagamishima also challenges, nevertheless, though to a lesser extent), sees the 12-fascicle text as expressing a multivalent “spiritual change” that marks a shift in emphasis rather than a revolution in Dôgen’s direction. The compromise suggests, for instance, that the 12-fascicle text must be seen only in connection with other writings and activities from Dôgen’s later period.

Kagamishima’s approach thus indicates that it is necessary to distinguish between two traditionalist positions—referred to below as (a) and (b)—for a total of three positions. At one end of the spectrum Critical Buddhism argues that Dôgen underwent a radical and deci-

¹⁶ Another way of framing the issue of Dôgen’s relation to nyorai-zô thought, suggested by Matsumoto, is to distinguish Dôgen’s later view from three perspectives: (1) all things have Buddha-nature, therefore one must practice but the goal appears unattainable; (2) Buddha-nature encompasses all things, therefore one need not practice because the Buddha-nature is already present; (3) Buddha-nature is actualized by practice, therefore one must continue to practice. Dôgen’s early standpoint is reflected in view (3) as a refutation of (1) and (2), but even this view does not sufficiently emphasize the retributive consequences of karmic conditioning (1991, pp. 209ff).
sive change, and at the opposite end the more conservative traditionalist (a) view maintains that there was no real change and that Dōgen stayed essentially the same throughout his life following his return from China. Both of these positions stress a single, simple standpoint, whereas the compromise traditionalist (b) view allows for change but not in the clear-cut and once-and-for-all way that the Critical Buddhists claim. The first position holds that the 12-fascicle text, which was written during one relatively confined time span, supersedes the earlier text and is sufficient for an understanding of Dōgen; the second position maintains the fundamental equality of the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts, while asserting the ultimate priority of the former in terms of the more sophisticated audience it targets; and the third position explores complex areas of development in Dōgen’s later writings and biography that affect an understanding of the relation between the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts.

What links the two traditionalist positions is a basic skepticism regarding any attempt to prove Dōgen’s intentionality concerning the priority of the 12-fascicle text. From that standpoint they both make a series of guerilla raids on Critical Buddhist strongholds, including interpretations of the rewritten fascicles and Dōgen’s philosophy of causality. The traditional scholars have argued against Critical Buddhism and in support of the 75-fascicle text on several grounds, such as the difficulty of establishing that the “rewriting” was Dōgen’s and not the editing of his disciples, and the existence of other apparently rewritten fascicles that do not appear in or express the standpoint of the 12-fascicle text. Furthermore, Dōgen’s approach to the topic of causality is complex, and it is easy to mistake a shift in perspective for a fundamental change.

The leading figures of the traditionalist (a) position include Kagamishima and Kawamura Kōdō. The latter, a specialist in the textual formation of the Shōbōgenzō and its early medieval commentaries, is sympathetic to some of the main aims of Critical Buddhism, especially it’s dramatizing of Dōgen’s critical stance with regard to forms of Buddhism he considered deficient. For example, Kawamura agrees that it is important to distinguish between Dōgen’s approach to Zen and the problematic views of kyōge betsuden and sankyō itchi, and also that it is helpful to compel contemporary Sōtō scholars to rethink the issue of how substantive metaphysics has been smuggled into a variety of syncretistic Buddhist doctrines and practices. However, Kawamura believes that Dōgen maintained the same critical distance from heretical views throughout his career and that it is important not to misread and overstate Dōgen’s criticisms. Instead, it is preferable to see Dōgen
as straddling a middle-way position in regard to hongaku thought, accepting its positive features as an expression of the unified nonsubstantive basis of contextual relations while refuting its tendency to obviate the need for sustained practice.

