Two Main Streams of Thought
in Yogacara Philosophy
By Yoshifumi Ueda

Philosophy East and West
V. 17 (1967)
pp. 155-165

Copyright 1967 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA



p. 155


    IN THE TRADITION OF Buddhism which has been transmitted to China and Japan, we can see two basically different streams of thought in the Yogaacaara philosophy. Although this fact is well-known among Japanese scholars, it does not seem to be widely known among American, European, and Indian scholars. In order to understand correctly the Yogaacaara philosophy, however, the clear understanding of these two streams of thought, their mutual differences, and their relation to the theories of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu is indispensable.

    One of these two streams was introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang. Although the thought of this stream can be known through the works of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Hsuang-tsang, it can be known in its most all-inclusive and systematic form in the Ch'eng wei shih lun of Dharmapaala.[1] This stream of thought continued from the time of Hsuang-tsang to the present day. Happily, it did not die out in China and Japan where its study was continued and where present-day scholars are well acquainted with it. There is no unclear point as regards the more important aspects of this stream of thought.

    The other stream of thought, represented by the works of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu as translated by Buddhasaanta, Bodhiruci, Paramaartha, Dharmagupta, Prabhaakaramitra, and others, was introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang. The translations of these masters, unlike those of the other stream, were not widely studied and the actual nature of its thought is difficult to determine. With the exception of Paramaartha, there are only one or two translated works of each of these masters. And,  

1.    Dharmapaala and others, Ch'eng wei shih lun,[p] Taisho-Daizokyo, Vol. 31, No. 1585. French translation: "Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi," by Dharmapaala, translated from Chinese into French by La Vallee Poussin (Paris, 1928-1929).



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even in the study of their works, it is not possible to determine the differences from the other stream of Yogaacaara thought.

    Paramaartha, however, translated a great many of the important works of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu. And, with the discovery and publication of the Sanskrit texts, eminent scholars of Japan have done comparative studies based on the Sanskrit original and the Chinese and Tibetan translations in order to determine the extent to which the stream of thought introduced into China before the time of Hsuang-tsang differs from that stream which was introduced by Hsuang-tsang. The results of this research clearly show that there is a fundamental difference between the theory introduced by Paramaartha and that of Hsuang-tsang. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that the theories introduced by Paramaartha and Hsuang-tsang are both said to be the theories of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu. If the theories of Paramaartha and Hsuang-tsang are fundamentally different, the problem arises as to which transmission is faithful to the theories of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu; or, if they are both separate traditions, what was the theory of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu? This has been the focus of attention of present-day Japanese scholars doing research in the Yogaacaara philosophy. As the studies of the Yogaacaara philosophy by Western and Indian scholars have been lacking in knowledge of these two streams of thought, their interpretations of the central problems of the Yogaacaara philosophy have been ambiguous and often erroneous and do not show a clear understanding of it. Their understanding of the Yogaacaara philosophy is not in accord with the theory of either one of these two streams of thought. And, because the differences between their interpretations and the two streams of thought are not clear, one cannot find a clear-cut understanding of the theories of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu.

    It is my aim in this paper to present the differences of interpretation of these two streams of thought relating to the theories of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu which were transmitted to China and to examine the question of which of the two streams is faithful to the thought of Maitreya, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu. As this paper cannot possibly deal with the whole of the Yogaacaara philosophy, it will deal with only a few of the essential points.



    The fundamental concept of the 'consciousness-only'[a] theory brought to China by Hsuang-tsang is the idea of vij~naanapari.naama, for through this idea it is possible to establish the theory that the trees, birds, mountains, and



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rivers which the average man takes to be real existences are not real existences as he takes them to be. This concept of vij~naanapari.naama first appears in the Tri^m`sikaa of Vasubandhu. In his commentary on the Tri^m`sikaa of Vasubandhu, the Ch'eng wei shih lun, Dharmapaala explains the term as follows:

    "These consciousnesses"[b] [in the 17th verse] refer to the previously stated three evolving consciousnesses with their concomitant psychic activities. The evolution of all of these, i.e., consciousnesses and the concomitant psychic activities into the seeing part (dar`sana-bhaaga) and seen part (nimitta-bhaaga) is called "evolution"[c] (pari.naama). The evolved seeing part is called "a perceiver or knower"[d] [in the same verse], because it perceives or knows the seen part. The evolved seen part is called "that to be perceived or known,"[e] because it is perceived or known by the seeing part. (Ch'eng wei shih lun, 7th chuan, Taisho, no. 1585, p. 38c.)

