

Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva's *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* with the *Vṛtti* of Harabhata Shastri

David Peter Lawrence

Published online: 8 October 2009
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the *Siddhitrāyī*, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* along with the *Vṛtti* commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century paṇḍit, Harabhata Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” arguments that a universal knower (*pramāṭṛ*), the God Śiva, necessarily exists and that this knower is sentient (*ajada*). He defends the Pratyabhijñā understanding of sentience against alternative views of both Hindu and Buddhist schools. As elsewhere in his corpus, Utpaladeva also endeavors through his arguments to lead students to the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of identity with Śiva, properly understood as the sentient knower.

Keywords Utpaladeva · Harabhata Shastri · Abhinavagupta · *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* · *Siddhitrāyī* · Pratyabhijñā · *pramāṭṛ* · *prakāśa* · *svaparakāśatva* · *Svasamivedana* · *vimarśa* · *prakhyā* · *upākhyā* · *karṭṛtā* · *ahambhāva* · *viśrānti* · Knower · Awareness · Consciousness · Self-luminosity · Self-consciousness · Recognition · Agency · I-hood · Transcendental argument · Idealism · Teleology

Abbreviations

APS *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* by Utpaladeva

APSV *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhivṛtti* by Harabhata Shastri, commentary on APS

D. P. Lawrence (✉)

Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Dakota,
276 Centennial Drive, Stop 7128, Grand Forks, ND 58202-7128, USA
e-mail: david.lawrence@und.nodak.edu

IPK	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā</i> by Utpaladeva
IPKV	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti</i> by Utpaladeva, commentary on IPK
IPV	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī</i> by Abhinavagupta, commentary on IPK
IPVV	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī</i> by Abhinavagupta, commentary on Utpaladeva's <i>Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti</i>
TAV	<i>Tantrāloka</i> by Jayaratha, commentary on Abhinavagupta's <i>Tantrāloka</i>

Introduction

Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.), building upon the initiatives of his teacher Somānanda (c. 900–950 C.E.), composed the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (henceforth, IPK) and autocommentaries thereon, which constitute the core texts of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism.¹ As elaborated and employed in scriptural hermeneutics and poetics by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors, Pratyabhijñā theories came to have a great influence on traditions of tantra, devotionalism and poetics throughout South Asia.²

Utpaladeva's *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi*, “Proof of a Sentient Knower” (APS), is one component of his trio of specialized studies called the *Siddhitrāyī*, “Three Proofs,” the others being the *Īśvarasiddhi*, “Proof of the Lord,” and the *Sambandhasiddhi*, “Proof of Relation.” The present article provides an introduction to and translation of the APS as well as the *Vṛtti* commentary (APSV) on it by the nineteenth-twentieth century paṇḍit, Harabhatta Shastri. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri included Harabhatta Shastri's commentary in his 1921 edition of the APS in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.³ Harabhatta Shastri is still renowned for his deep knowledge of the tradition, and the APSV is indeed highly illuminating.⁴

The Tantric Quest for Power and Utpaladeva's Pratyabhijñā Philosophy

Some background will facilitate the understanding of the APS. The designation “monistic Kashmiri Śaivism” refers to a group of overlapping and interweaving tantric lineages that developed in Kashmir from the latter centuries of the first millennium C.E. through the early centuries of the second. One of the most definitive characteristics of Hindu “tantra” for contemporary classifications is the

¹ See Raffaele Torella's critical edition and translation of Utpaladeva's IPK and the short *Vṛtti* autocommentary (henceforth IPKV), in Utpaladeva (2002). Torella has also been editing and publishing surviving portions of Utpaladeva's longer *Vivṛti* autocommentary, in Torella (1988, 2007a, b, c, d).

² Abhinavagupta comments directly on Utpaladeva's IPK in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (henceforth IPV), in Abhinavagupta and Bhāskara (1986, Vols. 1–2). The IPV is newly translated in Lawrence (contracted, in progress). Abhinava comments on the *Vivṛti* in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī* (henceforth IPVV), in Abhinavagupta (1987).

³ Utpaladeva (1921, pp. 1–12). Surya Prakash Vyas has parsed the APS into Sanskrit Hindi in Utpaladeva (1989). I have not made significant use of that work in the present study.

⁴ For a brief biography of Harabhatta Shastri, see Kaul (online).

pursuit of *power*, the practical expressions of which range from limited “magical” proficiencies (*siddhi*), through political power, to the omnipotence of the liberated person performing the divine cosmic acts. Theologically, the essence of such power is the Goddess, Śakti.

A basic doctrinal position of monistic Śaivism, which may be gathered from its appellation, is that the only reality is the God Śiva. These traditions mythically incorporate Śakti into the essence of the God Śiva as his integral power and consort, through whom he emanates and controls the world. In a manner that would delight Mircea Eliade, the adept endeavors through diverse ritual practices, including sexual rites, contemplations of *mantras* and *maṇḍalas*, and philosophical and theosophical speculations, to *recapitulate* the basic mythic structure. He or she thus realizes salvific identity with Śiva as the *śaktiman*, the possessor and enjoyer of Śakti.

Utpaladeva conceives the Pratyabhijñā system as both a philosophical discourse and a gnoseological form of tantric ritual, with the goal of leading students to the same liberating *recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*) “I am Śiva” that he himself experienced.⁵ He explains the primary modus operandi of his argumentation for this recognition in accordance with the monistic Śaiva mythico-ritual pattern just described, as the “revealing of Śakti” (*śaktyāviṣkaraṇa*). He also identifies the insight gained by the revealing of Śakti as the experience comprehended in a monistic Śaiva cosmological principle called “Pure Wisdom” (*śuddhavidyā*). Pure Wisdom is the awareness of oneself as the Śakti-possessing emanator of the universe, as may be typically expressed “I am this” (“this” designating the universe). Utpaladeva thus endeavors to demonstrate that, because this universe is my emanation through Śakti (I am this), therefore I am Śiva.⁶

Utpaladeva describes the monistic Śaiva soteriological realization as the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) “I am Śiva” in order to address skeptical critiques of recognition as typifying conceptual construction (*vikalpa*)—by the Buddhist logic school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.⁷ The philosopher’s central strategy for subverting this skepticism is the explanation of the very Śaiva cosmogonic myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti as itself an act of self-recognition (*ahampratyavamarśa*, *pratyabhijñā*). Utpaladeva additionally equates Śiva’s self-recognition (Śakti) with the principle of Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*), which he derives from the 4th–6th c. linguistic philosopher, Bhartṛhari; he thereby also appropriates that thinker’s explanation of creation as linguistic in nature. As Utpala

⁵ Utpaladeva’s philosophical theology adheres primarily to the lineage of monistic Śaivism called Trika, “Triadism,” named for its emphasis on various triads of modalities of Śakti and cosmic levels. Lawrence (1999) examines the purposes, methods and theories of the Pratyabhijñā writings of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, and engages the system with Western philosophy and theology.

⁶ Abhinavagupta interprets Śakti as the reason (*hetu*) in an overarching “inference for the sake of others” (*parārthānumāna*) articulated by the Pratyabhijñā system. This reason establishes the identification of the subject, I, with the predicate Śiva, already defined as the possessor of Śakti. Abhinava also describes the insight of Pure Wisdom as animating what he calls “good reasoning” (*sattarka*), which brings about a “purification of conceptual constructions” (*vikalpasamśkāra*) by overcoming deluded, dualistic thinking. On the character of the Pratyabhijñā as both philosophical proof and ritual praxis, also see Lawrence (1996).

⁷ The Buddhists deny the groundedness of the application of conceptual and linguistic categories from memory to the determination of identities in the evanescent data of immediate perception (*svalakṣaṇa*).

ascribes to recognition-Speech an originary and elemental status, he is able to affirm that it constitutes all experience and objects of experience. I have previously classified the Pratyabhijñā apologetics for the Śaiva recognition as a species of *transcendental argumentation*, inasmuch as it asserts that this recognition is necessary for coherent accounts of epistemology and ontology.⁸

There are two broad phases of Utpaladeva's argumentation in the field of epistemology. The first consists of idealistic arguments that reduce all states of affairs to the intrinsic contents of universal subjectivity, variously conceived in terms of "awareness" or "illumination" (*prakāśa*), "consciousness" (*saṁvid*) and "manifestation" (*ābhāsa*).⁹ The thrust of these arguments is analogous to George Berkeley's thesis that *esse est percipi*. Utpala contends that, because no objects are experienced outside of the various modalities of subjective awareness, all objects consist of nothing but such awareness.¹⁰ Furthermore, the Pratyabhijñā does not accept that there can be *another subject* outside of one's own awareness. These arguments conclude, however, not with solipsism as usually understood in the West, but a conception of a universal awareness. All sentient and insentient beings are essentially one awareness.¹¹

The second broad phase of Utpaladeva's epistemological argumentation consists of arguments that all forms of cognition have an integrally *recognitive* structure. Utpaladeva develops these arguments out of earlier theories of Bhartṛhari about the linguisticity of experience. Utpala contends that modalities of recognition in linguistically ascriptive apprehensions or judgments (*vimarśa*, along with *parāmarśa*, *pratyavamarśa*, *āmarśa*, and so on) and syntheses (*anusamdhāna*, *pratisamdhāna*, *abhisamdhāni*, and so on) are integral to the very nature of awareness.¹²

⁸ Lawrence (1999). This classification invokes a wide range of discussions about the character of inferential necessity in South Asian thought. In making it, I have been influenced by formulations of recent Western philosophical theology, such as those of Bernard Lonergan, Emerich Coreth and David Tracy, which unite Kantian conceptions of the transcendental-as-the-necessary with classical metaphysics; Karl Otto Apel's revisionist Kantian "transcendental pragmatics" that determines that of which the denial leads to performative self-contradiction; and Donald Davidson's refutation of relativism. Mohanty (1992) and Ram-Prasad (2002) have also expanded the Kantian conception of the transcendental to describe some Advaita Vedānta arguments. Arnold (2008) has recently suggested that Sanskrit varieties of transcendental argumentation pertain chiefly to the performative coherence of practical reason rather than strict deductions of theoretical reason. This refinement would apply well to the Pratyabhijñā as interpreted by the author, including the APS.