Kagamishima and Kawamura both argue that there is no firm evidence that Dōgen limited his message to the 12-fascicle text at the end of his life, or that he had come to reject the 75-fascicle text. Kawamura emphasizes Ejō’s role as an editor and interpreter of Dōgen. Ejō’s editing of the twelve fascicles two years after Dōgen’s death is the only tangible evidence for the priority of the new text. Yet, as Kawamura points out, all the other evidence indicates that Ejō asserted the priority of the 75-fascicle text. Ejō apparently gained Dōgen’s approval to edit the 75-fascicle text the year before the master’s final days. If Dōgen had emphasized the importance of the 12-fascicle text as he approached death, why did Ejō not show this in a more vigorous way than by composing a single, cryptic (and long-lost) colophon to the “Hachidainingaku” fascicle (see note 13 above)? If the Critical Buddhists are correct, why did Ejō not stop altogether his editing of the earlier fascicles, which Dōgen himself had continued to revise until nearly the very end of his life? Also, why did the other main disciples who were privy to Dōgen’s way of thinking, Senne and Kyōgō, comment only on the 75-fascicle text? KAGAMISHIMA wonders if there may be in the near future a discovery of another version of Ejō’s colophon that will further clarify—or perhaps complicate—our understanding of Dōgen’s final instructions or intentions (1991, p. 7).

Furthermore, Kagamishima and Kawamura emphasize that it is simplistic to argue that the five rewritten fascicles were revised for a single reason alone. The specific methods and purposes of rewriting vary significantly from case to case, but the general impression of the rewritten fascicles indicates that the respective versions express distinct but complementary rather than conflicting viewpoints on a particular topic. During the course of his move from Kyoto to Echizen, Dōgen, they argue, recognized the necessity of addressing the concerns of several different types of disciples (students): those still needing persuasion to leave home, those already in monastic life but needing to refine and develop their training, and those approaching the final stages of realization. For example, in the two versions of the fascicle on leaving home, the first version (“Shukke”) deals with home departure from the standpoint of jukai 受戒, or the stage of receiving the precepts, while the second (“Shukke kudoku”) examines it from the standpoint of kudoku 功徳, or the following stage of attaining merit. Similarly, the “Daishugyō” and “Jinshin inga” fascicles that
reach drastically different conclusions concerning the phrase *furaku inga* (not falling into causality) may be approaching its meaning from different standpoints (KAGAMISHIMA 1991, p. 13). “Daishugyō” approves of the saying from the standpoint of ultimate reality, which transcends the distinction between causality and noncausality, while “Jinshin inga” criticizes it from a more restricted realm of discourse, conventional truth, in which the tendency to avoid or escape causality must be refuted. But in the final analysis the two levels of discourse, ultimate and conventional, enhance and enrich one another to demonstrate a conclusion that would likely, though ironically, be supported by Critical Buddhism: the transcendence of causality is within, yet not merely within, causality, like the process of disentangling vines (*kattō 葛藤*) by means of entangled vines as in the 75-fascicle text’s “Kattō.” Therefore, the traditionalist (a) position is that the *Shōbōgenzō* expresses multiple perspectives, so that the 12-fascicle text is not complete and autonomous but complementary with the 75-fascicle text in that the two texts intertwine general and specific, introductory and advanced frames of reference without any sense of polarization between them.

ISHII Shūdō, one of the leading representatives of what Kagamishima has identified as the compromise view, is very sympathetic to the aims and methods of his friend and colleague, Hakamaya, and was one of the earliest to respond formally to Critical Buddhism.17 Ishii agrees that Dōgen’s approach to Buddhism is based primarily on wisdom (*chie 智慧*, Skt. *prajñā*) and learning rather than contemplation, despite the fact that Sōtō is often characterized as a religion based on zazen-only or just-sitting (*shikan-taza 只管打坐*), a sectarian misunderstanding traceable to fourth patriarch Keizan that has been projected back to Dōgen. Without being too harsh on Keizan, who since the Tokugawa era has been revered by the sect as a kind of co-founder, Ishii feels that the purity of Dōgen’s thought was subverted by the un-Buddhistic syncretism and misleading simplification inspired by Keizan and his disciples. Like the Critical Buddhists, Ishii argues that Dōgen should be understood as standing in accord with the critical approach to philosophy practiced in the Mādhyamika school in India and Tibet, which seeks to overcome all one-sided fixations and delusions. In that context, Ishii cites the studies of Yamaguchi Zuihō in the early 1980s that pointed out for the first time the significant affinities between Dōgen and South-Central Asian Buddhism. He also maintains that Dōgen Zen is different from Chinese Ch’an, which has been

