This paper shows that quiet-sitting (seiza), a Neo-Confucian meditative practice, accommodated, at least in the thought of Satō Naokata, a readiness to endorse energetic political activism, especially in the form of aggressive opposition to tyranny. The paper first examines Naokata’s writings on quiet-sitting, especially his Seiza setsu hikki (Notes on quiet-sitting), to establish the pervasive importance of quiet-sitting to Naokata. The paper then explores Naokata’s writings on the problem of King Tang and King Wu, two sage-kings described in the ancient Chinese classics as having risen to power after overthrowing oppressive tyrants. Unlike most other Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars associated with Yamazaki Ansai’s “Kimon” teachings, Naokata was much more prepared to recognize the full sagacity of Tang and Wu rather than denigrate them because of their violent rise to power. By juxtaposing these two seemingly disparate aspects of Naokata’s thought, quiet-sitting and his positive assessment of Tang and Wu, the paper suggests that quiet-sitting, at least for Naokata, served as the epistemological foundation for legitimization of remonstration against oppressive rule, and even political activism meant to end the same.

Keywords: Satō Naokata — quiet-sitting (seiza) — Zhu Xi — Yamazaki Ansai — Asami Keisai — Tang and Wu — Inoue Tetsujirō — Zen

Inoue Tetsujirō’s 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944) Nippon Shushi gakuha no tetsugaku (The philosophy of Japanese Neo-Confucian schools) concludes its critique of Satō Naokata’s 佐藤直方 (1650–1719) thought by noting that Naokata’s “Preface” to the Seiza shūsetsu 静坐集説 (Quiet-sitting anthology, 1717), advocated quiet-sitting (seiza 静坐) as a meditative practice for scholars. Illustrating this point, Inoue quoted Naokata as stating,

What Cheng-Zhu 程朱 scholars refer to as quiet-sitting is the practice whereby students preserve their ethical minds and lay
the foundation for growth in virtue. If those wishing to study
the teachings of the sages and worthies exert themselves in
this practice, will they not realize this for themselves?

(INOUE 1905, p. 752)

Inoue added that Naokata lectured on quiet-sitting, discussed it in his
writings, and authored a treatise on it—the *Seiza setsu hikki* 静坐説筆記
(Notes on quiet-sitting). Naokata also advocated, Inoue warned, vari-
ous “prejudiced notions” that were inconsistent with Japan’s national
essence (*kokutai* 國體). For example, he declared that the forty-seven
samurai of Akō 赤穗 domain had not been “righteous.” In Inoue’s
writings, however, the Akō samurai received high praise as exemplary
chūshin gishi (忠臣義士), or “loyal and righteous samurai.” Additionally,
Naokata argued at length that the dynastic overthrows led by the ancient
Chinese rulers, Tang 湘 (r. 1751–1739) and Wu 武 (r. 1121–1116), had
not violated political ethics, but instead, were the work of great sages.
Not surprisingly, Inoue, an outspoken advocate of the notion that
Japan’s distinctive national essence lay in the (supposed) fact that its
imperial line had never been overturned, found Naokata’s politically
dangerous appraisal of Tang and Wu revolting. Furthermore, Naokata
did not fully respect and revere, according to Inoue, the fourteenth-
century imperial loyalist-martyr, Kusunoki Masashige 楠 正成 (1294–
1336). Inoue, on the other hand, exalted Masashige almost as much
as he did the forty-seven rōnin. Naokata also claimed that Japan had
never produced a true sage or worthy. Finally, Inoue added, Naokata
had even questioned whether the imperial line had actually been
unbroken for myriad generations. Inoue observed that Naokata, in
coming to such offensive conclusions, had revered teachings and
practices advocated by Song Neo-Confucianism (INOUE 1905, p. 752).

Inoue had little use for Naokata. Rather, the Tokyo University don’s
turn-of-the-century philosophical trilogy—*Nippon Shushi gakuha no
tetsugaku, Nippon Ō yōmei gakuha no tetsugaku* 日本王陽明學派之哲學 (The
philosophy of Japan’s Wang Yangming school, 1903), and *Nippon ko
gakuha no tetsugaku* 日本古學派之哲學 (The philosophy of Japan’s School
of Ancient Learning, 1902)—most extolled the teachings of Yamaga
Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685). Inoue claimed that Sokō was one of the
first thinkers to clarify Japan’s *kokutai* via writings about the imperial
line, Japanese history, and, perhaps most importantly in Sokō’s case,
bushidō 武士道, or the “way of the warrior.” The latter teaching
remained, Inoue asserted, manifest as an integral element in the
“national ethic of the Japanese people” (*kokumin dōtoku* 國民道德). In
this context, Inoue lauded Sokō for having impacted the Akō vendetta
of 1702, both through his association with Akō samurai while serving
as the guest-teacher of the Akō daimyō, Asano Naganao 浅野長直 (1610–1672), and while in exile there for nearly a decade after having published his offensive Seikyō yōroku 聖教要録 (Essential lexicography of sagely Confucian teachings). Inoue even sketched out a Sokō “transmission lineage,” stretching from the Akō samurai, to Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰 (1830–1859), and finally in Meiji times, to the late General Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典 (1849–1912). Inoue also extolled Sokō’s readiness to reject China worship for the sake of clarifying Japan’s kokutai and advancing a kind of Nippon shugi 日本主義, or “Japanism.” Inoue further praised the vitality of Sokō’s philosophy, metaphysically and ontologically, lauding it as a kind of “activism” (katsudō shugi 活動主義), one opposed to the “quietism” (jakujō shugi 寂静主義) of Song Neo-Confucianism. In making this point, Inoue noted that Sokō had been one of the outspoken critics of quiet-sitting in his day (INOUÉ 1902, pp. 4, 119–28; 743–48; 70, 84, 86). It might be added that Inoue was also partial to the Kyoto philosopher, Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705), in whom he detected distinctively Japanese traits as well. For example, Inoue praised Jinsai’s metaphysical “activism” (katsudō shugi), a feature even more apparent in his thought than Sokō’s. And while Inoue’s writings on Jinsai do not recognize the fact, it might be added that Jinsai too was a harsh critic of quiet-sitting, albeit far less outspoken than Sokō (TUCKER 1998, pp. 42–43).

Sokō’s blatant opposition to quiet-sitting possibly contributed to his exile from Edo in 1666 (Kanbun 6). In the “Preface” to his “insufferably offensive” Seikyō yōroku, Sokō charged that “the Song and Ming Scholars of rational principle … had forced the sages to sit in filth” (YAMAGA 1970a, p. 340), thus alluding with disgust to the Neo-Confucian meditative practice. There is virtual consensus among Japanese scholars that Hoshina Masayuki 保科正之 (1611–1672) was the bakufu power-broker behind Sokō’s exile, and that Yamazaki Ansai 山崎関齋 (1618–1682), Masayuki’s teacher, was the philosophical force behind Masayuki and perhaps ultimately responsible for Sokō’s purge from Edo (HORI 1967, pp. 206–30; BITÔ 1993, pp. 116–17; TAHARA 1994, pp. 836–37; YAMAGA 1970b, p. 329; UENAKA 1977). There can be little doubt that Masayuki would have been offended by Sokō’s remark: Masayuki edited the Sanshi denshin roku 三子傳心録 (Teachings of the three masters on mind-cultivation), in which he traced quiet-sitting from (i) Yang Guishan 楊龜山 (1053–1135), a student of the Cheng Brothers, to (ii) Luo Congyan 羅從彦 (1072–1135), a student of Guishan, and finally to (iii) Li Yanping 李延平 (1093–1163), a student of Congyan. Ansai authored a preface and postscript for the Sanshi denshi roku, in which he recognized quiet-sitting as a technique for preserving the original mind and cultivating the moral nature (YAMAZAKI...
Sokō’s offensive allusion to the Neo-Confucian practice of quiet-sitting was surely not the only reason that he was exiled from Edo for nearly a decade, until the third year after Masayuki’s demise in 1672, but it was most likely a contributing factor.

While Ansai advocated quiet-sitting as an orthodox Neo-Confucian practice, and while the Kimon school is rightly associated with it, Naokata stands out among Kimon scholars as the most energetic, articulate, and enthusiastic proponent of it (Okada 1985, p. 88, 95; Yoshida and Ebita 1990, p. 51). Thus, Inoue’s identification of Naokata with the practice was hardly gratuitous. Inoue’s intent, however, was obviously not to praise Naokata; instead Inoue was attempting to offer a litany of exotic and offensive practices and/or thoughts associated with Naokata’s learning, beginning with the seemingly quietistic and perhaps superficially inert and sluggish practice of quiet-sitting (Inoue 1902, p. 291). The thread binding Inoue’s remarks is reverence for Japan, its imperial system, its supposed tradition of bushidō, its national essence, and its dynamic activism as an imperial nation. He possibly saw in quiet-sitting and Naokata’s praise for King Tang and King Wu philosophical practices and ideologies that were in part responsible for the sociopolitical inertia, and consequent national weakness, of Qing China. While Inoue’s objective was not to vilify Naokata, that was one of the byproducts of his philosophical trilogy in prewar Japan.

Given Inoue’s advocacy of kokumin dōtoku as a “national ethical system” that clearly served nationalistic, imperialistic, and ultimately militaristic ends, it is difficult not to view his opposition to quiet-sitting, a more distinctively Chinese philosophical practice, within the same biased context. However, if viewed apart from their ideological ends, Inoue’s remarks are insightful in suggesting that there was continuity between Naokata’s advocacy of the practice of quiet-sitting and his conclusions regarding a number of sociopolitical topics relevant to understanding the early-modern mentality of Tokugawa Japan, and even the intellectual climate of the modern-contemporary period. It would be overly simplistic to claim that Naokata’s conclusions about the world in which he lived and the seminal issues pertaining to it issued necessarily from quiet-sitting, for very different conclusions emerged from another Kimon scholar, Asami Keisai (1652–1712), who also practiced quiet-sitting, though perhaps less energetically. Nevertheless, scrutiny of Naokata’s thoughts on quiet-sitting, Japanese history, the imperial institution, bushi culture, loyalty, and what might be called proto-Japanism, show that quiet-sitting, which Naokata considered to be the crucible of all his thought, did not necessarily entail a lethargic, complacent, or acquiescent quietism that
would result in relative non-involvement in, if not passive withdrawal from, the sociopolitical world. Nor surely did it entail a parochial celebration of “Japan” and its distinctive, supposedly “unique” national culture, as was the case with Keisai.

Rather Naokata’s thought and practice reveal that quiet-sitting could inspire a very cosmopolitan critique of the samurai polity and its bushi culture. In many respects Naokata’s critique resonated with important, popular legendary tales about gimin 義民, or “politically activistic martyrs,” emerging at about the same time. Significantly, these legendary tales, especially as they echoed key themes from Naokata’s philosophy, came to play important roles in late-Tokugawa peasant uprisings, and the early-Meiji liberal discourse, to name just two of the more salient arenas in which they resurfaced. Naokata’s overt political thought, which presumably issued from his epistemological exercise of quiet-sitting, also articulated a relatively radical form of politically engaged, even occasionally iconoclastic, free thinking that was quite atypical of the early-modern mentality, and in many respects remains far from obsolete. Scrutiny of Naokata’s thought and practice shows again, as many recent studies have, that Neo-Confucianism was far more than a set of hegemonic doctrines meant to facilitate control of the social order, yet lacking any theoretical component justifying remonstrative critique or engaged opposition to oppression and tyranny (MARUYAMA 1975; HAROOTUNIAN 1970, pp. 3–21, 30–31; 1988, pp. 28–29).¹ Indeed, Naokata, the premier advocate of quiet-sitting, was also one of Tokugawa Japan’s staunchest defenders of the legitimacy of overthrowing despotic, tyrannical rule.

