

## Authority in Early Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka

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**Abstract** This paper examines the role of *pramāṇa* in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra*. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both *svatantra* inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* treatment of *svatantra*, and so comes to comment on the *locus classicus* for the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. For Jayānanda, *svatantra* inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither *svatantra* inference, nor *pramāṇa* (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (*pramāṇa*) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism.

**Keywords** Jayānanda · Candrakīrti · Prāsaṅgika · Pramāṇa · Authority · Skepticism

Buddhism is frequently portrayed as a “rational religion,” eminently concerned with critical investigation of reality, rather than with a faithful acceptance of central beliefs. From early Buddhist scriptures in which the Buddha himself urges his

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followers not to accept the validity of his teachings out of deference to his authority, but to critically examine them as one might refine gold ore to the present Dalai Lama's use of this trope, we have good reason for placing rationality among the central values of the tradition. Among the difficulties of evaluating Buddhism's rationality, however, is the breadth of concepts packed into the term "reason." Seeking the pinnacle of reasoned Buddhism, one might turn to those harbingers of rationality, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and choose to equate "reason" with "inference" (*anumāna*), as developed in the epistemological tradition. Or, one might note the centrality of "reasoning" (*yukti*) in the Madhyamaka tradition, presented in Tibet as the highest school of Buddhist philosophy: while some Mādhyamikas criticize the use of formal inference (dubbed by Candrakīrti *svatantra* inference), reasoning is widely endorsed.

Yet in both of these traditions, each seemingly good examples of Buddhism's rationality, authority—often conceived of as reason's foil—plays a significant role. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti both endorsed the Buddha's singularly authoritative status; investigations into the role of authority in Buddhist traditions has, following hundreds of years of Tibetan scholarship on the issue, focused on the "Pramāṇasiddhi" chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, a lengthy commentary on Dignāga's verse of praise to the Buddha at the opening of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Dignāga's claim that the Buddha is *pramāṇabhūta*, "one who has become valid cognition," forms the context for Dharmakīrti's very characterization of *pramāṇa*; this creates a central tension between reason and authority in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, suggesting that the Buddha's authority may form for his followers a source of knowledge, on par with perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).<sup>2</sup> In broadening the scope of scholarship on the role of authority in Buddhism, Ruegg and Silk have each pointed to important examples in Madhyamaka treatises, most notably in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra*, where Nāgārjuna is referred to as an "authoritative person" (in Tibetan translation, *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*, likely translating *pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa*).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Franco (1997), Jackson (1993), Ruegg (1994, 1995), Steinkellner (1983), Tillemans (1993), van Bijlert (1989), and van der Kuijp (1999).

<sup>2</sup> For a concise discussion of the relevant passages, see Ruegg (1994, pp. 304–306). A basic tension is that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti conceive of *pramāṇa* as a form of consciousness, neither as a person nor as a means of knowledge, which is standard in non-Buddhist Indian accounts of *pramāṇa*. In standard Buddhist tradition, the Buddha is a person, albeit a miraculous one, and so would not fit into Dignāga's or Dharmakīrti's technical accounts. Considering the Buddha as a source or means of knowledge would seem to be the most straightforward solution: the Buddha's words would be capable of generating valid cognitions in the minds of others. As will be discussed below, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti each make something like this move in considering "testimony" (*āpta*) to be a kind of inference. Ruegg (1994, pp. 315) suggests that Dignāga intended *pramāṇabhūta* in the sense of "like a valid cognition," in which case Dignāga's two-fold *pramāṇa* would be maintained, with the Buddha merely being likened to a valid cognition rather than claimed to be a kind or source of valid cognition. As Franco (1997, pp. 16–17) shows, it seems clear that Dharmakīrti's text gives the sense of "who has become a valid cognition," emphasizing the Buddha's attainment of validity, in contradistinction to non-Buddhist, brahmanical claims for the permanent authority of the Vedas. However, Ruegg (*ibid*) points out that some post-Dharmakīrti commentators considered *-bhūta* to have the sense of "like."

<sup>3</sup> Ruegg (1994, pp. 303–304) and Silk (2002, pp. 122–123). Silk's study goes well beyond the epistemological and Madhyamaka traditions, examining Buddhist usage in many genres.

Ruegg has written cogently on the difficulties of translating *pramāṇa* as “authority” in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, noting that an individual becomes trustworthy in the first place due to a direct realization of the nature of reality; in contrast to the value given ‘direct’ knowledge, “authority” conveys a sense of mediacy, of relying on another for one’s knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Such a reading preserves the ideals of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s epistemologies, in which direct perception is the preeminent form of knowledge, while the words of others are accorded second-class validity, at best. Mādhyamika authors similarly value Nāgārjuna’s direct cognizance of emptiness when calling him *pramāṇa*: after referring to “the treatise composed by the authoritative person,” Candrakīrti states “Ārya Nāgārjuna . . . realized the profound nature of phenomena,”<sup>5</sup> while Jayānanda, commenting on this passage, explains “Since Ācārya Nāgārjuna directly saw reality, we can know the intention of scripture by way of the treatise he composed.”<sup>6</sup> We might then conclude that for Candrakīrti and Jayānanda, as for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, “authority” is derivative, that the quality that makes Nāgārjuna authoritative—firsthand knowledge of reality—must be regarded as primary.<sup>7</sup>

Suspicion concerning the harmony between these two traditions’ approaches to reason and authority is raised, though, when we consider the tensions between Candrakīrti’s and Dignāga’s philosophical projects. It has long been recognized that Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* comments on the opening stanza of Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, Nāgārjuna’s famous denial of production from the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*), criticized Bhāviveka’s Madhyamaka adaptation of Dignāga’s inference.<sup>8</sup> Debate continues as to just what it was about inference that Candrakīrti found objectionable, a debate that turns on identifying what Candrakīrti meant by *svatantra-anumāna*.<sup>9</sup> Did Candrakīrti deny a kind of inference that ascribes too strong a status to the state of affairs that it attempts to prove or one that places undue credence in the logical process itself? What form of inference did he accept (what kind of *anumāna* is not *svatantra*)?

<sup>4</sup> Ruegg (1994, pp. 317–318; 1995, pp. 825–826).

<sup>5</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 75.14–75.20: *bstan bcos tshad mar gyur pa’i skyes bus byas shing lung phyin ci ma log par chad pa mthong ba las lung gi dgongs pa nges pas ni / [VI.3:] ji ltar de yis chos zab chos rtogs pa // lung dang gzhan yang rigs pas yin pas na // de ltar ’phags pa klu sgrub gzhung lug las // ji ltar gnas pa’i lugs bzhin brjod par bya /*

<sup>6</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 112b.2: *slob dpon klu sgrub zhabs kyis de kho na nyid dngos su gzigs pa yin pas des mdzad pa’i bstan bcos kyi sgo nas lung gi dgongs pa shes pa yin no*.

<sup>7</sup> Ruegg (1994, pp. 306–307) and Silk (2002, pp. 127–128) each examine Sthiramati’s comment that Nāgārjuna has been made into a *pramāṇa* (perhaps “authorized”) by the Buddha, owing to the Buddha’s “prophecies” concerning Nāgārjuna (discussed below). Sthiramati’s comment perhaps served as a precedent for Candrakīrti. Buescher (2007, vii–viii, n. 2) gives Sthiramati’s rough dates as 510–570, affirming Frauwallner’s notion that he was “an elder contemporary of Dharmapāla”; Candrakīrti refers to Dharmapāla at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 407.15.

<sup>8</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 12.8–39.4 discusses production from the four alternatives, with “production from self” (*svata utpannā*, as Mādhyamikas called the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda*) treated at 13.4–36.2 and containing most of Candrakīrti’s critique of Bhāviveka’s use of inference. Ruegg (2002, pp. 17–76) translates the section. The classic study of the *catuṣkoṭi* is Ruegg (1977).

<sup>9</sup> Significant contributions include Dreyfus and McClintock (2003), Yotsuya (1999), Tillemans (1992), Hopkins (1989), and Cabezón (1988).

Becoming increasingly clear are Candrakīrti's objections to Dignāga's broader valid cognition enterprise. After discussing Nāgārjuna's four alternatives, the *Prasannapadā* engages in a lengthy discussion of dependent arising, citing a range of sūtras, then turns to a critique of the very possibility of valid cognition, disparaging accounts of *pramāṇa* and perception that closely mirror Dignāga's own.<sup>10</sup> Candrakīrti's evaluation of valid cognition concludes with an avowal of a fourfold *pramāṇa*—which adds “scripture” (*āgama*) and “analogy” (*upamāna*) to perception and inference—as means of “knowing things of the world.”<sup>11</sup> Of course, propounding four *pramāṇas* is known primarily from non-Buddhist sources, most prominently, the *Nyāyasūtra*; however, Franco's work on the Spitzer manuscript, which he dates to the third century, suggests that some Buddhists—likely of the Sarvāstivāda perspective—also accepted four *pramāṇas*.<sup>12</sup> As is well known, Nāgārjuna critiqued a fourfold conception of *pramāṇa* at length in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, although his comments would seem to hold equally well against a twofold conception.<sup>13</sup> Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga's *pramāṇa*, coupled with his ‘worldly’ acceptance of a fourfold presentation, raise a number of questions: Should we read this as a return to an earlier Buddhist notion of fourfold *pramāṇa*,

<sup>10</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 39.6–55.10 treats dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), supplying ample sūtra quotations and a discussion of the distinction between sūtras of provisional meaning (*neyārtha*) and definitive meaning (*nītārtha*). Candrakīrti's broad critique of *pramāṇa* at *Prasannapadā*, 55.11–73.13 is the focus of Siderits (1981) and Arnold (2005a: chapters six and seven) and has been translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 17–135) (which translates *Prasannapadā* 12.8–75.13, the entirety of Candrakīrti's remarks on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I.1) and Arnold (2005b). This work makes it abundantly clear that Candrakīrti views Dignāga's epistemology as his target in this section of the *Prasannapadā*, although the point remains that he does not refer to Dignāga by name (having mentioned him by name at *Madhyamakāvātara* 407.14), after repeatedly referring to Bhāviveka by name earlier in his comments.

<sup>11</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 75.9: *tad evaṃ pramāṇacatuṣṭayāḥ lokasyārthādhiḡamo vyavasthāpyate //*.

<sup>12</sup> Franco (2003, pp. 25) notes that the manuscript contains an argument (possibly extending ten folios) for past and future existence, leading him to conclude that we have a telltale sign of the Sarvāstivāda perspective. Franco (2010, especially pp. 126–127) details the manuscript's discussion of inference and analogy (*aupamya* in this text) and suggests that presentations of perception and scripture (Franco: “verbal testimony”) bookended this discussion. Franco (p. 126, n. 12) acknowledges that a discussion of scripture might not have been included and (p. 127) that analogy might be presented by this text as a kind of inference, although he thinks (p. 135) the latter possibility to have been an opponent's position. I thank the anonymous reviewer of this paper who suggested the relevance of Franco's work on the Spitzer manuscript to the present investigation.

<sup>13</sup> See, most recently, Westerhoff (2010). Franco (2004) shows that Nāgārjuna's critique—formed around the question of how *pramāṇas* themselves are established—was not original to him, but was found in the Spitzer manuscript and so was perhaps standard in Abhidharma (and other) presentations of *pramāṇa*. Unfortunately, we do not have the Spitzer manuscript's answer to the dilemma; Franco (2004, pp. 204–205) shows that the Spitzer points out the infinite regress ensuing if one *pramāṇa* is said to establish another and the circularity ensuing if the *pramāṇas* are thought to mutually establish, and then considers the possibility of self-establishment. There the relevant fragment ends, and so we are unable to judge whether the manuscript adopts a position like Nāgārjuna's, that there is, in fact, no way to establish the *pramāṇas*.

having rejected Dignāga's account? Does Candrakīrti adopt a Nyāya presentation of *pramāṇa*?<sup>14</sup> Does the qualification “worldly knowledge,” along with Nāgārjuna's critique, denigrate the significance of all four *pramāṇas*? Finally, how would a Buddhist philosopher argue for “scripture” as a source of knowledge without admitting the validity of Brahminical or Jaina scriptures?