overly influenced by Lao-Tzu and Confucius (though Ishii’s view of Dōgen’s Japanification as a purification of the syncretistic elements he found in China may be considered naive). On the question of interpreting the Shōbōgenzō, Ishii endorses the Critical Buddhist focus on the 12-fascicle text as a means of generating a fundamental revision of the Sōtō sect in a way that links classical theories of dependent origination to the contemporary need for social responsibility, though like other traditionalists he does not comment directly on social issues.

On the other hand, Ishii shares with the traditionalist (a) position a skepticism concerning several of the main conclusions of Critical Buddhism. First, he feels that Dōgen’s attitude toward hongaku thought stayed relatively constant after his return from China, with no clearly discernible revision of thinking following his Kamakura visit. He sees Dōgen’s constancy as a position of constructive ambivalence, standing not strictly for or against hongaku thought, but he also seems to put more emphasis than traditionalism (a) on Dōgen’s struggle throughout his career for an appropriate communicative style and substance. Ishii agrees with Yamauchi Shun’yū, a specialist in Dōgen’s relation to Japanese Tendai, that it is necessary at this stage of scholarship to take attention away from Dōgen’s “doubt,” which after all stemmed from his youthful concerns and inexperience (his rather unsophisticated question is not entirely relevant to the complex historical and textual issues involved in interpreting Dōgen’s understanding of hongaku thought). Like traditionalism (a), Ishii is cautious not to overvalue the 12-fascicle text at the expense of Dōgen’s other works. He points out that Dōgen edited and added to the 75-fascicle text until his death, so that the dates of writing and rewriting (as well as the question of how much disciples contributed to the revised versions) cannot be pinned down, especially considering the variety of Shōbōgenzō texts. In particular, Ishii is skeptical of the role of the 12-fascicle text in relation to the so-called 100-fascicle project mentioned in Ejō’s colophon, because it is not entirely clear why this project would be important. Perhaps Dōgen was trying to emulate the juko hyakusoku 頼古百則 style [poetic commentaries on one hundred kōan cases] and other Sung-era collections of recorded sayings, but if this is the case it does not support the Critical Buddhist arguments.

The main reason that Kagamishima considers Ishii’s compromise position to be a reasonable one is that Ishii, somewhat like the Critical Buddhists, acknowledges a change during the last five years of Dōgen’s life, marking a new attitude toward the Eihei-ji environment and a period of spiritual growth. However, in sympathy with the traditionalist (a) position, Ishii tries not to exaggerate the role of the 12-fascicle text or downplay Dōgen’s earlier and other later writings. Interpreting
the multifaceted change in Dōgen’s life requires an examination of all aspects of what Dōgen was saying and writing in this period—it is not enough to limit oneself to the 12-fascicle text, which in fact does not express a single, uniform, coherent view, but uses multiple voices to reflect different influences and convey diverse messages. Ishii emphasizes that an understanding of the post-Kamakura period depends on a point-by-point comparative analysis of Dōgen’s thinking as expressed in both the 12-fascicle text and the other later works.

Ishii’s approach to the Shōbōgenzō issues centers on the interrelatedness of the 12-fascicle text and two other Dōgen texts from this period, showing the “intra-textuality” of the later Shōbōgenzō writings, the Eihei kōroku collection of jōdō or formal-style sermons (the majority of which were composed from 1247–1253), and the Hōkyōki 宝慶記 collection of conversations Dōgen had in China with Ju-ching. He also shows the intertextuality involved in Dōgen’s frequent references in his later works to the texts of Hung-chih, Ju-ching, and a variety of early Buddhist texts. The intra- and intertextual dimensions reveal changes in the style and substance of Dōgen’s thought, but not necessarily in a way that supports Critical Buddhism. For example, the Eihei kōroku provides an example of how Dōgen shifted in his later period from the informal or jishu style of the 75-fascicle text to the more formal jōdō style.19 His citations and allusions to Hung-chih and Ju-ching in the Eihei kōroku also increase significantly in the post-Kamakura period, and it is clear that the rewritten fascicles of the 12-fascicle text use many more citations from early Zen and Buddhist writings, including Zen goroku, Mahāyāna sūtras (especially the Lotus Sūtra), and jātaka tales.20 However, these stylistic changes could indicate an emulation of the patterns of Sung Ch’an or the continuing influence of Japanese Tendai as much as a return to the fundamental doctrine of dependendent origination. Examining changes in the substance of Dōgen’s thought by comparing the 12-fascicle text with other texts on specific topics also gives a mixed message. There is some agreement in that