⁹ Among the backgrounds to these concepts are the Upaniṣadic and Vedāntin theory of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*), and the Vijñānavāda Buddhist notion of self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*). Utpaladeva's distinctive terminology in the APS for formulating the idealistic arguments will be discussed below. Pratyabhijñā idealism itself is evidently indebted to Vijñānavāda, and perhaps, as Sthaneshwar Timalisina has suggested, early Advaita Vedāntin Dṛṣṭisrṣṭivāda.

¹⁰ Lawrence (1999, pp. 109–115).

¹¹ On Abhinavagupta's presentation of the refutation of the existence of other selves in favor of a non-solipsistic universal awareness, see Lawrence (1999, pp. 114–115).

¹² In the Pratyabhijñā system, *vimarśa* and its cognates have the significance of apprehension or judgment with a recognitive structure, as applying prepossessed linguistic interpretation to present items of experience. *Anusamdhāna* and cognates likewise have the sense of synthesis, with a recognitive structure, between different moments of experience. See the analysis of the terminology of the Śaiva theory of recognition throughout Lawrence (1999), summarized on pp. 86–87, 208–209.

All kinds of epistemic experience, such as perception, memory, inference and semantic exclusion (*apohana*), are essentially recognitive in nature.¹³

The two phases of argument operate together. As all epistemic experiences and their objects are comprehended within the awareness of a monistic subject, the recognitions that constitute such experiences *must be that subject's self-recognition*. Since it is through the monistic subject's self-recognition that all phenomena are created, Utpaladeva has ostensibly demonstrated the cosmogonic myth of Śiva's emanation through Śakti in terms of self-recognition. In terms of Pure Wisdom, Śiva's emanatory self-recognition, "I"/"I am Śiva," is disclosed as the inner reality of the recognition of the objective "this." Through pointing out the necessity and ubiquity of Śiva's self-recognition/Śakti, Utpaladeva's philosophy leads the student to full participation in it. Like other expressions of tantric praxis, Pratyabhijñā transcendental argumentation recapitulates the cosmogonic myth of Śiva-Śakti.¹⁴

Utpaladeva also articulates the mythico-ritual pattern of revealing Śakti with a variety of related philosophical theories on other subjects. His approach to ontology thus builds upon his appropriation of Bhartṛhari in the equation of self-recognition with Supreme Speech and the correlated interpretation of experience as linguistic in nature. He follows Bhartṛhari's Vyākaraṇa school and related Vedic exegetical traditions in interpreting being or existence (*sattā*), the generic referent of language, as *action* (*kriyā*). For Utpala, it is Śiva's mythic action as Śakti/self-recognition that accounts ontologically for all things, and that is ritually reenacted by philosophical discourse.

The Pratyabhijñā thinker further explains Śiva's mythico-ritual action with a philosophical theory of *action syntax* (*kriyā-kāraka* relations). He formulates what I have described as a "mythico-ritual syntax of omnipotence" by radicalizing earlier understandings, particularly from the Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya schools, of the role of the agent in this syntax:¹⁵ The transcendental agent, Śiva through his self-recognition forms the intention (*icchā*) for action, and becomes the instigator (*prayojaka*) and encompassing locus (*vyāpārāśraya*) of all processes in the universe. The Lord is "self-determined" or "independent" (*svatantra*), whereas all other things, as dependent on him, are "determined by another" (*paratantra*).¹⁶

In the final equation of Utpaladeva's ontological reductionism, "being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the agency of the act of becoming."¹⁷ The philosopher invokes this syntax in explaining a variety of metaphysical facts, including causality and the functional structure of cognitive processes. He reduces

¹³ Lawrence (1999, pp. 115–132).

¹⁴ Lawrence (1999, pp. 92–102).

¹⁵ Lawrence (1998; 1999, pp. 133–154).

¹⁶ Gerow (1982) and Lawrence (1998) have separately argued that there is a tendency in many traditions of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy to denigrate the role of the agent (*kartṛ-kāraka*) in the syntax of action. This tendency seems to reflect not only the agent's bondage to karma in rebirth for Hindus and Buddhists—as emphasized by Gerow—but also its subordination to the order of objective ritual behavior—pertaining to sacrifice, caste, life cycle, and so on, in orthodox Brahmanic norms.

¹⁷ *sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā*. IPKV 1.5.14, p. 23. Cf. Abhinavagupta: *sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam*. IPV 1.5.14, 1:258–259.

all processes of all things to the agent. Again, the Pratyabhijñā conception of transcendental divine agency is ritually axiomatic. Utpala thus describes the Pratyabhijñā philosophy as leading to liberation through the contemplation of one's status as the agent of the universe.¹⁸

Utpaladeva additionally presents in his writings rudiments of a philosophical psychology, which was again further developed by Abhinavagupta and other successors. He describes the empowered Śiva-identity recognized by the practitioner as a higher sense of "I" (*aham*) or, more abstractly, "I-hood" (*ahambhāva*), which later came to be called "perfect I-hood" (*pūrṇāhamitā*).¹⁹ For the Pratyabhijñā system and later tantra informed by it, ordinary egoistic identity, described by such terms as "I-construction" (*ahamkāra*), "pride" or "self-conception" (*abhimāna*), and "I-am-ness" (*asmitā*), is itself an immanent expression of God's identity. This philosophy thus *does not advocate the surrender or sublation of such egoism, but rather its universalization or transfiguration into its essential nature as perfect, divine I-hood*.²⁰

Philosophical and Religious Agenda of the APS

The following exposition will focus on some of the most salient points of Utpaladeva's APS as illuminated by Shastri's APSV. Utpaladeva initiates the inquiry by presenting the challenge of a Buddhist *pūrvapakṣin*, whom Shastri identifies as a follower of Vijñānavāda (*vijñānasamītanavādin*). This may be a follower of the "phenomenalist" Buddhist logic school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the main adversaries of the larger Pratyabhijñā *sāstra*; or of the earlier consciousness-only theory of Vasubandhu. Despite some differences over theoretical concepts, the chief prima facie arguments would also be acceptable to a variety of other Buddhist traditions. In any event, the opponent claims that there is an "ascertainment" (*niścaya*) that, "just as there is no distinction in essential nature between the existent and the nonexistent, likewise there is not that [a distinction in essential nature] between the sentient and the sentient."²¹ In response, Utpala presents arguments throughout the text that a universal subject or knower (*pramātr*) necessarily exists, and that it is sentient (*ajāḍa*). He further defends the Pratyabhijñā understanding of sentience against alternative views of both Hindu and Buddhist schools.

¹⁸ IPK 4.1.16, p. 80. I mention that Abhinavagupta further develops the Pratyabhijñā grammar of omnipotence in a theory of the relations of the grammatical persons. This theory reduces the indices of the audience, You (English second person, Sanskrit middle person), and discursive object, He-She-It (English third person, Sanskrit first person), to the index of the enunciator, I (English first person, Sanskrit final person). Lawrence (2008b). This theory is also relevant to the Pratyabhijñā philosophical psychology of egoity, described next. On other aspects of monistic Śaiva grammatical theory, see Torella (1999).

¹⁹ On the historical innovativeness of this conception and its influence on later tantric traditions, see "La notion de *pūrṇāhamitā* dans le Śivaïsme du Kaśmīr," in Hulin (1978, pp. 279–358), and Dyczkowski, "Self Awareness, Own Being, Egoity," in Vasugupta et al. (1992, pp. 37–48).

²⁰ The Pratyabhijñā philosophical psychology is examined in Lawrence (2008a).

²¹ APS 1.

Throughout the work, Utpaladeva frequently recurs to the theme of epistemic justification, which he describes with various terms, including “ascertainment” (*nīścaya*), “foundation” (*pratiṣṭhā*), “establishment” (*vyavasthā*), “proof” (*śiddhi*) and “realization” (*nirvṛtti*). According to him, the knower as understood in the Pratyabhijñā is the necessary basis or foundation for ascertaining anything whatsoever.

The Pratyabhijñā philosopher in various ways situates his demonstration of this knower within the overarching monistic Śaiva mythico-ritual process—of leading the student to identification with Śiva through the disclosure of his or her emanatory Śakti. Near the end of the text he thus reiterates his subversion of the Buddhist conception of self-consciousness (*svasaṁvedana*) as evanescent, in proclaiming that “Śakti... is the beginningless essential nature [*tattva*] of the knower, which [essential nature] is synonymous with self-consciousness [*svasaṁvedana*].”²² Elsewhere, he invokes the characteristic “I am this” apposition of Pure Wisdom:

Properly understood, the awareness [*prakāśa*], which is consciousness [*saṁvid*], of another thing is expressed “this.” However, [the awareness or consciousness “this”] can realize [*gacchet*] its foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*] as having the nature of “I.”²³

In his philosophical treatment of the knower, Utpala adverts to several homologous explanatory codes for Śakti, including recognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*, and so on), recognitive synthesis (*anusarṁdhāna*), agency (*karṭṛtā*), agential autonomy (*svātantrya*), I-hood (*ahambhāva*), and the theological concept of divine “pervasiveness” (*vyāpīva*).²⁴ Shastri also frequently adverts to agential autonomy (*svātantrya*) and other concepts of agency, as well as interpretations of Śakti from the Spanda tradition of monistic Śaivism, such as “creative pulsation” (*sphurattā*) and “cognitive impulsion” (*saṁrambha*).

With regard to the initial question raised by the Buddhist, Utpaladeva explains that the foundational knower makes distinctions between what is existent and nonexistent, and sentient and insentient, by determining inductive concomitances (*anvaya*) and nonconcomitances (*vyatireka*).²⁵ Paradoxically, however, in Utpala’s monistic reasoning the knower ascertains that the two pairs of categories are equivalent! That is, only the sentient knower itself exists, and that which is insentient, in the sense of other than the knower, does not exist.²⁶

Following monistic Śaiva as well as common South Asian religious traditions, Utpaladeva resorts to Māyā to explain how the knower becomes deluded to believe that there are things other than itself. In distinction from various treatments of this concept in Advaita Vedānta monism, however, Utpaladeva posits Māyā as another

²² APS 25.

