Rodney L. Taylor is an Associate Professor in Religious Studies at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Author's note: The ideas for this article were first germinated during lengthy conversations with Okada Takehiko at Kyuushuu University, Fukuoka, Japan, during the summer of 1977. The article was first read in an earlier version at the conference "The Sudden/Gradual Polarity: A Recurrent Theme in Chinese Thought" sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and held in Los Angeles May, 1981. I am particularly grateful to Tu Wei-ming for his comments.
Okada Takehiko [a] in his volume Zazen to seiza, [b] a study of the relation between Buddhist and Neo-Confucian forms of meditation, states the basic stereotype suggesting the application of the Buddhist sudden/gradual paradigm to Neo-Confucianism. "If the Chu Hsi school and the Wang Yang-ming school are compared and if the Chu Hsi school is spoken of in terms of Zen, it should be called a cultivated experience and gradual cultivation. The Wang Yang-ming school in the same terms should be called seeing into the nature and sudden enlightenment."  Okada's comment is suggestive of a common model for the interpretation of the inner workings of Neo-Confucianism. Though Okada himself has serious reservations about the import of Buddhism as an explanatory context for the development of Neo-Confucianism,  his suggestion places the primary issue of the sudden/gradual paradigm in proper perspective. In one sense there is a legitimate question as to the degree to which Buddhism serves as an impetus to the development of Neo-Confucianism. In more specific terms, to what degree do forms of Neo-Confucian learning and self-cultivation bear a mark of a potentially salient Buddhist model, the issue of sudden and gradual enlightenment?
Within the breadth of Neo-Confucian learning and self-cultivation there is a fundamental though often subtle distinction drawn between what we might call effort and spontaneity. In very general terms the Wang Yang-ming [c] school expresses a fundamental confidence in man's innate knowledge, liang-chih, [d] based upon their presupposition of the inherent nature of Principle, li, [e] as the foundation of the mind itself. The result is confirmed in forms of praxis which suggest a greater reliability upon the spontaneous expression of man's true nature. On the other hand, the fundamental pedagogical tool of the Ch'eng-Chu [f] school, the investigation of things, ko-wu, [g] necessitates effort and discipline in order to acquire knowledge of the basic principle within things as well as one's own nature. Thus from the Ch'eng-Chu perspective, the major task of learning is the proper training and clarification of the mind that it might be employed to search for Principle. Effort is placed upon the cultivation of seriousness or reverence, ching, [h] to this end. The emphasis is upon the necessity of diligent effort and accompanying toil. There is then a certain sense of ease of learning and self-cultivation in the School of Mind, while such terms seem hardly applicable to the extended process of learning necessitated by the general rubric of the investigation of things.
The potential ramifications of this model of learning within Neo-Confucianism suggest to some that the issue at hand in Neo-Confucianism is actually the sudden/gradual paradigm particularly as it would appear to reflect direct Buddhist influence. Certainly there is a level of commonality of expression if only at a very superficial level, and it may very well be the case that it is not a superficial level alone. Neo-Confucians do not, however, seem to apply sudden/gradual nomenclature to their own modes of discourse. This obviously extends to the Classical Confucian model as well even though it might be argued that the Neo-Confucians debating issues of effort and spontaneity in learning and self-cultivation are doing no more than maintaining a dialogue that bears echoes of Mencius and Hsün Tzu [i] or the Ta-hsüeh [j] and the Chung-yung. [k] For rather self-evident reasons a Buddhist model is not applicable to Classical Confucianism! What necessarily makes it any more appropriate to the inner workings of Neo-Confucianism? Certainly the sheer pervasiveness of Buddhism in Chinese culture and thus the potential for broad intellectual as well as religious ramifications for quite different systems of thought cannot be ignored. As such the sudden/gradual paradigm could indeed play a role and potentially influence a certain dimension of Neo-Confucianism. Here, however, the critical question is the nature of influence itself. Quite simply put, what does it mean to say that a Buddhist model influenced Neo-Confucian forms of thought and practice? Influence suggests various modes of relationship, and I want to return in the conclusion of the paper to a discussion of the potential range of such relationships.
One way of focusing this very broad topic of the potential influence of a Buddhist paradigm within Neo-Confucianism is to narrow the sights to a specific form of practice where we might better be able to examine the practice itself within its Neo-Confucian context, but also be able to adjudicate its potential impact from Buddhist sources. I think it might be interesting for our purposes here to examine a practice that perhaps more than any other in Neo-Confucianism has been discussed as a clear indication of Buddhist influence -- the practice of meditation in its distinctive Neo-Confucian form, "quiet-sitting," ching-tso (seiza). [l] Not only does it speak directly to the debate on Buddhist influence in Neo-Confucianism, but it also suggests the debate within Neo-Confucian circles between effort and spontaneity with its ramifications for the sudden/gradual controversy. In general terms the Chu His [m] School favored the practice while the Wang Yang-ming School felt it to be unnecessary and even potentially harmful as a practice. For Yang-ming and his followers man's sageliness was revealed within activity, reflecting the confidence in the innate knowledge, liang-chih, to manifest itself of its own effort. A meditative regimen was not only secondary, but antithetical to the potential immediacy, tang-hsia, [n] of the realization of sagehood, sheng-jen. [o] For the Chu Hsi School, particularly during the Ming Dynasty, meditation was combined with other forms of learning and self-cultivation and viewed as beneficial to the gradual realization of sagehood. I am intentionally using the terms sudden and gradual here to indicate
the potential perimeters within the Neo-Confucian context. The question that remains central to the analysis of the practice of quiet-sitting is the degree to which it is appropriate to employ the sudden/gradual nomenclature as a description of the practice and its often found culmination in enlightenment experiences, wu, [p] either in terms of its potential assimilation of a Buddhist model or its commonality with a universal characteristic of man as religious man.