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18 The Hōkyōki, Dōgen’s record of his conversations with Ju-ching between 1225–1227, was discovered posthumously and may not have been recorded by Dōgen until late in his career, after he received a copy from China of Ju-ching’s recorded sayings. According to traditional accounts, he found these to be disappointing and unworthy of preserving the true legacy of his master’s essential teachings.

19 According to the counting of Ishii (1991, pp. 328–30), Dōgen delivered 230 of 531 sermons in the last five years of his life.

20 According to Ikeda (1991b), the number of citations from traditional Buddhist and Zen texts in the following fascicles is: “Shukke” 5, and “Shukke kudoku” 21; “Den’e” 4, and “Kesa kudoku” 11; “Hotsumujōshin” 6, and “Hotsubodaishin” 10; “Daishugyō” 3, and “Jinshin inga” 9; “Sanjigo” (60-fascicle) 12, and “Sanjigo” (12-fascicle) 15.
the *Eihei kōroku* (no. 412), like “Shizen biku,” criticizes sankyō itchi, and that the *Hōkyōki* (no. 20), like “Sanjigo,” records Ju-ching’s refutation of Chang-sha’s view of karma. However, Ishii believes that an examination of all of the later texts shows that the key to the spiritual change in the later period was a renewed emphasis on the priority of “purposeless zazen.” The lack of attention to this issue in the 12-fascicle text is an incongruity that undermines the standpoint of Critical Buddhism and highlights the traditionalist (a) view of complementary, audience-specific texts.

The following chart sums up the major differences between Critical Buddhism and the two forms of traditional Buddhism on four interpretive issues: 1) Dōgen’s intention in revising the *Shōbōgenzō,* 2) the status of the rewritten fascicles; 3) the main emphasis of his later works; and 4) Dōgen’s view of hongaku thought.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Buddhism</th>
<th>Traditional (a)</th>
<th>Traditional (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dōgen’s Intention</td>
<td>12-fascicle text only</td>
<td>75- and 12-fascicle texts are complementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewriting</td>
<td>only rewritten fascicles are relevant</td>
<td>Dōgen continues editing 75-fascicle text to the end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Emphasis</td>
<td>emphasis on karmic causality</td>
<td>encompassing of introductory and advanced perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On <em>Hongaku</em></td>
<td>Dōgen sharpens critique in 12-fascicle text</td>
<td>maintains same consistent view throughout career</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions: Evaluation of the Contributions of Critical Buddhism**

While Sōtō scholars consider the Critical Buddhist movement overly sensational, other observers may view it as a “stirring of the waters” (or perhaps a “tempest in a teapot”). Those Buddhists and buddhologists who have been subjected to its often scathing criticisms may take offense, and some scholars and thinkers have responded that Critical Buddhism is actually a veiled form of fundamentalism (see FAURE, forthcoming) which deems itself alone worthy of determining authentic forms of religion based on a simple and perhaps arbitrary commitment to the doctrine of dependent origination and a sectarian preference for a particular set of Dōgen’s writings. The accusation of funda-
mentalism must seem both ironic and disturbing to the Critical Buddhists, who probably see themselves as quite unfundamentalist for several reasons: they appeal to the critical intellect rather than simplistic theological affirmation and faith based on the inerrancy of scripture; they aim for progressive reform rather than the conservative or reactionary political agenda found in many Western fundamentalist movements; and they are not involved in elaborately organized evangelical or healing rituals. Some of the New Religions in Japan, such as Sōka Gakkai, appear to qualify much more readily as “fundamentalist,” though such labels must be used with great caution. Hakamaya has already responded to some of his critics by stressing that Critical Buddhism, if it is to be genuine, must involve a continuing process of wholehearted self-criticism. In order to clarify the criticisms of the methodology thus far, as well as the contributions it has made, it is necessary to evaluate the Critical Buddhist and traditionalist approaches to the Shōbōgenzō in light of their broader impact on Buddhist studies and comparative religious thought as a whole. My suggestion is that it is more appropriate to view Critical Buddhism as an example of “foundationalism,” that is, as a sector of the religion trying to reinterpret its medieval sources from a classical or foundational standpoint and in terms of distinctively modern social and philosophical concerns.