²³ APS 11.

²⁴ On pervasiveness, see below, footnote 115.

²⁵ See APS 12.

²⁶ APS 13.

modality of the knower's own Śakti, which he also equates with Creator-hood (*nirmātrtā*) and Lordship (*īśitā*).²⁷ Delusion is the epistemically and soteriologically unfavorable counterpart of emanation within the experience of limited beings.²⁸ The Pratyabhijñā philosopher thus invokes the same empowered Śiva-Self in explaining ignorance as he does in treating his main topic, the foundation of knowledge. However, in the APS he is primarily concerned with Śiva as the knower rather than as the subject who deludes himself.

APS Formulation of the Pratyabhijñā Idealism

Much of the argumentation within the APS may be analyzed into the two phases in the broader Pratyabhijñā epistemology described above, although there are differences in terminology and explanatory emphasis. Thus the arguments that idealistically reduce all states of affairs to the contents of a universal subjectivity, through reasoning to the effect that *esse est percipi*, do not center exclusively on a concept of bare awareness (*prakāśa*) or consciousness (*saṁvid*) as abstracted from recognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*). Rather these arguments generally treat the awareness and recognitive apprehension of the sentient knower together, usually referring to them respectively with the roughly equivalent terms, “basic knowledge” (*prakhyā*) and “expressed knowledge” (*upākhyā*).²⁹

Utpaladeva introduces the idealistic arguments from the beginning of his reply to the Buddhist contention that there is no way of making distinctions in essential nature between the existent and the nonexistent, and between the sentient and insentient. Utpaladeva asserts that “existence is [the pair of] basic knowledge [*prakhyā*] and expressed knowledge [*upākhyā*].”³⁰ Likewise, he explains that “the nonexistence of anything is the contrary,” that is, the absence of these two characteristic features of the sentient.³¹

The Buddhist rejoins, articulating in a typical manner the critical force of the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), that one *cannot define the essential nature of one thing in terms of components or qualities of something else*. The existent thing cannot consist of basic and expressed knowledge because those belong not to the thing but to the knower.³² The opponent likewise argues that it would be unacceptable to define the essential nature of a thing as its *being the object* (*viśayatā*) of basic and expressed knowledge. While being an object is not a quality of the knower, there would still remain the deeper problem of defining a

²⁷ APS 24.

²⁸ See footnote 66 on Śiva's five cosmic acts.

²⁹ APS and APSV 1–8, 12, 18. On the terms *prakhyā* and *upākhyā*, see footnote 75.

³⁰ APS 2.

³¹ APS 2.

³² APS and APSV 2.

thing in terms of something else: “If there is a nonunitary nature, there is the contravention of existence.”³³

Now, the Pratyabhijñā thinker has structured these arguments by the Buddhist to play into his own hands. He accepts that it is impossible to define intrinsic natures of things independently of the sentient knower. Utpaladeva is thereby able to reaffirm his idealistic claim that existence and nonexistence are nothing other respectively than the presence and absence of the two types of knowledge, which are features of the knower.³⁴

The opponent next objects to the position affirmed by the Śaiva, that there is no existence of things independently of being known by the knower, on the basis that the criterion of existent things is that they have “practical value” or “efficacy” (*arthakriyā*). The idea is that in order to possess practical value, existent things would have to differ in their own objective natures from the nonexistent.³⁵ Dharmakīrti is well known for developing earlier Buddhist and Hindu sources in formulating practical value as a criterion of reality. A typical example is that only the particular rather than the conceptual fire can burn.³⁶ It is possible that other Hindu or Buddhist realists would also invoke the criterion of practical value to defend the existence of independent objects.³⁷

Utpaladeva accepts the suggestion that existent things generate practical value and that nonexistent ones do not. However, he reinterprets this criterion of reality in the perspective of the Pratyabhijñā idealism. He argues that there is the practical value only of things the existence of which has already been demonstrated by the knower. They do not possess it in themselves, as separate from the knower. Utpala claims that practical value is thus only an accidental attribute (*upādhi*) of things rather than their essential nature. According to the Pratyabhijñā, consciousness (*saṁvid*) is the basis (*āśraya*) for establishing what exists and does not exist through the criterion of practical value.³⁸

Some statements of the philosopher further elucidate the idealistic reduction of all existent things to the sentient knower, in terms of inductive concomitance (*anvaya*) and nonconcomitance (*vyatireka*). Utpala explains that one determines what is sentient and what is insentient by means of concomitance and nonconcomitance.³⁹ He supports the argument to the effect that *esse est percipi* on the basis

³³ APS 3.

³⁴ APS and APSV 4–5.

³⁵ APS and APSV 6.

³⁶ Two useful, older studies are Nagatomi (1967) and Mikogami (1979).

³⁷ Dharmakīrti’s “phenomenalism” is itself notoriously ambivalent on the objective-versus-subjective nature of the momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*).

³⁸ APS and APSV 6–8. Abhinavagupta elaborates greatly on the significance of practical value (*arthakriyā*) in the Pratyabhijñā criteriology. Each recognitive apprehension must be tested for its noncontradiction or coherence (*abādha* or *sthāiryā*) in the realization of practical values. Lawrence (2000; and forthcoming) compares the Pratyabhijñā approach to the evaluation of claims with that of David Tracy, who uses coherence theory and pragmatism as subsidiary tests for the hermeneutic conception of truth as disclosure.

³⁹ APS 12.

of the fact that nothing can be established without its epistemic foundation in the transcendental ego's self-recognition:

The knowledge of I [*ahamīdī*] has the nature of recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*] that is without nonconcomitance. It functions as the final limit [*paryantavartinyām*]. Therefore, no insentient manifests as other than manifestation.⁴⁰

APS Arguments for the Transcendental Recognitive Structure of Consciousness

Utpaladeva's idealistic argumentation in the APS generally does not treat awareness or basic knowledge separately from recognitive-linguistic apprehension or expressed knowledge, but rather presumes their integral relationship. Nevertheless, the philosopher does present discrete though concise argumentation that recognitive processes are transcendental to the sentient knower.⁴¹ As mentioned, Utpaladeva develops this class of Pratyabhijñā argumentation from Bhartṛhari's theory of the integrally linguistic character of all experience. In the present discussion, Utpala does not engage in technical analyses of diverse modalities of cognition, but rather focuses on the necessity of recognitive apprehension to the knower's self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) or self-consciousness (*svasaṁvedana*), as the foundation for "knowing that one knows."⁴²

Shastry identifies the view refuted by Utpaladeva in this discussion as "the doctrine of the quiescent Brahman" (*śāntabrahmavāda*), a common monistic Śaiva designation of Advaita Vedānta.⁴³ The philosopher's argument would equally challenge any position that denies the necessity of recognition, language or conceptualization to a witness-consciousness, from Sāṁkhya-Yoga through varieties of Buddhism.

Utpaladeva affirms that, if consciousness (*saṁvid*) did not have the essential nature of recognitive apprehension (*parāmarśa*), it would be both nonexistent and insentient.⁴⁴ This statement echoes an assertion he makes in the IPK that manifestation (*avabhāsa*) or awareness (*prakāśa*) without recognitive apprehension

⁴⁰ APS 18. Cf. APSV 18, 20. The explication of the Pratyabhijñā idealism on the basis of the knower's universal concomitance exemplifies a broader monistic Śaiva gnoseological and hermeneutic strategy, in which all forms of difference or otherness are systematically construed as "subsumed," "permeated," or, as Alexis Sanderson describes it, "overcoded" within the integral and dynamic unity of Śiva possessing Śakti. See "The Subsumption of Difference and Sequence," in Lawrence (2008b, pp. 32–37); "Permeation," in Vasudeva (2004, pp. 185–188); and Sanderson (1985).

⁴¹ APS and APSV 9–10, 14.

⁴² See the situation of the Hindu conception of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) and the Buddhist notion of self-consciousness (*svasaṁvedana*) within the broader context of South Asian discussions of epistemic justification, in "Knowing that One Knows," chapter in Matilal (1986, pp. 141–179).

⁴³ APSV 9.

⁴⁴ APS 9.

(*vimarśa*) would be like that which is insentient such as crystal.⁴⁵ Utpala's addition in the APS that an alleged consciousness without cognitive apprehension would also be *nonexistent* is justified by the idealistic argumentation he has already made, that nothing exists other than the sentient.

The philosopher's chief rationale for these claims is that the self-recognition of consciousness is necessary to its role as self-luminous epistemic foundation:

How could that [consciousness] which, being thus [without cognitive apprehension], has not realized its own existence, be the basis for the establishment [*pratiṣṭhā*] of another thing?⁴⁶

The significance of this argument is clear from the broader Pratyabhijñā epistemology. Though consciousness is ultimately nondual, its integral cognitive apprehension gives it what might be called a proto-intentional or proto-semiotic character, which enables it to serve as the basis for the more concrete judgments of ordinary epistemic experience. The APS adduces the two most primitive of such judgments, regarding the categories of the unitary knower itself and what is differentiated from that:

If awareness [*prakāśa*] were other, that is, bereft of cognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], then, forsaking the ascertainment [*vinīścaya*] of what is differentiated and what is undifferentiated, it would have no experience [*anubhava*].⁴⁷

In his explanation of this verse, Shastri interprets cognitive apprehension as “agential autonomy [*svātantrya*], which has the nature of unification [*saṁyojana*] and disunification [*viyojana*];” as necessary for experience (*anubhava*) which has the nature of “cognitive impulsion” or “intention” (*saṁrambha*); and as possessing divine “greatness” (*māhātmya*). He explains differentiation as the state of this (*idamā*) and nondifferentiation as resting in perfect I-hood (*pūrṇāhamtāvisrānti*).⁴⁸ In the larger Pratyabhijñā *śāstra*, Utpaladeva provides a philosophical account of the proliferation of categories for the multitude of subjects and objects of different sorts of experience.⁴⁹

Higher and Lower Forms of the Knower

Utpaladeva presents further considerations in the APS that elucidate the practical and metaphysical trajectory of his arguments. Thus one of his concerns is to analyze the relations between the *prima facie*, limited knower and its ultimate, divine nature. It is the higher form of the knower that Utpaladeva associates with the various philosophical and theological codes for Śakti-empowerment, such as unlimited

⁴⁵ IPK 1.5.11, p. 22. APSV 9 makes the allusion more explicit, by actually stating that awareness (*prakāśa*) without cognitive apprehension would be like crystal.