Herman Ooms’s Tokugawa Ideology suggests that Naokata’s views on self-cultivation “had little public bearing; its radius of emanation was mostly a private one.” Elaborating this claim, Ooms notes that,

The behavior to which such high “reverence” is prescribed, however, is minute etiquette of a very private nature. The heavy responsibilities shouldered by Chinese officials were not shared by most of their Japanese counterparts. Thus these teachings come down to such prescriptions as: “one’s step should never be either clumsy or hurried but light; one’s hands should always be firm as if one were reporting to a superior; when writing, one’s posture and the way one grinds the

¹ De Bary (1979, pp. 15–33) has critiqued Maruyama’s views on a number of counts, emphasizing the diversity and the adaptability evident within Neo-Confucianism. Apart from his critique of Maruyama’s claims, de Bary’s writings as a whole emphasize the liberal, politically challenging (as opposed to the ideologically repressive) aspects of Confucian thought. See, for example, DE BARY 1983 and 1991.
ink stone or holds the brush should express single-minded concentration.” … In Japan, self-cultivation had little public bearing; its radius of emanation was mostly a private one.

Ooms does recognize that the virtues inculcated “were political virtues.” Thus he adds that as

they came to regulate the life of more and more people, more and more Japanese came to act as “officials”—unknowingly, since the ideology misrepresented these political values as universal ethical values, and the conditions were lacking in which they could be officials. (Ooms 1985, p. 279)

Nevertheless, Ooms sees Naokata’s teaching as culminating in an “inner-worldly asceticism,” one which Naokata called sei no dō 静の動, or “quiescence in action.” According to Ooms, Naokata’s Kimon asceticism was comparable to the Jesuit notion of contemplativus in actione (Ooms 1985, pp. 279–80).

Problematic here is that Ooms does not see Naokata’s thought and praxis climaxing in political engagement of the sort “shouldered by Chinese officials.” Ooms’s conclusions partly result from the relatively brief consideration he gives to the significance of Naokata’s writings on the ethico-political status of two ancient Chinese kings, Tang and Wu, who rose to power by overthrowing tyrants, and then establishing regimes purportedly based in virtue, obedience to heaven’s will, and a sincere ethical concern for humanity. Naokata’s writings on Tang and Wu, far from being irrelevant, archaic pieces, need to be viewed as metaphorical expressions of Naokata’s belief in the possible legitimacy of challenging oppressive, despotic rule. When Naokata’s writings on Tang and Wu are factored in with his thoughts on quiet-sitting, his advocacy of the latter seems charged with highly controversial political consequences, the likes of which relatively few Chinese officials dared to broach.

Biographical Sketch

Naokata was born on the twenty-first of the tenth lunar month, in 1650 (Keian 3), in the castle town of Fukuyama 福山, in Bingo 倫後 Province (modern Hiroshima Prefecture). He died in Edo, in 1719 (Kyōhō 享保 4). He was thus a contemporary of the puppet theatre playwright Chikamatsu Monzaemon 近松門左衛門 (1653–1724), the poet Matsuo Bashō 松尾芭蕉 (1644–1694), and the author Ihara Saikaku 井原西鶴 (1642–1693). Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) was Naokata’s senior by twenty-three years, while Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) was his
junior by sixteen. Unlike these scholars and literary figures, all of them luminaries of Genroku culture, Naokata never adopted either a “literary name” (gō 号, or a “courtesy name” [azana 字]), declaring, according to one (perhaps legendary) account, that he followed the customs of his own country, which did not include using a literary name. Naokata supposedly added that even if he were to travel to China where the practice of using a literary pseudonym prevailed, he would still identify himself by his common name (tsūshō 通称), Gorōzaemon 五郎座衛門 (IKEGAMI 1941, p. 1). However, the name (na 名) “Naokata,” which he was commonly called, referred to his interpretation of the Book of Changes’s reference to “internal ‘correctness’ (nao 直) and external ‘uprightness’ (kata 方)” (Yijing 1986, p. 4), an interpretation that ultimately led to his break with his teacher Yamazaki Ansai. Naokata’s nao thus alluded to his belief that mental ordering (internal correctness) via quiet-sitting provided the foundation for right behavior in the world (external uprightness).

Naokata’s father, Shichirōbei 七郎兵衛, was a minor samurai retainer of Mizuno Katsutane 水野勝種, daimyō of Fukuyama castle. Naokata’s mother’s name is not known. Traditional accounts claim that Naokata decided to take up Confucian learning at age sixteen. His first teacher was Nagata Yōan 永田養庵, a follower of Ansai. In 1670 (Kanbun 10), Naokata, age twenty, traveled to Kyoto with Yōan, hoping to become a direct disciple of Ansai. Ansai quizzed Naokata about his studies. Naokata replied that he was reading the Five Classics. But when asked to identify a particular passage, Naokata could not. Ansai supposedly berated him, asking how he could be reading the Classics when he could not identify a line from the Rites. Naokata was thus turned away. A year later he returned, having immersed himself in study. After performing poorly again, this time in a reading contest, Naokata told Ansai that he had heard that Buddhists who could read the classics and build temples did not necessarily achieve enlightenment. His sincere intention, however, was to attain something akin to buddhahood. Naokata then asked whether such was possible with sagely Confucian learning. If so, then why should one make extensive textual memorization a priority? Moved by Naokata’s words, Ansai accepted him as a student, despite his relatively weak performance as a reader. After all, Naokata had endorsed a central theme of the Kimon scholarly ethic, one emphasizing right learning, i.e., reading and understanding selected Neo-Confucian texts for the sake of attaining sagehood, rather than simply indulging in extensive learning for the sake of scholarly reputation. Within two years, Naokata was supposedly recognized as one of Ansai’s best students (YOSHIDA and EBITA 1990, pp. 14–15).
In 1673 (Empō 延寶 1), Naokata, age twenty-four, returned to Fukuyama to begin lecturing on the Elementary Learning (Shōgaku 小學, Xiaoxue 學). A year later he traveled to Edo, where he remained for two years before returning to Kyoto to reenter Ansai’s school. By 1680 (Empō 8), however, Naokata, age thirty, had broken away from Ansai’s own teachings. In part, the break resulted from Ansai’s increasing interests in Shinto, as opposed to Naokata’s exclusive devotion to Zhu Xi/Neo-Confucian learning. Also, there were differences over the proper interpretation of the previously mentioned line from the Book of Changes. Maruyama Masao’s study of the Kimon school points to rigorous doctrinal tendencies in Kimon learning that also led to personal splits between Ansai, Keisai, and Naokata (Maruyama 1980, pp. 609–17). However, given the obvious importance of the “correctness and uprightness” passage to Naokata’s emerging self-identity, and to his lifelong practice and advocacy of quiet-sitting, it merits examination here.

Ansai claimed that “internal” (nai 内) referred to the person as a whole (shin or karada 身), while the family, the state, and all below heaven (ie 家; koku 國; tenka 天下) referred to what is “external” (gai 外). When asked his opinion, Naokata endorsed the more orthodox Cheng-Zhu line, replying that Ansai was mistaken: “internal” referred to the mind, while “external” to the person interacting with the world at various levels. Since Naokata’s view was more faithful to both the text and Neo-Confucian traditions of interpretation, many in the Kimon fold, including Asami Keisai, author of the treatise Keigi naigai setsu 敬儀內外說 (Explanation of internal seriousness and external rightness), agreed with him. Naokata, still respecting his teacher’s integrity, attempted to explain Ansai’s error by reference to his distaste for Buddhism. After all, Naokata allowed, viewing “internal” as the mind makes Confucianism seem Buddhistic. Nevertheless, Naokata remained insistent that “internal” referred to mental rectitude, and “external” to the correctness exhibited by a person in dealing with the world (Yoshida and Ebita 1990, pp. 38–41).

Following Ansai’s death in 1683 (Tenna 3), Naokata, age thirty-three, wrote several works meant to clarify essential Neo-Confucian teachings. Among the most important was his Shusei setsu 主靜說 (Grounding oneself in quiescence). Naokata’s thoughts on quiescence (sei 靜, jing 靜) are distinctive in their emphatic emphasis on practicality, especially in terms familiar to samurai. The Shusei setsu opens, for example, with Naokata addressing questions posed by his disciple, Inaba Masachika 稲葉真親, a mid-level bakufu retainer who had served as Osaka jōdai 大阪城代, or keeper of Osaka castle, and governor of Sado 佐渡, and later became governor of Noto 能登 Province. Masachika
asked how grounding oneself in quiescence could enable one to judge matters pertinent to the active, engaged life (Sato 1977a, p. 282; 1941, pp. 67–69).

Naokata responded that people must be mentally ready for any activity they undertake. Significantly, he equated useful work (yōjō no hataraki 用上の働き) with the eight clauses (hachijō 八條) of the Great Learning, including everything from “the investigation of things” (kakubutsu 格物) and “the extension of knowledge” (chichi 致知) to “bringing peace to the world.” Naokata thus rejected the notion that quiescence meant being uninvolved or disengaged from the socio-political arena. Naokata further equated activity (dōjō no koto 動上のこと) with the nine standards (kyūkei 九經) of government outlined in the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 1960, pp. 408–9), as well as all of the hexagrams in the Book of Changes, adding that in order to be prepared for action, one must cultivate quiescence. This was the teaching of the sages and worthies, and a natural principle of heaven and earth (tenchi shizen no dōri 天地自然の道理). Vulgar learning (zokugaku 俗學) failed to admit the importance of quiescence. Recounting the lineage of shusei, Naokata explained that Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) had first clarified the notion of “grounding oneself in quiescence”; then the teaching was transmitted as part of the Cheng-Zhu school. Yet since the Yuan and Ming dynasties, few scholars had appreciated the importance of shusei. Nevertheless, the sages and worthies agreed, Naokata observed, that there could be no active practice without the practice of quiescence. Illustrating his point, Naokata cited examples from the battlefield, the training field, music, and even the tea ceremony, emphasizing the importance of grounding oneself in quiescence for the sake of optimum performance.