Thus, according to Dharmapaala, "evolution" means that the mind or consciousness,[f] and its concomitant psychic activities,[g] appear in the form of the seer and the seen, and that "the perceiver or knower," in the 17th kaarikaa, is the seeing part and "that to be perceived or known" is the seen part. All the objects, such as trees, mountains, birds, etc., which are considered by an ordinary man really to exist outside our consciousness are expounded to be none other than the seen part of the consciousness (vij~naana). Vij~naana is divided into eight kinds, and accordingly, the seen part too is divided into eight kinds. The eight kinds of vij~naana are (1) eye-consciousness (cak.sur-vij~naana), (2) ear-consciousness (`srotra-vij~naana), (3) nose-consciousness (, (4) tongue-consciousness (jihvaa-vij~naana), (5) body-consciousness (kaaya-vij~naana),(6) thinking consciousness (mano-vij~naana), (7) subconscious mind (manas), and (8) store mind (aalaya-vij~naana). Of these, the first five consciousnesses and the thinking consciousness are not born when one is fast asleep, in a faint, or in the samaadhi without consciousness. Consequently, their seen parts are not born. Even in these states of mind, however, aalayavij~naana is born and consequently, its seen part is born. For example, a mountain as the seen part of the thinking consciousness does not exist when one is fast asleep. But the mountain as the seen part of aalayavij~naana exists even though one is fast asleep. The mountains and rivers which are thought really to exist by the ordinary man are none other than the seen part of aalayavij~naana.

    However, this understanding of Dharmapaala of the vij~naanapari.naama in the 17th kaarikaa differs from what is to be found in the Sanskrit text.

    In the first place, the demonstrative pronoun 'this' (ayam) in the Sanskrit text refers to pari.naama; Hsuang-tsang's translation attaches it to consciousness, thus translating "These consciousnesses. . . ."[h] Since, according to the Sanskrit text of the Tri^m`sikaa, the words "this vij~naana-pari.naama" refer to



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the three kinds of vij~naana, i.e., aalayavij~naana, kli.s.ta-manas, and vi.sayasya vij~napti, explained from the 2nd kaarikaa through the 16th kaarikaa, it can be inferred that the content of "pari.naama.h sa" in the 1st kaarikaa is vij~naana, that is, the compound "vij~naana-pari.naama" is used as karmadhaaraya. Throughout this section, the Sanskrit text makes no reference to the fact that the seeing and seen parts are evolved from the vij~naana. In other words, this section is nothing more than an explanation of the three kinds of vij~naana and not of the evolution of vij~naana. According to the Chinese translation, however, vij~naana and pari.naama mean different things. This section of the Chinese translation which is an explanation of the three kinds of vij~naana could not be interpreted as an explanation of pari.naama. Therefore, the word "these"[i] must be attached to consciousnesses and not to evolution (pari.naama). And accordingly, pari.naama of pari.naama.h sa ca tridhaa in the 1st kaarikaa could not be translated chuan p'ien (evolution), because it means the three kinds of vij~naana. Therefore the Chinese translation gives Neng p'ien,[j] giving it the meaning of vij~naana. Thus, we would have to conclude that the word pari.naama, capable of having the meaning of vij~naana according to Vasubandhu and not capable of having this meaning according to Dharmapaala, has a different meaning in each case.

    In the second place, according to Vasubandhu's reading of the text, the first sentence in the 17th kaarikaa should end on the word vikalpa. The reason for this is that the pari.naama is vij~naana. The 17th kaarikaa explains that all vij~naanas, i.e., the three kinds of pari.naama, taught up through the 16th kaarikaa are vikalpa (discrimination or conceptualizing thinking). A second reason for the sentence to end with vikalpa is that the following yad vikalpyate (that which is conceptualized or discriminated) is a correlative to the tad which follows. This becomes more apparent when one compares this understanding with that of Dharmapaala, who ends the sentence with the word yad vikalpyate. Since according to Dharmapaala, pari.naama does not refer to vij~naana, the statement "vij~naana-pari.naama is vikalpa" could not be made, and, furthermore, since chuan p'ien means that the seeing and seen parts are evolved from vij~naana, it would have to include that which is conceptualized or discriminated (yad vikalpyate) as well as the conceptualizing thinking or discrimination (vikalpa). Therefore, the Chinese translation reads the sentence up to yad vikalpyate and cannot end on the word "vikalpa."