⁴⁶ APS 10.

⁴⁷ APS 14.

⁴⁸ APSV 14.

⁴⁹ See the discussion in Lawrence (1999, pp. 115–132).

I-hood, recognitive apprehension, agency, agential autonomy, and Lordship (*tīsva-ratā*). Due to ignorance, he explains, the lower form of the knower is delimited by the vital breath and other features of human psychophysiology (*puryaṣṭaka*).⁵⁰ Shastri makes it clear that “the state of the individual soul, which is synonymous with bondage, is nothing but the nonmanifestation of the unfolding of one’s unlimited Śaktis.”⁵¹

Most important for the intellectual program of the APS, the two forms of the knower differ in the extent to which they serve as epistemic foundation. Utpaladeva explains that the establishment (*sthiti*) of things is restricted in the individual knower, but unrestricted in the higher one.⁵² It is the higher form of the knower that is concomitant with everything.⁵³

Other Erroneous Doctrines of the Knower

In one verse during the course of this discussion, Utpaladeva succinctly refutes two rival philosophical conceptions of the knower as a limited individual, evidently as varieties of its lower form.⁵⁴ The first is that of Nyāya, according to which the individual knower is an *insentient substratum* in which knowledge and other personal characteristics reside through the relationship of inherence (*samavāya*). Utpaladeva argues that such a knower “is not proven because it has no manifestation.”⁵⁵

Utpaladeva’s refutation of this view may be taken in two ways. Shastri interprets him as reiterating the argument for the transcendental nature of recognition. As Shastri explains, the knower as such an unconscious substratum would lack recognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*), and “without recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], there would be the undesirable consequence that it would be insentient.”⁵⁶ The problem with this interpretation, in my opinion, is that the Naiyāyikas do maintain that the knower is insentient. So they would not regard that conclusion as an undesirable consequence (*prasāṅga*).

Another possibility is that Utpaladeva is directing against Nyāya an expression of the Pratyabhijñā idealistic argumentation. This would be analogous to an argument he utilizes against Sautrāntika “representationalism” in the larger *śāstra*. To review that argument briefly, the Sautrāntika endeavors to infer objects external to cognition as the causes of the diversity of cognition. Utpaladeva responds that inference must be based upon concomitances that have already been observed. Therefore, he

⁵⁰ APS 16–23. On the *puryaṣṭaka*, see below, footnote 59.

⁵¹ APSV 21.

⁵² APS 20.

⁵³ APS 18. Cf. APSV 20. Bishop Berkeley likewise theorized the existence of all ideas in the mind of God rather than the limited subject. Of course, Berkeley did not proceed to posit the ultimate identity of God and the individual.

⁵⁴ APS 19.

⁵⁵ APS 19.

⁵⁶ APSV 19.

argues, there is no basis for inferring objects that have never been experienced.⁵⁷ I think that, in the present case, Utpaladeva could be making the same sort of claim regarding the inference of a knower external to manifestation. We cannot infer or affirm in any way an unconscious knower because such an entity is never known!

Next Utpaladeva refutes an opponent who identifies the knower as the “vital breath [*prāṇa*], and so on.”⁵⁸ Shastri interprets the “and so on” (*ādi*) as referring to the rest of the individual’s psychophysical complex (*puryaṣṭaka*).⁵⁹ I would interpret this doctrine as a “psychophysical reductionism.”⁶⁰ Utpaladeva repudiates this view on the basis that the knower “would be an object of knowledge,” and “thus there would not be a knower.”⁶¹ With this argument he makes a distinction of “noesis” from “noema” reminiscent of Upaniṣadic representations of the Self as the unseen seer, understood understander, and so on.⁶²

Recognition through the APS Argumentation: Teleology and Cosmogony

In his treatment of the higher and lower forms of the knower, Utpaladeva affirms that the two forms “are only one, because of recognitive synthesis (*anusamdhāna*). Therefore, another is not possible.”⁶³ Shastri brings out the practical significance of this assertion:

For one who recognitively synthesizes [*anusamdhārtayā*] what is past [the ultimate Self, Śiva] and what is present [the quotidian limited form of the Self], then there is only the unitary nature of creative pulsation [*sphurattā*], which is nothing but consciousness [*samvid*]. Since that is so, therefore, there is the impossibility of difference.⁶⁴

This article has already explained how Utpaladeva implements the monistic Śaiva ritual process of recapitulating the Śiva-Śakti myth through the disclosure of the aspirant’s Śakti or Pure Wisdom—in his philosophical argumentation for divine self-recognition, agency, I-hood, and so on. Utpaladeva provides occasional indications in the APS that further elucidate the metaphysical placement of the Pratyabhijñā discourse. He thus describes the higher subjectivity he is demonstrating as

⁵⁷ See IPK 1.5.8–9, pp. 21–22, and Lawrence (1999, pp. 110–111).

⁵⁸ APS 19.

⁵⁹ APSV 19. *Puryaṣṭaka*, often translated as “subtle body,” by standard reckoning consists of *buddhi*, *ahankāra* and *manas* (which make up the *antaḥkaraṇa*) along with the five *tanmātras*. However, there are divergent understandings in the Śaiva literature. Also, it is significant that the *sparsātanmātra* comprehends the breaths. See Torella, in Utpaladeva (2002, pp. 204–205, n. 24).

⁶⁰ However, I mention that Abhinavagupta’s pupil, Kṣemarāja in a doxographical discussion in his *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* refers to a view of some Vedāntins that the vital breath is the Self. Kṣemarāja (1980, p. 66). Exalted metaphysical conceptions of the breath as associated with the higher Self are common from the Upaniṣads through the tantras.

⁶¹ APS 19.

⁶² See *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, in *Upaniṣatsaṅgraha* (1970, 3.7.23, 1:106). Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, in *Upaniṣatsaṅgraha* (1970, 8.12.4–5, 1:83), on the distinction between the Self and its faculties.

⁶³ APS 17.

⁶⁴ APSV 17.

the “rest” or “fruitive repose” (*viśrānti*) of awareness in itself.⁶⁵ It may be recalled that, in Śaiva narratives, the bestowal of liberation is the Lord’s fifth and final cosmic act. Liberation is Śiva’s return of everything to its origin in himself *within the experience of the individual aspirant*.⁶⁶

Utpaladeva makes one of his most important statements regarding the metaphysical situation of Pratyabhijñā argumentation in APS 15. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this verse is perhaps the most frequently quoted passage in the writings of Abhinavagupta.⁶⁷ Utpala explains the recovery of the divine self-recognition, “I”/“I am Śiva”—through Pure Wisdom’s typical reduction to it of the objective “this”—as the telos of objective experience:

The accomplishment of the purpose [*kr̥tārthatā*] of the separated recognitive apprehension [*vicchinnavimarsā*], “this”—is the recognitive apprehension [*vimarsā*] of rest [*viśrānti*] in its own essential nature, [expressed] “I am he.”⁶⁸

In thus describing the teleology of objective experience, Utpaladeva is reformulating in a Śaiva framework the teaching of *Yoga Sūtra* 4.32 that the cosmic qualities (*guṇa*) accomplish their purposes (*kr̥tārtha*) in the achievement of liberation (*kaivalya*).⁶⁹

Shastri’s illuminating interpretation further situates within this teleology the APS’s motivating problematic of ascertaining the sentient-versus-insentient and existent-versus-nonexistent:

The insentient object of recognitive apprehension [*vimṛśya*] is separated [from consciousness, as is expressed] “this.” The accomplishment of its purpose [*kr̥tārthatā*], is characterized by rest [*viśrānti*] in its essential nature, which is consciousness [*saṁvid*]. Because of the identity [of that separated object “this”] with awareness [*prakāśa*], which is consciousness [*caitanya*]—[the accomplishment of its purpose] has the nature of the self-recognition [*ahampratyavamarsātāmā*] that constitutes its life, [expressed] “I myself, who shine [*prakāśe*] as the diversity of various things, am he.” On this basis [*āśraya*], the insentient thing, by unification with the subject [*pramātṛ*] who has the essential nature of the recognitive apprehender [*vimṛśṭṛ*]*—that is, by rest [*viśrānti*] in I-hood [*ahambhāva*]*—attains sentience [*ajādatva*]. Sentients really have the unitary essential nature of the Supreme Subject [*parapramātṛ*]. Thus only the reality that is the nondual, sentient Subject yawns forth [*vijṛmbhate*] as perfectly complete [*pāripūrṇyena*] everywhere.⁷⁰

Philosophy brings the knowledge of apparently insentient objects towards self-recognition by clarifying their original and essential nature as self-recognition.

⁶⁵ APS 23.

⁶⁶ Śiva’s five acts are: (1) creation, (2) preservation, (3) destruction, (4) delusion, and (5) liberation.

⁶⁷ See the list of quotations of the verse by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha below, at footnote 103.

⁶⁸ See below, footnote 103 on the gloss, “I am he.”

⁶⁹ Patañjali, *Yoga Sūtra*, in Patañjali et al. (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971, 4.32, p. 457; also see 4.34, p. 463). I am grateful to Alfred Collins for directing me toward this passage.

⁷⁰ APSV 15.

In the Śaivas' dynamic monism, the cosmic acts of cosmogony and the philosophical-cum-soteriological return are the same.⁷¹

On the Translation

My goal in the translation that follows has been to render the text as literally as possible within the limits of readable English. I have usually followed Shastri's interpretations, and have indicated above and in the notes the couple occasions on which I disagreed with him.

In this work it was initially challenging to distinguish in the first several verses between the statements made by the *pūrvapakṣin* and the *siddhāntin*. I have put a lot of thought into this effort, though it is possible that another scholar will come to some different conclusions.