Naokata admitted that Buddhists had a similar practice: “contemplating while sitting” (kanshin zazen 観心坐禅), but insisted that the Confucian emphasis on quiescence was crucially different. For Confucians, quiescence is integral to action (dōjō gōitsu 動上合一), while for Buddhists, true activity is anathema; thus they lapse into quiescence, and that alone. The quiescence of Buddhists is thus a “dead thing” (shibutsu 死物). Indeed, the original meaning of nirvana (jakumetsu 死滅) conveys essentially morbid nuances. On the other hand, Confucians refer to “quiet-responsiveness” (jakkan 寂感) in connection with their various activities. Naokata further insisted that Buddhists abandon human ethics and are repulsed by public duties and responsibilities. Their fundamental concern is with the afterlife (shinda ato no koto 死んだ後のこと); consequently they see the world of everyday activity as impermanent flux. Confucians, on the other hand, are not concerned with the afterlife: their focus is on the active, existential realm. Naokata
concluded that those responsible for maintaining families, states, and the world therefore should never neglect Confucianism for the sake of Buddhism. It should be noted that Naokata also criticized vulgar Confucians who wrongly stressed the activity of action (dō no dō 動の動) in countering the Buddhists’ emphasis on the quiescence of quiescence (sei no sei 靜の靜). Sagely Confucian practice (seigaku no kufū 聖學の工夫), Naokata asserted, cultivated the quiescent foundation of activity (sei no dō 靜の動) (SATO 1977a, pp. 283–84).

Other writings by Naokata from the period following Ansai’s death include Kōgaku bensaku roku 講學鞭策錄 (Lectures encouraging learning, 1683), one of his most revered works advocating Neo-Confucianism via explication of selected portions of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 writings; Haishaku roku 排釈錄 (A refutation of Buddhism, 1685), wherein Naokata rejected that heresy as one akin to those allowing regicide and patricide; Ben Itō Jinsai sō Futo Dōkō shi jo 弁伊藤仁齋送浮屠道香師序 (Refuting Itō Jinsai’s letter to the Buddhist monk, 1687) where Naokata took Jinsai to task for expressing sympathy towards Buddhism;² Kishin shiisetsu 鬼神集説 (Explanations of ghosts and spirits, 1689), in which Naokata advanced Zhu Xi’s metaphysical analyses of ghosts and spirits as manifestations of generative force (ki 氣); Shisho benkō 四書便講 (Lectures on the Four Books, 1689) where Naokata explained selected passages in the Four Books via reference to Zhu’s Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Classified conversations); and his Daigakuzen mōtaku gen 大學全蒙択言 (Selections from the Great Learning, 1689), an explication of Neo-Confucianism as expressed in the “gateway to learning.”

This explosive period of writing was followed, in 1691 (Genroku 4), by travel to Edo at the invitation of Lord Mizuno, lord of Fukuyama castle. The next year, however, Naokata returned to Kyoto, having decided that he would resign his status as a guest teacher for Lord Mizuno and the fifty man stipend accompanying it. In 1694 (Genroku 7), Naokata, at age forty-six, returned to Edo where he began more esteemed service as guest teacher to Uta no kami Sakai Tadakozo, daimyō of Umayabashi 亀橋 (present Gunma Prefecture). Lord Sakai, the official head of gagaku theater for the bakufu, maintained a well-stocked library, including substantial collections of Japanese and Chinese literature. While Naokata, apparently with a clear conscience, resided within Sakai’s mansion for nearly the remainder of his life, he was not fond of the stipend system whereby scholars became virtual academic retainers of daimyō, and

² “Appendix II” of SFAE 1948 provides a translation and commentary of both Jinsai’s “Letter,” and Naokata’s refutation of it.
referred to its corrupting influence as the “stipend disease” (rokushi no byō 禄仕の病) (YAMAZAKI 1977a, p. 30). Although Naokata eventually built a new house in Konya-machi, allowing him to quit the Sakai mansion, that occurred only four months before his death.

Naokata’s Nenpu ryaku 年譜略 (Abbreviated chronological biography) records nothing about his activities between his forty-fifth (Genroku 元禄 7—1694) and sixty-third years (Shōtoku 正徳 2—1712). It was during that period, however, that one of his most controversial pieces, Kusunoki Masashige boseki setsu 楠正成墓石説 (Essay on Kusunoki Masashige’s [1294–1336] gravestone,” 1705), was written. In it, Naokata articulated one rather controversial theme in what might be called his multifaceted critique of samurai culture. Although of samurai birth, and a Neo-Confucian teacher of a bakufu official, Naokata had little respect for “samurai” teachings, especially those glorifying bushi culture. Abe Ryūichi’s study of the Kimon school suggests that Naokata’s critical approach reflected a “rationalistic” (gorishugi 合理主義) bent in his thinking (ABE 1980, pp. 579–80). In addition to rationalism, Naokata’s criticisms of Masashige and samurai culture reflect his broader commitment to a kind of civil, philosophical cosmopolitanism grounded in Neo-Confucian ethical assumptions, values, and principles reflecting a cultural world larger and more universal, ontologically and ethically, than the one in which he lived.

Naokata’s ethical cosmopolitanism is evident, for example, in his admiration for the Korean Neo-Confucian Yi T’oebye 李 退溪 (1501–1570). More pointedly, it was reflected in contemporary criticisms of Naokata as either an “alien” (ihōjin 異邦人) or “the son of an alien” (ihōjin no ko 異邦人の子), due to his philosophical respect for “foreign teachings” (ikoku no kyō 異国の教) such as T’oebye’s (MARUYAMA 1980, p. 630). With regard to Masashige and samurai culture, Naokata’s ethical cosmopolitanism surfaced through his readiness to disparage a cultural idol (namely, Masashige) and a nascent ethic (bushido) that were increasingly celebrated, even by Neo-Confucians such as Asami Keisai, as distinctly Japanese. Rather than endorse a parochial, Japan-centric worldview and subsume Neo-Confucian ethics to them, Naokata chose to critique such thinking while elevating a more cosmopolitan perspective.

Naokata did not simply admire China or Korea because they were foreign. Rather, as Maruyama has suggested, it seems that Naokata’s passion was for the potentially universal ethical element in Neo-Confucianism (MARUYAMA 1980, pp. 631–38), an element providing him with a source of philosophical authority superior to self, textual tradition, and/or local custom. Because that element—specifically notions such as principle (ri 理), the way (michi 道, dao), and the great
ultimate (taikyoku 太極, tairī)—had first appeared in China, he respected Chinese thought for them; and because that thought, as he came to know it, had been last advocated in Korea by Yi T’oege, Naokata did not hesitate to revere him as well, even more than he did Ansai. Considered in this context, Naokata’s readiness to degrade Masashige and bushido can be seen as a philosophical byproduct of his dedication to an invariable, absolute ethical truth qua unitary Neo-Confucian principle (ichiri 一理, yilí), as well as the practical exercise meant to facilitate realization of it—quiet-sitting.

Naokata’s thought contrasts significantly with Keisai’s Kimon philosophy, which emphasizes many of the themes Naokata explicitly rejected. Rather than glorify samurai values as Keisai did, Naokata declared, “The way of the samurai (bushidō 武士道) is, from the perspective of the Analects, a hickish thing (inakamono 田舎者). I do not discuss things related to Japan (hon'ga kusha wa Nippon to iu kōjō wa dasanu zo 本学者ハ日本ト云々上ハ出サぬゾ)” (SATO 1941, p. 379). Judging bushido—and Naokata’s use of the word was one of the few times it surfaced in Tokugawa discourse—to be a “hickish thing,” seems neither inherently rational or irrational. Rather, it is a value judgment, apparently explained more fully in the sentence following where Naokata states that he does not discuss things related to Japan. Of course, what he meant is that he did not address things specifically related to Japan, things that claim to be unique to, particular to, and/or exclusive to Japan. Rather than such arguably proto-nationalistic notions, Naokata typically opts for ones with a wider, more universalistic bearing on human culture, the self, its cultivation, and its ethical activities.

As a result, Naokata’s remarks often seem atypical of much Tokugawa culture. For example, Naokata once declared that “since the death of Yi T’oege, there had been no true scholars in the world,” expressing not just admiration for the Korean Zhu Xi scholar, but implicit contempt for Japanese Neo-Confucians, including Yamazaki Ansai. Naokata explicitly belittled Japan by observing that “Japan (waga kuni 我が國) had not yet produced a sage or a worthy” (DENKI GAKKAI 1938, p. 75). Since Naokata recognized, as many Neo-Confucians did, that sagehood was attainable by anyone who seriously set out to achieve it, his observation surely did not speak well about the level of Neo-Confucian learning within Japan. Especially surprising here is that during an age when philosopher-scholars were fashioning accounts of Confucian learning so as to suggest that either they were sagely successors to the way, or that their samurai patrons might be worthy of that status, Naokata did neither, and flatly denied that any such claims issuing from Japan, up until his day, were credible.
In his “Explanation of Kusunoki Masashige’s Gravestone,” Naokata relates that Masashige’s memorial stone, found in Settsu Province at Minatogawa, was erected by Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628–1700). The inscription was composed by the Ming scholar-refugee Zhu Shunshui 朱舜水 (Shu Shunsui, 1600–1682), supposedly a relative of Zhu Xi and the Ming imperial line. Naokata’s critique is not of Masashige directly, but instead of Shunshui, and by extension, of Masashige. After all, Shunshui was known as a paragon of Ming loyalty because of his refusal to live in Qing China. Naokata points out, however, that because Shunshui did not martyr himself in defense of the Ming emperor Sizong during the anti-Ming rebellion led by Li Zicheng (1606–1645), he had turned his back on the right relationship between a ruler and his subject-ministers, discarded the sense of obligations that he had to his family members, and fled calamity in order to save himself by fleeing to our country. (SATÔ 1941, p. 12)

Naokata adds that Shunshui arrived in Nagasaki, and from there Mitsukuni learned of him and subsequently invited him to become his teacher. Although the Ming dynasty was destroyed and the Qing had risen, Shunshui refused to return home, and instead was buried in a foreign country. For this reason, Naokata declared that Shunshui was “neither a loyal nor righteousness man” (fuchū fugi no hito 不忠不義之人). Naokata asks rhetorically what Zhu Xi’s spirit would say, looking down upon Shunshui’s life from heaven. Why is he praised? Why, furthermore, would Mitsukuni have Shunshui, a disloyal man, eulogize Kusunoki Masashige for his loyalty? How, Naokata asked, could Mitsukuni not have realized Shunshui’s lack of righteousness? Answering his own questions, Naokata observed that most Japanese Confucians only praise the elegance of his commentaries and essays, without criticizing the disgraceful and humiliating fact that he forgot his ruler and lost his own self in the process (SATÔ 1941, p. 12).

Prewar admirers of Naokata felt compelled to defend him against charges that he had maligne Masashige. In 1941, Ikegami Kōjirō, editor of the Satô Naokata zenshû, acknowledged that people—Inoue Tetsujirō is cited in this context—wrongly considered Naokata to be a critic of Masashige. Given the political climate of Ikegami’s day, that charge alone would have been sufficient to make Naokata a philosophical pariah, and it did to a certain extent. After all, Masahige embodied the kind of self-sacrificing loyalty that the imperial state actively encouraged through school textbooks. As a result,

3 For an English language study of Zhu Shunshui, see CHING 1979.
Ikegami was forced to argue that Naokata recognized Masashige’s loyalty and righteousness (chūgi 忠義). The evidence Ikegami cites, however, proves only that Naokata admitted Masashige’s loyalty and martial prowess, and that only in a rather derogatory way. Thus, as Ikegami notes, Naokata did state,

> In Japan, Kusunoki and his son were loyal subjects. Loyalism was their fundamental rule. From start to finish their minds and hearts were with the imperial throne, and never wavered. ... Nor did they ever harbor any regrets. Military scholars of later generations praised Kusunoki, but only for his military and strategic abilities. That was not their basic intent.