    Dharmapaala's understanding that vikalpa and yad vikalpyate are the seeing and seen parts evolved from vij~naana has two unreasonable aspects. (1) The idea that vikalpa is the seeing part is too narrow a view. According to the Yogaacaara standpoint, parikalpa, kalpa, kalpanaa, and sa^mkalpa are synonyms of vikalpa and all of them are said to be "unreal" (abhuuta),



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meaning relatively existent. The fact that both the mind[k] and its concomitant psychic functions of the three realms (tridhaatuka) are included in this abhuuta-parikalpa (conceptualizing thinking or discrimination) has been taught by Maitreya and has been confirmed by all Yogaacaara teachers. Vikalpa is not merely the "seeing part" of vij~naana but is the same as vij~naana itself. Therefore, Vasubandhu stated in the 21st kaarikaa that vikalpa is of the dependent-on-others nature (paratantra-svabhaava), which means all the vij~naanas or vikalpas. There is no ground to give a special interpretation only to the vikalpa mentioned in the 17th kaarikaa so that it has only the meaning of the seeing part and not the seen part nor vij~naana itself,[l] for, according to Dharmapaala, all vij~naanas are always evolved into the seeing and seen parts and at the same time they remain as themselves (svasa^mv.rtti). (2) The interpretation that yad vikalpyate is the seen part is in direct opposition to Vasubandhu's understanding. Yad vikalpyate refers to that which is falsely discriminated or conceptualized (vikalpyate) by vij~naana (vikalpa). Vasubandhu, in the 20th kaarikaa, clearly states that this "yad vikalpyate" is of the conceptualized or discriminated nature (parikalpita-svabhaava). However, according to Dharmapaala, the seen part[m] is of the dependent-on-others nature (paratantra-svabhaava). The dependent-on-others nature denotes a relative existence, and the discriminated nature denotes nonexistence. Therefore, the understanding that yad vikalpyate is the seen part is directly opposed to Vasubandhu's view.

    In the third place, the tad (of tannasti) which follows is a problem. If yad vikalpyate is considered to be contextually connected with the words that follow it, then this tad would be a correlative of yad and would then have the meaning "that which is conceptualized or discriminated by vikalpa." But if yad vikalpyate is considered to be contextually connected with the words which precede it, then it becomes difficult to determine which of the preceding nouns this tad denotes, since tad and yad would be contextually different. According to Dharmapaala's understanding of Yogaacaara philosophy, the content of tad is that which is considered to be 'real self and real things'[n] by an unenlightened person. If this be so, since the only place where the words 'aatmaa dharmaa`s ca' appear is in the 1st kaarikaa, the absurdity of such an understanding is clear when one understands that tad is a correlative of yad.

    Therefore, from the above reasons. It is clear that Dharmapaala's understanding of vij~naanapari.naama in the 17th kaarikaa is different from that of Vasubandhu. The difference occurs from the fact that Dharmapaala understands the word pari.naama to mean 'the evolution of the seeing and seen parts from the vij~naana.' Had this not been so, the special interpretation, like pushing a cart sideways, that vikalpa, which actually refers to vij~naana, is the



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seeing part and the interpretation, without taking the 20th kaarikaa into consideration, that yad vikalpyate refers to the seen part of vij~naana, would not have been necessary. Furthermore, one could have understood without any difficulties that pari.naama refers to vij~naana and that tad is a correlative of yad. In other words, one could easily have had a correct understanding of the 17th kaarikaa. Therefore, the fact that the meaning of pari.naama, as found in the 17th kaarikaa, is not as Dharmapaala would have it mean is beyond all doubt.