Less examined than the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā* is Candrakīrti's survey of the same ground in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* and autocommentary, in which he cites and restates Nāgārjuna's famous opening stanza and provides a brief discussion of argumentative method.<sup>15</sup> The *Madhyamakāvatāra* offers a comparatively straightforward examination, one lacking the nuanced discussions of the *prasaṅga* and *svatantra* methods found in the *Prasannapadā*, which must be seen as representing Candrakīrti's more mature and developed presentation.<sup>16</sup> However, recognizing that the *Madhyamakāvatāra*'s analysis of argumentation is bookended by deliberations on “authority” in stanzas VI.2–3 and VI.30, the less-developed account might improve our understanding of Candrakīrti's stance on *pramāṇa* and, more generally, the role of authority in his well-reasoned Buddhist tradition.

An additional benefit of including the *Madhyamakāvatāra* in our deliberations is recourse to Jayānanda's lengthy twelfth-century commentary.<sup>17</sup> Jayānanda's commentary, as van der Kuijp pointed out, was composed at a great distance from his native Kashmir, in the Tangut kingdom, very likely after his sojourn in Central Tibet during the middle of the twelfth century.<sup>18</sup> Outside of the anonymous eighteen-folio *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, brief comments on portions of four of Candrakīrti's works that has recently resurfaced,<sup>19</sup> Jayānanda's is the only Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti's works. Given the centuries between Candrakīrti and Jayānanda, we cannot regard the commentary as presenting Candrakīrti's “true thought.” However, given Jayānanda's instrumental role in reviving Candrakīrti's views after centuries of neglect and in propagating these views in Tibet, where they were

<sup>14</sup> Judging from the mythological examples used in the Spitzer manuscript, none of which stems from particularly Buddhist myth, Franco (2010, p. 130) deems the fourfold account of *pramāṇa* to be borrowed “from a Brahminical source.” By Candrakīrti's time, it is fair to say that a technical Nyāya presentation had developed that could be distinguished from the earlier Buddhist borrowing.

<sup>15</sup> Candrakīrti quotes *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I.1 in the preamble to *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.8 (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 81.7–8), gives his own half-stanza restatement of it in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.8ab (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 82.1–2), and then discusses argumentative technique in his examination of self-production in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.8cd–VI.13 (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 82.3–87.14).

<sup>16</sup> The relative chronology of composition is clear, as the *Prasannapadā* repeatedly cites the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, including (relevant to this discussion) stanza VI.8cd at La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 13.7–13.8.

<sup>17</sup> Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* is extant only in the Tibetan translation prepared by Jayānanda and his Tibetan collaborator, Kun dga' grags: *sde dge* edition, Toh. 3870, *dbu ma*, vol. *ra*; Peking edition, 5271, vol. 99 (*dbu ma*'i 'grel, vol. *ra*).

<sup>18</sup> See van der Kuijp (1993); for a tentative chronology of Jayānanda's travels, see Vose (2009, pp. 53–55).

<sup>19</sup> Concerning the composition of the *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, Yonezawa (2001, p. 27) writes: “it is very likely that the Tibetan scribe, called Dharmakīrti or snur/gnur Dharma grags, wrote down the texts for the sake of his understanding under the supervision of Abhayākaragupta.” Abhayākaragupta and sNur D[h]ar ma grags produced the Tibetan translation of Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptatī*, along with Candrakīrti's commentary on it.

quickly formed into “Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka,” Jayānanda’s text offers us rare insight into how one of Candrakīrti’s very few Indian supporters understood and presented his philosophy at the very time it gained widespread currency.<sup>20</sup>

Further, when commenting on Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvātāra* discussion of argumentative technique, Jayānanda quotes much of the relevant passages from the *Prasannapadā*.<sup>21</sup> Jayānanda’s quotations differ markedly from Pa tshab nyi ma grags’s Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā* found in the canonical collections and so suggests at minimum that Jayānanda’s transmission of Candrakīrti’s works in Tibet and among the Tangut represents a textual strand separate from that propagated by Pa tshab. The colophon to Pa tshab’s translation of the *Prasannapadā* notes that he utilized two different Sanskrit manuscripts of the text, completing his initial translation with Mahāsumati on the basis of a Kashmiri manuscript, while later revising his translation in Lhasa’s Ramoche Temple with Kanakavarman with recourse to a manuscript from “eastern Aparānta” (*nyi ’og shar phyogs*).<sup>22</sup> It could well be that Jayānanda worked with a *Prasannapadā* manuscript distinct from either of Pa tshab’s exemplars when he incorporated these passages into his massive commentary on the *Madhyamakāvātāra* in Tangut lands.<sup>23</sup> At the very least, the Tibetan translation of his work, which he and his Tibetan collaborator Kun dga’ grags provided, evinces notions disparate from Pa tshab’s on how particular Sanskrit locutions should be rendered in Tibetan.<sup>24</sup> Thus, Jayānanda’s quotations offer insights into the textual history of this section of the *Prasannapadā*.

Jayānanda’s own discussion parallels *Prasannapadā* I.1, as he offers a substantial discussion of *svatantra* inference as compared to *prasaṅga* reasoning when commenting on *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.8, both incorporating Candrakīrti’s fully developed treatment in the *Prasannapadā* and discussing several of the issues he does not quote directly, before turning to a broader consideration of valid cognition in his comments on stanza VI.13 that bears resemblance to the *Prasannapadā* critique of Dignāga’s *pramāṇa* theory.<sup>25</sup> These follow an account of Nāgārjuna’s authority that takes *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.3 as its departure but ranges far beyond Candrakīrti’s deliberations. Throughout, Jayānanda draws a broad correlation between the Mādhyamika’s use of *prasaṅgas* (and disavowal of *svatantras*) and a thoroughgoing rejection of the *pramāṇa* enterprise as developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

<sup>20</sup> Jayānanda’s role in the eleventh and twelfth century resurgence of Candrakīrti and the formation of Prāsaṅgika are treated in Vose (2009).

<sup>21</sup> In his comments to *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.9a, Jayānanda quotes two passages from the *Prasannapadā*, corresponding to La Vallée Poussin’s edition, 13.4–25.5 and 34.13–36.2 (and to the Tibetan translation, *sde dge* edition, 5a.6–8a.7 and 11b.1–6). These quotes are found in Jayānanda’s text, *sde dge* edition, 120b.7–123a.7 and 123a.7–123b.5. These two passages correspond closely to points i and iv in Yotsuya’s (1999, xii) structuring of “Candrakīrti’s wider critique of *svatantra*-reasoning”: “i. Candrakīrti justifies Buddhapālita’s position” and “iv. The faults which Candrakīrti finds in Bhāvaviveka’s inference do not apply to his own inferential statement.”

<sup>22</sup> For the identification of *nyi ’og shar phyogs* as “eastern Aparānta,” see Ruegg (2000, p. 45, n. 90).

<sup>23</sup> Throughout Jayānanda’s *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā* we can find abundant evidence that his transmission of the *Madhyamakāvātāra* is distinct from Pa tshab’s transmission of this text, as well.

<sup>24</sup> Jayānanda and Kun dga’ grags do not seem to be guilty of paraphrasing the *Prasannapadā* passages, as they provide very detailed renderings.

<sup>25</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.8cd–13 treat the denial of “production from self.”

In turn, he reads Candrakīrti as embodying a return to a different kind of *pramāṇa*: rather than seeking valid means of cognition, Jayānanda advocates the authority of Nāgārjuna as the sole means by which one can come to understand emptiness. Despite disavowing formal epistemology, Jayānanda's argument for Nāgārjuna's authority borrows heavily from Dharmakīrti's arguments (and those of his commentators) for the Buddha's authoritative status. Jayānanda's *prasaṅga* method, then, forges a Madhyamaka that dismisses some of the central features of the Dharmakīrtian tradition and recasts those that support a traditionalist return to a founder's mandate. This version of Candrakīrti—hostile to Buddhist epistemology, promoting authority in its stead—served as a central feature of the early Prāsaṅgika movement.<sup>26</sup>

### Svatantra v. Prasaṅga

The bulk of Jayananda's quotation of the *Prasannapadā* concerns the distinctions Candrakīrti draws between Bhāviveka's faulty use of inference, which Candrakīrti terms *svatantra*, and Buddhapālita's (and Nāgārjuna's) use of *prasaṅgas* and an unproblematic kind of inference. Candrakīrti argues that Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* statement points out the self-contradiction implicit in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of 'production from self,' which, he claims, ought to obviate any need for *svatantra* inference: an inference would not offer any additional argumentative purchase against a recalcitrant opponent than would a *prasaṅga*.<sup>27</sup>

Rather than accept *svatantra* inference and *prasaṅga* reasoning as equal means of argumentation, Candrakīrti attacks Bhāviveka's use of *svatantra*, chiding, "It is not reasonable for Mādhyamikas themselves to compose *svatantra* inferences due to not asserting other positions."<sup>28</sup> The "other positions" alludes to the context of this argument, Nāgārjuna's denial of production from the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*); as Candrakīrti's discussion of argumentative technique (and Bhāviveka's before him) revolves around Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* against the first alternative, 'production from self,' we must understand "other positions" as the other three alternatives, all of which Nāgārjuna rejected. Of course, *svatantra* means more than asserting one of the four alternatives: Candrakīrti broadly associates *svatantra* inference with inference supporting any thesis, stating that Bhāviveka's argument against 'production from self,' "the inner sense spheres are not produced from self," constitutes a *svatantra* thesis.<sup>29</sup> This suggests that what Candrakīrti disavows is an inference attempting to establish a thesis one holds, even if it is a 'negative' thesis—the denial of a state of affairs—rather than a 'positive' thesis that, say, 'things are produced from other.'

<sup>26</sup> Rather than considering Prāsaṅgika to begin with Candrakīrti, I trace its inception to the first widespread acclaim given to Candrakīrti's major works, this in eleventh- and twelfth-century India and Tibet; see Vose (2009: chapter one). Jayānanda, then, is among the earliest Prāsaṅgikas.

<sup>27</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 15.3–15.10; translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 27–28).

<sup>28</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 16.2: *na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumānaṃ kartuṃ yuktam pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāvāt* /. MacDonald (2003, p. 154) reads the same.

<sup>29</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 16.11–16.12: *yadā caivaṃ svatantrānumānānābhīdhāyitvaṃ mādhyamikasya tadā kuto na ādhātṃkāny āyatanāni svata utpannānti svatantrā pratijñā*. MacDonald 2003: 159 reads the same.

Emphasizing this reading of *svatantra*, in place of Candrakīrti's "*svatantra anumāna*" in this passage, Jayānanda's quotation reads, "inferences that are established for oneself" (\**svatantra-siddha-anumāna*), making it clear that, at the very least, Jayānanda understood a *svatantra* inference as one supporting a thesis held by oneself.<sup>30</sup> Candrakīrti's discussion of the problems Bhāviveka encounters by asserting a negative thesis focus on the difficulties of providing a convincing argument to Sāṃkhya; Bhāviveka's inference would only occasion a Sāṃkhya rebuttal.<sup>31</sup> Asserting or not asserting one's own thesis proves to be the central distinction between argumentative forms Candrakīrti rejects and those that he accepts for Mādhyamika use.