(IKEGAMI 1941, p.6)

Also, Naokata did praise Masashige as a general in his “Grounding Oneself in Quiescence.” Nevertheless, as Ikegami seems to realize, though he does not admit it, Inoue was not entirely wrong in suggesting that Naokata had little respect for Masashige. After all, later in the passage quoted above, Naokata added that “viewed from the perspective of scholarship, Lord Kusunoki had no learning at all” (ikkō no mugakusha 一向の無学者). Ikegami further defended Naokata, but only by noting that Ansai had similarly criticized Masashige in remarking, “Although many people praise Masashige’s wisdom, humanity, and courage, those who do have not read the *Doctrine of the Mean*” (IKEGAMI 1941, p. 6).

Another defense of Naokata appeared in a study of the Kimon school authored by the Denki Gakkai, but is hardly convincing. That study explains, for example, that Naokata’s *Daigaku hikki* 大學筆記 (Notes on the great learning) states, “In regard to loyalty and righteousness, Lord Kusunoki was the greatest example of a loyal subject that our country has ever produced. However, this is more the view of vulgar and unlearned people than it is our own position” (DENKI GAKKAI 1938, p. 76). Whether the Denki Gakkai intended sarcasm in citing this remark is open to question, but Naokata’s statement does seem a curious expression of admiration. Ikegami suggests that Naokata’s disparaging appraisals of Masashige resulted from the fact that Masashige was not a Confucian, nor were most of those who admired him. Furthermore, Masashige’s claim that he would die for his country seven times if he had that many lives smacked of Buddhism (IKEGAMI 1941, p. 6). Yet it also seems that Naokata viewed bushido (a hickish thing), Masashige, and most of his followers, as well as the quasi-Buddhistic pledge, as the products of ignorance of Confucian principles. Thus, in another context Naokata more positively declared that “Confucian learning [gakumon] conveys the nor-
mative ethical principles of the way of humanity, while the arts of samurai [bugei 武藝] are the duties of the samurai houses” (DENKI GAKKAI 1938, p. 75). Unlike scholars such as Yamaga Sokō who merged Neo-Confucianism with samurai learning, Naokata viewed them more as disparate fields of learning, with Neo-Confucianism clearly occupying the higher ground.

Naokata’s thoughts on Masashige were not unprompted. Rather, they represented one aspect of his overall philosophical and cultural disagreement with Keisai’s branch of the Kimon school. Keisai was a great admirer, even worshiper of Masashige, readily recognizing him as the premier “loyal minister” of Japan (SATÔ 1933, p. 66). Later Kimon followers of Keisai recognized Masashige as a chûshin gishi 忠臣義士 worthy of legitimate sacrificial worship as sanctioned in the Book of Rites (NAKAMURA 1733, 4:27a). Inoue Tetsujirô later suggested as much: in his concluding observations on Keisai, Inoue praised him for (i) declaring that the overthrows launched by kings Tang and Wu were wrong, (ii) lauding Kusunoki Masashige as “perfectly loyal and of great merit,” and (iii) writing the Seiken igen 靖献遺言 (Testaments of calm and dedicated loyalists), sounding the spirit of loyalty, filial piety, regulation, and duty (INOUE 1905, p. 467). In the latter work, Keisai highlighted Chinese loyalist martyrs who died out of loyalty to their country and ruler. Although the martyrs were Chinese loyalists, the message Keisai emphasized was loyalty to one’s country of birth over loyalty to or affection for another country, or even a teaching such as Confucianism (ASAMI 1977, pp. 225–28). Since in Keisai’s case that meant Japan, his use of Chinese figures simply served the purposes of fostering a sort of proto-ultra-nationalism. Keisai thus defined taigi 大義, or one’s greatest duty in life, as considering one’s own country as the lord (shu 主), and other countries as visitors (kyaku 客) (ASAMI 1977, pp. 236–37). If Keisai rendered his loyalist, Japan-centered philosophy metaphorically, Naokata offered his response to it in no uncertain terms: in a famous remark he declared “the Seiken igen is an egregious work” (warui sho da zo ワルイ書ダゾ) (SATÔ 1941, p. 360).

Maruyama Masao has hinted that Keisai’s emphasis on revering the way of one’s own country was a veiled attack on Naokata and his followers (MARUYAMA 1980, pp. 629–30). Maruyama’s insight might also be applied to the Seiken igen: in emphasizing respect for one’s own country, i.e., Japan, Keisai was disparaging Naokata’s more cosmopolitan, perhaps universalistic approach. After all, unlike Keisai, who celebrated Japan’s nativist culture via Neo-Confucian categories, Naokata never subordinated philosophical principle to national identity. Thus he stated,
There is only one principle [ichiri一理] in the universe, and that is all. This one principle does not sanction two ways. If Confucianism is correct, then Shinto is heterodox. If Shinto is correct, then Confucianism is heterodox. … What sort of principle would allow one to follow both of these ways?

(SATÔ 1941, p. 11–12)

Without a doubt, Naokata viewed Confucianism as correct. And insofar as China was the source of Confucianism, Naokata could not avoid a certain partiality towards China. Thus, in contrast to Keisai, who suggested that “if Confucius and Zhu Xi should attack Japan, Kimon scholars would be among the first to march forward and blow off their heads with our cannon” (MARUYAMA 1980, p. 631), Naokata offered a different perspective, judging that “if a great sage were to emerge from China, assume the throne, and institute a rule that would make all within the four seas virtuous, then as a matter of right duty Japan too would have to follow and submit as a vassal” (SATÔ 1941, p. 341).

In 1712 (Shōtoku 2), Naokata, then 63, finished Dōgaku hyōteki道學標的 (The goal of the learning of the Way), a Neo-Confucian philosophical work widely interpreted as the sequel to his Kōgaku bensaku roku, a text he had completed nearly thirty years earlier. In Naokata’s view, the goal of learning was achieving sagehood (seijin聖人). Dōgaku hyōteki thus advocates self-cultivation and self-realization through the learning of the Way, with special emphasis on selections from the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, Mencius, Reflections on Things at Hand, Master Zhu’s Collected Prose Works, the Classified Conversations of Master Zhu, and teachings such as those of Confucius. Naokata stressed that self-cultivation and realization, essential to achieving sagehood, involve not just following the Way, or even writing about it, but taking personal responsibility for it. Fundamental to that project was quiet-sitting.

**Naokata’s Writings on Quiet-Sitting**

Although Naokata practiced quiet-sitting most of his adult life, his writings on seiza, produced in his final years, were prompted by an anthology compiled by one of his students, Yanagawa Gōgi柳川剛義(fl. 1717), a physician from Kii 紀伊 Province. Gōgi’s work, the Shushi seiza setsu朱子靜坐說 (Master Zhu’s remarks on quiet-sitting), included ninety-seven passages from Zhu Xi’s Wenji文集 (Collected works) and the Classified Conversations of Master Zhu, and was first published in 1714 (Shōtoku 4). Three years later, Gōgi asked Naokata to author a preface for the text. Naokata agreed to do so, but insisted on assum-
ing considerable editorial authority over the new edition. Naokata used only thirty of the original Shushi seiza setsu passages, and added four new ones, so that the resulting work, published in 1717 (Kyôhô 2) and entitled Seiza shūsetsu (Anthology on quiet-sitting), was much more concise, consisting of only thirty-four passages (YAMAZAKI 1959). In addition to Naokata’s preface, the new edition featured a postscript by Gõgi. Naokata’s preface states,

Activity and quiescence (dôsei 動靜) are natural springs (shizen no ki 自然之機) of the way of heaven. Since activity is controlled by grounding oneself in quiescence, the latter must be cultivated by students. The sages and worthies of antiquity had good reason to formulate their approaches to learning for children and for adults, with their teachings on abiding in reverent-seriousness (kyokei 端敬) and investigating principle (kyûri 究理). In despising activity and seeking only quiescence, Daoists and Buddhists have never been able to expound the wholeness of the way of heaven. Because vulgar Confucians never realized that they should ground themselves in quiescence, they ended up teaching useless, absurd activities. How can they be deemed true scholars?

What Cheng-Zhu scholars call quiet-sitting is the technique for preserving the mind and the ground for accumulating virtue. If unable to exert strength in this technique, how can anyone hoping to study the learning of the sages achieve anything? But if one is obsessed with quiet-sitting, one will unfortunately lapse into Zen meditation in search of samadhi. Therefore we follow precisely Master Zhu’s brilliant instructions. If students truly exert their strength in this, they will surely be deemed excellent. Yanagawa Gõgi compiled an anthology of Master Zhu’s remarks on quiet-sitting, the Seiza shûsetsu, to provide instructions for the practice. He asked me to author a preface for it. Fascinated by the passages explaining quiet-sitting, I wrote this. (SATÔ 1977b, pp. 280–81)

Gõgi’s postscript states,

Students must practice quiet sitting: attempting to bypass it is like trying to sail a boat without a rudder! Thus how can anyone neglect this practice? Those who strive to master the sages’ learning must rightly perfect their thoughts. Later scholars, however, indulged in vulgar miscellaneous learning without understanding the fundamental intent of the sages and worthies. Soon, this was true of nearly all scholars. Personally
regretting this, I edited Teacher Zhu’s remarks on quiet-sitting. This fall I asked Master Satô Naokata to author a preface, and fortunately he agreed. At the urging of friends and disciples I am having this work published. (YANAGAWA 1977, p. 281)

Composed of passages from works relating Zhu Xi’s teachings, the Seiza shūsetsu clearly reveals that Naokata’s thoughts on quiet-sitting derived largely from Zhu Xi; indeed, many of its key passages reappear in Naokata’s Seiza setsu hikki. But the Seiza shūsetsu perhaps wrongly implies that Naokata’s views on quiet-sitting were little more than selective, verbatim compilations of key passages in which Zhu Xi articulated his own thoughts. For that reason it has relatively limited value as a statement of Naokata’s distinctive ideas regarding quiet-sitting, which were more diverse in terms of their sources and more indigenous in their articulation. Rather than the Seiza shūsetsu, the best statement of Naokata’s thinking appears in his Seiza setsu hikki.

The Seiza setsu hikki presents Naokata’s thoughts on quiet-sitting as an eclectic Neo-Confucian mix based on his analyses of remarks by the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, Zhu’s disciple Huang Gan 黄榦 [Mianzhai 勉齋 (1152–1221)], the Ming scholar Xue Xuan 薛瑄 [Jingxian 敬軒 (1389–1464)], Yi T’oegye, and others. Naokata opens the Seiza setsu hikki by enthusiastically explaining the nature of quiet-sitting and its importance for students of the Cheng-Zhu teachings:

Quiet-sitting is the practice for preserving [our original minds] and nourishing [our ethically good natures] (son’yō no kufu 存養の工夫). People who do not understand the basic intent of the Cheng-Zhu teachings sometimes lapse into zazen and heterodoxy. Nevertheless, it is a major error to skip even one day of the practice.