It has also proven difficult to provide separate translations for a variety of terms that Utpaladeva and Shastri equate with each other, in either extension or intension, for example, at APS and APSV 12. I have for the most part maintained consistent English glosses for such terms, except when that is made problematic by the context. Thus I have usually translated *pratiṣṭhā*, as "foundation," but have sometimes translated it as "establishment."

Square brackets enclose Sanskrit words that have been rendered. They also enclose English words that identify interlocutors and referents, provide additional glosses, and further explicate arguments.

Translation

Proof of a Sentient Knower

Composed by the Great, Great Lord Preceptor Utpaladeva

With Commentary

1. [The Buddhist argues:] There is the ascertainment [*nīścaya*]⁷² that, just as there is no distinction [*viśeṣa*] in essential nature between the existent and the nonexistent, likewise there is not that [a distinction in essential nature] between the insentient and the sentient.

This is the view of those holding the doctrine of a phenomenal series of consciousness [*viññānasamāntānavādinām*, that is, Viññānavādin Buddhists]: All things are momentary. Therefore each individual [thing], being a self-characterized [*svalakṣaṇa*, a unique particular], is without a distinction [*viśeṣa*] in its essential nature. For [the Buddhists] do not accept a unitary recognitive synthesizer

⁷¹ See the discussion of the identity of cosmogony and teleology in "The Philosophical and Soteriological Return," in Lawrence (1999, pp. 95–102).

⁷² See the discussion of the issue of ascertainment in the expository section of this article.

[*anusamdhātṛ*] as the possessor of the phenomenal series.⁷³ Likewise there is no distinction between what is conscious and what is unconscious.⁷⁴

2. [The Śaiva suggests:] Existence is [the pair of] basic knowledge [*prakhyā*] and expressed knowledge [*upākhyā*].⁷⁵ The nonexistence of anything is the contrary [that is, the absence of basic and expressed knowledge]. [The Buddhist responds:] This [pair of basic and expressed knowledge] does not touch the essential nature of a thing. That [pair] is associated with the knower.

Basic knowledge and expressed knowledge are defined [respectively] as awareness [*prakāśa*] and recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*]. [The Buddhist responds to the Śaiva suggestion in the verse:] You wish [by basic and expressed knowledge] to establish the existence and nonexistence of things. Nevertheless, they do not touch the essential nature of a thing.⁷⁶ Basic knowledge, and so on [expressed knowledge], are qualities of the knower. Therefore they cannot distinguish the essential nature of that [which is other than the knower].⁷⁷

3. It is [also] unreasonable that [as the Śaiva might suggest] the essential nature of a thing is its being an object of basic knowledge and expressed knowledge,⁷⁸ because it would [still] depend upon something else. For if there is a nonunitary nature, there is the contravention of existence.⁷⁹

Even if a thing were the object of basic knowledge, and so on [expressed knowledge], it would be unreasonable for it to have an essential nature, because that [thing] would [still] depend upon the awareness [*prakāśa*, which has been equated with basic knowledge] belonging to what is other. For if there are many forms

⁷³ The Buddhists do not accept such a subject as would be able to recognize the individual and generic features of the contents of experience.

⁷⁴ There are no distinguishing characteristics by which *svalakṣaṇas* may be distinguished from each other, whether as existent or nonexistent, or conscious or unconscious.

⁷⁵ In the commentary to this verse, Shastri interprets *prakhyā* and *upākhyā* respectively as *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*. As *prakāśa* designates the bare fact of awareness, *prakhyā* may be interpreted as “knowledge per se” or “basic knowledge.” *Upākhyā*, which I translate as “expressed knowledge,” thematizes the linguistic aspect of recognitive apprehension. Abhinavagupta uses these terms in IPV 1.1.benedictory verse, 1:21, and in his own benedictory verse to the *Dhvanyālokalocana*, in Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta (1975–1981, 1:1). The terms are discussed by the commentator Bhāskara, in *Bhāskartī* on IPV 1.1.benedictory verse, 1:22; and by Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri in Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (1984, 1:8, n. 14). Evidently following Bhāskara, Pandey glosses *prakhyā* and *upākhyā* respectively as “inner visualization” and “outer expression,” in IPV 1.1, 3:2. Pandey’s precedent must be acknowledged for the translation of *upākhyā* provided here. Cf. the grand theory of the poetic significance of the triad *prakhyā*, *upākhyā* and *prasara* in Tripathi (2003).

⁷⁶ *bhāvānām sadasattayor vyavasthāpayitum iṣṭayor api vastunah svarūpasparśābhāvaḥ*.

⁷⁷ A quality belonging to one item, in this case an alleged knower, cannot distinguish the essential nature of another. The Buddhist arguments follow their basic teaching of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). According to that teaching, all things are only collections of extrinsic factors and therefore lack any intrinsic natures.

⁷⁸ This hypothesis would endeavor to rectify the error of the previous one, that a thing is distinguished directly by modes of knowledge that belong to the knower.

⁷⁹ By the logic of dependent origination, the problem is the same as that of simply taking basic and expressed knowledge as defining the existence of a thing.

[*ākāra*], there can be no foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*] for the existence of a thing. Therefore, there is no distinction between a thing and its nonexistence.

4. [The Śaiva answers, in partial agreement with the Buddhist:] Let there be no distinction [between existent and nonexistent things independently from the knower]. There are the existence and nonexistence of basic knowledge, and so on [expressed knowledge]. From that [the existence and nonexistence of basic and expressed knowledge], however, a distinction between those [existent and nonexistent things, as properly conceived] is indeed proven. By so much, there is [our] purpose.⁸⁰

Even if it is accepted that there is no distinction between existent and nonexistent things [independently from knower], the existence and nonexistence of basic knowledge, and so on [expressed knowledge] are unimpaired. Based upon that, however, it is proven [that things] possess distinctions.⁸¹ Therefore, the practical value [*arthakriyā*] in things [distinguished as existent and nonexistent, as reinterpreted by the Śaiva] can be fully proven.⁸²

5. [The Śaiva elaborates:] Thus existence, as connected to manifestation, would be reasonable. Without depending on that [manifestation], existence and nonexistence could not be distinguished.

Thus, there can be the existence of a thing only as associated with awareness [*prakāśa*]. The reasonableness of that [existence] is possible, as characterized by its being illuminated [*prakāśamānatā*]. For, otherwise, without connection to consciousness [*saṁvid*], the existent and the nonexistent would be unrelated to each other and confined to their respective essential natures,⁸³ and distinctions between them would be impossible.

6. [It might be asked:] How could there be no distinction between them [between existence and nonexistence], inasmuch as the existent can generate practical value and that which is other [nonexistent] cannot? [The Śaiva answers:] Even though it is so [that the existent can generate practical value and the nonexistent cannot] a thing is without distinction in innate nature [as something that is independent of the knower].

There is an objection [*ākṣepa*]: An existent thing generates practical value and a nonexistent does not. Therefore, how can there be no distinction, since there is the establishment [*upapādanāt*] of that by practical value? [The Śaiva] answers: Even though it is so [that the existent can generate practical value and the nonexistent cannot, the thing is without distinction in its innate nature, as may be demonstrated by the following reasoning:] Practical value depends upon various knowers [who

⁸⁰ In other words, this explanation serves our purpose of making a meaningful distinction between existence and nonexistence.

⁸¹ The Śaiva is happy to distinguish between things in terms of how they appear in subjective experience rather than any separate intrinsic natures.

⁸² Cf. the discussion of *arthakriyā* in APS and APSV 6.

⁸³ *svasvarūpa*. Shastri is not reverting to a notion of separate independent natures, but is using this expression to refer to the Buddhist notion of particulars as *svalakṣaṇas*. Contra the Buddhists, meaningful distinctions can be made, within the synthetic experience of the subject.

establish it in their business], and is thus not natural [to the existent thing]. Practical value does not prove that a thing possesses a distinction in its essential nature, without consciousness as its substratum.

7. [The Śaiva continues:] Thus an existent thing can be differentiated⁸⁴ [from a nonexistent one] by the accidental attribute that is the manifestation of practical value. However, it cannot be distinguished from a nonexistent one by its essential nature.

In the manner explained, a thing is differentiated [from a nonexistent one] by means of various accidental attributes, which are manifestations, and which produce practical value. Even if it does possess existence, if it does not have its foundation in consciousness [*saṁvidy apratiṣṭhānād*], its distinction by essential nature from that thing which is nonexistent cannot be proven.⁸⁵

8. [The Śaiva explains:] And in this regard, there is the practical value [only] of a thing the existence of which has already been demonstrated; it is not the essential nature of a thing.⁸⁶ Therefore the establishment [*pratiṣṭhā*] of both [what exists and what does not exist, in each case] equally has its basis in consciousness [*saṁvidāśrayā*].

And regarding the two that are existent and nonexistent.⁸⁷ There is not the establishment of practical value of a thing that has not [itself] been previously demonstrated. There is rather the proof of that [practical value] of that thing which has been previously demonstrated. Thus practical value is not in any way the essential nature of a thing. Therefore, the proof of both what is existent and what is nonexistent, without order of precedence [between each case],⁸⁸ entirely depends upon consciousness [*saṁvid*]. For there is the establishment of things only as residing in that [consciousness].

9. [The Śaiva explains:] Furthermore, consciousness [*saṁvid*], if it did not have the nature of cognitive apprehension [*parāmarśa*], would in its nature be the same as what is nonexistent and insentient, as [explained] before.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Utpaladeva is here using the expression *-sambhedam āgataḥ*, rather than a construction of *vi-śiṣ*, to indicate that the differentiation is not based on essential nature. To indicate the alternative meaning, I am glossing this expression (and Shastri's gloss, *sambhinna*) as "differentiated" rather than "distinguished."

⁸⁵ Shastri is here unhappily using *vi-śiṣ* rather than *saṁ-bhid*. The point is nevertheless clear that we cannot in any way discriminate an existent thing from a nonexistent one, if the former is taken as independent of consciousness.

⁸⁶ *tatrāpy arthakriyā siddhasattākārthe na varṇitā*. I have followed Shastri's reading: *...na vastvātāmā*.

⁸⁷ Shastri is glossing "And in this regard" (*tatrāpi*) from the verse.

⁸⁸ *akramam*, glossing *samam*, "equally," in the verse.