Having supported Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* statement and pointed out some difficulties in Bhāviveka's inference, Candrakīrti explains that if one insists upon an inference (and Bhāviveka did), Buddhapālita's statements can be understood as a kind of inference, as they contain a probandum, reason, and example accepted by the opponent.<sup>32</sup> While in this passage Candrakīrti stops short of calling Buddhapālita's statement "an inference," later in his discussion (in a passage not quoted by Jayānanda) he endorses the practice of "refutation by way of an inference just accepted by the opponent; only this is indicated by our inferences."<sup>33</sup> An 'opponent-accepted' inference functions much like a *prasaṅga*, which similarly lacks any thesis of one's own or even the acceptance of a counter-thesis adduced by way of the "reversal of the consequence" (*prasaṅgaviparīta*).<sup>34</sup> Since a *prasaṅga* points out unacceptable outflows of an opponent's position, utilizing only the commitments of the opponent, "stating a *prasaṅga* results in merely refuting another's thesis; thus, the meaning [derived from] reversing the *prasaṅga* does not apply [to the Mādhyamika]."<sup>35</sup> Both *prasaṅgas* and inferences adduce and exemplify logical entailments; these practices do not become problematic (in Candrakīrti's opinion) as long as the terms forming the entailment consist of the commitments of the Mādhyamika's opponent (in this case, the Sāṃkhya). An argument utilizing the other's commitments would stand in contradistinction to the objectionable kind of

<sup>30</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvataṛaṅgikā*, 121b.3: *rang gi rgyud kyi grub pa'i rjes su dpag pa*, in place of Pa tshab's (6a.4) *rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa* for the Sanskrit (16.11) *svatantrānumāna*. It is possible that Jayānanda introduces his own gloss into the compound, rather than offering a direct translation of the Sanskrit. However, if it is a gloss, it would be unique in this lengthy quotation, which otherwise seeks to represent Candrakīrti's text quite faithfully.

<sup>31</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 16.11–18.4; translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 29–30).

<sup>32</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 20.1–21.6; translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 33–35). The key statement is at 20.4–20.5: *anena ca vākyena sādhyasādhana dharmānugatasya paraprāsiddhasya sādharmyadr̥ṣṭāntasyopādānam /*

<sup>33</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 34.10–34.11: *svaprasiddhena evānumānena virudhyata iti / etāvan mātram asmad anumānair ubdhāvayata iti*. The context dictates that *sva-* in *svaprasiddhena* refers to the opponent; to avoid confusion, my translation supplies "by the opponent" rather than using the more literal "by oneself." Just prior to this passage, Candrakīrti introduces *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* III.2 by stating that the opponent's position is "invalidated by inference just acknowledged by himself"; La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 34.6–34.7: *tatprasiddhena evānumānena nirākriyate /*

<sup>34</sup> This is the thrust of La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 23.3–24.6; translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 38–40).

<sup>35</sup> This statement continues with Candrakīrti's assessment that "Just so, for the most part the Master [Nāgārjuna] refuted others' positions by stating consequences"; La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 24.5–24.7: *parapratijñāpratīṣedhamātraphalatvāt prasaṅgāpādanasya nāsti prasaṅgaviparītarthāpatītiḥ / tatha cācāryo bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiḥ parapakṣaṃ nirākaroti sma /*



inference—*svatantra* inference—in which one’s argument would express a thesis, reason, and example accepted in “one’s own (*sva*) [mental] continuum (*tantra*).”

In the final passage that Jayānanda quotes from the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti would have it that invalidating non-Madhyamaka positions by way of those positions’ own commitments mirrors “worldly” practice. Referring to a kind of legal proceeding, he notes that one party will not accept victory or defeat based on the opponent’s words but will accept a verdict reached through one’s own words; alternatively, a ruling from a judge held as authoritative (*prāmāṇika*) by both parties can determine the case.<sup>36</sup> We have seen that Candrakīrti denies the possibility of an inference utilizing a thesis that could be established for both parties to a debate and endorses logical forms that take their terms from the opponent’s commitments. Here, Candrakīrti further contrasts inference—the terms of which can only be established for one side—and authority, which can be held in common.<sup>37</sup> In making this claim, he refers to and rejects one of Dignāga’s criteria for a valid proof statement, that it “express what is certain for both.”<sup>38</sup> Candrakīrti’s rejection of Dignāga’s criterion suggests that “*svatantra* inference” is shorthand for the kind of inference delineated by Dignāga. Candrakīrti contrasts Dignāga’s form of inference with the “worldly” procedure of utilizing commonly held authority (scriptures) or scriptures and positions held by the non-Mādhyamika. Intriguingly, Jayānanda ends his quotation with Candrakīrti’s declaration that Buddhas, too, adopt this worldly procedure, assisting others by using logic established for those they are assisting. We can deduce that for Buddhas, as for Mādhyamikas, no position is established, no thesis is held.

Turning to Jayānanda’s distinction between *svatantra* inference and *prasaṅga* reasoning, we see his own set of concerns, which—while he surely sees himself as in concert with Candrakīrti’s own thinking—move the discussion beyond Candrakīrti’s deliberations. Jayānanda helpfully prefaces his quotations from the *Prasannapadā* with a discussion of argumentative technique, first defending his use of *prasaṅga* reasoning then showing the problems with *svatantra* inference. He succinctly defines *prasaṅga* as “that which points out what to the proponent is unacceptable by way of what that proponent asserts.”<sup>39</sup> Having noted that Candrakīrti’s arguments take the form of *prasaṅgas*, Jayānanda distinguishes *prasaṅga* from *svatantra* reasoning by comparing each to the standards of valid cognition widely accepted by Buddhists of his day. He considers the objection that for a *prasaṅga* to have any utility, it must be supported by valid cognition:

One might say: “If a *prasaṅga* is stated as a reason, it will either be established by valid cognition (*tshad mas grub pa*) or not established. In the first

<sup>36</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 34.13–35.3; translated in Ruegg (2002, pp. 66–67).

<sup>37</sup> In debate, the Mādhyamika attempts to convince the opponent through *prasaṅga* reasoning or inference accepted by the opponent, not by the Mādhyamika. Then, in “inference for one’s own sake” (*svārthānumāna*), Candrakīrti (La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā*, 35.9) states that what is established for oneself is germane, not what is established for both parties.

<sup>38</sup> In Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as cited in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* (Svārthānumāna chapter), we read (Gnoli 1960, 153.19) *ubhayaviniścitavācī*.

<sup>39</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvataṛaṅkā*, 120a.5: *thal ’gyur gyi mtshan nyid ni gzhan gyis khas blangs pa’i sgo nas gzhan la mi ’dod pa ston pa gang yin pa ste /*. Jayānanda gives this definition after noting that *Madhyamakāvataṛa* VI.9 is a *prasaṅga*.

case, since it is established for both [debaters] how can you say that [only] the proponent asserts it? In the second case [if it is not established by valid cognition], since it is not appropriate for the proponent to assert, how can you say that the proponent asserts it?"<sup>40</sup>

This hypothetical challenge assumes the necessity of valid cognition: either a *prasaṅga* operates as valid cognition or it is not validly established and so the position that it expresses is not suitable for anyone to hold. Further, the challenger here claims that a validly established *prasaṅga* will function as an inference; if it is validly established, it will fulfill Dignāga's dictum that an inference be established for both parties to a debate. This would run counter to Candrakīrti's injunctions that a Mādhyamika disprove a proponent's position solely on the ground of that position and his claim that common establishment is impossible when a Mādhyamika debates a non-Mādhyamika.

Jayānanda's response makes clear instead that *prasaṅgas* are utilized because of the impossibility of common establishment and, perhaps taking the matter a step further than Candrakīrti, as a rejection of the valid cognition enterprise. He writes:

That whatever is established by valid cognition is established for both [debaters] is not known by us. When the proponent states a proof, although the stated reason may be established by valid cognition for oneself, how is it known if it is established by valid cognition for the other [the opponent]? For the particulars of another's mind are not referents of direct perception or inference. And how is it known if [the reason] is established by valid cognition even for oneself? For it could be deceptive due to being held for a long time by mistaken reasoning. Therefore, proponent and opponent assert the nature of things through the force of what they assert to be valid cognition. Thus, it is reasonable that the proponent's position is debunked by way of what the proponent asserts.<sup>41</sup>

Jayānanda's rejection of common establishment points out that anyone stating a reason can never know if that reason will be established for the debating opponent. This complaint that we cannot know the workings of another's mind would not seem to hold much purchase against those committed to formal inference. Of course we cannot know for certain how a stated reason will be received; if the debating opponent rejects the validity of the reason, establishing that reason would be the next logical step. However, Jayānanda has something more in mind: he claims here that one can never know if one's own reason is validly established. Certainly,

<sup>40</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 120a.6–7: 'ga' zhiḡ na re gal te thal 'gyur gtan tshigs su 'dod na tshad mas grub pa yin nam / 'on te ma grub pa yin / de la gal te phyogs dang po ltar na de'i tshes gnyis ka la grub pa yin pas gzhan gyis khas blangs pa zhes ci ltar brjod / phyogs gnyis pa ltar gzhan gyis khas len par mi 'os pa yin pas gzhan gyis khas blangs pa zhes ji ltar brjod ce na /. This passage and the following, giving Jayānanda's answer to this hypothetical objection, were translated in Ruegg (2000, p. 157).

<sup>41</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 120a.7–120b.2: tshad mas grub pa gang yin pa de gnyis ka la grub pa yin no zhes pa de nyid kho bos mi shes te / 'di ltar rgol bas sgrub byed bkod pa'i dus na gtan tshigs 'god pa de la tshad mas grub pa yin grang / gzhan la tshad mas grub par des ci ltar shes te / gzhan gyi sems kyi khyad par mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro // rang nyid la yang tshad mas grub par ci ltar shes te / 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus ring po nas bzung ba'i phyir slu ba 'drid pas so // de phyir rgol ba dang / phyir rgol ba dag gis tshad ma nyid du khas blangs pa'i stobs kiyis dngos po mams kyi rang bzhin khas len pa yin no /.

Mādhyamikas dispute the validity of the reasons adduced by all other philosophical schools for the positions they hold. The fact that members of those competing schools surely believe in the validity of their own positions and reasons (despite their falsehood, according to Madhyamaka) may be what Jayānanda here insinuates. But can one trust Madhyamaka reasoning? Jayānanda's comment suggests that the standards of validity set forth in the epistemological tradition are simply too high to be met. He intends—as will become clear below—to reject the possibility of valid cognition in the world, even for Mādhyamikas; the only validity he will accept is the rarified perspective of the ārya.

In the absence of certainty, debaters simply assert that their respective, competing positions are validly established: one's own logic supports one's own position. Given both the commitments each debater will have and our inability to know the workings of the opponent's mind, *prasaṅga* reasoning becomes the only recourse; one can form convincing arguments only by utilizing what the opponent states.

Turning to the features that distinguish *prasaṅga* reasoning from *svatantra* inference, Jayānanda writes,

Furthermore, as for the position of *svatantra* reasons (*rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs*), if the entailment between the reason and the probandum is established by valid cognition, then there would be a *svatantra* proof (*rang rgyud sgrub byed*). However, no entailment is established, the valid cognition that establishes the entailment being direct perception or inference. The entailment is not established by direct perception: one realizes [the entailment] between fire and smoke in the kitchen by direct perception and non-observation (*anupalabdhi, mi dmigs pa*)—when the one is present, the other arises and when the one is absent, the other does not arise; however, this is not the case in all places. [The entailment] is not [established] by inference either because its sphere is limited. Inference's sphere is not all things because only when the probandum and its related reason exist is the consciousness of impermanence and so forth produced, not in all places and times. Therefore, the world establishes entailments by way of mere assertions, not by valid cognition. Thus, how can you say that it is not reasonable to debunk the proponent's position with *prasaṅga* reasons (*thal 'gyur gyi gtan tshigs*)?"<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 120b.3–6: *gzhan yang rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs kyi phyogs la gal te gtan tshigs dang / bsgrub par bya ba dag la tshad mas khyab pa grub na de'i tshe rang rgyud sgrub byed du 'gyur ba yin la / 'on khyang khyab pa ma grub ste / 'di ltar khyab pa sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni mngon sum mam rjes su dpag pa yin no / de la re zhig mngon sum gyis khyab pa mi 'grub ste / 'di ltar tshang bang du mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa dag gis me dang du ba dag la / 'di yod na 'di 'byung la / 'di med na 'di mi 'byung ba rtogs kyi / yul thams cad la yod pa ni ma yin no / rjes su dpag pas kyang ma yin te / de yang yul nges pa can yin pas so / 'di ltar rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni thams cad ma yin te / gang gi phyir gang na bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel ba'i [sde dge edition: 'grel pa'i] rtags yod pa de kho na mi rtag pa la sogs pa shes pa skye bar 'gyur ba yin gyi / yul dang dus thams cad du ma yin no / des na 'jig rten pas khas blangs pa tsam gyi sgo nas khyab pa grub pa yin gyi tshad mas ni ma yin pas thal 'gyur gyi gtan tshigs kyi gzhan gyi phyogs sun 'byin pa ci ltar mi rigs she'o /*. This passage is translated in Ruegg, *Three Studies*, pp. 158–159. Ruegg interprets the passage in a different light, reading the sentence translated here, “However, no entailment is established, . . .” as “However, [in a *prasaṅga* where no *svatantra* element is adduced,] no *vyāpti* is established [by a *pramāṇa* belonging to both parties]. . . .” I understand Jayānanda at this point to analyze the claims of a *svatantra* inference, showing that it cannot meet the stringent requirements of validity, rather than to describe the structure of a *prasaṅga*.