When you have nothing else to do, quiet-sitting is an appropriate practice. With quiet-sitting, idle and scattered thoughts (kanzatsu shiryo 閑雜思慮) cease as the mind achieves a calm purity and peaceful brilliance (tanzen heimei 湛然明) and the physical disposition (kichitsu 氣質) is naturally transformed. (SATÔ 1977c, p. 287)

Naokata’s claim that people can transform their physical disposition through quiet-sitting was inspired, according to Yamazaki Michio, by Xue Xuan’s Dushu lu 讀書録 (Reading notes) (YAMAZAKI 1977b, p. 288). But unlike Xue who emphasized the role of book learning in transforming the physical self, Naokata discounts book learning, while extolling instead quiet-sitting as the way to transform one’s physical self. The priority of quiet-sitting vis-à-vis the investigation of things,
book learning, and other more academic pursuits is evident in Nao-
kata’s following remarks:

Quiet-sitting cannot be mastered in a morning or an evening. Unless one devotes months and years to it, becoming truly proficient in it, one will never have fully experienced it. Selfishness (jinyoku 人欲) can be expelled through investigating principle (kyūri 管理), but it is difficult to transform the physical disposition simply by means of that alone. However, one can utterly transform it through the preservation and nourishment of quiet-sitting (seiza sonyō 静坐養).

Ceaselessly investigating principle, even when focused on the words of the sages and worthies, might leave one’s thoughts scattered. On the other hand, the quiescence of the mind achieved through quiet-sitting provides one with the highest form of clarity. Conversely, one whose nature is not quiet, cannot pursue learning. (Sato 1977c, p. 287)

Naokata criticizes those who think that learning is nothing more than reading books, calling them “worldly Confucians.” While such scholars may discuss humaneness and rightness, Naokata claims that their remarks remain disjointed. Moreover, the feeling of compassion within them never really emerges, leaving them void of the physical disposition (kishō 氣象) manifesting true humaneness. These failings are largely due, Naokata suggests, to the fact that worldly scholars are only interested in investigating principles (kyūri 管理). Learning, Naokata concludes, is not simply a matter of book study. While there are two branches to learning—abiding in reverent-seriousness (kyokei) and investigating principle (kyūri)—grounding oneself in quiescence, preserving the original mind, and nourishing one’s nature are, in Naokata’s view, the very foundation of it. Naokata insists that unless one learns through one’s personal self (mi de manabaneba みで学ばねば), via quiet-sitting, book learning will be useless. Learning via one’s person is, Naokata explains, truly learning for the sake of the [ethical] self (ki 己). Merely reading lots of books without engaging the physical self amounts to showing off to impress others (Sato 1977c, pp. 288–89).

Naokata suggests that his views on quiet-sitting are consistent with those of Zhu Xi, at least during Zhu’s early period when he was most influenced by the teachings of Li Yanping. Naokata thus quotes the following very positive passages from the Classified Conversations of Master Zhu (Zhu Xi 1984, p. 3926):

Someone asked, “Why did Yichuan, when he encountered people who practiced quiet-sitting, praise their excellence in
learning (zengaku 善學)?"

Master Zhu responded, “He did so because that practice is the most essential.” (SATO 1977c, p. 289)

Naokata adds that students should similarly view quiet-sitting as the very foundation of learning (gakumon no konpon 学問の根本), which must not be neglected. In emphasizing the crucial function of quiet-sitting, Naokata quotes another passage from the Classified Conversations (ZHU XI 1984, p. 345) in which Zhu Xi observes,

Cheng Mingdao taught people to practice quiet-sitting, and so did Teacher Li Yanping. If one’s essential spirit (seishin 精神) is not settled, then moral principles will have no place in which to lodge. … If one practices quiet-sitting, then one will be able to collect (shiren 收斂) one’s mind quite well.

(SATO 1977c, p. 289)

Naokata thus saw quiet-sitting as a technique, or exercise, whereby one epistemologically prepared the mind, via settling it, for ethical cognition.

While drawing heavily upon Zhu Xi’s remarks, Naokata is not uncritical of the Song master. Thus he presents a passage from Zhu Xi’s Collected Works (ZHU XI 1985, ch. 40), in which Zhu Xi responds to He Shujing (1128–1175) stating,

It is clear that Li Yanping generally taught people to realize personally (tainin suru 體認する) the appearance that is evident during their quiet contemplation of the unmanifest mind’s great foundation (taihon mihatsu 大本未発). In managing affairs and responding to things, people should center themselves with a natural sense of self-control. This was the instruction passed down by disciples of Yang Guishan 楊龜山. However, when his disciples were together, they often indulged in listening to lectures and some secretly favored learning based on commentaries. Thus they did not exhaust their minds realizing Guishan’s teachings. As a result, today teachings such as “preserving the original mind” barely exist, and this thread of teachings seems no longer evident. This blatantly contradicts the intent of Guishan’s teachings. Every time I think of this, I become feverish and perspire. (SATO 1977, pp. 289–90)

Thus Naokata implies that while Zhu Xi initially accepted the practice of grounding oneself in quiescence as taught by Yanping, due to his own fondness for lecturing and investigating principles (koron kyuri 講論窮理), as well as that of others, he and they came to neglect Yan-
ping’s teachings, something he, Zhu Xi, at least, later regretted (Satô 1977c, p. 290).

Nonetheless, Naokata often endorses Zhu Xi’s positive views on quiet-sitting. But like Zhu Xi, he also felt compelled to warn against possible imbalances that might result when students pursue quiet-sitting exclusively. Thus he quotes a passage from the *Classified Conversations* (Zhu Xi 1984, p. 345) in which Zhu Xi observes,

> Beginning students must practice quiet-sitting. If they practice quiet-sitting, they will be able to establish the fundamental source (hongen 本原) [of learning]. Even though they will inevitably pursue things, they should still be able to collect (shûki 収歸) their minds and quickly recover this peaceful state of mind. We can compare this to staying inside one’s home: after a while one must leave, but upon return, one will again find peace at home. Similarly, when overwhelmed by external things, if one practices quiet-sitting one’s mind will regain its composure. While one must look inside, that is not the only place where this composure can exist. (Satô 1977c, p. 290)

Naokata explains that while quiet-sitting is necessary, like staying at home, without book learning and the investigation of principle, i.e., without leaving one’s home occasionally, it leads to heterodoxy (itan 異端). Emphasizing the mutual relationship of quiet-sitting and investigating principle, Naokata cites Zhu Xi’s remarks (Zhu Xi 1984, p. 241) to explain how, after grappling with difficult principles, they naturally become clear while one is “immersed in cultivation” (kan’yo 濡養, hanyang) (Satô 1977c, pp. 290–91). Implied here is that quiet-sitting assists one’s understanding at all levels, and not just in a preliminary manner.

Despite their superficial similarities, Naokata insists that quiet-sitting and Zen meditation are utterly different. Buddhists emphasize “seeing one’s nature and the way of enlightenment” (kenshô godô 見性悟道) as the practice for realizing nirvana (*jakumetsu* 寂滅). They consider emptiness and obliteration (*kûmetsu* 空滅), and becoming like a dead thing (*shibutsu* 死物), to be their essential goals. While they make their minds quiescent and clear, Naokata declares that they seek only to become like “withered wood and dead ashes” (*koboku shikai* 枯木死灰), obliterating their active engagement with things. They thus destroy the humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom endowed in the mind, and consider the feelings of compassion, shame, deference, and right and wrong as mere illusions. Confucian quiet-sitting, on the other hand, seeks to eliminate idle and scattered thoughts only (Satô 1977c, p. 291).
Returning to a theme developed in his *Keisetsu hikki* (Notes on reverent-seriousness), Naokata states that reverent-seriousness (*kei* 敬) is indeed the practice of grounding oneself in quiescence (*kei wa shusei no kufu* 敬は主静の工夫). After all, it is reverent-seriousness that enables people to put a stop to idle and scattered thoughts. Naokata adds that reverent-seriousness is never really savored until it is experienced in quiet-sitting. Attempting to convey this experience, T’oegye thus noted, “While quiescent, one can immerse oneself in the fundamental nature of heaven’s principles (*tenri no honzen* 天理の本然)” (Satô 1977c, p. 294). Naokata also highlights the healing capacity of quiet-sitting. When someone is sick, Naokata recommends cultivating the mind of quiet-sitting by focusing on the navel (*seika* 脐下), which thus preserves and nourishes one’s generative force. Here again, Naokata endorses Zhu Xi’s more positive remarks on quiet-sitting. Zhu’s *Collected Works* (Zhu Xi 1985, p. 3571) records that he instructed his disciple, Huang Zigeng 黃子耕 (1147–1212), as follows.

When sick, you should not try to think about things. For a while, leave matters alone. You should concentrate on preserving your mind (*zonshin* 存心) and nourishing your generative force (*yôki* 氣) by quiet-sitting in the lotus position (*kafu seiza* 蹲踞静坐), with your eyes focused on the tip of your nose, and your mind on your navel (*seifuku* 脐腹). After a while you will begin to warm up. Then you will gradually regain your health. (Satô 1977c, p. 295)

Naokata emphasizes that it is only for the sake of cultivating good health (*yôjô no tame* 養生の為も) that people should practice quiet-sitting in this way. It is the practice for times of sickness. While superficially similar to Zen meditation, the therapeutic intent of such quiet-sitting differs greatly from *zazen* (Satô 1977c, p. 296).

In addition to good health, Naokata emphasizes that the aura of humaneness (*jin no kishô* 仁の気象) emerges from the practice of grounding oneself in quiescence. This physical disposition of humaneness is moist and warm, while learning based solely on plumbing of principle is physically dreadful due to its laboriousness. Knowledge gained by plumbing principle is very dry, like paper treated with astringent persimmon juice. To illustrate further the benefits of quiet-sitting, Naokata recalls that when Cheng Yi was exiled to Fuzhou, he had to cross the Han River. Midway through it, wind and waves began rocking his boat. Those onboard cried and wailed in distress; only Cheng Yi kept his head straight, sitting as always. Naokata thus concluded that quiescence enables the mind to remain unperturbed, even when it encounters difficulties (Satô 1977c, p. 296).
Citing another example, Naokata relates that after Zhu Xi had criticized the Song prime minister, Han Touzhou (1127–1202), his teachings were officially branded as “false learning” (igaku 僞學). Then it seemed that Zhu Xi might be executed, and anyone daring to study his thought was treated as a criminal. Nevertheless, the *Classified Conversations* (ZHU XI 1984, 2: 4254) relates that,

One disciple said, ‘Our teacher was serious and extremely severe. But some have noted that he was warmly intimate, encouraging, and respectfully at ease. If one looked at him, this was evident in his posture and countenance. Although it was at this time that various scholars were being attacked for “false learning,” our teacher remained calm and tolerant as always.’ (SATÔ 1977c, pp. 296–97)

From this, Naokata observes, we can see that Master Zhu had completely made quiescence his foundation, preserved his mind, cultivated his nature, and achieved an imperturbable equilibrium (SATÔ 1977c, p. 297).