The practice of quiet-sitting is discussed by a number of Sung Neo-Confucians, but certainly two of the names most frequently associated with the practice are those of Lo Tsung-yen [q] (1072-1135)  and Li T'ung [r] (1088-1158).  Both are students of Ch'eng I [s] (1033-1107) and Li T'ung is one of the teachers of Chu Hsi (1130-1200). In fact it appears to have been primarily from Li T'ung that Chu Hsi learned of quiet-sitting. The object of quiet-sitting as Lo Tsung-yen taught it to Li T'ung and in turn Li T'ung taught it to Chu Hsi was far more than a simple complement to reading and study. It was nothing less than a form of practice that was capable of penetrating to the very core of one's nature. Lo Tsung-yen says of the practice, "In quiet-sitting one observes happiness, anger, sorrow and joy before they are manifest (wei-fa [t]) and have assumed material form (ch'i-hsiang [u])."  According to the Sung-Yuan hsüeh-an [v] Lo received this teaching from Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) rather than Ch'eng I,  though it is probably not necessary to speculate upon a secret and esoteric transmission as Forke has suggested.  Li T'ung in turn taught Chu Hsi that the practice of quiet-sitting revealed the Principle of Heaven, T'ien-li, [w] in the not-yet-manifest mind, wei-fa. As Okada has pointed out, Chu Hsi was young when he received the teaching of Li T'ung and because of other major influences upon him, Chu Hsi was never fully swayed to Li T'ung's point of view that quiet-sitting was the method best suited to reveal the Principle of Heaven within the not-yet-manifest component of the mind.  Okada cites an example of the influence upon Chu Hsi to remain free from a commitment to methods of quietude. The example is taken from a verse in which Chu Hsi observes:
Holding firm to the recluse life resting in the empty valley,
The wind and moonlight over a stream demand of man his attention,
For the clouds their responsibility  rests with furrowing and unfurrowing,
Yet ten-thousand ages the azure mountains are just azure. 
A scholar by the name of Hu Wu-feng [x] (1105-1155) described Chu Hsi's verse as possessing substance, but having no function and thus running the risk of lapsing into quietude. He countered Chu Hsi's verse by composing a verse of his own that was to suggest the importance of both substance and function.
The recluse is partial towards the azure mountains' loveliness,
This is because the azure of the azure mountains never grows old.
Clouds come out of the mountains and rain in Heaven and Earth,
Having once been washed, the mountains are even more lovely. 
As the verses suggest, Chu Hsi seems almost nostalgic for the simple life of the rustic and expresses a certain sense of appreciation for the fact that nature left to itself is all that is needed. The contrast to this bucolic scene are the rigors of learning and the necessity of perfecting man's nature. There seem almost echoes of Hsün Tzu's metaphor of the blue of the indigo plant  in Hu Wu-feng's response. For Hu the clouds over the mountains perform a function and a responsibility. They cleanse the mountains and as a result the loveliness of the mountain is even more apparent. The ramifications for learning and self-cultivation are obvious: quietude has little or no place in the rigors of learning and self-cultivation.
Hu, unlike Li T'ung, thought that the Principle of Heaven could only be realized in the active capacity of the mind, the already-manifest, i-fa. [y]  For Wu-feng a focus upon the not-yet-manifest, wei-fa, differed little from the theory and practice of the Ch'an or Zen school. Care was taken to ensure the preservation and nourishment of the not-yet-manifest, but the focus of the attention was placed upon the already-manifest as the basis for learning. Hu Wu-feng was a major influence upon Chu Hsi through Wu-feng's disciple Chang Nan-hsien [z] (1133-1180),  and Chu Hsi's eventual qualification upon the role of quiet-sitting may well indicate the degree of such influence.
It would appear that Chu Hsi's successful synthesis of Neo-Confucianism incorporated elements of quiet-sitting, but did not retain the focus both Lo Tsung-yen and Li T'ung saw for the practice. The degree to which Chu Hsi sees quiet-sitting as a part of a regimen of learning, summed up in the notion of a half-day of study and a half-day of quiet-sitting, is the degree to which the practice is subsumed within the context of a pedagogy of learning focused upon the investigation of things. It is not surprising then that for Chu Hsi, when too much emphasis was placed upon quiet-sitting, when it became a practice as an end unto itself, and not simply a subsidiary element in the investigation of things and the cultivation of seriousness/reverence, it ran the risk of becoming a Buddhist practice. 
There certainly exist other and varied perspectives on quiet-sitting during the Sung,  but in the same way in which Chou Tun-i's [aa] (1017-1073) teaching of the "mastering of quietude", chu-ching, [ab] was thought potentially suspicious of Taoist or Buddhist inclinations and thus not given a prominent place in Chu Hsi's synthesis, so too with quiet-sitting. As a practice it can be helpful, but it must be used in tandem with serious and proper learning. In a sense one is tempted to say that for Chu Hsi, quiet-sitting was useful to the degree that it remained focused upon the active component of learning, the already-manifest mind, and it was suspicious and potentially harmful to the extent that it became a practice exploratory of the not-yet-manifest mind.
At least one tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the Sung materials would suggest that quiet-sitting was not the sole prerogative of the Ch'eng-Chu school. A good deal of the reason may simply be that "orthodox" Neo-
Confucianism is only in the process of being defined  and orthodoxy itself covers a range of interpretation from state orthodoxy to the individual not unlike the Ming experience,  though certainly less obvious. However, the fact that Ch'eng I and Ch'eng Hao as well as Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan [ac] (1139-1193) all practiced quiet-sitting suggests a flexibility in the practice that permits it to adapt to varying points of view. Certainly the heart of the Goose Lake Temple debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan did not revolve around the practice of quiet-sitting. At the same time, however, "book learning" versus "immediate experience" is not irrelevant to the practice. Chu Hsi's refocusing of Li T'ung's emphasis in quiet-sitting may be reflected in the apparent "sudden/gradual" distinction between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan. However, as Tu Wei-ming reminds us, the sudden/gradual elements may be quite secondary.
Underlying the difference, however, is more than the conflict between sudden enlightenment and gradual enlightenment. It is also the conflict between the perception of mind as the authentic manifestation of principle and thus the ultimate ground as well as the actual faculty of self-realization, and the perception of mind as the synthesis of human nature and human feelings (a mixture of principle and material force) and thus the actual faculty but not the ultimate ground of self-realization. 