In its analysis of the meaning and relevance of the Shōbōgenzō texts, Critical Buddhism has, at the very least, contributed to a breaking down of some of the barriers between South and East Asian studies by commenting for the first time on hongaku and Zen thought from the perspective of Mādhyamika dialectical negation. Although the traditional scholars dispute Critical Buddhism on textual and historical grounds, the new methodological movement has exposed levels of sedimentation surrounding interpretations of the intentionality and merit of Dōgen’s philosophical and practical writings. The depth and detail of the discussions of texts and intertexts by the Critical and traditional Buddhists has contributed to a full-scale revision in our understanding of Dōgen that has helped revitalize the Sōtō sect, currently facing an array of difficult and even bewildering social issues. This in turn has awakened Buddhism from its discriminatory slumber and prompted a self-reflection about what authentic Buddhism is, based on ideological continuity with the doctrine of causality. For many years, Buddhist thought, as opposed to Buddhist studies, was centered in Kyoto, and particularly in the Nishida-Tanabe-Nishitani Kyoto School. Now Critical Buddhism in Tokyo has stolen some of its thunder and criticized Nishida’s philosophy of place (basho 場所,
based on the Greek *topos*) as a dhātu-vada, topical philosophy linked to prewar nationalism.

The main aim of Critical Buddhism is to demonstrate that, amid an array of deficient alternatives, the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* text provides a legitimate historical precedent for modern reform, a role model that can be extracted from its original context and made relevant to the contemporary scene. Critical Buddhism is not the first methodology that has attempted to lay a theoretical ground for social reform. There is, for example, the Rinzai priest/scholar Akizuki Ryōmin, who writes on numerous topics including Dōgen and whose calls for a “new Mahāyāna” issue from a postmodern viewpoint that has a “painful awareness of the demands facing Buddhism today, both from within and from without” (1990, p. 155). The late Hisamatsu Shin’ichi created the reform F.A.S. society to promote world peace, and Ichikawa Hakugen (1970) has called for Buddhist intellectuals to share responsibility for Japanese atrocities committed during the Asia-Pacific War, as these were based on a false sense of harmony that led to compliance with the totalitarian regime (see Ives 1992). But the Critical Buddhist project, with its sometimes excessive hyperbole, risks creating an inflated sense of the purity and authenticity of Dōgen’s thought and simultaneously denigrating most of the Sōtō sect’s history after Dōgen. It also appears exclusivist, even combative, toward most of the already polarized and fragmented Chinese and Japanese Buddhist sects. Many feel that Critical Buddhism is simply trying to “save” Dōgen from a host of challenges (though Hakamaya claims a higher regard for Hōnen) and is all too ready to abandon Sōtō and other syncretistic forms of East Asian Buddhism—as if any thinker, Sākyamuni and Dōgen included, is immune from charges of syncretism. Although Critical Buddhism does not intend to foster exclusivism, it is perhaps inevitable that its tone of being *engagé* and even *enragé* creates such an impression.

There are two reasons for the misimpressions about Critical Buddhism, one based on shortcomings in what the Critical Buddhists have accomplished and the other based on complexities involved in determining and assessing its unique methodological orientation.