Naokata’s enthusiasm for quiet-sitting is evident in his endorsement of one of Zhu Xi’s (1984, 2: 4474) most positive statements on quiet-sitting.

If for one day people can eliminate one or two sentences of idle chatter, and scale back their idle intercourse with others, that would improve things. If one is surrounded entirely by noise from the marketplace, how will one ever be able to read books? If one can make one’s days free of concerns and has sufficient provisions, then one should spend half of each day quiet-sitting, and the other half in reading books. If one can do that for one or two years, why would one worry about not making progress?

Naokata wholeheartedly suggests that the regimen outlined be considered the basis for daily practice (*nichiyô no kufû* 日用の工夫) (SATÔ 1977c, p. 300).

Naokata acknowledges that in Zhu Xi’s *Classified Conversations* and *Collected Works* there are remarks suggesting that people should not necessarily practice quiet-sitting. He adds that vulgar Confucians cite these very remarks to justify their distaste for quiet-sitting. These passages, however, were meant as warnings to students whose physical dispositions (*kishô* 氣象) were too fond of quiescence, but disliked plumbing principle. Zhu warned them against quiet-sitting fearing that they might become overly partial to quiescence and fall into heterodoxy (SATÔ 1977c, p. 300). That Naokata saw no such problems was evident in a poem he offered:
The profound ideas of sages and worthies reside in the unity of reverent-seriousness (itsu no kei). Even discussion and debate are all based in reverent-seriousness.

The *Four Books* and *Six Classics* are like eclectic literature (zassho ni onaji) in this regard. Grounding oneself in quiescence is simply reverent-seriousness. (SATO 1977c, p. 301)

Explaining the poem, Naokata admits that while reverent-seriousness and quiet-sitting differ, quiet-sitting consists in reverent-seriousness (seiza mo kei nari 静坐も敬なり), just as abiding in reverent-seriousness is the occasion of quiescence (sei no ba nari 静の場なり). Indeed, the reverent-seriousness manifest during quiescence is the practice of quiet-sitting (SATO 1977c, pp. 301–302).

Naokata next incorporates Ming (1368–1644) Neo-Confucian ideas on quiet-sitting into his analysis to clarify aspects of quiet-sitting that he earlier criticized Ansai for neglecting in his preface to the *Sanshi denshin roku*, namely the relationship of quiet-sitting to “the quiescence of unmanifest feelings” (mihatsu no sei 未発の静), “the activity of manifest feelings” (ihatsu no dō 己発の動), “self-scrutiny” (seisatsu 省察), “preserving and cultivating” (son’yō 存養), as well as the states of “centrality and harmony” (chüwa 中和). First, Naokata quotes Xue Xuan’s *Dushu lu*:

Through quiet reverent-seriousness, we can immerse ourselves in cultivation of the centrality of the unmanifest emotions, pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. Through active reverent-seriousness, we can scrutinize the harmony of the emotions as regulated according to the mean. This should be considered the essence of learning. (SATO 1977c, p. 302)

Via these passages, Naokata emphasizes that quiet-sitting is not merely a matter of quiescence, but relates to serious, active engagement of both the internal realm, in its active and quiescent, manifest and unmanifest modes, as well as the external realm, in both activity and quiescence. In effect, Naokata suggests that quiet-sitting is as much about action as it is about sitting still.

In drawing the *Seiza setsu hikki* to a close, Naokata first relates quiet-sitting to humaneness (jin 仁) by noting that if people do not experience a sense of compassion (sokuin no jō 激隱の情) while quiet-sitting, or if they do not manifest humaneness in their physical appearance (jin no kishō 仁の気象), then the quiescence they cultivate becomes the empty quiescence of Zen Buddhists (Zen no kyosei 禪の虚静). Naokata
observes that sageliness is simply humaneness (sei wa jin naru nomi 聖は仁なるのみ), and that the whole of the Analects teaches humaneness. By grounding oneself in quiescence, Naokata explains, one becomes humane (shusei nareba jin nari 主静ならば仁なり). If one grounds oneself in quiescence, one can also manage things according to principle. Even with activity, one’s mind will be able to concentrate itself so that the original quiescence (honzen no sei 本然の静) is not lost. Naokata adds that proficiency at the elementary level of learning, in abiding in reverent-seriousness, preserving the mind, and cultivating the nature, as well as eight clauses of the Great Learning (Daxue 大學), make this evident. The teachings of the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸) also convey nothing other than this (SATÔ 1977c, p. 304).

Naokata further relates that despite distinctions between heaven and humanity, by meditating on unitary principle, one can experience it personally. The four seasons and the birth of myriad things all proceed from the ground of quiescence, otherwise they would not be possible. In describing the quiescent foundation of the universe, Naokata cites the “Appended Remarks” of the Book of Changes that states,

Through quiescence, heaven (qian 乾, ken) gathers itself. In its activities, it corrects things. In this way, it gives birth to everything. Via quiescence, earth (kun 坤, kon) gathers things. Through activity, it opens them up. Thus it gives breadth to creation.

(Yijing 1986, p. 41)

Naokata explains that heaven, earth, activity, and quiescence all are grounded in quiescence. Firmness (chen 賢, tei), origination (yuan 元, gen), the mind’s reservoir of wisdom (zhicang 知藏, chizō), and the emergence of humaneness and its hidden functioning, are also grounded in quiescence. Even the good government of states and empires (kokka tenka no köyō 国家天下の功庸) are grounded in the quiescence of the ruler’s unified mind (shu taru hito no isshin shusei ni ari 主たる人の一心主静にあり). Constancy and change are linked through the unitary principle of activity and quiescence. Thus Naokata states that whoever can successfully manage the constant, can also, upon encounter with change, successfully manage it too. The Great Learning explains, “Knowing the highest, one has determined one’s aim. Having determined one’s aim, one can be fully quiescent. Fully quiescent, one can attain peace. Through peace, one can think about things. With thought, one can attain one’s goals” (Daxue 1984, p. 356–57). From this, Naokata concludes that the ultimate importance of grounding oneself in quiescence should be clear (SATÔ 1977c, pp. 304–5).
Resistance to Tyranny

Naokata’s *Seiza setsu hikki* makes quiet-sitting fully relevant to ruling by suggesting that the quiescence of the ruler’s mind is the very foundation of humaneness and good government. While Naokata saw quiet-sitting as a practice that could enhance the well-being of every aspect of the polity, he never advocated passive or quietistic acceptance of tyranny. In this context, Naokata’s thinking about the problem of tyranny—namely, the problem of how people should respond when an immoral and oppressive tyrant lords it over them—sharply distinguishes his philosophical worldview from Keisai’s. Kimon thinkers often defined themselves on this topic via essays on Han Yu’s *Juyou cao* (768–824) 獄幽操 (J. Kōyūsō, Imprisonment), a brief work composed of an enigmatic poem, the “Youli cao” 羸里操 (Youli prison), and a terse commentary. The poem reads,

> My eyes look, but see nothing;
>  
> my ears listen, but hear nothing.
>  
> In the morning the sun does not rise;
>  
> in the evening, I never see stars or the moon.
>  
> Does anyone understand my fate, or are all ignorant of it?
>  
> Should I kill myself, or remain alive?

Han Yu’s commentary adds,

> Alas! The crimes of a minister must be punished;
>  
> the heavenly king is brilliant and sagacious!

The Song scholar Cheng Yi claimed that Han Yu’s poem captured the mentality and the ultimate ethical virtue of King Wen 文王 while he was unjustly imprisoned by the tyrant Zhou 縱, the last Shang 商 king. Ansai favored Cheng Yi’s view, suggesting that even though Wen knew that Zhou was debauched, he never refused to regard him as his sovereign ruler, nor did he consider resisting his decrees (YAMAZAKI 1980, pp. 200–201). Ansai added that Confucius had judged King Wu 武王 to be “not entirely good” (*Lunyu* 1988, p. 5), supposedly because Wu later overthrew the evil king and founded a new dynasty. Ansai’s allusion to Confucius suggested that the latter had implicitly deemed Wen’s unwavering loyalism superior to Wu’s overthrow.

Later Kimon reflections on Ansai’s *Kōyūsō* defined the school’s views on how a minister should respond to a tyrant via judgments of Wu, and often King Tang 湯王 too, since his overthrow of the last Xia 夏 king, Jie 桀, also a tyrant, had preceded Wu’s overthrow of Zhou. Keisai amplified Ansai’s line by declaring that Wen exhausted the moral way in remaining loyal to Zhou and bearing no resentment
even while imprisoned. Keisai added that not only was Wu not a sage, he lacked propriety (murei 無礼) as well. For those reasons, Keisai suggested, Confucius had judged Wu so severely (ASAMI 1980, pp. 202–10). Not surprisingly, Maruyama characterized Keisai’s position as one advocating “absolute loyalty to one’s ruler” (kimi e no zettai chūsei 君への絶対忠誠); historically contextualizing Keisai’s position, Maruyama explained that Keisai understood the “ruler” to have been “the liege lord within the lord-vassal relationship among bushi” (MARUYAMA 1980, p. 650).

Naokata’s Kōyūsō ben 拘幽操辯 affirms the ethical nature of the deeds of Tang and Wu far more than Keisai. Indeed, Naokata declares that Tang and Wu were “great sages” (taiseijin 大聖人) who acted expediently (ken 權), recalling that Confucius, in commenting on the Book of Changes’s hexagram of “change” (ge 革, kaku, no. 49), had observed, “Tang and Wu followed heaven and responded to the people in changing the mandate” (湯武順之応人革命) (Yijing 1986, p. 30). Clearly implied is that Tang and Wu had acted rightly in overthrowing Jie and Zhou. Naokata adds that the Doctrine of the Mean recognizes how “the ethically refined man (junzi 君子, kunshi) responds to the times in accordance with the mean” (Zhongyong 1960, p. 386), implying that Tang and Wu had done nothing more than that. Naokata reasons that in the last days of the Shang, heaven and earth were moving toward a change in the mandate (tenchi makoto ni kakumei 天地真に革命), and that everyone looked to the east, to King Wu, for a punitive expedition (seibatsu 征伐) to overthrow the Shang. Although Wu regretted the situation, he submitted to their wishes and in doing so acted consistently with “the great mean and ultimate justice of the ethical way” (michi no taichō shisei 道の大中至正). Naokata emphasizes that while Confucius described Wu as “not entirely perfect,” he never declared that Wu was “utterly evil” (SATÔ 1980a, pp. 211–12). Naokata noted that Zhu Xi himself had questioned Master Cheng’s view that the lines, “A minister’s crimes must be punished; the heavenly king is sagacious and brilliant,” expressed King Wen’s thoughts. If that had been the case, Zhu Xi reasoned, the Zhou overthrow of the Shang never would have occurred. Naokata related that Zhu Xi had called Cheng Yi’s view a “poor explanation” (warui setsu ワルイ説), paraphrasing Zhu’s opinion that Cheng Yi was “greatly mistaken” (taiguo 大過) (ZHU XI 1984, pp. 3238–39).

