Confucianism, without any intention to also do a critique. This is where its main value lies. However, the book has shown some obvious shortcomings that need correction in the future edition. One is that due to the wide range of subjects and extensive contents, there exists unnecessary repetition and duplication in some parts of the book. Another point concerns its methodology. In order to make clear generality and individuality among philosophers and scholars, and in order to show similarities and differences more analytically, it is obviously useful for Mr. Cai to construct his own Chinese philosophical hermeneutics for Neo-Confucianism in the Song-Ming periods. It seems that he can do so on the basis of considerations of both Gadamerian hermeneutics and onto-generative hermeneutics (bentiquan-shixue) from both of which he could benefit. He could specifically benefit from consideration of the generative ontology of the Yijing as indicated in onto-generative hermeneutics because in the latter, the idea of benti was fully explored as basis for any philosophical construction, including the construction of Neo-Confucianism. In this spirit, we will be enabled to see how Confucian classics could or even must be transcribed by way of interpretation into Neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming.

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Jason Clower presents a highly sophisticated subject in an elegant, comprehensive, and pleasant manner. The book contextualizes the thought and writings of Mou Zongsan (1909–2005) within the history of Confucianism, Chinese Buddhist scholarship, and the new intellectual culture in the post-Imperial China. The arguments are enriched by thorough footnotes, where philosophical and textual details facilitate the understanding of the doctrinal issues under investigation.

The first chapter presents Clower’s research questions, study methodology, and key arguments. He addresses the philosophical and contextual reasons that led Mou, a Confucian thinker, to combine the study of Confucianism with Buddhist philosophy, even trying to reinterpret Confucian thought through the lenses of Tiantai Buddhism.
According to Clower, in combining Buddhism and Confucianism, Mou brought back the ideal of cross-field studies that the literati in premodern China had been pursuing. Another important issue that emerges in reading Mou is the attention to Chinese identity; the emphasis on Tiantai Buddhism is then read as a way for Mou to highlight a Chinese school of Buddhism. The final part of the chapter explores Mou’s biography within the political and intellectual history of China, his position within competing voices in the Confucian circle, and the dialectics between Confucian thought and Communist (Marxist) ideology, which helped, rather than undermine, the persistence of Confucian ideas in the country.

The following chapter explores Mou’s understanding of the concept of “philosophy,” which he defined as the “guide to living” (57). The entire chapter discusses the Chinese vocabulary that Mou used in his works on philosophy and his interpretation of metaphysics. Mou not only put Western philosophy and (Chinese) Confucian ideas in dialogue, but also highlighted how Buddhism denied the possibility of a moral law. Rather than a “philosopher,” Clower labels Mou as an “exegetical theologian” (59) of the Confucian tradition, and devotes the rest of the chapter to explaining the “Two-Level Ontology” that characterizes Mou’s view of the transcendent and the immanent as not separate entities but as two aspects of the same reality. In this respect, as Mou argued, the Tiantai notion of “Buddha-nature” represented a successful attempt on the part of Chinese Buddhism to embody the “Two-Level Ontology.”

Clower then continues with a detailed account of Mou’s interpretation and evaluation of Tiantai Buddhism. Based mostly on Mou’s work Buddha-Nature and Prajñā, this chapter unveils and analyzes the grounds on which Mou selected Tiantai among the various Buddhist schools that had been present in China, Mou’s viewpoint on the value of Chinese Buddhism and Chinese translation of Buddhist texts, and Mou’s reading of Zhiyi’s doctrine, especially his panjiao. More importantly, Mou used Kantian thought as a lens through which to provide a structured view of Buddha’s teachings and a revaluation of Tiantai philosophy. According to Mou, Tiantai Buddhism is the best Chinese interpretation of Buddhadharma, and, as a Chinese Buddhist school, Tiantai also becomes representative of Chinese thought. The study of Chinese Buddhist texts is seen as valuable because philology is instrumental to metaphysics. The continuous emphasis on the Chinese nature of Tiantai is also mirrored in Mou’s analysis of Zhiyi. Indeed, according to Clower, Mou selected Zhiyi among the various Tiantai thinkers because Zhiyi had reminded him of the Confucian Hu Wufeng. Finally, given the fact that he was a Confucian and not a Buddhist intellectual, Mou considered his
Buddhist hermeneutics as well as his positive evaluation of Tiantai Buddhism as “objective” and, therefore, reliable.