The crucial issue in evaluating *svatantra* inference is the entailment between the reason and probandum. While a *prasaṅga* embodies a logical entailment, the distinction here is how the entailment is reached. As he did with *prasaṅga* reasoning, Jayānanda considers the possibility that *svatantra* inference could be supported by valid cognition, serially considering perception and inference. Perception fails to establish a logical entailment because one observes a state of affairs (or fails to perceive a state of affairs, in the case of *anupalabdhi*) in one place, not “in all places.” One’s senses are limited. One could well ask why this observation of the co-presence of smoke and fire, albeit limited to the kitchen, cannot be utilized in other settings. Jayānanda would seem to deny the universal applicability of any one perception; consistent with his previous arguments, we might read him here as saying that we can never be certain that two elements perceived as co-present in one setting will always be found together in every setting.

Inference, likewise, cannot establish a valid entailment because inferences, like all else, arise dependently.<sup>43</sup> A particular inference arises from the presence of a probandum and a supporting reason, yielding knowledge of particular circumstances. The scope of inference is limited by the factors from which it arises (it does not arise “in all places and times”) and, like perception, produces a limited knowledge and not knowledge of “all things.”<sup>44</sup> These limitations rule out, in Jayānanda’s mind, inference as a tool for establishing universally valid entailments. His analysis of *prasaṅga* reasoning has already pointed out that claims and the validity of reasons adduced in support of those claims are just assertions, lacking certitude. To this, his dismissal of *svatantra* inference adds that the logical entailment between a reason and the claim that it supports itself is “mere assertion.” The only recourse is to operate in terms of assertion: one states *prasaṅgas* that utilize the proponent’s assertions in order to draw from those assertions conclusions that the proponent cannot accept.

*Svatantra* inference must be rejected, then, due to the impossibility of establishing entailments with valid cognition. *Prasaṅga* reasoning works because it operates on the level of assertion: neither the common establishment of reason and subject nor the valid logical entailment between reason and probandum is required. Having considered both *prasaṅga* and *svatantra* against the foil of valid cognition—having shown *prasaṅga* to operate without the procedures of valid cognition and *svatantra* to be futile because it is based upon an unachievable validity—Jayānanda’s analysis clearly sanctions the use of *prasaṅga* reasoning because of the impossibility of valid cognition. *Prasaṅga* does not oppose just one kind of

<sup>43</sup> Arnold’s (2005a, chapter six) reading of Candrakīrti as critiquing any argument that sets out to prove emptiness/dependent arising on the grounds that such an argument is merely an example of dependent arising offers another possibility for how we interpret Jayānanda’s critique of inference. In this case, the fairly standard translation, “autonomous inference” would make sense for *svatantra-anumāna*, as Jayānanda would be claiming that those who use *svatantra* inference conceive of it as acting “autonomously,” rather than arising dependently.

<sup>44</sup> By stating that inference’s “sphere is limited” (*yul nges pa can*), Jayānanda perhaps offers a play on a central notion of the *pramāṇa* tradition, that valid cognition produces “certainty” (*niścita, nges pa*). We will examine his rejection of “certainty” in detail below.

inference while leaving the bulk of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition intact; rather, *prasaṅga* rejects the entirety of the epistemological enterprise.

### On Valid Cognition

Jayānanda's comments on the related stanzas of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*'s arguments against 'production from self' spell out a denial of the *pramāṇa* project altogether, a denial that travels ground similar to the latter portion of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* comments on the opening stanza of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. Following his remarks on *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.13, Jayānanda begins an excursus on valid cognition that briefly critiques the fourfold model of *pramāṇa* found in Nyāya (and certain early Buddhist)<sup>45</sup> sources before considering the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti twofold model in some detail. Drawing on Nāgārjuna's *Viśvavārtanī* arguments, Jayānanda challenges the notion that "valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) establish objects of cognition (*prameya*)," asking which of the four valid cognitions—perception, inference, scripture, or testimony—would then establish valid cognition. Any of the four that might serve to establish a valid cognition would, being a putative example of a valid cognition, require a further valid cognition to establish it. This infinite regress leads Jayānanda to reject the fourfold model of *pramāṇa*.<sup>46</sup>

Only when discussing the twofold model of *pramāṇa* does Jayānanda come to evaluate the notion of "intrinsic validity" (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*), a doctrine that would end the infinite regress of establishment by holding that some valid cognitions are innately valid and require no further cognition to warrant them. He provides an account of which valid cognitions—subtypes of perception and inference—Buddhists claim to be intrinsically valid and which they claim to be validated by a further cognition, an account that does not seem to be drawn from any one Buddhist scholar's reckoning.<sup>47</sup> Jayānanda has the Buddhist epistemologist hold that inference is intrinsically valid, as is perception in which the fulfillment of a purpose appears (*don gyi bya ba snang ba*), such as the experience of fire burning. Perception in which the establisher of the fulfillment of a purpose appears (*don gyi bya ba sgrub par byed pa snang ba*), such as the perception of a distant fire (which would "establish" such purposes as heating and cooking), is intrinsically valid when produced in a trained mental continuum (*goms pa dang bcas pa'i rgyud*) but is extrinsically valid (*gzhan las nges pa*) when produced in an untrained mental continuum (*ma goms pa'i rgyud*), as for the untrained, the doubt accompanying the initial perception (is that distant glow a fire or not? will it warm me up?) will be cleared away when the fire's effect is later experienced. This does not lead to infinite

<sup>45</sup> See note 12.

<sup>46</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 128a.1–7. However we interpret Candrakīrti's claim in *Prasannapadā*, 75.6–75.13 to adopt the fourfold model of *pramāṇa*, it is clear here that Jayānanda rejects this model and sees Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti to reject it as well. As discussed below, though, Jayānanda makes a lengthy argument in support of "scriptural valid cognition" (*āgama-pramāṇa*), one of the two forms of *pramāṇa* accepted in the fourfold model and denied by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (and most Buddhists).

<sup>47</sup> For a discussion of various Indian and early Tibetan views on this issue, see Krasser (2003, pp. 161–184).

regress, Jayānanda has the Buddhist epistemologist claim, as the validating perception will be one in which the fulfillment of a purpose appears (the experience of fire burning), itself intrinsically valid.<sup>48</sup>

Jayānanda responds that no cognition is intrinsically valid and, therefore, that the search for a grounding validity is futile. His reasoning signals that he must understand his opponent here as a Mādhyamika epistemologist, as he notes,

You do not assert that a consciousness of an observed fulfilled purpose is just true. Thus, a consciousness of the fulfillment of a purpose exists as just having the nature of untruth and so doubts of truth and untruth even concerning a consciousness of the fulfillment of a purpose [which, for the Buddhist epistemologist, would end the infinite regress of extrinsically valid cognitions] are not reversed. Thus, it follows that if another valid cognition assesses [the previous valid cognition, then the process of validation] is endless. Thus, your claim that some valid cognitions are intrinsic while others are extrinsic is not reasonable. Therefore, valid cognition is not established.<sup>49</sup>

Jayānanda's Madhyamaka principles do not admit any *prima facie* valid cognitions; the truth of things will always be subject to investigation and, from these comments, assumed false until otherwise proven. The process of assessing the validity of a cognition would then become an infinite regress: without an intrinsically valid cognition, further validation will always be required. The conclusion, as Jayānanda would have it, is that there is simply no final way of determining a cognition to be valid.

In the process of arguing against any claims of intrinsic validity, Jayānanda further challenges the Buddhist epistemologist's defining feature of real objects, noting that the fulfillment of a purpose appears also in dreams, where it does not correspond to a real object. In drawing out the epistemologist's qualification of reality to show that something that should not qualify as real actually might, he clearly intends to reject the differentiation itself. He has the epistemologist provide five criteria that distinguish real appearances of fulfilled purposes from those seen in a dream, the most interesting of which is that real fulfilled purposes appear in common (*mtshun pa'i snang ba*) to multiple people, whereas dream-fulfillment appears only to the dreamer.<sup>50</sup> Jayānanda rejects this distinction, claiming that it gives undue credence to the waking perspective. He writes, "If you say 'Due to not being observed by the waking, dream entities are deceptive,' then it would follow that the fulfillment of a purpose [perceived] in the waking state also just does not exist because dreamers do not

<sup>48</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 128b.1–7. Jayānanda's account bears some resemblance to Dharmottara's position on intrinsic/extrinsic validity and, intriguingly, to rNgog Lotsāba's position (although both Dharmottara and rNgog provide a much more sophisticated discussion of extrinsically valid perception). For these latter two, see Krasser (2003, pp. 162–163, 166).

<sup>49</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 130b.1–3: *dmigs pa'i don gyi bya ba shes pa bden pa nyid du khyod kyis mi 'dod la / des na don gyi bya ba'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin can nyid du yod pas don gyi bya ba'i shes pa la yang bden pa dang mi bden pa'i the tshom dag ldog pa ma yin pas tshad ma gzhan tshol na thug pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba yin no // des na 'ga' zhig rang las tshad ma yin na / 'ga' zhig gzhan las tshad ma yin no zhes brjod pa de rigs pa ma yin no // des na tshad ma ma grub pa'i phyir ro /.*

<sup>50</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 128b.7–129b.1.

observe the waking fulfillment of a purpose.”<sup>51</sup> In challenging the Buddhist epistemologist’s hallmark of the real, Jayānanda evokes a familiar Madhyamaka analogy, suggesting that there is no good reason to weight the reality of waking perceptions over dream visions. The implication seems clear: just as the waking discount the reality of things seen in dreams, so too awakened Buddhas know the falsehood of things claimed in the world to be real.

Jayānanda’s dismissal of valid cognition, along with real objects, would seem to be self-defeating. How could he validly know that there are no valid cognitions? And, much to the point of the broader context of his argument, how can he validly know that things are not produced? He considers the objection that the certainty (*niścita*, *nges pa*) that “things are not produced from self” must itself be produced by a valid cognition: knowing (*adhigama*, *khong du chud pa*) an object of cognition (*prameya*, *gzhal bya*) depends on valid cognition.<sup>52</sup> If Jayānanda claims to be certain that self-production is false, he must have arrived at that certainty through a valid means; the objection presses the necessity of valid cognition for any real knowledge. Rather than challenge this necessity, Jayānanda cedes the very notion of certainty along with valid cognition. He writes, “If there were uncertainty, then there would be certainty, its antidote, in dependence on it; but when for us there is no uncertainty, how can there be certainty to contradict it? . . . When we do not assert certainty, we make no assertion of valid cognition for the sake of establishing it.”<sup>53</sup>

Jayānanda would seem here to admit a kind of skepticism, in which his rejection of the opponent’s position of self-production itself may not be certain. Is he then forced to acknowledge that even Nāgārjuna’s declaration that things are not produced from self, from other, from both self and other, or without cause lacks certainty? Might there be production from one or more of these alternatives?<sup>54</sup> Was there really a point to Nāgārjuna’s, Candrakīrti’s, and his own arguments rejecting these possibilities? Jayānanda’s answer ties together this discussion of valid cognition with his previous remarks on the *prasaṅga* method:

[Nāgārjuna’s stanza] is a certain statement for the world, through reasoning established for them; it is not for āryas. How could we say that reasoning exists or does not exist for āryas? How could there be the proliferations of reasoning or non-reasoning for those āryas who say nothing at all ultimately?