⁸⁹ Utpaladeva is referring to the reduction of existence and nonexistence respectively to the presence and absence of basic and expressed knowledge. Utpaladeva and Shastri are here treating *saṁvid* as an equivalent to *prakāśa*, which the latter has previously identified with basic knowledge. Existence requires both awareness and cognitive apprehension, or basic and expressed knowledge. As mentioned in the exposition, this verse alludes to IPK 1.5.11, p. 22, which states that manifestation (*avabhāsa*) or awareness (*prakāśa*) without cognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*) would be like that which is insentient such as crystal. APSV 9 makes the allusion clearer by stating explicitly that awareness (*prakāśa*) without cognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*) would be like crystal.

Furthermore, awareness [*prakāśa*], without recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], would lack the agential autonomy [*svatantratva*]⁹⁰ to manifest the universe, like a crystal, and so on [other unconscious reflecting media]. Therefore, it would in its essential nature be entirely similar to a thing that is nonexistent and insentient.⁹¹ For it would amount to being deaf and mute regarding the knowledge of the characters of various things. By this is indicated the refutation of the doctrine of the quiescent brahman.⁹²

10. How could that [consciousness] which, being thus [without recognitive apprehension], has not realized its own existence,⁹³ be the basis for the establishment [*pratiṣṭhā*] of another thing?

Consciousness [*saṁvid*] without recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], which has not realized its own existence, is unable to establish what is other, just as a sky-flower [is unable] to produce fragrance, and so on.

11. Properly understood, the awareness [*prakāśa*], which is consciousness [*saṁvid*], of another thing is expressed “this.” However, [the awareness or consciousness “this”] can realize [*gacchet*] its foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*] as having the nature of “I.”

It is appropriate that there is the awareness [*prakāśana*] of a differentiated thing through recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*] as in the state of this [*idaṁtā*]. However, [that awareness of the differentiated thing] can realize its establishment [*vyavasthā*] as having the nature of I-hood [*ahaṁtā*]. That very consciousness [*saṁvid*] comprises the creative pulsation [*sphurattā*]⁹⁴ of the universe. That is, through its own agential autonomy [*svātantryād*] it creatively pulsates out [*prasphurantī*] as consisting of awareness [*prakāśa*] that is differentiated into diverse things. Thus [consciousness] is the life of the universe. Therefore, [a differentiated thing] is unproven [*asiddham*] by itself, without resting [*viśrānti*] in that [consciousness]. How could [such a thing] be an object of worldly behavior [*vyavahārya*]?

12. There is the ascertainment [*nīścaya*] of what is insentient and what is other [sentient] by means of nonconcomitance [*vyatireka*] and what is other [that is, concomitance, *anvaya*].⁹⁵ [That ascertainment] is also referred to as

⁹⁰ I am using the expression, “agential autonomy” rather than a simpler one such as “freedom” to direct attention to the significance of this term as articulating the Śaivas’ syntactic theory of omnipotent agency. Whereas Śiva is “self-determined” or “autonomous” (*svatantra*) in relation to the operations of all other factors of action—the latter are “determined by another” (*paratantra*), namely, the agent. See Lawrence (1998).

⁹¹ Shastri is here referring to IPK 1.5.11, p. 22: “*svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam vidur anyathā/ prakāśo ‘rthoparakto ‘pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ.*”

⁹² *śāntabrahmavāda*, that is, Advaita Vedānta.

⁹³ Following Shastri’s gloss of *alabdhapariniṣṭhitih* as *alabdhasattākā*.

⁹⁴ *Sphurattā*, and cognates such as *prasphurantī*, are technical terms in monistic Śaivism closely related to the concept of *spanda*, “creative vibration.”

⁹⁵ In Sanskrit philosophy, the observation of concomitances and nonconcomitances is the basis of induction. Thus one will determine that certain characteristics are present and certain are absent in what is sentient, and likewise in what is insentient.

establishment [*vyavasthā*], foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*], proof [*siddhi*] and realization [*nirvṛtti*].⁹⁶

An insentient exists when it has been established [*vyavasthitatve*] within the knower. Otherwise it is nonexistent. When there is the cognitive impulsion [*saṁrambha*]⁹⁷ towards oneself and what is other, there is self-luminosity. When there is the absence of that [cognitive impulsion towards oneself and what is other], then there is not [self-luminosity]. For there is the ascertainment [*niścaya*] of oneself and what is other by means of concomitance and nonconcomitance.⁹⁸ That [ascertainment] is also referred to by terms such as establishment [*vyavasthā*], foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*], and so on.

13. Thus, these insentients, which in themselves are the same as nonexistent,⁹⁹ exist only as belonging to awareness [*prakāśa*]. There exists nothing but awareness [*prakāśa*] of oneself, as oneself and as what is other.¹⁰⁰

Thus, without resting [*viśrānti*] in consciousness [*saṁvid*], insentient things are the same as nonexistent. Therefore, there is the existence [of those insentient things,] which in themselves are nonexistent in nature, only as related to the knower, who has the essential nature of awareness [*prakāśa*]. Therefore, nothing but awareness [*prakāśa*], which is consciousness [*saṁvid*], can creatively pulsate out [*prasphuret*] into the diversity of the universe—as the two collections of insentient and sentient things that [respectively] have the nature of objects of knowledge and knowers, and which are not different from [awareness'] own nature, although they appear to be different. [That diversity of the universe] is manifested through [awareness'] own Māyā Śakti as a bursting forth [*uccalati*] of itself. Thus the preceptor has indicated the unfolding [*pronmīlana*] of the doctrine of agential autonomy [*svātantryavāda*].¹⁰¹

14. Furthermore, if awareness [*prakāśa*] were other, that is, bereft of cognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], then, forsaking the ascertainment [*vinīścaya*] of what is differentiated and what is undifferentiated, it would have no experience [*anubhava*].

⁹⁶ See the exposition on the significance of these terms.

⁹⁷ *Saṁrambha* is another technical term related to the concept of creative vibration. I have added the qualification “cognitive” in the present context to bring out its significance to the present epistemological problem. Abhinavagupta identifies *saṁrambha* with cognitive apprehension (*vimarśa*) and the Action (*kriyā*) Śakti at IPV 1.1.4, 1:74.

⁹⁸ Shastri has specified the concomitance and nonconcomitance for the ascertainment of self-luminosity. Note that the distinction between what is sentient and what is insentient has been reformulated as that between the self-luminous Self and what is other.

⁹⁹ *asatkalpā*.

¹⁰⁰ This verse is quoted at IPV 1.1.3, 1:64; IPV 1.5.3.8, 1:208; IPVV 1.1, 1:97; and Kṣemarāja, *Spandaninīyaya*, in Vasugupta and Kṣemarāja (1980, 1.5, p. 46).

¹⁰¹ *pronmīlanam sūcitavān*.

Abandoning agential autonomy [*svātantrya*], which has the nature of unification [*saṁyojana*] and disunification [*viyojana*],¹⁰² awareness would be insentient [*jadaprakāśa*]. Because it would lack recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], it would have no experience [*anubhava*], which has the nature of cognitive impulsion [*saṁrambha*]. For this is the greatness [*māhātmya*] of recognitive apprehension [*pratyavamarśa*]: it manifests the universe, which is established [*sthitam*] within, in unity with itself, as external, in the state of this [*idamītā*]¹⁰³—and even while it is being manifested, can again establish [*āpadayet*] it in nondifferentiation, as resting in perfect I-hood [*pūrṇāhamītāviśrānti*].

15. The accomplishment of the purpose [*kṛtārthatā*] of the separated recognitive apprehension [*vicchinnavimarśa*], “this”—is the recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*] of rest [*viśrānti*] in its own essential nature, [expressed] “I am he.”¹⁰³

The insentient object of recognitive apprehension [*vimṛśya*] is separated [from consciousness, as is expressed] “this.” The accomplishment of its purpose [*kṛtārthatā*], is characterized by rest [*viśrānti*] in its essential nature, which is consciousness [*saṁvid*]. Because of the identity [of that separated object “this”] with awareness [*prakāśa*], which is consciousness [*caitanya*]¹⁰⁴—[the accomplishment of its purpose] has the nature of the self-recognition [*ahampratyavamarsātmā*] that constitutes its life,¹⁰⁴ [expressed] “I myself, who shine [*prakāśe*] as the diversity of various things, am he.” On this basis [*āśraya*], the insentient thing, by unification with the subject [*pramātr*] who has the essential nature of the recognitive apprehender [*vimṛśtr*]¹⁰⁵—that is, by rest [*viśrānti*] in I-hood [*ahambhāva*]¹⁰⁵—attains sentience [*ajāḍatva*]. Sentients really have the unitary essential nature of the Supreme Subject [*parapramātr*]. Thus only the reality that is the nondual, sentient Subject yawns forth [*vijṛmbhate*] as perfectly complete [*pāripūrṇyena*] everywhere. This is the purport.

16. That very Self is twofold, limited and unlimited. Thus the finite individual [*aṇu*] is restricted by the vital breath, and so on. However the Supreme Self is unbroken [*akhaṇḍita*].

That very Self that is consciousness [*saṁvid*], is the Supreme Lord. [That Self/Supreme Lord] desires in play to appear as the universe. Then, through his own intention [*icchā*], appearing as one who has the nature of the vital breath, and so on,¹⁰⁵ becoming contracted as the knower of those [vital breath, and so on]¹⁰⁵—he becomes an individual soul. However, when unrestricted by vital breath, and so on,

¹⁰² The terms *saṁyojana*, and *viyojana* are used by monistic Śaivas to describe a wide range of unifications and disunifications, from the cosmic and soteriological levels through the cognitive operations of limited subjects with their objects.

¹⁰³ *so 'ham*. I translate *so* as “he” rather than “that” because the awareness discussed is Śiva. This verse is quoted frequently by Abhinavagupta, for example, at IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:35; IPV 1.5.11, 1:1:244; IPV 1.5.17, 1:279; IPVV 1.1, 1:54. Also see Jayaratha, *Tantrāloka*, in Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha (1987, 5.82, 3:1008). Jayaratha’s commentary will henceforth be referred to as TAV.