Naokata hardly meant to endorse easy rebellion. Rather, he cites the Book of History’s “Great Declaration,” where King Wu explains the overthrow of the Shang, and in doing so explains the ultimate nature of the relationship between rulers and those ruled. The “Great Declaration” states,
Heaven and earth are the father and mother of the myriad creatures. Of all that exists, humanity is the most spiritually endowed. The person who is the most sincere and intelligent among humanity becomes the sovereign. The sovereign is the father and mother of the people.  

(Shujing 1960, p. 283)

Naokata adds that one should be as reluctant to execute one’s sovereign as one might be to kill one’s father. He further states that the people are the children of their rulers (tami wa kimi no ko 民は君の子), and that the ruler is their father and mother (kimi wa tami no fubo 君は民の父母). Naokata adds that the Great Learning, in progressing from “regulating the family” (斉家), to “governing the nation” (治国), and finally to bringing peace to the world” (平天下) (Daxue 1960, pp. 357–59), implies that the way of serving one’s parents is the way of serving one’s ruler. Naokata emphasizes that patricide is an extremely rare crime, implying that the overthrow of a ruler should be equally so. Naokata then recalls Mencius’s claim that the ancient sage emperor Shun would have fled from the authorities carrying his blind father into hiding if the latter had killed another man (MENCIUS 1988, p. 53). Naokata insists that people be as willing to serve even a bad ruler as Shun was to serve his father, even after he had committed murder. Quoting Zhu Xi, Naokata admonishes that “one should not [fable] emphasize resort to expedient measures lest one soon find oneself without a ruler at all” (SATÔ 1980a, p. 213; ZHU XI 1984, p. 370).

Naokata next differentiates Chinese practices (Kara no fū 唐風) from those of Japan (Nippon 日本), and in doing so subscribes to some of the “Japan-centric” cliches that more characterize Keisai’s thought. He also makes clear that his understanding of the legitimacy of Tang and Wu meant no threat to the imperial throne. Naokata claims that Japan had long since understood the foundation of loyalty and fidelity, which, in China, was first associated with Tai Bo 泰伯,4 King Wen, Bo Yi 弊夷, and Shu Qi 叔齊. Since Japan received its imperial line from Izanagi 伊邪名, Izanami 伊邪名, and Ame-no-minaka-nushi 天御中主, the status of the emperor was no different than that of a king, and all since have been their descendants. Thus even a bad emperor like Buretsu 武烈 (498–506) was not dethroned. As a result, the Japanese imperial line was never displaced by an enemy, not even during the

4 Tai Bo was the great uncle of King Wu. Although he was the eldest son of King Dan, because his father wished to pass authority on to Tai Bo’s youngest brother, Ji Li, Tai Bo went into voluntary exile so that no one would consider him a contender for the throne. The Lunyu 8/1 praises his virtue because he declined the position assigned to his younger brother on three occasions. Tai Bo went on to found the state of Wu, while Ji Li’s son became King Wen.
tumultuous age of the Taiheiki 太平記 (1318–1368). In China, on the other hand, Shun succeeded Yao, but after that the succession of virtue splintered. This, Naokata concluded, effectively proves Japan’s superiority (SATÔ 1980a, pp. 212–15).

In his Tõ Bu ron 湯武論 (Essay on Tang and Wu), written in 1718 (Kyõhõ 3), the year before he died, Naokata analyzed the ethical status of Tang and Wu. He first distinguishes the “standard” (kei 經) from the “expedient” (ken 權), noting how the former refers to moral principles that all should follow, while the latter to the way of managing unusual circumstances, a way to which only “worthies” and those of higher standing might resort. Naokata insists that ordinary people should never presume to resort to expedient courses. He admits that Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, and Zhu Xi disagreed about Tang and Wu, but adds that no one ever suggested that Tang and/or Wu merely sought to seize control via their conquests. And everyone agrees that the despotism of Jie and Zhou knew no bounds (bõgyaku itarazaru tokoro naku 暴虐至ラザル所ナク). Therefore heaven had decreed their overthrow (hõbatsu 放伐).

According to Naokata, this task was not necessarily that of Tang or Wu: any sage in such circumstances would have felt compelled to do the same. Because Jie and Zhou exhibited the worst degree of evil (bõaku shigoku 邪悪至極), heaven implored Tang and Wu to overthrow them. Tang and Wu realized that this would be an awesome task, but did not recoil from it because they knew it would exorcise evil (ja’aku 邪悪) and be a blessing for the world. To bolster his appraisal of Tang and Wu, Naokata quotes Master Cheng’s remark, “The thinking of Yao, Shun, Tang, and Wu was the same” (ZHU XI 1974, p. 81). Naokata qualifies this somewhat, admitting that Confucius had said Wu was “not entirely perfect,” but then he explains Confucius’s remark by likening Tang and Wu to viewing cherry blossoms in the rain: they were not entirely perfect, but still good (SATÔ 1980b, p. 216).

Naokata further claims that King Wu must have been a sage because his fate was linked with that of the Duke of Zhou: if Wu was not a sage, neither was the Duke of Zhou who “rode behind” him in the conquest. Turning to Bo Yi and Shu Qi, Naokata admits that their remonstration with Wu might suggest that they condemned him. Naokata explains, however, that Bo Yi and Shu Qi never said Wu was “unjust” (fugi 不義), rather they simply opposed his plan to attack the Shang dynasty (SATÔ 1980b, p. 217).

Naokata next addresses the question of why did King Wu, following his overthrow of Zhou, not enthrone the Viscount of Wei 微子, the worthy elder brother of the last Shang king. Here Naokata emphasizes that the viscount never regarded King Wu as a regicide. Instead he
recognized that the decree of heaven operated as it did; thus he had secured his family’s sacrificial vessels and fled the Shang palace before it fell. Nor would another relative of the Shang line, Bi Gan 比干, have resented Wu’s overthrow: after all, he had been inhumanely executed by King Zhou for having remonstrated against Zhou’s excesses.\(^5\) Also King Wu enfeoffed the Viscount of Ji ( Ji Zi 箕子), supposedly the Senior Tutor to the last Shang king, with the principality of Chôsen 朝鮮.\(^6\) If the Viscount of Ji had regarded Wu as a regicide, why would he have accepted Chôsen as a fief? Naokata adds that Confucius described the Viscount of Wei, Bi Gan, and the Viscount of Ji as “the three humane men of the Shang dynasty” (Lunyu 1988, p. 37), which suggests that King Wu, with whom the first and last came to terms, was not a regicide (SATO 1980b, p. 217).

Naokata also explains Zhu Xi’s “raised eyebrows,” which was his initial response to the question, Why did Wu not elevate the Viscount of Wei rather than himself following his overthrow of Zhou? After raising his eyebrows at the disciple who asked the question, Zhu Xi merely responded, “That is difficult to explain” (ZHU XI 1984, p. 1452). Naokata suggests that Zhu Xi’s terse response reflected the fact that the answer involved understanding “the great course of expedient actions that the sage’s way can embody” (聖人体道ノ大權), but that Zhu’s disciple was not ready for the answer. Naokata adds that if Zhu Xi had meant to suggest that Wu’s decision was wrong, he would have said so. Since he did not say so, there is no reason to infer, as the “Shintoist” (神道者, i.e, Ansai) suggests, that Zhu’s raised eyebrows implied that Wu was wrong (SATO 1980b, pp. 217–18).

Naokata next examines the claim that Yao’s yielding (zenjû 軍授) the throne to Shun embodied the legitimate way (seiryû 正流) to authority. Naokata declares such thinking hazy. Yao did not yield the throne to his son because doing so would have thrown the realm into disorder. Instead, he yielded authority to Shun. The same circum-

\(^5\) After Wu’s conquest of the Shang, the Viscount of Wei presented himself to King Wu; Wu was impressed with the Viscount, and reinstated him. Later, the Viscount of Wei was enfeoffed by the Duke of Zhou with the principality of Song (Shujing 1960, pp. 273–79; 376–80). Bi Gan was supposedly the Junior Tutor 少師 referred to in the last chapter of the Books of the Shang 令書, “The Viscount of Wei,” wherein the viscount admits the debauchery of Zhou, and is advised to flee for his life. Bi Gan supposedly offered the harshest remonstrations to King Zhou. The latter allegedly declared that “The heart of a sage has seven apertures. Let’s see them!” Thereupon King Zhou ordered that Bi Gan’s heart be cut out. After his conquest of the Shang, King Wu had a tumulus elevated over Bi Gan’s grave.

\(^6\) The Viscount of Ji remonstrated with King Zhou, but when he saw that his words were not heeded, feigned madness rather than flee. Supposedly, King Wu released him from prison following the conquest of the Shang (Shujing 1960, p. 315). In Korea, the Viscount is known as Kija and was worshiped “as a patriarch of ancient Koreans.” See HAN 1985, pp. 349–74.
stance occurred with Shun. In neither instance was it the case that they did not wish to yield authority to their sons. However, because their sons were not fit for the task, they chose to yield power to a sage. When Tang and Wu lived, one would have expected someone like Tang and Wu to have existed. Just as the throne would have been yielded to Confucius had he lived in Yao and Shun’s times, so would someone like Tang and Wu have presided over the overthrow of Jie and Zhou had Tang and Wu not lived (Satô 1980b, p. 218).

Why then did Wen accept King Zhou’s rule as it was? Naokata admits that he does not have an answer. This question is one meant for a sage. It cannot be answered by those living in later generations. Some have suggested that Zhou’s evil tyranny (bōaku 暴悪) had yet to become as fully manifest as it would by Wu’s day. Naokata dismisses this theory as mere speculation. Furthermore, that analysis implies that ordinary people have some way of knowing when the mandate has shifted; Naokata denies being privy to this sort of understanding. Rather, he more simply states that Tai Bo and King Wen never considered, under any circumstances, acting expediently. Although Wen governed two-thirds of the Shang empire, he was not an unscrupulous man; nor did he mean to leave the task to King Wu. Expedient actions are undertaken by great worthies who embody the way; they require utter certainty in action. The person whose virtue enables them to make the decision of whether or not to overthrow a ruler should know when the situation requiring such arises (Satô 1980b, pp. 217–18).

Naokata next juxtaposes King Wu with Bo Yi and Shu Qi, noting how the former overthrew Zhou, while the latter two men, ashamed to eat the grain of the new dynasty, retreated to Mt. Shouyang 首陽山, and died of starvation. He allows that if King Wu’s action is deemed just, then Bo Yi’s decision not to eat the grain of the Zhou dynasty might seem mistaken. Or conversely, if Bo Yi’s stance was just, then King Wu’s was not. Naokata denies that one must be right and the other wrong, suggesting instead that both Wu and Bo Yi followed ethical principles (dōri 道理) that were not incompatible with one another. Naokata claims that if Bo Yi’s remonstration with Wu had not been just, then it would not have been true remonstration. Overthrowing a ruler to fulfill the mandate of heaven is a most extreme undertaking, one requiring careful reflection. After all, Zhou was the ruler (kun 君), and Wu the minister (shin 臣). Thus Wu heard Bo Yi out, and then reflected on what he meant to do, but ultimately acted according to the decree of heaven (tenmei 天命), following the way of expedient means (kendō 權道). Bo Yi did not advocate the decree of heaven, but instead remonstrated with Wu via appeal to the constant way (jōdō
常道), i.e., the standard (kei 經), which emphasizes proper relations between rulers and ministers. Here Bo Yi exhibited what was called “the purity of a sage” (聖之清), a quality that made him who he was (MENCIUS 1988, p. 39), while King Wu followed the expedient way in serving the decree of heaven. Still, Naokata adds, the constant way merges with the decree of heaven, as does the expedient way. While Bo Yi’s approach might be compared to eternal sunny skies, Wu’s prepares us for rain and bad weather. Although they do differ significantly, they are also thoroughly consistent with one another (SATÔ 1980b, p. 219). Naokata condemns writings such as those by advocates of Shinto-Confucian unity (Shin Ju gōitsu 神儒合一, i.e., Ansai), which obstruct people’s vision of things with claims such as “From the perspective of the constant way, Tang and Wu were men who should have been crucified (haritsuke hito),” while extolling myriad generations of our orthodox line of emperors. Such tendencies are in his view, pathetic expressions of “foolish Confucians” (gu Ju 愚儒) (SATÔ 1980b, pp. 220–21).