[Opponent:] If āryas do not state reasoning, how do they induce realization of the ultimate in the world?

<sup>51</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṅkā*, 129b.2–3: *gal te sad pa’i gnas skabs kyi skyes bu rnams kyis mi dmigs pas rmi lam gyi dngos po de brdzun pa yin zer na / de’i tshes sad pa’i gnas skabs kyi don gyi bya ba yang rmi lam gyi gnas skabs na yod pa’i skyes bu rnams kyis mi dmigs pa’i phyir sad pa’i gnas skabs kyi don gyi bya ba yang med pa nyid du thal bar ’gyur ro /*

<sup>52</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṅkā*, 126b.3–5.

<sup>53</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṅkā*, 127a.1–2: *ma nges pa* [the *sde dge* edition reads *ma nges par*] *yod par ’gyur na de la ltos pa’i de’i gnyen po nges pa yod par ’gyur gyi / gang gi tshes kho bo cag la ma nges pa yod pa ma yin pa de’i tshes de dang ’gal ba’i nges pa yod par ga la ’gyur te / . . . gang gi tshes nges pa* [the *sde dge* edition reads *nges par*] *khas mi len pa de’i tshes gang bsgrub pa’i don du tshad ma khas mi len* [the *sde dge* edition reads *khas len*] *par byed /*

<sup>54</sup> In considering this objection, Jayānanda cites *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I.1ab; *Madhyamakāvatāraṅkā*, 127a.3.

Āryas do not state reasoning established for themselves; asserting whatever reasoning that is established in the world for the sake of others' realization, they induce realization in the world through just that.<sup>55</sup>

Having claimed that valid cognition fails to generate certainty, Jayānanda here tells us that certainty is induced in the world, for the world, by means of reasoning established in the world. Our practices of perception and inference will not produce knowledge, but āryas can induce “realization of the ultimate” through a reasoning process that is acceptable to us. The world can become certain of Nāgārjuna's denial of production through his reasoning process and those of other āryas (including Candrakīrti?). While Jayānanda may adopt a skeptical stance concerning our understanding of an ārya's own reasoning process (“How could we say that reasoning exists or does not exist for āryas?”), a more likely interpretation—given his subsequent statements—is that no reasoning at all is established for āryas.

The teaching technique of āryas, then, bears a strong resemblance to Jayānanda's portrayal of the *prasaṅga* method. The Mādhyamika argues by way of *prasaṅgas*, utilizing the opponent's assertions and the entailments the opponent asserts (reasoning that is established for the opponent), while denying that any argument could be commonly established between the two parties. Āryas utilize “whatever reasoning that is established in the world,” as they know that in reality all things lack establishment. Jayānanda very likely sees this resemblance drawn in Candrakīrti's work: recall that Candrakīrti, in the final passage Jayānanda quoted from the *Prasannapadā*, rejects Dignāga's dictum that a proof be established for both proponent and opponent, immediately juxtaposing this with the Buddhas' procedure of leading others to the Buddhist view by way of reasoning established only for those others. Jayānanda reads Candrakīrti's rejection of the common establishment that *svatantra* inference is predicated on as stemming from a great divide between the perspective of a realized Mādhyamika and any opposing view. Rather than adopting a skeptical position, Jayānanda would have it that Nāgārjuna's understanding of emptiness, the way things really are, is singularly true and precludes the possibility of common establishment. Āryas know emptiness and induce others to realize it; ultimately, they say nothing at all.

## On Authority

Jayānanda's linking of *prasaṅga* reasoning and the ārya perspective is consistent with a broader argument he weaves throughout his discussion of the early portions of *Madhyamakāvātāra* chapter six. As noted above, Candrakīrti opens this chapter with an appeal to Nāgārjuna's authority, referring to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as “the treatise composed by the authoritative person (*pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa*)” and

<sup>55</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 127a.4–6: 'jig rten pa rnam la rang nyid la grub pa'i rigs pas nges pa'i ngag yin gyi 'phags pa rnam la ni ma yin no // ci 'phags pa rnam la rigs pa yod dam med do zhes gang gis brjod / don dam par 'phags pa rnam ni ci yang mi gsung bar 'gyur ba de la gang gis rigs pa dang mi rigs par 'gyur ba'i spros pa ga la yod / gal te 'phags pa rnam rigs pa mi gsung na / don dam pa gang gis 'jig rten pa rnam la rtogs par byed ce na / 'phags pa rnam ni rang nyid la grub pa'i rigs pa gsung bar mi mdzad kyi / 'on kyang 'jig rten pa la sgrub pa'i rigs pa gang yin pa de gzan la rtogs pa'i don du khas blangs nas de nyid kyis 'jig rten pa rnam la rtogs par byed pa yin te .



stating that Nāgārjuna has “realized the profound [emptiness] of phenomena.”<sup>56</sup> Jayānanda, paraphrasing Candrakīrti, writes, “It is difficult for those like ourselves to ascertain the meaning of scripture. However, since the master Nāgārjuna saw reality (*de kho na nyid*) directly, we can know the thought of scripture by way of the treatise he composed.”<sup>57</sup> So begins a theme that Jayānanda threads through some forty folios of his commentary: the contrast between Nāgārjuna as *pramāṇa*, or “authority,” and the processes that the Buddhist epistemological tradition advances as *pramāṇa*, or “valid cognition.”

Jayānanda supports his and Candrakīrti’s endorsement of Nāgārjuna with a substantial discussion of scriptural authority that begins, oddly, with an allusion to Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* I.218–219 and autocommentary, in which Dharmakīrti argues that “the words of a reliable person” (*āptavākya/āptavāda*) cannot serve in a strong sense as a means of valid cognition because of the difficulties in determining just who is reliable. If the standards for reliability are the absence of faults and the presence of virtues, Dharmakīrti reasons, then those of us who lack the ability to perceive others’ mental qualities cannot identify a genuinely reliable person; we might try to infer virtue or fault from a person’s actions but, Dharmakīrti reminds us, a person can act at variance with one’s underlying mental state.<sup>58</sup> Jayānanda digests much of Dharmakīrti’s discussion (without attribution) and summarizes, “We cannot ascertain that [a scripture] was composed by a reliable person. Why? Because we cannot know another’s mind.”<sup>59</sup> While this acknowledgement would seem to undermine Jayānanda’s claim for Nāgārjuna’s authority, it

<sup>56</sup> The latter statement is found in stanza VI.3; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 75.17–20: *ji ltar de yis chos zab chos rtogs pa // lung dang gzhan yang rigs pas yin pas na // de ltar 'phags pa klu sgrub gzhung lugs\* las // ji ltar gnas pa'i lugs bzhin brjod par bya //* \*The La Vallée Poussin edition reads *gzhung lug*; the *sde dge* edition has the correct reading. The former statement is found in the preamble to this stanza; *ibid*, 75.14: *bstan bcos tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas*. Fulfilling his commentator duty, Jayānanda notes that “the authoritative person” is Nāgārjuna, among others, and the treatise he composed is the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* “and so forth”; *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 112a.7: *tshad mar gyur pa'i zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te / tshad mar gyur pa yang yin la / skyes bu yang yin pas na tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu ste / 'phags pa klu sgrub zhabs la sogs pa'o // de rnam kyis byas pa'i bstan bcos te / dbu ma [the sde dge edition mistakenly adds la] rtsa ba'i shes rab la sogs pa'o /*.

<sup>57</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 112b.1–2: *kho bo dang 'dra ba rnam kyis lung gi dgongs pa nges par dka' ba yin gyi / 'on kyang slob dpon klu sgrub zhabs kyis de kho na nyid dngos su gzigs pa yin pas des mdzad pa'i bstan bcos kyi sgo nas lung gi dgongs pa shes pa yin no zhes pa'i tha tshigs go /*.

<sup>58</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I.218–219 and autocommentary; Gnoli (1960, 109.23–110.16); English translation in Dunne (2004, pp. 243–244).

<sup>59</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 113a.4: *nyes pa zad pas byas pa yin par nges par mi nus te / gang gi phyir gzhan gi sems shes par mi nus pa de'i phyir ro /*. Jayānanda’s broader discussion (*Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 113a.2–6) follows Dharmakīrti’s text quite closely and additionally reveals his use of Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, as he provides the same example as does Śākyabuddhi for an action that varies from a mental state: we might observe a desirous person acting as though free from desire and vice versa; *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 113a.5–6: *lus kyi bya ba la sogs pa'i 'bras bu yang skyes bu'i 'dod pas gzhan du bya bar nus pa yin te / 'dod chags dang bcas pa rnam 'dod chags dang bral ba'i bya ba byed par mthong ba dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba rnam 'dod chags dang bcas pa bzhin du bya ba byed par thong bas . . .* and Śākyabuddhi, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, 248b.4–5: *lus dang ngag gi mtshan nyid can gyi tha snyad kyang phal cher mang du blo sngon du giong ba zhes bya ba so sor brtags pa bsam pa las rnam pa gzhan du yang bya bar nus te / 'di ltar 'dod chags dang bcas pa yin yang 'dod chags dang bral ba bzhin du bdag nyid ston par byed cing 'dod chags dang bral ba yang 'dod chags dang bcas pa bzhin du ston par byed do /*.

is likely that Jayānanda understands Dharmakīrti's argument as applying to non-Buddhist claims to reliable persons, as he follows this discussion with a denial that the authority of scripture could stem from it being authorless.<sup>60</sup>

How should we understand the authority of scripture if we do not simply appeal to the speaker's or author's reliability? Jayānanda suggests that the criteria by which words are considered authoritative in the world should be applied also to scripture: "in the world, words that are coherent, have a suitable method, state the welfare of beings, and are non-deceptive (*avisamvāda*) are asserted to be authoritative."<sup>61</sup> The first three of these "worldly" characteristics are none other than Dharmakīrti's qualifications (given in *Pramāṇavārttika* I.214) that a scripture must possess to be a source of inferential knowledge, while the fourth is a further condition of such scriptures (discussed in *Pramāṇavārttika* I.215), determined by those scriptures not being invalidated by perception and the two kinds of inference—non-scriptural and scriptural inference (as well as, more generally, constituting the hallmark of Dharmakīrtian valid cognition).<sup>62</sup> Indeed, Jayānanda eventually quotes these two stanzas, while his explanation of these qualifications draws heavily on Dharmakīrti's own commentary on them.<sup>63</sup> Jayānanda additionally—and without attribution—draws on Śākyabuddhi's commentary to explain the process used to confirm that a scripture is non-deceptive, noting that one first analyzes its claims with "the two valid cognitions that operate through the force of fact" (*dnogs po'i stobs kyis 'jug pa'i tshad ma*), perception and non-scriptural inference, and then utilizes "inference dependent on scripture," to determine that claims made concerning "thoroughly hidden phenomena" (*atyantaparokṣa*) are not contradictory.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 113a.6–113b.5. Dunne (2004, p. 243, n. 29) points out that Manorathanandin identifies the position that a reliable person is one with good qualities as that of Naiyāyikas, among others (*naiyāyikādayah*).

<sup>61</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 113b.5–6: *ci ltar 'jig rten pa'i tshig tshad ma yin pa de bzhin du lung yang tshad ma yin te / 'di ltar 'jig rten na 'brel pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i thabs dang ldan pa dang / skyes bu'i don rjod par byed pa dang / mi slu ba'i tshig ni tshad mar 'dod pa yin no /*

<sup>62</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I.214–215; Gnoli (1960, 108.7–8); *sambaddha-anuṅa-upāyaṃ puruṣa-artha-abhidhāyakam / parīkṣā-adhiktaṃ vākyam ato anadhiktaṃ param //* and 108.18–19: *pratyakṣena anumānena dvividhena apy abādhakam / drṣṭa-adrṣṭa-arthayor asya avisamvādas tad-arthayoḥ //*; English translation in Dunne (2004, pp. 361–362): "A statement that is a worthy subject of examination is one that is coherent (*sambaddha*), offers a suitable method, and cites some human aim. Other statements are not worthy subjects of examination." and p. 362: "Its trustworthiness consists of not being contradicted by perceptual awareness and two kinds of inference with regard to both the observable (*drṣṭa*) and unobservable (*adrṣṭa*) things (*artha*) that are the objects (*artha*) of those instrumental cognitions."