    If the words vikalpa and yad vikalpyate in the 17th kaarikaa, according to Vasubandhu, do not refer to the seeing and seen parts, then we would have to conclude that there is no mention of these "two parts" in the Tri^m`sikaa. The word pari.naama, found in other kaarikaas besides the 17th kaarikaa, would not have the meaning that the seeing and seen parts are evolved from vij~naana. Dharmapaala himself did not give such a meaning to the word pari.naama found in the other kaarikaas. Only the word "vij~naanapari.naama," found in the 1st kaarikaa, is interpreted by him as meaning those (two parts) evolved from vij~naana. It is quite clear, however, that this term vij~naanapari.naama cannot be translated as shih so p'ien[o] "those which are evolved from vij~naana," that is, the seeing and seen parts. Since even the term vij~naanapari.naama in the 17th kaarikaa, which contains two correlative words, vikalpa and yad vikalpyate, has not the slightest meaning of evolution into the seeing and seen parts, in spite of Dharmapaala's commentary, the term pari.naama, which is not related to the two words meaning the seer and the seen, will be unable to have such a meaning.

    It is needless to say that this interpretation of pari.naama by Dharmapaala cannot be found in the Vi^m`sikaa. Moreover, no other text of Vasubandhu mentions the fact that the vij~naana is evolved into seeing and seen parts. Therefore, this interpretation by Dharmapaala, based on the Tri^m`sikaa, could not be said to be faithful to Vasubandhu since it is nothing more than an addition to Vasubandhu's Tri^m`sikaa by Dharmapaala himself. This will become clearer in comparing Dharmapaala's commentary to the Tri^m`sikaa with that of Sthiramati. Sthiramati, unlike Dharmapaala, has given a commentary which is faithful to Vasubandhu's Tri^m`sikaa.



    The pari.naama concept was contextually connected to vij~naana and used in the compound vij~naanapari.naama by Vasubandhu for the first time in the history of Yogaacaara philosophy. The word pari.naama can be found from very early times in various Buddhist texts, but the compound -vij~naanapari.naama -



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cannot be found in either Maitreya's or Asa^nga's thoughts. Therefore, it can be said that Vasubandhu was the one who made this compound a technical word in the Vij~naaptimaatrataa theory. Thus, Sthiramati felt a great necessity to give special attention to this word. In his Tri^m`sikaabhaa.sya, in commenting on the term vij~naanapari.naama used in the 1st kaarikaa, he asks himself "what is this called pari.naama?" and answers, "it is being different." He further comments that "being different" means "to be different from the previous state." With only this much information from Sthiramati, it is already clear that his interpretation differs from Dharmapaala's. According to Sthiramati, vij~naanapari.naama means that the present vij~naana is different from the previous vij~naana. Thus pari.naama refers to the relation of vij~naana at the present moment to vij~naana at the previous moment, and is a temporal relationship. We have already seen that for Dharmapaala, pari.naama meant that the vij~naana is evolved into the seeing and seen parts in the present moment. It is a relationship of the evolving (i.e., consciousness) to the evolved (i.e., the seeing and seen parts)., and is considered by him to be a relationship which takes place in the present one moment and can never cover two moments.

    The understanding of pari.naama by Sthiramati is identical to that of Vasubandhu, who states that pari.naama is vij~naana. Vij~naana is momentary and is produced every instant, and this necessitates its being different from the previous instant. The continual flow of change in every instant is known as the flow of consciousness. That the present vij~naana is "different" from the previous one, namely vij~naana "pari.naama," manifests its actual state of being, Therefore, the statement "self (aatmaa) and things (dharmaas) are conventionally designated depending on the vij~naana" is contextually the same as the statement "self and things are conventionally designated depending on. vij~naanapari.naama." Each of the so-called three kinds of pari.naama in the 1st and 2nd kaarikaas, i.e., aalayavij~naana, kli.s.tamanas, and vi.sayasya vij~naapti, is a kind of vij~naana, and each one varies at every moment. Since that which exists as vij~naana is necessarily of the present moment, and since the vij~naana of the present moment has the function of perceiving or knowing, the difference of one vij~naana from another is established by the interrelation of one moment to another. Vij~naanapari.naama, viz., "vij~naana as being different from the previous one," is the actual state of vij~naana. Therefore, in this way, we can conclude that Sthiramati's understanding makes vij~naanapari.naama contextually the same as vij~naana.