What does this say for the practice of quiet-sitting? At least as far as the Sung perception of the role of quiet-sitting is concerned, it appears capable of fitting into the context of Lu Hsiang-shan's immediate realization of the principle of the mind as well as Chu Hsi's gradual accumulation of knowledge of principle.
The terms sudden and gradual suggest at least something of the general context for the inner workings of the self-cultivation process. As the practice of quiet-sitting itself indicates, however, such differences may remain largely superficial in sudden/gradual nomenclature in comparison to the breadth of the metaphysical dimensions to the problem. It is perhaps the case, however, that even the metaphysical dimensions of the problem remain only partially adumbrated until the Wang Yang-ming challenge to the Ch'eng-Chu orientation in learning. It is a challenge at the experiential level; Chu Hsi is tried and Chu Hsi is put aside. As a result, methods of practice such as quiet-sitting become more crystallized as part and parcel of Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy, and in turn opposition to such forms of practice becomes more articulate by those who reject the Ch'eng-Chu model. As such sudden/gradual remains a loose way of describing the essential difference. Its effectiveness as a paradigm, however, may well be measured by its ability to suggest the inner dimensions of conflict felt by Wang Yang-ming in his attempt to come to grips with the Ch'eng-Chu learning and in this particular case what becomes a commonly recognized Ch'eng-Chu form of practice -- quiet-sitting.
The early life of Wang Yang-ming, as Tu Wei-ming has so admirably demonstrated, is frought with crisis when he is faced with the necessity of reformulating
Chu Hsi's understanding of the investigation of things, ko-wu.  The resolution to the crisis is found in Yang-ming's formulation of the unity of knowledge and action, chih-hsing ho-i, [ad] which as Tu Wei-ming argues, is neither a rejection of the method of ko-wu nor even a minimizing of its importance, but simply a restoration of ko-wu to its original meaning from Wang's perspective.  At root is a profound philosophical difference between Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming. For Chu Hsi principle is acquired from external sources in a gradual process, but as Yang-ming came painfully to recognize through his own practices, such external sources need not be easily accrued to one's own self-realization. Thus Yang-ming grapples with the Chu Hsi formulation of ko-wu and eventually reformulates it in his well known focus on ch'eng-i, [ae] sincerity of intention, with the presupposition of the immanental nature of Principle.
Within the context of the development of Yang-ming's thought there is a gradual change in focus in forms of self-cultivation. One such form of self-cultivation is quiet-sitting. Yang-ming continues to recommend the practice of quiet-sitting even after the formulation of chih-hsing ho-i, however, qualifications begin to be placed upon the practice. Note, for example, the following passage from the Ch'uan-hsi lu: [af]
The teacher said: "Formerly, when I stayed in Ch'u-chou, seeing that students were mostly occupied with intellectual explanations and debates on similarities and differences, which did them no good, I therefore taught them sitting in meditation. For a time they realized the situation a little bit [they saw the true Way] and achieved some immediate results. In time, however, they gradually developed the defect of fondness for tranquility and disgust with activity and degenerated into lifelessness like dry wood. Others purposely advocated abstruse and subtle theories to startle people. For this reason I have recently expounded only the doctrine of the extension of innate knowledge. 
As both Okada and Tu Wei-ming have suggested, Yang-ming moves away from the practice of quiet-sitting as a central component to the process of self-cultivation and instead focuses his efforts upon the self-realization of the embodiment of Principle, ts'un t'ien li, [ag] and the gradual elimination of human desires, ch'ü jen-yü. [ah]  Yet one wonders why Yang-ming rejects the quiet-sitting model of self-cultivation. As Tu Wei-ming has put it, "Why is quiet-sitting, a form of inner spiritual self-cultivation, not accepted as a highly desirable method of learning to become a sage? In other words, if the structure of the self is sufficient for the actualization of the inner sage, what else is needed to manifest what is inherent in human nature?"  Yang-ming would certainly seem to suggest the potential of quiet-sitting as a method for the realization of sagehood when he says in the Ch'uan hsi-lu, "If one's innate knowledge is clear, it will be alright to try to obtain truth through personal realization in a quiet place or to discover it through training and polishing in the actual affairs of life. The original substance of innate knowledge is neither tranquil nor active."  There is little doubt that the self is sufficient, at least metaphysically, to unfold the inner sage. The metaphysical nature of man is not the stumbling block. Neither is the setting;
it can be a setting either of quietude or of activity. However, this is predicated upon one condition -- the clarification of the innate knowledge. The focus remains Yang-ming's reformulation of Chu Hsi's understanding of ko-wu and the priority rests with the process of self-actualization through self-rectification. As a result quiet-sitting becomes secondary, as it had for Chu Hsi, though obviously for very different reasons. For Chu Hsi and his synthesis of Neo-Confucianism the salient emphasis rests with ko-wu and a mind of seriousness/reverence. Quiet-sitting is maintained as a practice, but is important essentially only to the degree that its role is supportive of ko-wu and ching. Yang-ming, on the other hand, in his reformulation of ko-wu as a substantiation of the immanental nature of Principle focuses upon a process of rectification as the existential confirmation of man's metaphysical nature. For both men quiet-sitting pursued as an end is filled with hazards. If put within the proper context it is acceptable but it still remains curiously secondary.
Yang-ming's seeming ambivalence towards quiet-sitting is echoed in divisions within the Yang-ming school. Lo Hung-hsien [ai] (1504-1564), for example, continues to advocate the use of quiet-sitting.  Wang Chi [aj] (1498-1583), Wang Ken [ak] (1483-1541) and members of the T'ai-chou [al] School reject the practice outright as of no relation to the existential context which from their perspective provides the ground for the realization of sagehood. 
What then of the potential impact of the Buddhist sudden/gradual paradigm? Let us return for a moment to the central focus of Yang-ming's reformulation of Chu Hsi's understanding of ko-wu, the unity of knowledge and action, chih-hsing ho-i. In summarizing Yang-ming's critique of Chu Hsi's ko-wu, Tu Wei-ming suggests that for Yang-ming ko-wu as it had been understood by Chu Hsi lacked urgency, "for it assumes that the process of self-realization is necessarily a gradual one."  On the other hand chih-hsing ho-i suggests a certain immediacy in terms of the immanental nature of Principle and thus sagehood itself. If we follow this theme through the liberal followers of Yang-ming, the tendency becomes even more pronounced to focus upon the immediate response, tang-hsia, of the nature and thus the immediate realization of sagehood.