<sup>63</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 115a.4–5 quotes *Pramāṇavārttika* I.214–215, while 113b.6–114a.2 explains "coherence," "suitable method," and "human aim." The discussion of "non-deceptive" spans 114a.2–115a.2, drawing on Dharmakīrti's explanation of perceptible objects and objects known by the two kinds of inference, inference not dependent on scripture (*anāgamāpekṣānumāna*) and inference dependent on scripture (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*), for which see Gnoli (1960, pp. 108.9–109.4) and Dunne (2004, pp. 362–363).

<sup>64</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 114b.4–5 quotes Śākyabuddhi, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, 245a.1–2 (quoted and translated in Dunne 2004, p. 363, n. 9) then concludes "If such inference [that is, inference dependent on scripture, which Jayānanda also calls 'inference that engages through the force of scripture' (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 114b.4: *lung gi stobs kyis 'jug pa'i rjes su dpag pa*)] does not invalidate thoroughly hidden entities, they are non-deceptive" (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 114b.5–6: *de lta bu'i rjes su dpag pa shin tu klog tu gyur pa'i dnogs po la gnod pa med na mi slu ba ste /*).

It might appear that, in addition to weakening his claim for Nāgārjuna's authority by citing Dharmakīrti's mistrustful account of the very notion of a "reliable person," Jayānanda has now contradicted his rejection of Dharmakīrtian epistemology, given that he seemingly has adopted Dharmakīrti's preference for the empirical forms of valid cognition, "valid cognitions that operate through the force of fact," utilizing scriptural inference as a kind of epistemic last resort. Before examining this problem, we must consider a further piece of Dharmakīrti's discussion of scriptural inference (along with some of Śākyabuddhi's explanation), which Jayānanda utilizes in order to re-introduce the notion of reliable persons as a means to determine a scripture's validity.<sup>65</sup> Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* I.216–217 and autocommentary present an alternative account of scriptural inference, pointing out that because a credible person's speech is non-deceptive it can be considered inference: because we can verify that what the Buddha said concerning the "prime matter" (*pradhānārtha*) of the four noble truths is non-deceptive, we can utilize his teachings to gain inferential knowledge of other matters.<sup>66</sup> Śākyabuddhi understands these "other matters" to be "thoroughly hidden phenomena"; just as we determine a reliable person's words to be non-deceptive concerning matters that we can know through perception or inference, so we can trust that reliable person's words concerning "thoroughly hidden" matters that we have no other way to know.<sup>67</sup>

Jayānanda, then, summarizes or quotes a substantial portion of Dharmakīrti's elucidation of scriptural authority, albeit out of order (discussing *Pramāṇavārttika* I.218–219 prior to I.214–217). Dharmakīrti's somewhat begrudging admission of scriptural inference in stanzas 214–217 and subsequent rejection of the "reliable person" in stanzas 218–219 suggests a discomfort with accepting scripture's utility into an otherwise empiricist epistemology. Indeed, Tillemans points out that Dharmakīrti holds scriptural inference in strong suspicion: in his autocommentary to *Pramāṇavārttika* I.217, Dharmakīrti notes that scriptural inference is "not at all a flawless inference," while elsewhere (the autocommentary to I.318) he points out that scripture does not produce "certainty" (*niścaya*) and so is not counted as a source of valid cognition.<sup>68</sup> We have noted that Jayānanda perhaps sees no

<sup>65</sup> Jayānanda "re-introduces" reliable persons only because he began this discussion with *Pramāṇavārttika* I.218–219, in which Dharmakīrti critiques the notion, and then discusses *Pramāṇavārttika* I.216–217, in which Dharmakīrti gives some credence to reliable persons. The net effect in Jayānanda, then, is much the opposite of the sense one gets from Dharmakīrti: where Dharmakīrti introduces the notion of reliable persons and then states the problems with "knowledge" so conceived, Jayānanda aims the problems of reliability at non-Buddhists, then uses Dharmakīrti's more forceful account to support Nāgārjuna's reliability.

<sup>66</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I.216–217 and *svavṛtti*; Gnoli (1960, 109.5–6): *āpta-vāda-avisamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā / buddher agatyā abhihitā parokṣe apy asya gocare / and 109.11–14: athavā anyathā āpta-vādasya avisamvādād anumānatvam ucyate / heya-upādeya-tattvasya sa upāyasya prasiddhitah | pradhāna-artha-avisamvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā //*; English translation in Dunne (2004, pp. 363–365). Dharmakīrti gives the four noble truths as an example of a "prime matter" just below this; Gnoli (1960, p. 109.16).

<sup>67</sup> Śākyabuddhi, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, 245a.7–245b.1: *ci ltar mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas mi slu pa'i don yongs su gcod par nus pa la nyes pa zad pa'i tshig mi slu ba de ltar shin tu lkog tu gyur pa yang yin te / nyes pa zad pa'i tshig nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // des bas na don la mi slu ba nyes pa zad pa'i tshig gi mtshan nyid can gyi rtags las byung pa'i blo ni rjes su dpag pa nyid du slob dpon gyis brjod do /*

<sup>68</sup> Tillemans (1999b, pp. 42–43).

contradiction between Dharmakīrti's acceptance of scriptural inference and his rejection of reliable persons, as he seems to read stanzas 218–219 as a rejection of non-Buddhist claims to reliability. Still, it is difficult to see how he could fail to notice the problems attendant on the rejection of some would-be “reliable persons” and the acceptance of others; surely this cannot be a case of simply accepting the authority of persons who say what we like. Does Jayānanda, then, share Dharmakīrti's misgivings about accepting scriptural inference? Does he follow Dharmakīrti in preferring empirical forms of knowledge? And, in a more basic sense, why does he appeal to Dharmakīrti's authority at all when we have already seen him dismiss the standards of Dharmakīrtian validity?

Rather than claiming a second-class status for scriptural inference, Jayānanda offers a strong interpretation of personal testimony. In Jayānanda's hands both of Dharmakīrti's arguments for the reliability of the Buddha's teaching become claims for Nāgārjuna's authority. Following his quotation of Śākyabuddhi's account of analyzing scriptures by means of perception and inference, Jayānanda writes,

Any scripture having a thoroughly pure referent is non-deceptive and thus, following the world, is an authority (*pramāṇa*) because the world asserts that only words with thoroughly pure referents are authoritative. By asserting scripture to be authoritative in that way, we ascertain the prophecies [concerning] ārya Nāgārjuna to be true; thus, it is reasonable to ascertain reality by way of seeing the non-erroneous explanations of scripture [in] the treatise composed by him.<sup>69</sup>

The main thrust, for Jayānanda, of Dharmakīrti's procedure of “purifying” scripture is to establish that the sūtras that Candrakīrti cites containing prophecies of Nāgārjuna are authoritative; the prophecies are true.<sup>70</sup> Since they are true, we can accept Candrakīrti's claims that Nāgārjuna is an “authoritative person” and that we can realize emptiness in dependence on his writings.

Then, Jayānanda punctuates his unattributed quote of Śākyabuddhi's explanation of Dharmakīrti's alternate method of determining scriptural credibility—that we can judge a reliable person's words to be non-deceptive concerning perceptible and inferable matters and so can induce their validity concerning “thoroughly hidden” matters—by noting, “[A reliable person's words] are, in that way, an aspect of

<sup>69</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 115a.2–3: *de ltar lung gang la yul yongs su dag pa yod pa de ni mi slu ba yin pas 'jig rten pa'i rjes su 'brangs nas tshad ma yin te / 'jig rten pas yul yongs su dag pa'i tshig kho na tshad mar 'dod pas so // de ltar lung tshad mar khas blangs pas 'phags pa klu sgrub zhabs lung bstan pa bden pa nyid du nges pas des mdzad pa'i bstan bcos lung phyin ci ma log par 'chad pa mthong ba'i sgo nas de kho na nyid nges pa ni rigs pa nyid yin no /*. The last part of this passage alludes to Candrakīrti's comment immediately prior to stanza VI.3 (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 75.14–16): *bstan bcos tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas shing lung phyin ci ma log par chad pa mthong ba las lung gi dgongs pa nges pas ni /*. Thus, the final sentence could be rendered “it is reasonable to ascertain reality by way of seeing the non-erroneous explanations of scripture [and] the treatise composed by him.” However, in a parallel passage, Jayānanda's text later (115b.6) reads *des gsungs pa'i lung 'chad pa phyin ci ma log pa'i bstan bcos kyi sgo nas de kho na nyid nges par rigs pa yin no /*, supporting the translation “. . . in the treatise. . .”

<sup>70</sup> At La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 76, Candrakīrti cites prophecies found in the *Lañkāvatārasūtra* and the *Dvādaśasahasramahāmeghasūtra* concerning “Nāga.”

worldly valid cognition.”<sup>71</sup> We can recall that Jayānanda introduced Dharmakīrti’s criteria for determining which scriptures can be sources for a scriptural inference by stating that these criteria are worldly standards and, just above, we saw Jayānanda state that the authority of “pure” scriptures “follows the world.” At every turn, Jayānanda frames Dharmakīrti’s words as the standpoint of “the world.” These important signals alert us to how Jayānanda uses Dharmakīrti’s account of scripture: Jayānanda recasts arguments that were intended to evaluate scriptural inference against the technical characteristics of formal inference as instead representing the way of the world. As the world accepts words deemed authoritative on a given topic, Nāgārjuna’s treatises ought to be accepted as authoritative when it comes to emptiness. Rather than allegiance to the Buddhist epistemological project, Jayānanda uses the Dharmakīrtian tradition to validate Nāgārjuna’s singular authority in “the world.”

Immediately after Jayānanda’s statement that a reliable person’s words are “an aspect of worldly valid cognition,” he further undermines Buddhist epistemological commitments by accepting a category of valid cognition denied by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti:

This realization in dependence on a particular [passage] of an accurate scripture is non-deceptive, just like for example the realization of objects to be realized by perception or inference. The realization of a thoroughly hidden object is likewise dependent on a particular [passage] of an accurate scripture. Through this reasoning, a scriptural valid cognition (*lung tshad ma*) of a thoroughly hidden object [arises].<sup>72</sup>

This “formal argument” (*prayoga*), like several other passages discussed here, is lifted directly from Śākyabuddhi, except for the final sentence: Śākyabuddhi concludes, “This is a nature reason (*svabhāvahetu*).”<sup>73</sup> His point here is to fit the reason used in a scriptural inference into one of the three classes of reasons, concluding that the process of “realizing a thoroughly hidden object” in dependence on scripture is a case of utilizing a “nature reason,” by which he means that the particular passage of the scripture that illuminates a thoroughly hidden object is of the same nature as the passages of that scripture that one can determine through perception and inference to be non-deceptive. Jayānanda, however, strikes “nature reason” from his unattributed quotation (he also fails to introduce it as a “formal argument”) and instead concludes that the process is a case of “scriptural valid cognition,” a category of valid cognition

<sup>71</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 115a.6: ‘jig rten pa’i tshad ma’i mam pa de lta bu yin te /.

<sup>72</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 115a.6–7: ‘di ltar gang ci ltar bstan pa’i lung gi khyad par la bren nas rtogs pa de ni mi slu ba yin te / dper na mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas rtogs par bya ba’i don rtogs pa bzhin no // shin tu lkog tu gyur pa’i don la yang ci ltar bstan pa’i lung gi khyad par la bren pa’i rtogs pa yin no zhes pa’i rigs pas shin tu lkog tu gyur pa’i don la lung tshad ma yin no /. I translate *ci ltar bstan pa’i lung* as “accurate scripture” rather than a more literal “scripture so indicated” because “accurate” is clearly the sense intended by Śākyabuddhi’s *ji skad du bshad pa* (in *ji skad du bshad pa’i lung*; see the following note), which refers to his procedure of verifying scriptural passages by means of perception and inference; once so verified, these scriptures can be said to be “accurate.”