The first involves a set of limitations inherent in the arguments of both Critical and traditional Buddhism, which remain bound by Dōgen apologetics and never move much beyond the arena of Dōgen studies. Because of this, the Critical Buddhists have left several problematic areas in Dōgen’s writings outside the boundaries of their discourse. The most significant area involves the role of magico-religious ritualism directly reflected in the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* as well as other
works of Dōgen’s post–Kamakura period, including the Eihei kōroku and other records of his sermons. Some passages in the 12-fascicle text support the Critical Buddhist view of karmic determinism devoid of supernaturalism. Among the rewritten fascicles, for example, two of the earlier versions, “Hotsumujōshin” and “Daishugyō,” are primarily concerned with the ritual efficacy of building stupas and the burial of monks, respectively, while the new versions—“Hotsubodaishin” and “Jinshin inga”—focus exclusively on the issues of impermanence and causality. However, other passages in the 12-fascicle text tend to give an entirely different picture of Dōgen as a popularizer who uncritically affirms all aspects of Buddhist religiosity. To illustrate the meaning of karma, for instance, Dōgen refers to miracles and magical deeds, such as a eunuch whose sexual status is reversed, a prostitute whose life dramatically changes because she briefly wears a Buddhist robe, and the power of animal transformations involving a fox and deer. Most of these examples are drawn from jātaka tales, as noted by the traditionalist (b) scholars, or perhaps more directly from the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā (T 27.592a–93b).

One area the Critical Buddhists need to explore is how Dōgen’s view of karma may have been influenced by related doctrines in other forms of Kamakura Buddhism, including the notions of mujō (impermanence), innen (karmic fate), ōjō (rebirth), and mappō (age of the degenerate law). Dōgen may also have been affected by the increasingly popular setsuwa tales, such as the Konjaku monogatari, which were the primary textual vehicle for jātakas and which convey a literal view of karmic determinism in the past, present, and future lives. This latter aspect may well have developed subsequent to the original Pāli sources (Nakamura 1973, pp. 29–34). Furthermore, the Critical Buddhists need to address a number of historical, philological, and philosophical issues involved in interpreting Dōgen’s literal view of karma. Aside from the larger question of whether dependent origination can be considered the single preeminent doctrine in early Buddhism (the Nikāyas, for example, contain several different versions of Śākyamuni’s realization), there is another question central to Shōbōgenzō studies: What is the relation between the accumulation of karmic merit and the attainment of a transcendental awareness that remains bound by karma? (See Keown 1993, pp. 83–126; Kalupahana 1975, pp. 89–146; Hirakawa 1990, pp. 170–219.) Does Dōgen’s later standpoint recreate the problematic Abhidharma view of separating merit from transcendence, a view that Mādhyamika refutes? Is there not a need to critically evaluate the 12-fascicle text itself (Matsumoto 1991, p. 240)?
In addition, Critical Buddhism should explain more fully other possible influences on Dōgen’s later writings, such as that of repentance meditation in T’ien-t’ai/Tendai practice. Critical Buddhism also needs to connect its interpretation of Dōgen’s thought to a whole series of subsequent developments in Sōtō Zen and Japanese Buddhism leading up to the modern social crises. These include textual issues, such as the role of the early medieval Shōbōgenzō commentaries by Senne and Kyōgō, which set the stage for later interpretations of Dōgen especially with regard to hongaku thought. Also important are historical studies, such as the effect of the Tokugawa-era Buddhist parish (danka) system and the Meiji-era Shinto-Buddhist separation (shinbutsu bunri) on the role of Zen in contemporary society.

The second reason for misimpressions is that it is difficult to identify and categorize Critical Buddhist methodology in a modern context. Critical Buddhism is strictly neither historical scholarship nor speculative philosophy (although it tends to resemble both), and it may appear dogmatic and argumentative compared to the conventional standards of objectivity and rationality in these disciplines. As in modern studies of most religious traditions, there tends to be a methodological gap in Buddhist studies between, on the one hand, fieldwork studies following a social-scientific model and focusing on ritual praxis and living encounters with symbols and, on the other hand, textual studies following philological or hermeneutic models and focusing on an analysis of scripture and various genres of scriptural commentary. However, within the domain of textual studies there is often another, more subtle, but perhaps even more significant gap between the historical approach and the comparative philosophical approach. The historian asks when, where, and who wrote the text without succumbing to speculative inquiries, while the philosopher asks how and why the text was written and what its meaning is, without limiting the inquiry to a particular diachronic context. The textual historian may feel that the philosopher takes too much liberty with the source material, while the philosopher may feel confined by the seemingly artificial boundaries of discourse set up and enforced by the historian. Philosophers may see historians as overly skeptical about Buddhism’s apparent contradictions and problematics, while historians may believe that philosophers present an idealized view of the tradition shorn of inconsistencies based on cultural conditioning.