Are we, however, asking the right question when it is formulated in terms of sudden/gradual? In other words, is Yang-ming primarily concerned that he reformulate Chu Hsi's understanding of ko-wu away from a gradual accumulation of external principle towards the immediate or sudden realization of the innate knowledge and potential of sagehood? The answer would seem to suggest that sudden/gradual remain primarily adjectival, that is, they are qualifications upon the nominal substantive, and in this case the substantive is the basic formulation of man's nature. That is not to say that sudden/gradual does not play a role, but simply that the role played may be rather more secondary. As such it may very well harken back echoes of the Buddhist paradigm, but at a level of consonance well below the threshold of sound influence.
Finally, what of quiet-sitting itself? While Yang-ming suggests that quiet-
sitting can be useful, he certainly lessens its relevance to the cultivation and experience of sagehood. The liberal followers of Yang-ming only increase the irrelevancy of the practice of quiet-sitting to the existential context of sagehood. In the continued development of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, however, quiet-sitting comes to occupy a prominent position.  It is as if Yang-ming's failure in the Chu Hsi learning and his own reformulation of ko-wu as well as his own decreasing focus upon quiet-sitting crystallized the relation between Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy and the practice of quiet-sitting. Certainly for a number of post-Yang-ming members of the Ch'eng-Chu School quiet-sitting is of salient import to regimens of self-cultivation.
The struggle represented by Yang-ming's attempt to reach sagehood is also present among Ch'eng-Chu followers during the Ming. The heightened sense of self-consciousness and corresponding genres of self-reflection and self-scrutiny have been commented upon at some length.  There are numerous examples of Ch'eng-Chu interest in and articulation of the practice of quiet-sitting throughout the Ming.  Certainly two of the most thorough-going discussions of the role and practice of quiet-sitting come from the late Ming Tung-lin [am] Academy members Ku Hsien-ch'eng [an] (1550-1612) and Kao P'an-lung [ao] (1562-1626).  For both Ku and Kao quiet-sitting is a major element in their neo-orthodoxy, an orthodoxy highly critical of the Wang Yang-ming learning, particularly the liberal followers of Yang-ming, yet in certain ways highly influenced by Yang-ming and his struggle with ko-wu. 
Quiet-sitting for Ku Hsien-ch'eng plays a major role in his self-cultivation. He is sensitive to its history, that is, the role it has played in the Ch'eng-Chu School and to the reservations and qualifications Chu Hsi had placed upon the practice. Ku's articulation of the practice suggests an attempt to synthesize various attitudes about the practice and from his own perspective to see a much greater role for quiet-sitting than Chu Hsi was either willing to allow or felt could be tolerated without running the risk of appearing either Buddhist or Taoist. Part of the explanation for Ku's focus upon the practice of quiet-sitting is the position in which Ku held Chou Tun-i. From Ku's perspective Chou was central to the Ch'eng-Chu tradition and not simply in terms of the recognized importance of Chou's cosmogony. Ku was particularly interested in Chou's teaching of the "mastering of quietude," chu-ching, a teaching that for Chu Hsi could lead dangerously in the direction of quietude. As W. T. Chan has suggested, Chu Hsi's completion of Neo-Confucianism precluded a central position for Chou Tun-i's teaching of quietude.  To Ku Hsien-ch'eng, on the other hand, the quietistic imagery of man's true nature in Chou Tun-i's thought simply indicated the central role that could be assigned to quiet-sitting. Thus Ku says, "The quiescence advocated by Master Chou (Tun-i) which is doubtless deduced from the 'limitless' (wu-chi [ap]) is the final aim."  For Ku quiet-sitting was to probe the
depths of human nature. The idea that quiet-sitting was no more than a part of a regimen of study and learning, a view held by both Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, was regarded by Ku as but a "preliminary exercise."  As we have already seen, quiet-sitting for Lo Tsung-yen and Li T'ung also involved an attempt to arrive at the roots of one's nature. Ku finds support for his own understanding of quiet-sitting in the Lo and Li tradition. He speaks of the method of quiet-sitting in some detail.
If the mind has something to dwell on it stagnates; if it has nothing to dwell on it drifts. The state "antecedent to the activation of affection, anger, grief and pleasure," of which Li T'ung speaks, is just in the middle between having and not having something to dwell on. It offers an entrance to the interior. If one methodically and continuously (makes use of it), the life force (ch'i [aq]), after a while, gradually becomes calm and the mind settled, and (one can be) in this state when one is alone, when one is occupied, when one is with people, and even when affection, anger, grief or pleasure suddenly overtakes us. When one is always and completely in this state antecedent to the activation (of the emotions), so that there is no distinction whatsoever between interior and exterior, quiescence and motion, then the preliminary phase becomes the final stage. 
For Ku as for Li T'ung the object of quiet-sitting is the direct experience of the not-yet-manifest mind. Certainly for Ku the direct experience of the not-yet- manifest mind need not preclude an establishment of relation with the already-manifest mind, i-fa. In fact from Ku's perspective self-cultivation may only be considered complete when i-fa and wei-fa are thought of as no longer two distinct realms; that is, "there is no distinction whatsoever between interior and exterior." Thus for Ku quiet-sitting does not stop with the calming and settling of the mind within a setting of quietude. The practice can only be considered successful at the point that interior and exterior or stillness and activity are regarded as a continuum.