<sup>73</sup> Śākyabuddhi, *Pramāṇavārttikaṅkā*, 245b.6–7: *sbyor ba yang gang dang gang ji skad du bshad pa’i lung gi khyad par la bren pa’i rtogs pa de dang de ni mi slu ba can yin te / dper na mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas go bar bya ba’i don ma lus par rtogs pa lta bu’o // shin tu lkog tu gyur pa’i don rtogs pa yang ji skad du bshad pa’i lung gi khyad par la bren pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so /.*

explicitly rejected by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and all Buddhists following them. Rather than soften the validity of scriptural inference by downplaying its ability to induce certainty, and so fall in line with Dharmakīrti and Śākyabuddhi, Jayānanda gives scriptural valid cognition a category all its own and, in so doing, shows just how far his project deviates from that of Buddhist epistemologists.

We have seen that Jayānanda's argument differs from Dharmakīrti's account of scriptural inference in two major ways: Jayānanda utilizes Dharmakīrti's arguments to support Nāgārjuna's authority and turns Dharmakīrti's account into a case of scriptural valid cognition. One final piece of Jayānanda's appropriation of Dharmakīrti is necessary to see how these two dovetail. Jayānanda recasts Dharmakīrti's autocommentary to *Pramāṇavārttika* I.217—in which Dharmakīrti explains that because the Buddha's teaching on the four noble truths (“the prime matter” [*pradhānārtha*]) can be verified by perception and inference, we can accept his authority concerning thoroughly hidden phenomena—to extend an argument we examined above:

By establishing [those] scriptures to be just authoritative in that way,<sup>74</sup> the prophecies [concerning] Ārya Nāgārjuna are ascertained to be just true; thus, it is reasonable to ascertain reality by way of his treatise, which [contains] non-erroneous scriptural explanations spoken by him. Further, having the characteristic of not being invalidated by perception and inference, [his treatise] is non-deceptive concerning emptiness, the prime matter; thus, [it] is non-deceptive also in regard to other thoroughly hidden objects, and therefore is just an authoritative scripture (*lung tshad ma*).<sup>75</sup>

The first part of this passage repeats Jayānanda's previous claim that Dharmakīrti's method of “purifying” scripture allows one to accept Nāgārjuna's authority on emptiness. Here, Jayānanda follows this by offering the same inductive process that Dharmakīrti advocates in regard to the Buddha's teaching, but now in support of Nāgārjuna: Nāgārjuna's empirically verifiable teachings on emptiness enable us to accept what he says concerning the “thoroughly hidden.”<sup>76</sup> This makes his treatise,

<sup>74</sup> This refers to Dharmakīrti's and Śākyabuddhi's explanations of “purifying” scriptures by way of perception, ordinary inference, and scripturally based inference. As noted above, the scriptures in question here are the sūtras Candrakīrti cites containing prophecies about “Nāga.”

<sup>75</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 115b.5–7: *de liar lung tshad ma nyid du grub pas 'phags pa klu sgrub zhabs lung bstan pa bden pa nyid du nges pas des gsungs pa'i lung 'chad pa phyin ci ma log pa'i bstan bcos kyi sgo nas de kho na nyid nges par rigs pa yin no // yang na gtso bo'i don stong pa nyid la mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas mi gnod pa'i mtshan nyid can mi slu bas shin tu llog tu gyur pa gzhan la yang mi slu ba'i phyir lung tshad ma nyid yin no /.*

<sup>76</sup> Emptiness here takes the place of the four noble truths in Dharmakīrti's argument: Nāgārjuna's teachings on emptiness, like the Buddha's teachings on the four noble truths, are empirically verifiable and so support the trustworthiness of his treatises' claims concerning thoroughly hidden phenomena. Tillemans (1999a, pp. 30–32) pointed out that Dharmapāla interprets a stanza (XII.280) in Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* similarly, although in Āryadeva, it is the Buddha's trustworthiness that is confirmed by his teachings on emptiness. Tillemans further points out (p. 35, n. 17) that Candrakīrti, in his commentary on this stanza, notes that emptiness serves as “an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*)” of the Buddha's authority, although Candrakīrti does not follow Dharmapāla in connecting this directly with the Buddha's trustworthiness on the thoroughly hidden. It could be that Āryadeva's stanza, through Candrakīrti's commentary, served along with Dharmakīrti's argument as a source for Jayānanda's presentation. Jayānanda is still unique, though, in using this inductive pattern to argue for Nāgārjuna's authority.

like the Buddha's sūtras, "authoritative scripture" (*lung tshad ma*). This, of course, is the same term that we saw Jayānanda apply to the "realization of a thoroughly hidden object" on the basis of a scriptural passage, scriptural valid cognition, constituting a category of valid cognition not accepted by Buddhist epistemologists.<sup>77</sup> Here, I render the term "authoritative scripture" as (for Jayānanda) Nāgārjuna's treatise is a source of "scriptural valid cognition," just as much as valid sūtras are.<sup>78</sup> But the common valence is clear: Jayānanda accepts scriptural valid cognition as a worldly category of knowledge and (Dharmakīrti's misgivings notwithstanding) accepts scriptural authority—the Buddha's and Nāgārjuna's—as sources of that knowledge.

This reading of Jayānanda's appropriation of Dharmakīrti's "scriptural inference" to argue for a worldly version of scriptural valid cognition, one that legitimates Nāgārjuna's authority, requires two further clarifications. Jayānanda could face the conundrum that he claimed that Nāgārjuna's teachings on emptiness served as a verifiable reason for his reliability and yet at the same time he claims that Nāgārjuna's treatise is our means of knowing emptiness. One might charge him with a circular argument, in which we are asked to accept Nāgārjuna's authority on emptiness as a precondition for realizing emptiness, upon which we would be in a position to evaluate his authority. As I see it, the best solution is to read Jayānanda as saying that emptiness, while not a thoroughly hidden phenomenon, is a very difficult thing to realize; scripture represents the sole authority concerning the thoroughly hidden and also proves crucial with this difficult topic.<sup>79</sup> Additionally, Jayānanda is not saying that Nāgārjuna's treatise is sufficient for realizing emptiness. We noted above (see note 77) that he adopts the classic paradigm of "hearing, thinking, and meditating"; scriptural valid cognition produces only the first, "the wisdom arising from hearing."

A second needed clarification concerns the role of Dharmakīrtian empirical valid cognition in Jayānanda's arguments. We saw that Jayānanda adopts Dharmakīrti's

<sup>77</sup> Another case of Jayānanda calling a cognition "scriptural valid cognition" (*lung tshad ma*), as opposed to using this term for an authoritative scripture, occurs at *Madhyamakāvataṭāṭikā*, 5a.5: the wisdom arising from hearing (from the triad of hearing, thinking, and meditating) is called "the certainty produced from testimony and scriptural valid cognition" (*thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab ni yid ches pa lung tshad ma nyid las skyes pa'i nges pa yin no /*).

<sup>78</sup> Jayānanda could well be using *pramāṇa* here in the normative Brahmanical sense of "means of knowledge," rather than in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti sense of the "fruit" of those means, knowledge itself.

<sup>79</sup> A slightly different and plausible way out of this predicament would be to acknowledge the possibility of realizing emptiness apart from Nāgārjuna's teachings on the subject—Nāgārjuna's treatise is our **best** means of ascertaining emptiness, but there are other ways—much as Buddhists acknowledge the category of *pratyekabuddha*. Such a person would then serve as an "independent evaluator" of Nāgārjuna's teachings on emptiness. A less desirable solution would be to classify emptiness as "thoroughly hidden." Recall that Jayānanda argued that Nāgārjuna's treatise "is non-deceptive concerning emptiness, the prime matter; thus, [it] is non-deceptive also in regard to other thoroughly hidden objects." Why did he state "other thoroughly hidden objects" unless emptiness itself is thoroughly hidden? And, if Nāgārjuna's scriptural authority allows us to know the thoroughly hidden through his treatise, what else but emptiness does his treatise really teach? The problems with this solution are two: First, if emptiness is thoroughly hidden, it cannot serve as a verifiable reason for accepting Nāgārjuna's authority. Second, classifying emptiness as thoroughly hidden runs counter to Āryadeva's and Candrakīrti's views on the subject (as noted above), of which Jayānanda was surely aware.

procedure for determining trustworthy scriptures: one investigates the scripture's claims by means of "the two valid cognitions that operate through the force of fact" (*dnogs po'i stobs kyiis 'jug pa'i tshad ma*), perception and non-scriptural inference, and then by means of "inference dependent on scripture." Even if we place scripture alongside perception and inference as categories of "worldly" valid cognition, it might seem that the verification procedure defers to empirical, "factual" forms of knowledge.

Jayānanda would seem to make the opposite claim. In his brief text, the *Tarkamudgara*, he takes to task several of the key features of Dharmakīrtian valid cognition, arguing against several possible definitions of *pramāṇa*.<sup>80</sup> Jayānanda introduces these (in his view) untenable definitions by noting, "Logicians following Dharmakīrti propound that reality is realized through valid cognitions that operate through the force of fact."<sup>81</sup> This would seem to be Jayānanda's chief complaint against Buddhist epistemologists: "reality" (*tattva, de [kho na] nyid*) is not to be realized by means of empirically based valid cognitions. The thrust of his arguments for scriptural authority is to establish that "it is reasonable to ascertain (*niścaya, nges pa*) reality by way of Nāgārjuna's treatise." Recall Dharmakīrti's point that scriptural inference does not produce certainty (*niścaya, nges pa*) and so cannot be counted as true valid cognition. Recall also Jayānanda's claim that perception and inference fail to produce certainty. Jayānanda would seem to say that scriptural authority is our only source of certainty concerning the nature of reality. His claims constitute an inversion of Dharmakīrti's preference for "factual" valid cognition. Once we accept Nāgārjuna as "scripture," we see that scriptural valid cognition is the basis for realizing emptiness.

### Conclusion: Authority, Validity, Certainty

We are now in a position to reconcile Jayānanda's critique of both twofold and fourfold presentations of *pramāṇa*—along with his repudiation of the *svatantra* form of inference that would be supported by *pramāṇa*—with his adaptation of "scripture," a component of the fourfold model, in "the world." At every turn, Jayānanda marked the arguments he lifted from Dharmakīrti and Śākyabuddhi as "worldly," much as Candrakīrti adopted four *pramāṇas* as ways of "knowing things of the world."<sup>82</sup> Doubtlessly referring to this passage, Jayānanda summarizes his own critique of the epistemological enterprise:

<sup>80</sup> Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikā*, 374b.4: *blo gang bcaad don thob byed pa // tshad ma yin zhes kha cig smra // la la ma rtogs don gsal 'dod // gzhan dag bden pa'i don rtogs smra //* ("Some say that an awareness that reaches an identified object is valid cognition. Some assert that [valid cognition] reveals a [previously] unknown object. Others say [valid cognition] knows a true object.")

<sup>81</sup> Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikā*, 374b.3–4: *yul dngos stobs kyiis zhugs pa yi // tshad mas de nyid rtogs so zhes // chos kyi grags pa'i rjes 'brang ba'i // rtog ge ba rnam smra bar byed //* I discussed this stanza briefly in Vose (2009, p. 77), although there I hypothesized that Jayānanda drew the label "operate through the force of fact" from a bifurcation, like that made by Karṇakagomin, of inference into "operating through the force of fact" and "scripturally based." As noted above, it is clear that Jayānanda had good authority in labeling Dharmakīrtian valid cognition (perception and most kinds of inference) "factual."

<sup>82</sup> See note 11.



Thus, since valid cognition is not established, how could treatises' definitions of the valid cognitions be correctly clarified? Thus, [Candrakīrti's] claim that the logicians' statements of definitions [of valid cognition] are pointless is reasonable because the conventions, "valid cognition" and "object of valid cognition" are established in just the world. This very master [Candrakīrti] made clear that the conventions, "valid cognition" and "not valid cognition" are in just the world."<sup>83</sup>

Jayānanda presents his (and Candrakīrti's) "worldly" system of valid cognitions as an alternative to "the logicians' definitions," both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Rather than classifying scripture as a (rather weak) form of inference, *a la* Dharmakīrti, Jayānanda places it on par with perception, inference, and analogy as forms of knowledge accepted and acceptable in the world.