¹⁰⁴ *jīvitasthānīyo*.

¹⁰⁵ These are characteristic features of limited identity.

he is perfect [*pūrṇa*], because he contains the universe. He is none other than that Self, which is agentially autonomous consciousness [*svatantracid*]. Thus [the Self] is twofold, as limited and unlimited.

17. These two [forms of the Self] are the final support [*paryantabhūmi*] of the experiences [*saṁvid*] of all things. They are only one, because of recognitive synthesis [*anusamdhāna*]. Therefore, another is not possible.

This Self that is awareness [*prakāśa*], although twofold, is the locus for the rest [*viśrāntyāspada*] of the experiences of all things, which are both existent and non-existent. For one who recognitively synthesizes [*anusamdhātrtayā*] what is past [the ultimate Self, Śiva] and what is present [the quotidian limited form of the Self], then there is only the unitary nature of creative pulsation [*sphurattā*], which is nothing but consciousness [*saṁvid*]. Since that is so, therefore, there is the impossibility of difference.

18. The knowledge of I [*ahamvidi*] has the nature of recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*] that is without nonconcomitance.¹⁰⁶ It functions as the final limit [*paryantavartinyām*]. Therefore, no insentient manifests as other than manifestation.

The awareness of I [*ahamprakāśe*] has the nature of recognitive apprehension [*pratyavamarśa*] that is undifferentiated from the universe. It is the place of rest [*viśrāntibhūmi*] of all cognitions. Therefore, there does not exist an insentient that is other than that awareness [*prakāśa*]. For that [an alleged insentient thing over and above awareness] is vitiated by the alternatives of being separate, not being separate [, being both separate and non-separate, or being neither separate nor non-separate] from the awareness [*prakāśa*] that is consciousness [*saṁvid*], all of which can be shown to be impossible, so that it must be concluded that such a thing cannot possibly exist.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the unitary sentient knower, through its own agential autonomy [*svātantrya*] manifests and dissolves within itself the multitude of things that are not different from itself. Its nature undiminished, it creatively pulsates [*prasphurati*]. That is the meaning.

19. In addition, [a proposed knower] in which knowledge and so on inhere [*samavāyī*] is not proven because it has no manifestation.¹⁰⁸ According to

¹⁰⁶ That is, it is concomitant with everything.

¹⁰⁷ Shastri is referring to a technical strategy of argumentation with the expression, *tasya saṁvitprakāśād bhedābhedavikalpair upahatatvāt*. See the similar expression in APSV 24. My translation of these expressions follows the suggestion of an anonymous viewer, who points to the plural here, *vikalpair*, and notes that that “Śaiva authors not infrequently use a rather Buddhist-sounding tetralemma.” As that reviewer also observes, similarly phrased arguments are found elsewhere in Śaiva literature. For example, see TAV 1.1, 1:6; TAV 1.33, 1:66; TAV 1.52, 1:90; TAV 1.60, 1:99; TAV 1.132, 1:172; TAV 2.12, 1:321; TAV 3.98, 1:459; TAV 3.100, 1:461; TAV 3.125-126, 1:482; TAV 3.203, 1:547; TAV 3.282, 1:608; Rājānaka Ānanda’s *Vivaraṇa* in *Shaṭ Trimshat Tattva Sandoha with the Commentary of Rājānaka Ananda* (1918, 1, p. 2); and Mukunda Rama Shastri, in *Kṣemarāja* (1918, p. 3, n. 5).

¹⁰⁸ See the discussion of this verse in the exposition. Utpaladeva is here refuting the Naiyāyikas’ understanding of the self. According to Nyāya, the self is in its own nature unconscious. Knowledge and various other features of personality are extrinsic qualities that reside in it by a relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

another error, [the knower] is the vital breath, and so on. It would be an object of knowledge. Thus there would not be a knower.

A limited knower in which inhere qualities such as knowledge, and so on, is not proven, because it lacks recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*]. For, without recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*], there would be the undesirable consequence that it would be insentient.¹⁰⁹ According to a different error, the knower is the vital breath and psychophysical complex [*puryaṣṭaka*].¹¹⁰ It would be an object of knowledge. The existence of the Supreme Knower would not be possible.

20. The establishment [*sthiti*] of things is restricted in the individual soul that is delimited by the vital breath and psychophysical complex [*puryaṣṭaka*]. However, that [establishment] [actually, in an unrestricted form] abides in the Supreme Self.

In worldly affairs, which have the nature of activities in Māyā, the establishment of all external and internal objects is confined in the individual soul that possesses the contractions such as the vital breath, and so on. However, when the contractions are removed from the limited, contracted knower, then that [establishment] abides in Śiva, in unity with the Supreme Knower. For the vital breath, and so on, are not [actually] distinct from [*avyatīrekatvāt*, not nonconcomitant with] the awareness [*prakāśa*] that is consciousness [*cit*]. For that very Śiva assumes the condition of a finite individual by taking on the role of a bound creature, which he has manifested by his own intention [*svecchayā*].

21. How could be proven an [actual] restriction of him by the [limited knower consisting of various factors such as the] vital breath, who is [really] nothing but his own self? Rather [as explained] in the *Pratyabhijñā*,¹¹¹ the state of the limited soul is due to ignorance [*akhyāti*].

Therefore, how could there really be an obstruction of the manifestation of Śiva, who comprises unbroken awareness [*prakāśa*], bliss, perfect I-hood [*pūrṇāhamtā*], and creative pulsation [*sphurattā*—by the knower consisting of the vital breath, and so on, who has contracted Śakti, and who is not [really] different in essential nature from Śiva? If it were so [that Śiva's manifestation were actually obstructed], that [limited knower] alone would be incapable [*aśakya*] of establishing [*sthātum*, even] itself. Therefore the state of the individual soul, which is synonymous with bondage, is nothing but the nonmanifestation of the unfolding of one's unlimited Śaktis. Since this has been explained in detail in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā śāstra*, it should be studied there.

22. There is not the establishment [*vyavasthā*] of things in that [limited knower consisting of the] vital breath, and so on, because [in such a knower]

¹⁰⁹ As explained in the exposition, the Naiyāyikas would not accept that the insentience of the knower is an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*), because that is their position. Pace Shastri, perhaps Utpaladeva is saying that there is no basis for affirming an insentient self, because it cannot establish itself, and because there is no other way that it could be established.

¹¹⁰ On this term, see above, footnote 59.

¹¹¹ Utpaladeva's IPK and autocommentaries.

there is a restriction of I-hood [*ahambhāva*]. For I-hood [*ahambhāva*] is declared to be the rest [*viśrānti*] of awareness [*prakāśa*] in itself.

23. That rest [*viśrānti*] is also said to be agential autonomy [*svātantrya*], because it is not restricted by dependence on anything,¹¹² and to be primary agency and Lordship.

There is indeed not the establishment [*vyavasthā*] of things on the basis of the limited knower, who consists of the vital breath, and so on, and who is [actually] insentient. This is because [in the limited knower] there is the obstruction of cognitive apprehension [*parāmarśa*], which has the nature of the creative pulsation [*sphurattā*] of one's own self; and because that [establishment of things, actually] is dependent upon consciousness [*saṁvid*]. For that rest of consciousness [*saṁvid*] in nothing but its own self is declared to be I-hood [*ahambhāva*], which has the nature of the cognitive apprehension of perfect I-hood [*pūrṇāhamtā*]; and to be that which establishes [*vyavasthāpaka*] the thing. That is declared in the *āgamas* to be rest [*viśrānti*] because it is the ultimate basis for the establishment of all things [*paryantapraṭiṣṭhābhūmikavāt*]; to be agential autonomy [*svātantrya*] because it does not depend upon any set [*sāmagrī*, of factors] different from itself in emanating the universe; and to be primary agency and Lordship.

24. Due to his [Śiva's] Śakti called Māyā, there is this universe that is full of ignorance [*akhyāti*] of himself. For no other [cause of the universe] can be proven. Creator-hood is Lordship.

The Śakti called Māyā is not different from the possessor of Śakti [*śaktiman*], Siva. It is [Śiva's] play [*krīḍā*], which consists of concealing his own nature. Due solely to that cause, this universe that is full of ignorance [*akhyāti*] appears. For no other cause can be proven, because [an alleged cause different than Śakti] is vitiated by the alternatives of being different, not being different [, being different and not different, or being neither different nor non-different, all of which can be shown to be impossible].¹¹³ Therefore, Creator-hood of all manifestations is Lordship.

25. That [Śakti] is explained to be unitary due to her cognitive synthesis [*anusamdhāna*] of all experiences [*saṁvid*]. She is [further explained to be] the beginningless essential nature [*tattva*] of the knower, which [essential nature] is synonymous with self-consciousness [*svasaṁvedana*].¹¹⁴

That Supreme Śakti of the Lord is explained to be unitary. That is, because of her cognitive synthesis [*anusamdhāna*] of unity between the prior and later points of creation [*kārya*—which [creation] consists of the unification and disunification all

¹¹² See explanation of the grammatical concept of *svātantrya* in footnote 90.

¹¹³ I have translated *bhedābhedavikalpopahatatvāt* according to the advice of an anonymous reviewer regarding the similar expression at APSV 18. See footnote 107. I am assuming that *vikalpa* in the compound here is plural like in the previous statement.

¹¹⁴ The Buddhists conceive *svasaṁvedana* as a validating self-awareness that is an integral aspect of each momentary experience of a *svalakṣaṇa*. Utpaladeva is claiming that what the Buddhists describe can properly be understood only in terms of the Śaiva philosophy of an enduring subject synthesizing all moments in its self-recognition—the interpretation of Śiva/the Self as the *śaktiman*.

differentiated experiences [*saṁvid*] such as of blue, and so on—she is undifferentiated in containing those [differentiated experiences]. She is [further explained to be] the beginningless essential nature [*tattva*] of the knower, which [essential nature] is synonymous with self-consciousness [*svasaṁvedana*].