Ku Hsien-ch'eng's discussion of quiet-sitting raises the question of a Buddhist model in several areas: the relation between stillness and activity, the necessity of meditation to span both stillness and activity, and the sudden/gradual paradigm. The perspective Ku gives to quiet-sitting implicitly speaks to the sudden/gradual issue. For Ku the practice of quiet-sitting leads towards the realization of sagehood; the mind gradually becomes calm with continued practice. With the calming of the mind the roots of man's sagely nature become clearer. Essentially for Ku quiet-sitting is a gradual process of unfoldment and is indicative of Ku's understanding of the gradual development of learning in general. On the other hand, for Ku and the Tung-lin School in general, the liberal followers of the Yang-ming School, in particular the T'ai-chou School, represented the anathema of proper learning.  The reason was a simple one. Presupposing the immanental nature of Principle and thus suggesting a spontaneous expression of the sagely nature, the T'ai-chou followers deemed learning toilsome and discipline unnecessary. If anything such learning and discipline simply stood in the way of the spontaneous expression of the innate knowledge, liang-chih. Learning without
structure and discipline was to the neo-orthodox followers the boat without a rudder, and its result was almost certainly great harm. As quiet-sitting became so prominently associated with the Ch'eng-Chu school in the late Ming and in turn was adamantly rejected by the liberal followers of the Yang-ming school, the practice takes on the character of gradual learning. This seems to hold even where the practice leads to an enlightenment experience as in the case of Kao P'an-lung.
We have with Kao P'an-lung one of the most extensive records of the practice of quiet-sitting. Not only was quiet-sitting a frequent topic of letters, poems, and journals, but in addition Kao wrote two essays on the practice itself. I have discussed Kao's views on quiet-sitting at some length in an article on the subject  and would like here to refer only to those questions that are most relevant to the issue of the sudden/gradual paradigm. Kao's two essays on quiet-sitting are titled Ching-tso shuo [ar] (A Discussion of Quiet-Sitting) and Ching-tso shuo-hou [as] (A Later Discussion of Quiet-Sitting), written in 1613 and 1615, respectively.  I would like to reproduce here the first of these essays.
In considering the method for quiet-sitting, there is no need for any particular procedure. Just act in an ordinary fashion  and let quietude come forth from silence. This idea of ordinary should not be taken lightly for it is the very substance of one's nature. If (the nature) is pure and clear and unencumbered by so much as a single thing, then it can be called ordinary. The changes that took place before there were hexagrams are like this.  What is prior to "man at birth is quiet" is like this.  "Before the arising of happiness, anger, sorrow and joy"  is also like this. It is the naturalness of the Heavenly Principle: something that each should embody for himself to reach self-fulfillment.
In the midst of quietude false thoughts are not to be forcefully removed. Once the True Substance manifests itself, false thoughts will disappear of their own accord. The dark forces cannot be forcefully removed either. When false thoughts disappear by themselves, dark forces will of themselves become clear. Simply recognize the original nature, and the original form will again become clear. Neither attach yourself to a single intention, nor to a single view; if only one thought is added, the original form is lost.
When the transition from quietude to activity is an ordinary one, the activity that emerges is pure. The time of quietude and activity are one, just as the time of activity and quietude are one. The reason that they are one is that they are both ordinary. Therefore it can be said that there is neither activity nor quietude. The essence of neither activity nor quietude can only be observed, however, by the student engaged in quiet-sitting.
If quietude produces results, activity will certainly be productive; and (conversely) if activity is fruitful, quietude will have results. This is none other than what is called reverence, none other than human-heartedness and none other than sincerity. It is the way of returning to one's nature.
In considering this essay several points are relevant to the sudden/gradual paradigm. For Kao quiet-sitting is a process that will result in the full under-standing of one's nature, that is, the root or foundation, pen-t'i, [at] of the nature. It is a practice that is pursued with diligence and earnestness, for it is seen as a method that will reveal the substance of Heavenly Principle, T'ien-li, and thus
the nature of sagehood. In many ways this is reminiscent of the immanental nature of Principle Yang-ming struggled to realize and indicates a certain degree of influence of Yang-ming upon the late Ming neo-orthodoxy. We see this in Kao as well as other Ch'eng-Chu followers; Principle has become something interior, and, for Kao at least, if man can quiet the activity of the mind, he will see the Principle that is the root of the mind itself, what Li T'ung referred to as the state antecedent to the arising of the emotions and what Kao himself paraphrases.
The actual moment of seeing into the nature is for Kao a sudden one, if I may use that phrase. The experience occurs while on a journey to Chieh-yang [au] in 1594.
I passed by T'ing-chou [av] and traveled on by land until I reached an inn. The inn had a small tower. To the front were the mountains, to the rear a nearby rushing stream. I climbed the tower and was very much at ease. In my hand I held a book of the two Ch'eng brothers. Quite by chance I saw a saying by Ming-tao, "In the midst of the ten-thousand affairs and the hundred thousand weapons 'joy still exists though water is my drink and a bent arm (my pillow).'  Changes all exist within man, while in reality there is not a single affair."  I suddenly realized this and said, "It really is like this, in reality there is not a single affair!" There was singleness of thought and all entanglements were broken off. Suddenly it was as if a load of a hundred pounds had fallen to the ground in an instant. It was as if a flash of lightning had penetrated the body and pierced the intelligence. Subsequently I was merged with the Great Transformation  until there was no differentiation. And yet even further there was no partition between Heaven and man, exterior and interior. At this point I saw that the six points  were all my mind, "frame of the body" was their field and "square inch of space" was their original seat. But in terms of their spiritual and luminous character, no location could actually be spoken of. I ordinarily despised scholars who discussed enlightenment with grand display, but now I could see that it was something quite natural and realized that from now on it was suitable to apply my own efforts to this end. 
Kao's description is reminiscent of the classic accounts of enlightenment experiences. The experience itself is a sudden one, but it is a product of an agonizingly slow process of learning and self-cultivation in which moments of understanding, let alone self-confidence, are few and far between. It is precisely the toils of learning that become the agenda of Kao's autobiography.  It might even be argued that part of the purpose in writing an autobiography, as so many Ming figures did, was to try to sum up what in fact had been accomplished over the span of a life of learning.  Thus even though there is a moment of sudden understanding, the regimen continues to suggest a gradual process of learning and self-cultivation.
As far as the method of quiet-sitting is concerned, Kao seems to downplay its discussion, focusing instead upon what he considers to be the naturalness of quietude itself. He advises that distracting thoughts are to be allowed to disperse of their own without force, or even more importantly, without the arising of any intention for their dispersal. Any thought of acting upon them only causes the ruination of quietude itself. Thus one proceeds by not proceeding in an intentional manner. The language suggests Ch'an. It might also be argued, however,
that accepting Chou Tun-i's teaching of quietude establishes the philosophical priority of quietude and thus necessitates only a return to quietude, not an intentional pursuit.