This suggests we might introduce a tried and true Madhyamaka interpretive scheme and claim that Jayānanda sees the four forms of valid cognition to operate conventionally, while he denies their ultimate existence. This, however, does not quite do justice to Jayānanda's critique of perception and inference, the purported "factual" forms of valid cognition that fail to reach reality, nor to his advocacy for Nāgārjuna's authority as the key to realizing emptiness. We must note also that despite his claim to oppose "logicians' definitions," Jayānanda leans heavily on technical discussions of "scripture," arguing against non-Buddhist accounts and then adapting Buddhist epistemologists' portrayals. Thus, identifying a worldly account of knowledge as one that opposes all technical presentations of epistemology does not entirely capture Jayānanda's usage. Instead, we get a strong sense of "the world's" limitations, a clear-cut delineation between the world and reality. Scripture comes to rank as the pre-eminent form of worldly knowledge because it is the primary means of getting out of that world.

Candrakīrti, similarly, demarcates two spheres of expertise, noting, "Anyone who is not knowledgeable in a particular subject is seen to be not an authority (*pramāṇa*) on that [subject], for example, those who are not knowledgeable in examining precious gems and so forth."<sup>84</sup> This seemingly general observation packs a rhetorical punch: the world can distinguish precious gems from those of little value but knows nothing about emptiness. Candrakīrti states, "In deliberations on reality, only āryas are authorities, not non-āryas"<sup>85</sup> and again, "The world is not an authority in any respect on the state of reality; the world does not invalidate the state

<sup>83</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā*, 131a.3–5: *des na tshad ma ma grub pas tshad ma mams la bstan bcos kyi mtshan nyid yang dag par gsal bar ci ltar byed / des na rtog ge'i mtshan nyid brjod pa don med pa yin no zhes brjod pa de rigs pa yin te / tshad ma dang gzhal bya'i tha snyad 'jig rten pa nyid las grub pa'i phyir ro // tshad ma dang tshad ma ma yin pa'i tha snyad 'jig rten pa nyid las yin no zhes slob dpon rang nyid kiyis gsal bar mdzad par gyur pa yin no /.*

<sup>84</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 112.11–13: *gang la gang gi yul can gyi mi shes pa yod pa de ni de la tshad ma nyid ma yin par mthong ste / dper na nor bu rin po che la sogs pa brtag pa la de mi shes pa mams lta bu'o /.*

<sup>85</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 111.18–20: *de kho na nyid bsam pa la 'phags pa rnam kho na tshad ma yin gyi 'phags pa ma yin pa dag ni ma yin no /.*

of reality.”<sup>86</sup> Perception, inference, scripture, and analogy may be valid forms of worldly knowledge; however, emptiness represents an entirely distinct sphere, one in which only āryas—the source of scripture—have domain.

In keeping with his creative appropriation of the Dharmakīrtian tradition, Jayānanda (in explaining *Madhyamakāvatāra* stanza VI.30, which concludes “It is not reasonable for foolishness to be authoritative”) elucidates, “Whoever becomes just non-deceptive becomes just authoritative; non-deceptive also means having the quality of thoroughly knowing entities just as they are.”<sup>87</sup> In supporting the authority of āryas, Jayānanda adopts the central qualification of Dharmakīrtian validity, non-deceptive, to “define” authority. However, “non-deceptive” for Jayānanda can only be descriptive of the advanced realization of reality; it is not a characteristic of worldly knowledge. This far more stringent interpretation of *pramāṇa* makes clear that while scripture may be one of four means of worldly knowledge, only āryas like Nāgārjuna, “who directly saw reality,” have validity concerning emptiness and so Nāgārjuna’s treatise holds singular authority in this world.<sup>88</sup>

The sharp divide between the world and reality challenges a skepticist reading of Candrakīrti, at least the Candrakīrti presented by Jayānanda.<sup>89</sup> On the one hand, Jayānanda’s critique of “certainty” (which mirrors Candrakīrti’s own) suggests the impossibility of true knowledge in the world. On the other hand, Jayānanda uses terms like “certainty” and “ascertainment” (both translations of *nīścaya/nges pa* in different contexts), knowledge, and realization, all in reference to emptiness. We ascertain, become certain of, reality through Nāgārjuna’s texts. Jayānanda, then, does not argue for the position that we can never be certain that all things are empty, nor the position that there is no particular way in which emptiness can be known. For Jayānanda, emptiness is certain and it is known through Nāgārjuna’s teachings, which lead us out of the world of uncertainty. The pressing question for Jayānanda is not how we can become certain of emptiness but is, instead, who might become certain of emptiness?

We have seen that Dharmakīrti devalued scriptural inference due to its inability to generate certainty. Tillemans further pointed out that Dharmakīrti recognized that for a scripture to produce inferential knowledge, one first has to accept

<sup>86</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 112.20–113.1: *de kho na nyid kyi skabs su 'jig rten rnam pa thams cad du tshad ma ma yin zhing / de kho na nyid kyi skabs su 'jig rten gyi gnod pa yang ma yin no /*

<sup>87</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 151a.6–7: *mi slu ba nyid yin par 'gyur na tshad ma nyid du 'gyur ba yin la / mi slu ba nyid kyang dngos po ji lta ba bzhin du gnas pa yongs su shes pa'i rgyu mtshan can yin la /* Jayānanda’s appropriation of the Dharmakīrtian terminology “non-deceptive” (*avisamvāda*) and “unmistaken” (*abhrānta*) is discussed further in Vose (2009, pp. 74–76), which includes a discussion of the two senses of *pramāṇa* (“authority” and “validity”) in this passage.

<sup>88</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 112b.2: *slob dpon klu sgrub zhabs kyiis de kho na nyid dngos su gzigs pa yin pas des mdzad pa'i bstan bcos kyi sgo nas lung gi dgongs pa shes pa yin no zhes pa'i tha tshig go /*

<sup>89</sup> For a nuanced argument for reading *Madhyamaka*—based on the writings of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Tsong kha pa—as a form of skepticism, see Garfield (2002, pp. 3–23). Arnold (2005a, pp. 121–142) likewise provides a fine discussion of how skepticism might illuminate *Madhyamaka* claims, as part of his reading of Candrakīrti as presenting a transcendental argument.

(*abhyupagama*) the validity of that scripture.<sup>90</sup> While Jayānanda has proven a creative appropriator of Dharmakīrtian arguments, this basic point must hold: Jayānanda's scriptural valid cognition presupposes acceptance of Nāgārjuna's authority. Recalling that Jayānanda founds his claims for Nāgārjuna's status on sūtra prophecies, it could well be that he imagines his audience to be Buddhists of all stripes—those who accept the authority of the Buddha's sūtras should also accept the authority of Nāgārjuna. However, following his own endorsement of Nāgārjuna as an "authoritative person," Candrakīrti recommends that Nāgārjuna's emptiness be taught to those "whose eyes moisten" and "whose hair stands on end" upon hearing the word.<sup>91</sup> Candrakīrti counsels that Nāgārjuna's treatise "is to be taught only to those who have planted the seeds of emptiness in their [mental] continua by means of previous contemplation"; Jayānanda interpolates "the treatise is to be taught to those whose [mental] continua have the causes of surpassing faith in emptiness."<sup>92</sup> Candrakīrti and Jayānanda would seem to be speaking to Mādhyamikas. While much about Tangut Buddhism remains unknown, it is safe to say that at least while in Tibet Jayānanda operated in a Madhyamaka milieu. Jayānanda's scriptural valid cognition, then, would seem to be a function of and for Mādhyamikas.

While Mādhyamikas surely need no convincing of Nāgārjuna's authoritative status, Jayānanda's reliance on Dharmakīrti's and Śākyabuddhi's arguments to make his case for scriptural authority suggests further that he writes for Mādhyamikas well familiar with the Dharmakīrtian epistemological tradition. Jayānanda's argument claims, in the face of the centuries-old union of Madhyamaka and formal epistemology, that the pre-eminent source of knowledge is not perception or inference, but Nāgārjuna's authority. Having seen that for Jayānanda *svatantra* characterizes the chief features of the epistemological tradition, we can surmise that his pejorative "Svātantrika" encompasses those Mādhyamikas who place a strong premium on the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti edifice.<sup>93</sup> His Candrakīrti-inspired reading, not yet labeled Prāsaṅgika, attempts to redress this trend; it is a conservative restoration of Nāgārjuna's stature as *pramāṇa*.

Tillemans astutely suggests that those who mistake Dharmakīrti's scriptural inference for an "objective" form of inference risk a kind of fundamentalism, in which Buddhist scripture takes on a probative force compelling assent to characteristically Buddhist teachings in the same way that the presence of smoke compels us to deduce fire.<sup>94</sup> Jayānanda may go even a step further, not mistaking scriptural

<sup>90</sup> Tillemans (1999b, pp. 43–44).

<sup>91</sup> These statements are found in La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, stanza VI.4, 78.2–78.5: *so so skye bo'i dus na'ang stong pa nyid thos nas // nang du rab tu dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung // rab tu dga' ba las byung mchi mas mig brlan zhing // lus kyi ba spu ldang bar gyur pa gang yin pa //*. This stanza is quoted in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (Bendall 1903, pp. 387): *prthagjanatve 'pi niśamya sūnyatām pramodam antar labhate muhur muhuḥ / prasādajāśrāvanipātalocanaḥ tanūruhotphullatanuś ca jāyate //*.

<sup>92</sup> La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 77.7–77.8: *...bstan bcos de yang sngar goms pas rgyud la stong pa nyid kyi sa bon bzhas pa rnam kho na la bstan par bya. . .*; Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 116a.2: *sngar goms pas rgyud la stong pa nyid kyi sa bon stong pa nyid la lhag par mos pa'i rgyu gang gi rgyud la yod pa de nyid la bstan bcos bstan par bya ba yin te /*.

<sup>93</sup> Jayānanda uses the expression *dbu ma rang rgyud pa* at *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, 281a.6 and 281b.6.

<sup>94</sup> Tillemans (1999b, pp. 46–47).

inference for objective inference, but claiming that scripture supersedes objective forms of knowledge. Does Jayānanda's conservative claim for scripture's pre-eminent authority and his concomitant devaluation of perception and inference belie a similar dogmatism, circumscribing reasoned argument? Are we asked to accept Nāgārjuna's authority uncritically and to develop "surpassing faith in emptiness"? Jayānanda's response must be a qualified "no." He and Candrakīrti see Nāgārjuna's repudiation of "self-production" as taking "the perspective of reasoning."<sup>95</sup> We saw that Jayānanda glossed "the wisdom arising from hearing" as "certainty produced from scriptural valid cognition."<sup>96</sup> While "hearing" Nāgārjuna's treatise can produce certainty, still required are "thinking" and "meditating"; Jayānanda tells us that "the wisdom arising from thinking" is produced from reasoning.<sup>97</sup> While we are indeed told that it is "reasonable" to accept Nāgārjuna's authoritative status, we are also told to proceed by reflecting on and utilizing the (*prasaṅga*) reasoning found in his texts. Jayānanda develops an uniquely Madhyamaka model of scriptural authority that goes hand in hand with Candrakīrti's *prasaṅga* logic, opposing both *svatantra* inference and the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Jayānanda's arguments, then, espouse a traditional account of Buddhist training, now in a Madhyamaka context, in which Nāgārjuna serves as the gateway.

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<sup>95</sup> *rīgs pa'i dbang du byas nas /*; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, 82.18–19 and Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 120a.2.

<sup>96</sup> See note 77.

<sup>97</sup> Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, 5a.5–6: *thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab ni yid ches pa lung tshad ma nyid las skyes pa'i nges pa yin no // bsams pa las byung ba ni rigs pas nges par brtags pa las skyes pa yin no // bsgoms pa las byung ba ni ting nge 'dzin las skyes pa yin no /*. We can note that Jayānanda does **not** identify the wisdom arising from thinking with inference, nor does he identify the wisdom arising from meditating with yogic perception.

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