26. Pervasiveness [*vyāpītvam*] is the recognitive synthesis [*anusamdhāna*] belonging to the one who possesses I-hood [*ahambhāva*], on whom depends the establishment of things. That cannot be justified to belong to the insentient.¹¹⁵

Pervasiveness [*vyāpītvam*] has the nature of recognitive synthesis [*anusamdhāna*] everywhere. It belongs to the sentient knower, who has the nature of consciousness [*saṁvid*] and whose essence is the recognitive apprehension of perfect I-hood [*pūrṇāhantāparāmarśa*]. For that [sentient knower] is not without agential autonomy [*svātantrya*]. On that [sentient knower] there is the establishment [*vyavasthīti*], that is, the foundation [*pratiṣṭhā*] of all things. And that [pervasiveness] cannot belong to the insentient, which is not agentially autonomous [*asvatantra*], since that [the insentient] does not have as its essence recognitive apprehension [*vimarśa*].

27. However, since there is nondifferentiation from that [the sentient knower], there can be the manifesting of the object of manifestation.¹¹⁶ Therefore, it is explained in the *Pratyabhijñā* that the universe is nondual.

However, by accepting the sentience [of the knower, it can be explained how], when there is this universe that has the nature of the manifestation of differentiation,¹¹⁷ this is possible: By the Knowledge Śakti,¹¹⁸ there is the illumining [*prakāśamānatā*] of the object of manifestation such as blue, pleasure, and so on, which appear as external, while their establishment internally is undiminished. Alternatively,¹¹⁹ accepting nondifferentiation, there is the possibility of the illumination [*prakāśana*] of the insentient. However, otherwise there is not the illumination [*prakāśana*] of the insentient. For this reason,¹²⁰ it is explained in the *Śrīmad Īśvarapratyabhijñā* that the universe has the nondual nature that is consciousness [*saṁvid*]. Thus Śiva.

¹¹⁵ Utpaladeva believes that only the Śaiva philosophy properly establishes the knower as sentient. See Lawrence (1999, p. 56) on Abhinava's treatment of pervasiveness as an expression of the reason, Śakti, in the inference for the identity of the individual with Śiva. Cf. *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* in Lawrence (2008b, 3.26–27, p. 97) on the modality of Śakti called Omnipresent (Vibhvi), who performs the functions of pervasion and grace. Pervasiveness provides the basis for the universal concomitance discussed by the APS and APSV. Also see above, footnote 40.

¹¹⁶ As seen directly, Shastri provides two interpretations of this verse according to whether an alpha privative has been deleted by *samdhī* between the first two words, as printed *tato bhede*. *Bhede* would mean, “when there is differentiation,” and *abhede*, “since/when there is nondifferentiation.” I follow his second reading. There is no disagreement between the two interpretations of the verse about any points of Śaiva doctrine.

¹¹⁷ Shastri first interprets the text as printed, *tato bhede*.

¹¹⁸ The Knowledge (*jñāna*) Śakti is the modality of Śakti that generates cognitive processes.

¹¹⁹ *Atha ca*, taking the text as beginning *tato 'bhede*.

¹²⁰ By either account.

Acknowledgements My translation and interpretation of the *Ajaḍapramāṭṛsiddhi* have benefitted from detailed advice provided by Hemendra Nath Chakravarty and Navjivan Rastogi. I am grateful to Srinarayan Mishra and Sthaneshwar Timalisina for their suggestions about particular sections of the text. An anonymous reviewer of this article also provided helpful recommendations. Unless otherwise indicated, translations and paraphrases of various Śaiva texts are my own.

References

- Abhinavagupta. (1987). *The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivrtivimarsinī* by Abhinavagupta (3 vols). In M. K. Shastri (Ed.) Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Reprint. Delhi: Akay Book Corporation.
- Abhinavagupta & Bhāskara. (1986). *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition* (3 vols). Vols. 1–2 are Sanskrit text with *Bhāskarī* commentary by Bhāskara, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer & K. C. Pandey, Vol. 3 is translation of Abhinavagupta's text by K. C. Pandey. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Abhinavagupta & Jayaratha. (1987). *The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the commentary of Jayaratha* (8 vols). In M. K. Shastri & M. R. Shastri (Eds.), Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. Republication by R. C. Dwivedi & N. Rastogi (Eds.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Ānandavardhana & Abhinavagupta. (1975–1981). *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (3 vols). In R. Tripāṭhi, Ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Arnold, D. (2008). Transcendental arguments and practical reason in Indian Philosophy. *Argumentation*, 22, 135–147.
- Gerow, E. (1982). What is Karma (Kīm Karmeti): An exercise in philosophical semantics. *Indologica Taurinensia*, 10, 87–116.
- Hulin, M. (1978). *Le Principe de l'Ego dans le Pensée Indienne Classique: La Notion d'Ahamkāra*. Paris: de Boccard.
- Kaul, Mrinal. (online). Brief biography of Harabhata Shastri. Accessed July 29, 2009, from <http://mkmartand.blogspot.com/2007/02/pandit-harbhata-shastri.html?showComment=1171953360000>.
- Kṣemarāja. (1918). *Parā Praveśikā of Kṣemarāja*. In M. R. Shastri (Ed.) Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 15, Mumbai: Tatva-Vivechaka Press.
- Kṣemarāja. (1980). *Pratyabhijñāhrdayam: The secret of self-recognition*. Edited, translated, and with introduction by Jaideva Singh. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Lawrence, D. P. (1996). Tantric argument: The transfiguration of philosophical discourse in the Pratyabhijñā system of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. *Philosophy East and West*, 46, 165–204.
- Lawrence, D. P. (1998). The mythico-ritual syntax of omnipotence. *Philosophy East and West*, 48, 592–622.
- Lawrence, D. P. (1999). *Rediscovering god with transcendental argument: A contemporary interpretation of monistic Kashmiri Śaiva Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lawrence, D. P. (2000). Zu Abhinavaguptas Offenbarungstheorie. *Polylog*, 5, 6–18.
- Lawrence, D. P. (2008a). *The teachings of the odd-eyed one: A study and translation of the Virūpākṣapañcāśikā with the commentary of Vidyācakraṭartin*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lawrence, D. P. (2008b). Abhinavagupta's philosophical hermeneutics of grammatical persons. *Journal of Hindu Studies*, 1, 11–25.
- Lawrence, D. P. (forthcoming). The plurality and contingency of knowledge, and its rectification according to the Pratyabhijñā. In N. Rastogi & M. Rastogi (Eds.), *Perspectives on Abhinavagupta* (commemoration volume for K. C. Pandey). Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
- Lawrence, D. P. (contracted, in progress). *Abhinavagupta's Commentary on the Recognition of the Lord: A translation of the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī, with Utpaladeva's Īśvarapratyabhijñākarikā, Introduction and Notes*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Matilal, B. K. (1986). *Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mikogami, E. (1979). Some remarks on the concept of Arthakriyā. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 7, 79–94.
- Mohanty, J. N. (1992). *Reason and tradition in Indian thought: An essay on the nature of Indian Philosophical thinking*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Nagatomi, M. (1967). Arthakriyā. *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 31–32, 52–72.

- Patañjali, et al. (1971). *Pātañjalayogadarśanam*. In S. Mishra, (Ed.) Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
- Ram-Prasad, C. (2002). *Advaita epistemology and metaphysics: An outline of Indian non-realism*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Sanderson, A. (1985). Purity and power among the Brahmans of Kashmir. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.), *The category of the person: Anthropology, philosophy, history* (pp. 190–216). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shat Trimshat Tatva Sandoha with the Commentary of Rājānaka Ānanda. (1918). In M. R. Shastri (Ed.), Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 13. Mumbai: Tatva-Vivechaka Press.
- Torrella, R. (1988). A fragment of Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*: Edition and translation. *East and West*, 38, 137–174.
- Torella, R. (1999). Devī Uvāca: A theology of the perfect tense. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 27, 129–138.
- Torella, R. (2007a). Studies in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*, Part I: *Apoha* and *Anupalabdhi* in a Śaiva Garb." In K. Preisdanz (Ed.), *Expanding and merging horizons: Contributions to South Asian and cross-cultural studies in commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass* (pp. 473–490). Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Torella, R. (2007b). Studies in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*, Part II: What is Memory. In K. Klaus & J.-U. Hartmann (Eds.), *Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn zum 65. Geburtstag* (pp. 539–563). Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
- Torella, R. (2007c). Studies in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*, Part III: Can a cognition become the object of another cognition? In D. Goodall & A. Padoux (Eds.), *Mélanges tantriques à la mémoire d'Hélène Brunner* (pp. 475–484). Pondicherry: Institut Français de Pondichéry.
- Torella, R. (2007d). Studies in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*, Part IV: Light of the subject – light of the object. In B. Kellner et al. (Eds.), *Pramāṇakīrtiḥ: Papers dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday* (pp. 925–939). Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
- Tripathi, N. (2003). *Sāhityaśāstrīyo Navonmeṣaḥ*. Varanasi: Bhāratīya Saṁskṛti Saṁsthān.
- Upaniṣatsaṅgraha*. (1970). Edited by Jagadīśa Śāstrī. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Utpaladeva. (1921). *The Siddhitrayī and the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikāvṛtti*. In M. K. Shastri (Ed.), Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 34. Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press.
- Utpaladeva. (1989). *Siddhitrayī* (Edited and translated into Hindi by S. P. Vyas). Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan.
- Utpaladeva. (2002). *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vṛtti*, corrected edition. (R. Torella, Ed. & Trans.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Utpaladeva & Abhinavagupta. (1984). *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva with the Vimarśinī by Abhinavagupta* (2 vols). Reprinted from M. R. Shastri & M. K. Shastri, Eds., Kashmir Series of Text and Studies. Delhi: Butala & Co.
- Vasudeva, S. (2004). *The Yoga of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra: Chapters 1–4, 7, 11–17*. Pondicherry: Institut Français de Pondichéry.
- Vasugupta & Kṣemarāja. (1980). *Spanda-Kārikās: The divine creative pulsation* (with Kṣemarāja's Nirṇaya) (J. Singh, Ed., and Trans.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Vasugupta, et al. (1992). *The stanzas of vibration: The Spandakārikā with four commentaries*. (Translated with introduction and exposition by Mark S. G. Dyczkowski). Albany: State University of New York Press.