    Both Dharmapaala and Sthiramati have commented on vij~naanapari.naama and both have arrived at different interpretations. As we have already seen, Dharmapaala's understanding was different from that of Vasubandhu, whereas Sthiramati's was faithful to it. The interpretation of Sthiramati and Para-



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maartha concur with each other. Due to lack of space, however, I will not deal with the matter here. I refer the reader to my paper in Japanese, which deals with this subject.[2]



    In the concept of the vij~naanapari.naama of the Yogaacaara philosophy introduced into China by Hsuang-tsang, the mountains and rivers, which are ordinarily thought to be real existences, are explained as not being really existent outside of the seen part evolved from consciousness. If this meaning of vij~naanapari.naama, however, is not found in the thought of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Paramaartha as explained above, the question in what meaning vij~naaptimaatrataa is used must be asked.

    In Yogaacaara philosophy the terms vij~naana and vikalpa are synonymous. And, according to Sthiramati and Vasubandhu, vij~naanapari.naama is the actual state of vij~naana. Therefore, Vasubandhu states in the Tri^m`sikaa "this vij~naanapari.naama is vikalpa" (17th verse). As to what vikalpa is he states: "Anything which is discriminated or conceptualized by any vikalpa, it is of a conceptualized nature; it does not exist" (20th verse). The same idea is expressed in the 17th verse: "This vij~naanapari.naama is vikalpa. Anything which is discriminated or conceptualized by the vikalpa does not really exist. Therefore the whole world (which is discriminated or conceptualized by it) is consciousness-only" (17th verse). Vikalpa or vij~naanapari.naama refers to the consciousness of an ordinary man, i.e., a man who is not yet enlightened. The object which is known through this vij~naanapari.naama is not a thing as it really is, but rather a conceptualized thing. In other words, this mind does not grasp the object as it really is, but rather as a concept or name. In truth, he does not take real existence itself as the object, but instead takes the concept as the object and thinks that he is taking real existence as the object, not realizing what he has done. In Vasubandhu's words, he is not abiding in vij~naaptimatrata (all that which is seen by vij~naana is none other than the seeing vij~naana).

    In contrast to this, the mind of the Yogaacaara philosopher is called praj~naa or nirvikalpa j~naana (wisdom "apart" or different in its nature from vikalpa or vij~naana). This mind does not know an object through conception, but

2.    Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Views on vij~naana-the View that vij~naa Develops and the View that vij~naana Knows." Essays on the History of Buddhist Thought Presented to Professor Reimon Yuuki[q] (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppen Co., 1964).



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rather it knows directly the object as it really exists (yathaabhuutaartha). In Vasubandhu's words, this mind abides in vij~naptimaatrataa.[3]

    For one who has not realized what is expressed in the above-quoted 17th and 20th verses (the objects of vikalpa are all consciousness-only [vij~naptimaatrataa]), that is, for one whose mind is vij~naana, the object known is a conceptualized thing, and not the object as it really exists. For the person who has truly realized that the objects of vikalpa are all of the conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhaava), the object known is that thing as it really exists. To realize truly that (the objects of vikalpa are of the conceptualized nature, that is, consciousness-only [vij~naptimaatrataa] ) is to abide in vij~naptimaatrataa.

    I shall illustrate what I have stated above by quoting the words of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati in the Tri^m`sikaa and the Bhaa.sya.

XXVI: As long as consciousness does not abide in the consciousness-only (vij~naptimaatrataa), the seeds of the two [the grasping (vij~naana = vikalpa) and the objects grasped by it] have not been extinguished.

XXVII: Accordingly, as long as he [the yogin] is in this state of mind, even though he thinks that all the things in the world are none other than vij~naana [i.e., that he has abode in the consciousness-only], he has not yet abode in the consciousness-only, because since he is grasping [that is, conceptualizing] that all this is none other than Vij~naana, he is setting up something before himself (and he has not yet abode in the realm where there is no conceptualized object).

XXVIII: But when his consciousness does not perceive any object [be it a natural phenomenon, or be it an idea in the consciousness], then it has abode in the consciousness-only. For when there is no object to be grasped, there can be no-grasping it

XXIX: This is both no-mind and nothing-grasped, and also it is the supra-mundane wisdom, is the revulsion of abode, because he has already given up the seeds in the two kinds.

Sthiramati's commentary on verse 28 is as follows:

Whenever the consciousness does not perceive, see, grasp, and attach itself to the teaching, admonitions, as well as natural phenomena of colors and shapes, sounds, and so forth, as objects, except (the seeing) mind itself, then since the yogin (a bodhisattva or a Yogaacaara philosopher) sees an object as it really is (yathaabhuutaartha), and he is not like a man born blind, at that time the grasp of the consciousness (vij~naana) has been broken down and the mind is established in the state of being aware of everything as well as of itself as they really are. There is not only (no object) to be grasped (and there is no grasping consciousness either) but also there arises the super-mundane, non-conceptualizing wisdom

3.    Vasubandhu, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, Vi^m`sikaa et Tri^m`sikaa, par Sylvain Levi (Paris, 1925), p. 43.