Ideally the state of quietude and that of activity ought to be one and the same. As we have already seen in Ku Hsien-ch'eng, dwelling in the not-yet-manifest mind, stillness and activity are a continuum. Kao uses the phrase p'ing-ch'ang [aw] or p'ing-p'ing ch'ang-ch'ang, [ax] ordinary or ordinariness, to describe the essential state that precedes either quietude or activity and states that through the practice of quiet-sitting quietude and activity may be regarded as one.  The creation of this continuum of quietude and activity, the "ordinary," remains fundamentally for Kao a gradual process. Even with the partial acceptance of Yang-ming's struggle for innate knowledge, Kao still insists that quiet-sitting will not produce instantaneous results, but only gradually produce an understanding through great toil and effort. While for Chu Hsi quiet-sitting was placed in a context of many forms of self-cultivation, for Ku and Kao quiet-sitting assumes an importance comparable to Lo Tsung-yen's and Li T'ung's understanding of the practice.
To what degree is it possible to estimate the influence of the sudden/gradual paradigm in the neo-orthodox practice of quiet-sitting? Even though Ku and Kao engage in typical Neo-Confucian polemics against Buddhism,  a virtual requirement of the neo-orthodox school, there is yet a strong case to be made for cordial relations with Buddhists. For example, Kao has close ties with Te Ching (1546-1623),  and one of Kao's writings on quiet-sitting was written while visiting a Buddhist monastery.  Such visits, which are relatively frequent in the case of Kao, certainly don't make Kao a Buddhist. On the other hand such visits would seem to mitigate against Kao's seriousness in the often vituperative prose directed against the Buddhist. Putting Kao's discussion of quiet-sitting in this context, it would certainly appear that issues raised by these essays have their counterparts in Buddhist meditative praxis. This is not to suggest a necessary causal connection, but perhaps simply exploration of common areas of concern. At a deeper level the contents of the traditions of Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism are remarkably different from each other. Can we assume then that when Ku and Kao talk of quiet-sitting as a method for the gradual realization of sagehood they have a Buddhist model in mind in any manner that would be judged significant?
The tension felt over the practice of quiet-sitting within Neo-Confucianism raises some key questions for the assessment of the potential reflection of the Buddhist sudden/gradual paradigm in various modes of Chinese thought. First, the debate within Neo-Confucian forms of self-cultivation between what we have described as effort and spontaneity may be no closer to resolution by implementing a Buddhist model. It might simply be argued that the issue at hand within the inner
workings of Neo-Confucianism reflects a continuity between Neo-Confucianism and its own heritage in Classical Confucianism as, for example, reflected in the distinction between Mencius and Hsün Tzu or the Ta-hsüeh and the Chung-yung. If the issue is a central one to the classical tradition, then an argument for external impetus is at best only a secondary influence. As a pre-existing structure of thought there may be little influence by the sudden/gradual paradigm per se, or at the very minimum it becomes increasingly difficult to measure. Another point can be made in this respect. It is virtually impossible to exclude the classical tradition as an impetus in the development of Neo-Confucianism. On the other hand, however, it is not easy to suggest that the development of Neo-Confucianism was not influenced to some degree from the cultural milieu from which it sprang. Thus it would appear to be equally untenable to suggest that Buddhism plays no role at all.  One wonders, quite frankly, whether the actual character of the debate within Neo-Confucianism reveals echoes of either a Confucian or a Buddhist mode strongly enough to suggest varying degrees of consonance with the root paradigms.
A second question seems relevant. Is the application of sudden/gradual terminology to the inner workings of Neo-Confucianism a clear and consistent process which establishes an equivalency of meaning within both traditions? One aspect of the problem would seem the establishment of a consistent use of the sudden/gradual paradigm within the Buddhist context itself. My impression of the usage of sudden/gradual terminology has suggested a certain pejorative connotation. Gradual seems always to be what the other person represents, that is, "otherness," with its connotation of inferiority.  Essentially no one calls himself a member of the "lesser vehicle." Surely something other than a pejorative is intended, but does it possess a consistent usage? Consistency is not irrelevant, for if Neo-Confucianism is indeed influenced by the model it would be assumed that there is enough consistency to create a model! Depending again upon the actual nature of the debate within Buddhism, it might be argued that the sudden enlightenment experiences of those Neo-Confucians who practiced quiet-sitting and define their self-cultivation within a meditative regimen gravitates against the application of the Buddhist paradigm in any meaningful manner. In such a case sudden and gradual simply break down as meaningful distinctions. On the other hand, the distinction between the Ch'eng-Chu model of an extensive program of learning and the Yang-ming focus upon enlightenment embodied within ordinary existence may be all that is meant by the application of the Buddhist paradigm.
If indeed this is the level at which the paradigm is applicable and there exists a more than plausible model from within the tradition in terms of its own roots, then how are we to adjudicate the potential influence of either of these models? The focus must necessarily be upon the meaning of influence. In suggesting, for example, that there are broad intellectual and religious ramifications of a controversy within Buddhist circles we are proposing a transfer of situation and
in turn a translation of that situation to the degree that the given model is assimilated into an assumingly different context. Influence, or the transfer and translation of situation, implies several different types of relationships that might occur between the model and its different contexts. Avoiding spurious relations, either forms of mis-translation or over-translation, the potential impact of transfer of paradigms can be expressed in several different modes.
Several terms describe modes of relationship between traditions though they often seem marred by imprecise or inconsistent usage. One can speak of historical interrelationship, eclecticism, syncretism, or synthesis, and potentially each could explain the ramifications of the sudden/gradual paradigm. Essentially the terms are arranged in ascending order of complexity of assimilation, at least insofar as there is an internal consciousness of the process of assimilation and an increasing attempt to deal with the model and its potential ramifications upon assimilation.