However, Critical Buddhism as an example of “foundationalism” really does not try to duplicate the methods of either objective scholarship or rational philosophy in the contemporary sense. Instead, its main model is classical Buddhist scholasticism, which is deliberately
evaluative rather than neutral or descriptive in its approach to interpreting various ideologies. Buddhist scholasticism, particularly the approach known as “hierarchical evaluation of the teachings” (kyōhan 教判), seeks to provide an orthodox theological (rather than objective buddhological) ground for a particular form of orthopraxis by contrasting its own approach with alternatives that are judged to be partial, misleading, or deficient. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the hermeneutics of scholastic hierarchical classification, which is intended to be evaluative and polemical, and the hermeneutics of scholarship, which tries to maintain objectivity and neutrality. In this case, Critical Buddhist foundational scholasticism uses the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō philosophy of karmic retribution to support a broad-based reform movement underway not only within the Sōtō sect in Japan but throughout a number of other Buddhist movements, including “socially engaged Buddhism” in America. It transforms traditional concerns with monastic practice and discipline into contemporary concerns for social commitment and responsibility. Despite occasional rhetorical excess, it is a generally consistent and constructively critical method, though not without flaws and lacunae.

Therefore, Critical Buddhist foundationalism more closely resembles other recent forms of Western theology than it does either religious scholarship or fundamentalism. One example is deconstructive theology, often compared to Mādhyamika Buddhism, which highlights and deconstructs the substantive ideological presuppositions underlying conventional theology in its attempt to unravel and decenter all logocentric (dhātu-vāda) standpoints (see TAYLOR 1984). Deconstructionism exposes the sociopolitical context underlying theological rhetoric, though it usually does not endorse a social agenda.

Another comparison can be made to liberation theology, which advocates a rethinking of the foundational sources (i.e., the Gospels) as the basis for contemporary social reform and justice. Like Critical Buddhism, liberation theology has been criticized both for too liberally diverging from and too conservatively remaining within the framework of traditional Christianity (BENAVIDES 1989). However, the comparison breaks down for two reasons. First, the Latin American sociopolitical situation interacts with one religion (Roman Catholicism), whereas Japanese Buddhism must operate in an increasingly secularized country with a long history of religious pluralism. Also, liberation theology is based on a distinction and conflict between oppressor and oppressed and is influenced by Marxism. Should Critical Buddhism wish to identify its methodology more fully with the cause of the oppressed, such as the minority groups serviced by Sōtō temples for
funeral ceremonies, it could probably find a better basis than Dōgen’s elitist monasticism. Among these might be medieval Sōtō popularization or Pure Land millenial movements, which in different ways offered spiritual uplift and hope to the downtrodden and displaced.

The main contribution of Critical Buddhism to the debate between historical and philosophical textual studies lies in its effort to bridge the methodological gap by reexamining and reevaluating areas of shift, transition, and syncretism from the standpoint of philosophical consistency and continuity with the foundational doctrines of Buddhist thought. According to this movement, Buddhism can and must change, and the model for this must come from within the tradition. However, for Critical Buddhism to make the 12-fascicle text the basis for reform and have a concrete impact on contemporary society, the methodology must deal with one overriding issue: How exactly does Dōgen’s view of karma, or the Critical Buddhist view of Dōgen’s view, promote social change? Can, in other words, Dōgen’s understanding of karmic causality in a medieval monastic context be translated into an agenda for the modern social reform of institutional Buddhism?

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