Responding to students, Naokata insists that Wu did not possess “a rebellious mind” (muhon no kokoro 謀叛ノ心). Wu acted because he wanted to restore right order to the world by ending the evil (aku 悪) of King Zhou. He thought of nothing other than the hardships and suffering imposed upon the people (tami no shinku fubin 民ノ辛苦不便). He was not thinking of becoming a minister of heaven in order to save humanity, or of fleeing like Tai Bo, or even that the time was right for a change of heaven’s decree. How can even the minds of sages and worthies see that the decree of heaven is about to change? As is true with the minds of sages and worthies, King Wu only wished to institute the way. Because most people do not understand this kind of motive, they mistake the way of expediency practiced by sages and worthies for the deeds of rebellious men (muhonnin 謀叛人). Naokata thus asserts that neither Tang nor Wu were traitors (muhon de nai 謀反デナヒ) (SATÔ 1980b, pp. 221–22).

Naokata replies that even if an evil person tyrannizes the world (tenka o gyaku suru 天下ヲ虐スル), the way does not allow a minister to murder his ruler. Unless we follow heaven in doing so, we are committing regicide. Heaven is the father, and the ruler of the empire is a relative of heaven. In place of heaven, the ruler governs the myriad people. This is the task of the ruler. When those like Jie and Zhou lose heaven’s principles (tenri o nakushi 天理ヲ亡シ), turn against heaven’s decree (tenmei ni somuki 天命ニソムキ), render void their heavenly task (tenshoku o kūshite 天職ヲ空シテ), and tyrannize the people (tami o gyaku suru 民ヲ虐スル), then they are truly enemies of our fathers (jitsu ni fu ni ada suru 実ニ父ニアダスル), i.e., traitors (zokushi 賊子). Although
Tang and Wu had been ministers, the people submitted to them; while Jie and Zhou had been rulers, the myriad people turned away and deserted them, leaving them so isolated that they could not be called rulers (kimi to iu mono de wa nashi 君ト云モノデハナシ). Unexpectedly, the eight hundred lords of the realm assembled and decided to move against Zhou, and with heaven decreeing this, they proceeded to execute him. How could King Wu have stopped this? Had he not overthrown Zhou, King Wu would have been betraying the minds-and-hearts of the people (tenka no jinmin no kokoro ni somuki 天下ノ人民ノ心ニ背キ), as though he were abandoning them to burn to death or drown in the depths. This reasoning cannot be set aside. Different principles did not apply to Bo Yi. Naokata concludes that if we judge him on the basis of such principles, then from the perspective of Tang and Wu, Bo Yi was not right in remonstrating against the overthrow (SATÔ 1980b, pp. 224–25).

Political Resonance

According to Naokata, King Wu nevertheless viewed Bo Yi as a gijin 義人, or “just man” who, in remonstrating with him against the overthrow of the Shang, spoke honestly. King Wu presumably listened, but did not follow his advice. As a protest, Bo Yi, who was not punished by Wu for his remonstration, decided not to eat the grain of the newly risen Zhou dynasty, and soon thereafter died of starvation, a martyr for his convictions (SATÔ 1980b, pp. 224).

Though Naokata was not as sympathetic toward Bo Yi as he was toward Tang and Wu, it is worth noting that Naokata never meant to discount remonstration as such. Rather his purpose in faulting Bo Yi in relation to Wu was to emphasize the sagely righteousness of Wu, even when juxtaposed with “the purity of the sages,” Bo Yi. Surely Naokata allowed that remonstration was a legitimate response to the tyranny of an evil ruler. After all, the overthrows led by Kings Tang and Wu can be interpreted as final, ultimate acts of remonstration that capped a series of earlier warnings issued by both heaven and humanity.

If that is granted, then one can find no dearth of echoes of Naokata’s political thought in the Tokugawa period. Perhaps the most sensational involves the legendary peasant martyr, Sakura Sogorō 佐倉宗五郎. It should be noted that the only historical basis to the Sogorō legend is that in 1653 (Jōō 承應 2) the rice fields and dwelling place of a peasant named Sogorō 懐五郎 were confiscated, and he was put to death along with his four children (YOKOYAMA 1977, p. 203). Nevertheless,
over time, the story came to be that Sõgorõ was the mayor (nanushi 名主) of Kõzu 公津 Village. In response to extremely heavy taxation levied by the young daimyõ Hotta Masanobu 堀田正信 (1629–1677), Sõgorõ was chosen by the assembled village leaders to represent Sakura domain in a plea for relief. After unsuccessfully petitioning local magistrates and domain officials, Sõgorõ took direct action and handed the petition for relief personally to the shogun Ietsuna 家綱 (1639–1680) while the shogun was en route to the Kan’ei-ji in Ueno. Moved by the petition, Ietsuna called Masanobu to court to account for himself. Masanobu later took revenge on Sõgorõ, crucifying him and his wife, but only after they had witnessed the decapitation of their children (PAPINOT 1972, pp. 534–35). Sõgorõ’s crime was remonstrating with authorities higher than those directly responsible for the situation.

Sõgorõ was soon enshrined and worshiped by the people of Sakura as a martyr for their cause. In short order, his fame spread throughout Japan, making him, by Meiji times, a suitable candidate, in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s mind, for honors as a true martyr for the cause of people’s rights (jinmin no kengi 人民の権義) (FUKUZAWA 1986, p. 72). Also important, however, is Sõgorõ’s significance for understanding the nature of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan. After all, the Confucian nuances that infuse the Sõgorõ legend are difficult to overlook. Not surprisingly, one of the first written sources of the legend, still extant, the Sõgo tekishu monogatari 勅使御物語, recorded in 1776 (Anei 安永 5), was written by an obscure Confucian scholar, Yuasa Insen 湯浅允仙 (YOKOYAMA 1977, p. 205). Also, modern scholars who have written on Sõgorõ typically give at least passing, generic lip service to the idea that martyr-remonstrators such as Sõgorõ, as well as those responsible for propagating the legends about them, subscribed to a “Confucian conception of their role” (WALTHALL 1986, p. 1084; SCHEINER 1978, pp. 50–52).

Of course it is impossible to speak of the direct and actual influence of any particular thinker and/or idea on a legendary figure who, after all, did not have a mind of his own, apart from that created for him by various voices involved in the transmission of a cumulative legend. Nevertheless, if we attempt to be more specific in identifying the nature of the “Confucianism” evident in Sõgorõ’s conception of his role, then it does seem, at least by process of elimination, that a fair case can be made for there being echoes of Naokata’s sociopolitical thought in the Sõgorõ legend. Naokata’s Tõ Bu ron did aggressively defend the ethicality of resort to expedient courses of action in exceptional circumstances, such as tyranny. The writings of few if any other contemporary Confucian scholars provide such grounds for comparison. Certainly Ogyû Sorai’s 萩生徂徠 (1666–1728) authoritarian philosophy provided no room for a Sõgorõ. Nor did Itô Jinsai’s 伊藤仁斎
(1627–1705) thought, at least not in as outspoken a manner as Naokata’s. Neither Ansai nor Keisai, with their emphasis on utter loyalism, offer theoretical grounds for the kind of heroic, legendary twists that led to Sōgorō’s tragic execution. Much the same can be said about earlier Tokugawa thinkers such as Fujisawa Seika (1561–1619) and the Hayashi scholars: their philosophical systems are not known for energetic defenses of extreme, expedient courses of action challenging tyranny and oppression. Instead, Naokata’s thought stands out in its advocacy of both quiet-sitting, and the legitimacy of political activism, if sanctioned by heaven and consistent with the heartfelt wishes of the people.

**Epilogue: Naokata’s Fate in Prewar Japan**

In “Ogyū Sorai no zōi mondai” (The problem of posthumous rank for Ogyū Sorai), Maruyama Masao claims that in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Sorai was consistently denied posthumous imperial rank, even as virtually every other major Confucian scholar from the Tokugawa was awarded similar honors. In explaining Sorai’s exclusion, Maruyama notes that Inoue Tetsujirō’s *Kokumin dōtoku ron* had severely criticized Sorai from the perspective of Japan’s kokutai, noting in particular how Sorai had referred to himself as “a barbarian,” and to Ming China as “Great Ming China.” These remarks reflected poorly on imperial Japan, and because they did so, posthumous imperial honors for Sorai were withheld (Maruyama 1979, pp. 108–39).

Though Maruyama does not make the point, he might well have included Satō Naokata as another Tokugawa thinker excluded from the long list of Tokugawa thinkers granted posthumous imperial rank at the turn of the century. No doubt there was far less sympathy for Naokata as a recipient of such honors than there would have been for Sorai, given Naokata’s willingness to recognize the overthrow of a ruler-tyrant as an ethically legitimate deed, provided of course that heaven had sanctioned it and the people all desired it. And this despite the fact that the Kimon school otherwise rose to high honors, with Ansai himself being granted Junior Third rank (*Jū san’i* 徒三位) in 1932 (Shōwa 7), after having earlier received Senior Fourth rank (*Shō shi’i* 正四位) in 1907 (Meiji 40). Maruyama suggests that Ansai received such high rank due to his contributions to a stream of thought that came to be manipulated into the “ideology of national essence” (*kokutaironteki ideorogī*) (Maruyama 1979, p. 114). Considered in that light, the fact that Naokata was passed over could surely be considered, in the context of postwar values, especially those deemphasizing the
imperial state and utter loyalty to it, a source of humanitarian honor and prestige, arguably deriving from his advocacy of both quiet-sitting and political activism.

REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS


PRIMARY SOURCES

ASAMI Keisai 浅見綱斎


Daxue 大學

FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福澤諭吉

Lunyu 論語

MENCIUS 孟子

NAKAMURA Gihō 中村義方
1733  *Seiri jigi kōgi* 性理字義口義. Unpublished manuscript, recorded in 1733 (Kyōhō 18). Housed in the Kyoto University Fuzoku Toshokan.

SATO Naokata 佐藤直方


Shujing


YAMAGA Sokō 山鹿素行


YAMAZAKI Ansai 山崎亜齢


YANAGAWA Gōgi


Yijing


Zhongyong

ZHU XI 朱熹

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