A historical interrelationship, for example, suggests contact between traditions and the borrowing of ideas and practices such that the given ideas and practices would be assimilated into the framework of a particular point of view with little attention to a restructuring of the truth claims of the initial and basic point of view. In fact the assimilation of "outside" influences is thought of only as augmentation to assist or even reinforce the primary world-view. If we take the example of quiet-sitting, it might be argued that a form of meditation is not part of the Classical Confucian tradition and is thus obviously of non-Confucian origin, either Buddhist or perhaps Taoist. Liu Ts'un-yan, in discussing Taoist self-cultivation during the Ming, suggests this by stating that the "Neo-Confucians merely invented a system of mental cultivation which the Confucians had never before possessed... So they were obliged to adopt such a system of mystical practice from other religions and present it in respectable language taken from the Confucian Classics."  Quite apart from the difficulties Liu's point of view represents, it could certainly be concluded that the Sung Neo-Confucians primarily responsible for the formulation of quiet-sitting were influenced by a model of meditation whether Buddhist or Taoist. This does not suggest, however, that by adapting and practicing quiet-sitting the basic Neo-Confucian orientation has been altered in any significant manner. The critical issue in historical interrelationship is that borrowing and adaptation can take place but without any radical change or augmentation to the respective truth claims of the root tradition.  Thus in this particular case the practice of meditation is borrowed and placed within a set of propositions that remain fundamentally Confucian, and the very object of the practice itself is the experiential verification of the truth claims. If this is the suitable framework for the sudden/gradual paradigm it is suggestive of the common origin of processes of self-cultivation, but is attenuated at the level of truth claims.
An eclectic model is more complex, if only because the term itself implies not only complexity of relation, but a certain element of inconsistency as well.  The
use of the term eclecticism often suggests a pejorative judgment: to say someone is eclectic is to say that what he holds comes from different sources and there is an internal inconsistency about the combination itself. Or it simply may mean that one doesn't understand how an individual holds the beliefs he holds.  If Neo-Confucianism is described as eclectic and quiet-sitting is regarded as an example of such eclecticism, the practice would be judged to find its origin in non-Confucian sources, but something more is involved. In addition to a practice from non-Confucian sources, eclecticism would imply that quiet-sitting would bring with it certain elements of the original setting that would not assimilate with Neo-Confucian truth claims. In terms of the sudden/gradual paradigm, eclecticism would suggest that the Neo-Confucian finds the model attractive in itself, quite apart from whether it has correlates to the larger context of the Neo-Confucian world-view.
A syncretic model suggests yet another stage of assimilation. If syncretism is not a misused form of historical interrelationship, but instead regarded as a separate phenomenon in which the participant is conscious of the truth claims of the respective traditions, then a syncretic model would suggest a highly complex interrelationship. In the case of a true syncretism, quiet-sitting would carry with it a certain world view and would be assimilated into Neo-Confucianism with a more obvious concern for its Buddhist or Taoist roots. Those who suggest that a Confucian cannot practice quiet-sitting without falling into Buddhism come close to this perspective. That is, the practice cannot be removed from its moorings: a simple historical borrowing of a practice does not explain syncretism.  There must be a conscious attempt to reconcile potentially conflicting truth claims. In the case of the sudden/gradual paradigm, syncretism would suggest that it is more than a model for processes of self-cultivation. It would be instead an attempt to deal with the truth claims the sudden/gradual model presupposes.
The final relation, a synthetic mode, suggests that truth claims rest not with the respective traditions whose practices and ideas are being assimilated, but rather in the assimilation itself. In other words, a new point of view is created claiming its own prepositional truth value.  In this case it is the combination of elements that creates something categorically different. If this were to be applied to Neo-Confucianism, then the Neo-Confucian who practices quiet-sitting would have reached a new point of view which precludes a label of crypto-Buddhist, but it also limits the usefulness of the designation Neo-Confucian.
It seems obvious that we are not dealing with a synthesis, for there is nothing posited that circumvents the perimeters of the respective traditions, unless one argues that something such as the T'ai-chou School represents a categorically different phenomenon.  In turn a true syncretism seems ill-suited to describe the potential impact of the sudden/gradual paradigm, for the Neo-Confucian is not entertaining Buddhist truth claims.  Eclecticism is at best a bad term. It would be difficult to suggest that inconsistency is an appropriate designation whatever
the roots of the given practice. Historical interrelationship seems at least at one level the most appropriate designation. Neo-Confucianism was influenced by Buddhism and such influence plays its role in developing and defining the continuing world view bound by a certain set of truth claims that remain remarkably Confucian.
1. Takehiko Okada, Zazen to seiza (Tokyo, 1972), p. 95.
3. On Lo Tsung-yen see Huang Tsung-hsi, Sung-yüan hsüeh-an (Taipei, 1975) 10/58-65.
4. On Li T'ung see Huang, Sung-yüan hsüeh-an 10/65-79.
5. Huang, Sung-yüan hsüeh-an 10/63.
6. Huang, Sung-yüan hsüeh-an 10/64.
7. Alfred Forke, Geschichte der neueren chinesischen Philosophie (Hamburg: Friederichen, DeGruyter & Co., 1938), pp. 156-163.
8. Okada, p. 118. See also Huang, Sung-yüan hsüeh-an 10/72.
9. The term "responsibility", i-jen, [ay] suggests the responsibility of holding office and assuming one's rightful duty. Used in this way it reinforces Chu Hsi's own sense of the eremitic ideal in the present poem.
10. The verse is from the poem Sung hu chi-ch'i and is quoted in Okada, pp. 118-119.
11. Quoted in Okada, p. 119.
12. Hsün-tzu 1/1.
13. Okada, p. 119.
14. Tu Wei-ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), p. 129.
15. Okada, p. 123.
16. Note for example Lu Hsiang-shan's practice of quiet-sitting. See Siu-chi Huang, Lu Hsiang-shan: A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher (New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1944), pp. 69-70.
17. See W. T. Chan's seminal article on the role played by Chu Hsi in the formation of Neo-Confucianism. W. T. Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," Etudes Song -- Sung Studies: In Memoriam Etienne Balazs, ed. Francoise Aubin (Paris: Mouton, 1973), pp. 59-90.
18. On the range of meanings to orthodoxy during the Ming see W. T. de Bary, "Introduction," Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, eds. W. T. de Bary & Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 16-17.
19. Tu Wei-ming, p. 130.
20. Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming's Youth (1472-1509) (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 163-167.