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in which subject and object (aalambhya-aalambhaka) are identical with each other without nullifying and extinguishing their distinction (sama-sama). The seeds of the attachment to (the two, i.e.) (the object) to be grasped and the grasping (consciousness) have been broken down and the mind is established in the state of being aware of everything as well as of itself as they really are. [This is called] the mind has abode in the consciousness-only.

Some explanation of the statements of this commentary is necessary. It is as follows: Whenever the consciousness does not see anything as an object except the seeing mind itself, it sees an object as it really is (yathaabhuutaartha). Here it is stated that the consciousness (i.e., mind) sees itself. This does not mean the mind sees itself as its object by objectifying itself, for here there is no object except the mind (the seer) itself. This means that the seer, as it were, sees the seer itself. Here is established the self-identity of the seer with the seen. The seer itself is the seen, and the seen is the seer itself. This is called sama (equal) -sama (equal) -aalambhya (that which is seen)-  aalambhaka (that which sees). The seen (aalambhya) is equal to (or non-different from) the seer (aalambhaka), and the seer is equal to the seen. There is the distinction between the seer and the seen, and yet, the two are identical with each other. There is the distinction because, when the mind sees itself without seeing it as an object, it sees an object (for example, a mountain) as it really is (yathaabhuutaartha); that is, there is the distinction between the mind or a person that sees and the mountain that is seen as it really is. When the mind sees the mountain as it really is, it does not see the mountain as its object, and accordingly, the object (the mountain) must become: identified with the subject (the mind). In other words, the dichotomy between subject and object must be extinguished, for there is no object except the mind (the seer). And this self-identity of the seer with itself, by the extinction of the object, must at the same time be the self-identity of the seen, because a thing (the mountain) is seen by the mind as it really is. Here the mountain is seen from within, or by itself without the seer outside it. This negation of the seer which stands in opposition to the seen is called no-mind (acitta) in the 29th verse, and the negation of td object (the seen) is called nothing-grasped (anupalambha). It is expounded in Sthiramati's commentary that since there is no mind that grasps and there is perceived no object to be grasped, "this is both no-mind and nothing-grasped" (verse 29). It is in this sense that vij~naptimaatrataa is said to be apart from graahya (to be grasped)-graahaka (the grasping). Thus, when-the mind sees a thing as it really is, it is the mind seeing itself as it really is, and, at the same time, by losing itself in the mountain (no-mind), the mind sees the mountain



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from within, or, as it were, the mountain is seen by the mountain. There is no seer outside or except for the mountain.

    Thus we can see that the standpoint of the philosophy of the consciousness-only is reality itself. A Yogaacaara philosopher stands on the reality of himself as well as of everything. In contrast to this, the standpoint of those who do not stand on the consciousness-only (vij~naptimaatrataa) should be called ideal or conceptual. While the former deals with reality, the latter deals with conceptualized things. When a man can truly say that all this (which is seen by vikalpa) is consciousness-only, he means that his thinking is no longer conceptualizing thinking or objectifying thinking (i.e., vikalpa) ; his thinking belongs to that kind of thinking which is called praj~naa or nirvikalpa j~naana in Buddhist terminology.

    We have roughly examined the meaning of vij~naptimaatrataa in Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. This is identical with Paramaartha's understanding of vij~naptimaatrataa. I think that there will be no need to comment further on how far the meaning of consciousness-only according to Dharmapaala is from that of these earlier philosophers of the Yogaacaara School. One may be called a kind of idealism; the other should be called a theory of reality. In the latter, what is meant by the word "consciousness-only" is not different from that to which the word "no-mind" (acitta) points.





a. 唯識 j. 能變
b. 是諸識 k.
c. 轉變 l. 自体
d. 分別 m. 相分
e. 所分別 n. 實我實法
f. = o. 識所變
g. 心所 p. 成唯識論•護法等菩薩造
h. 諸識 q. 「識ズ關エペ二コソ見解─能變シ能緣」