Zhiyi’s *panjiao* is assessed critically and in detail in chapter 4. Mou followed Zhiyi’s scheme and perspective, and highlighted again the correspondences that Zhiyi made between “Tripitaka Theory” (*zangjiao*) and Hinayāna, “Shared Theory” (*tongjiao*) and Madhyamaka, “Beginning Separation Theory” (*shi biejiao*) and Late (Chinese) Yogacara, and finally, “Perfect Theory” (*yuanjiao*) and Tiantai Buddhism. According to Mou, Buddhist philosophy focuses on addressing two main questions: the question of *prajñā* (wisdom) and the question of Buddha-nature. Therefore, Mou entitled his main monograph on Buddhism *Foxing yu Boruo* (Buddha-nature and *Prajjñā*). According to Mou, Nāgarjuna and the Madhyamaka school had developed the issue of *prajñā* well but had failed to understand the ideal of *Buddha-nature*. On the contrary, Tiantai, especially Zhiyi’s writings, tackled both questions in a systematic and successful way. Mou framed his discussion on “Buddha-nature” in ontological terms, arguing that such an ontology had soteriological purposes and had to be understood as leading to salvation. Consequently, it could be addressed as “soterio-ontology.”

The next two chapters analyze what Confucian Mou understood as the achievements of Buddhist philosophy, as well as underlining what Buddhism lacked. As for the latter, Tiantai’s “Perfect Theory” was read by Mou as an excellent way to unify the immanent and the transcendental. However, important issues for the Confucian Mou were the notion of “Heaven” (*tian*) and the concept of “Moral Law” (*daode faze*), which Buddhism did not take into consideration. Indeed, Buddhist arguments, to Mou, revolved around subjective states and realities and did not include objective entities such as a “Moral Law” would. Hence, Buddhists could not propose a form of moral philosophy that Confucianism provided. As Clower puts it, “Daoism and Buddhism are both non-moral; they do not start out by talking about what people should do, so they are of no use for public morals” (171).

The book concludes with Clower’s own assessment of Mou’s philosophy and contribution to Chinese culture. Clower discusses Mou’s firm belief in presenting historically objective and neutral views, his dogmatic assumptions, his shortcomings in the analysis of Buddhist history and doctrine, and finally his perspectives in the context of the intellectual developments and politics of twentieth-century China.

*The Unlikely Buddhologist* is a monograph that discusses, through the thoughts of Mou Zongsan, the philosophical debates between traditional Confucianism and Buddhism (and Daoism as well), showing how a twentieth-century Confucian scholar revisited both the Confucian and Chinese Buddhist traditions, and demonstrating why Mou
wanted to combine Buddhist and Confucian thought in contemporary China. This book is a valuable reference for students and scholars of Chinese religions and philosophy, as well as historians of East Asia.

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In *Music, Cosmology, and the Politics of Harmony in Early China*, Erica Fox Brindley nicely combines sinological rigor with philosophical reflection to provide a thorough account of the function of music in early China. The focus of the book is not so much on specific musical practices or even music theory but rather on the ways in which music functioned and was theorized within the broader matrix of early Chinese thought. More specifically, Brindley examines the evolving role of music in its interplay with shifting political concerns and changing conceptions of cosmic order. In this way, it is more a study of early Chinese philosophy, religion, and political theory than a study of music per se.

The greatest contribution made by the book comes from its genealogical accounts. Brindley provides a detailed analysis of the fundamental changes in Chinese thought that took place through the mid-to late Warring States Period and into the Han dynasty. In that time, music shifted from a cultural product of the human realm to a powerful force linking human beings with the cosmos. The concept of harmony (和) went through a similar process of development (12–20). Brindley explains this shift through changes in conceptions of cosmic order: “Causes and conditions that used to be attributed to local, ancestral, and Heavenly spirits with arbitrary, personal powers began to be explained in some circles by spiritual notions of another type: by cosmic harmony, balance, and resonance, especially as such notions related to the most basic force of qi” (3). This shift created a natural role for music, which had been characterized by those same ideas of harmony, balance, and resonance. The harmony of music thus became not just a metaphor for the forces of the cosmos but an active participant in those forces.

In itself, the link between music and what has become known as “correlative cosmology” is not new or surprising. Brindley’s analysis, though, complicates generalizations about “correlative cosmology” in two important ways. First, she points out the mistake in positing a