21. Tu Wei-ming, Essays, p. 146.
22. W. T. Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 217.
23. Okada, p. 91 and Tu Wei-ming, Essays, p. 149.
24. Tu Wei-ming, Essays, p. 149.
25. W. T. Chan, Instructions, p. 217.
26. See Dictionary of Ming Biography 1368-1644, eds. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 980-984. Hereafter cited as DMB.
27. This is exemplified in W. T. de Bary, "Introduction," The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, ed. W. T. de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 18-19. A further discussion is found in W. T. de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth Century 'Enlightenment'," Unfolding, pp. 194-199. See also Tu Wei-ming, Essays, pp. 149-154.
28. Tu Wei-ming, Essays, p. 145.
29. See Heinrich Busch, "The Tung-lin Academy and Its Political and Philosophical Significance," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1945. Page references refer to the dissertation. Also published in Monumenta Serica 14 (1949-1955): 1-163. See also R. L. Taylor, The Cultivation of Sagehood as a Religious Goal in Neo-Confucianism: A Study of Selected Writings of Kao P'an-lung, 1562-1626 (Missoula, Montana: Scholar's Press/American Academy of Religion, 1978), pp. 78-88, 187-202.
30. See W. T. de Bary, "Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought," Self and Society in Ming Thought, ed. W. T. de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 145-247.
31. See R. L. Taylor, "Meditation in Ming Neo-Orthodoxy: Kao P'an-lung's Writings on Quiet- Sitting," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6 (1979), pp. 142-182.
32. Busch, pp. 168-174, 178-188; Taylor, "Meditation"; on Ku see DMB, pp. 736-744: on Kao see DMB, pp. 701-710.
33. See Taylor, Cultivation of Sagehood, pp. 47-58.
34. W. T. Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion," p. 63.
35. Busch, p. 174.
36. Chung-yung 1/4.
37. Busch, p. 174.
38. See, for example, Busch, pp. 110-125 where the attacks on Wang Yang-ming followers are discussed in some detail.
39. Taylor, "Meditation."
40. Found in the collected works of Kao P'an-lung, Kao-tzu i-shu, [az] ed. Ch'en Lung-cheng [ba] (1585-1645) (1876 ed.), 3/19b-21a. Dating is based upon the chronological biography of Kao, Kao Chung-hsien kung nien-p'u, [bb] ed. Hua Yün-ch'eng [bc] (d. 1648), appendix to Kao-tzu i-shu, 15b.
41. Kao-tzu i-shu, 3/19b-20a.
42. The text uses both p'ing-p'ing ch'ang-ch'ang and p'ing-ch'ang rendered as ordinary or ordinariness but suggesting that which is most essential to man's nature.
43. Undifferentiated change and transformation before the specification of individual situations of change.
44. Li Chi, yüeh-chi, [bd] 1/1/11.
45. Chung-yung, 1/4.
46. Analects, 7/15.
47. Erh-ch'eng ch'üan-shu, [be] SPPY ed., Vol. I, 6/3a.
48. The cycle of increase and decrease of yin [bf] and yang [bg] throughout the four seasons.
49. The four cardinal directions plus zenith and nadir.
50. Kao P'an-lung, K'un-hsüeh chi, [bh] found in Kao-tzu i-shu 3/13b-17b.
51. See R. L. Taylor, "The Centered Self: Religious Autobiography in the Neo-Confucian Tradition," History of Religions 17, nos. 3-4 (February-May, 1978): 266-283.
52. The theme is developed in my article "Acquiring a Point of View: Confucian Dimensions of Self-Reflection," forthcoming Monumenta Serica 34.
53. See Taylor, "Meditation." pp. 172-174, where the dimensions of these terms are explored.
54. See Busch, pp. 126-134. Kao wrote a refutation of Buddhism titled I-tuan pien [bi] in 1605 (Kao-tzu i-shu, 3/51b-54a); a partial translation is contained in my Cultivation of Sagehood, p. 21.
55. See Pei-yi Wu, "The Spiritual Autobiography of Te-ch'ing," Unfolding, pp. 83-84.
56. See for example Shan-chü k'o-cheng, [bj] Kao-tzu i-shu 3/18a, translated in my Cultivation of Sagehood, pp. 195-196.
57. Okada cautions against value judgments in this question. "In general terms those who defend Buddhism have a tendency to criticize the Chu Hsi and Yang-ming learning as a remolded and renovated form of Zen, particularly the Yang-ming learning. Chu Hsi and Yang-ming were critical of Zen and did not take up a Buddhist point of view, yet when discussed from a Buddhist standpoint their arguments are said to derive from Zen." (Okada, p. 95.)
58. Strenski raises some basic philosophical issues involved in attempting to define and explicate the sudden/gradual categories and goes on to suggest an intriguing solution based upon the predominance of a priori epistemological models in meditational practice. "Typically, it is facilely
assumed that this problem is merely a factual matter about temporal duration... What could have been the possible interest for the early Buddhist in saying that enlightenment was to be attained gradually?" (See Ivan Strenski, "Gradual Enlightenment, Sudden Enlightenment and Empiricism," Philosophy East and West 30, no. 1 (Jan., 1980): 3-4.
59. Liu Ts'un-yan, "Taoist Self-Cultivation in Ming Thought," Self and Society, p. 312.
60. What I am describing as historical interrelationship and borrowing is the manner in which Berling seeks to define syncretism. (Judith Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 9-13) I argue at some length against this as a definition of syncretism in my article "Proposition and Praxis: The Dilemma of Neo-Confucian Syncretism," Philosophy East and West 32, no. 2 (April, 1982): 187-199.
61. The term remains primarily as a description of what others do or believe and to this degree it often becomes a value judgement.
62. The manner in which the beliefs remain misunderstood with the application of the term eclecticism suggests the quite spurious nature of the term itself.
63. See my "Proposition and Praxis."
64. Robert Baird has suggested that the term synthesis might be applied to an implied unity but is more concerned with its potential self-contradictory claim than the creation of a new position with correspondingly new truth claims as I argue. See Robert Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 147.
65. See Thomas A. Metzger, Escape From Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 52-53.
66. See my "Proposition and Praxis." 194-195.