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A Companion to Angus C. Graham's *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters* (review)

Steve Coutinho

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(Review)

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pre-Nara trends through the formation of classical and medieval sects as well as early modern sociopolitical conditions to contemporary new religious movements. The book is a reliable reference guide that offers a snapshot of important events, leading figures, and doctrinal themes in a way that is evenhanded and objective, including the explanation of Nichirenist new movements such as Risshō Kōsei-kai. For that reason it can be highly recommended.

On a close reading, however, the deficiency of this approach becomes clear. For example, chapter 3 dealing with the development of early Buddhist temples in Japan tries to show a progression from Asuka-dera through Shitennō-ji and Hōryū-ji to Yakushi-ji, but the discussion in the narrative does not sufficiently flesh out what the diagram on page 41 is trying to illustrate about unfolding trends in iconography and scriptural exegetical studies.

Also, the sections on such topics as Eizon and the revival of the Ritsu school during the Kamakura era and the role of the *danka* system in the Tokugawa era are a bit confusing and misleading in their brevity. Page 93 in chapter 8 on “The Founders of Kamakura Buddhism” refers to a “definite philosophical development” between the teachings of Hōnen, Nōnin, and Eisai, in the late twelfth century, and the thirteenth-century founders of new Buddhist sects, but this key point is never clearly explained. Nevertheless, keeping these limitations in mind, *Japanese Buddhism* should make a significant contribution to much-needed instructional materials in the field.

A Companion to Angus C. Graham’s Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters. By Harold D. Roth. Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, 20. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003. Pp. 243. Paper \$18.00.

Reviewed by **Steve Coutinho** Towson University

Scholars of Chuang Tzu—and “children of Angus”—will enthusiastically welcome Harold Roth’s *A Companion to Angus C. Graham’s Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters*, a collection of A. C. Graham’s scholarly studies of the *Chuang Tzu*. Thanks to Roth’s concerted efforts, Graham’s scholarship on the *Chuang Tzu* has now been made readily available in a single volume. A. C. Graham was one of the most distinguished Western scholars of classical Chinese philosophy and one of the leading interpreters of the philosophy of Chuang Tzu. His pioneering research—textual, linguistic, and philosophical—on the *Chuang Tzu* and on its philosophical predecessor, the *Later Mohist Canon*, have laid the scholarly groundwork for further explorations of this philosophical and literary masterpiece.

This collection includes: Graham’s “Textual Notes to *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters*,” first published as a scholarly monograph in 1982 as a supplement to the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, under the title “Chuang-tzu: Textual Notes to a Partial Translation”; “How Much of *Chuang Tzu* Did Chuang Tzu Write?” which first appeared in 1976 in the *Journal of the American Academy of Re-*

ligion; "Chuang Tzu's Essay on Seeing Things As Equal," written in 1968 for the Belaggio Conference on Taoist Studies and first published in a volume of *History of Religions*; "Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics," which first appeared in 1991 in *Interpreting Culture Through Translation: A Festschrift for D. C. Lau*; and "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought,'" first published in 1983 in Victor Mair's *Experimental Essays on the Chuang Tzu*. The *Companion* ends with a Colophon by Harold Roth, "An Appraisal of Angus Graham's Textual scholarship on the *Chuang Tzu*."

Chapter 1 reproduces Graham's textual notes on his translation of the *Chuang tzu*. Graham had written his "Textual Notes to *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters*" while working on his translation of the Inner Chapters, and he had hoped to include them in the final version of *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters*. Since this was not possible, Graham had them published instead by SOAS as a supplement to their *Bulletin*. Roth begins the *Companion* with a painstakingly reproduced computer-input version of Graham's original typewritten manuscript, which he also reorganized so that it corresponds to the (somewhat idiosyncratic) order and structure of Graham's translation. For ease of cross-reference, page numbers are provided to both Graham's translation and the Harvard *Concordance (Chuang-tzu yin-te)*, the source text with which Graham worked.

Chapter 2 is Graham's study, "How Much of *Chuang Tzu* Did Chuang Tzu Write?" This was written in large part as a response to Fu Ssu-nien's extraordinary and controversial claim that chapter 2, "Qi Wu Lun," is not the work of Chuang Tzu but of Shen Tao. In this paper Graham also attempts to identify how much of what he calls the "ragbag" chapters could have come from the same author as the Inner Chapters. The technique he uses is a straightforward tabulation of occurrences of characteristic usages and expressions in the various chapters, followed by a set of detailed comments. He compares carefully chosen idioms, grammatical particles and patterns, philosophical terms, and references to persons and themes. Comparisons are made specifically between the Inner Chapters, the "ragbag" chapters together with chapter 32, and the rest of the book.

This is followed by a detailed justification of his "reconstruction" of what he believes to be the original introductory paragraph to chapter 3, "Yang Sheng Zhu." The next two sections put forward reasons for dividing the "Anarchist" chapters (8 to 11a, and 28 to 31) into two sections, the former group (8 to 11a) attributed to a person he calls the "Primitivist," the latter (28 to 31), following the argumentation of Kuan Feng, attributed to the followers of Yang Zhu. The chapter closes with a discussion of the stylistic and philosophical characteristics and classification of what Graham calls the "Syncretist" school, more commonly identified as the "Huang-Lao" school.

Chapter 3, "Chuang Tzu's Essay on Seeing Things as Equal," is an early essay on chapter 2 of the *Chuang Tzu*. It represents an early attempt of Graham's to come to grips with the technical terminology of the "Qi Wu Lun" by relating it to the ideas of Huizi and the later Mohist *Canon*. At the time, Graham had not yet completed his monumental translation and commentary on the *Canon*, although he had produced

and published a translation of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* chapter. Here we see his "conventionalist" interpretation of Chuang Tzu's philosophy of language taking shape, his emphasis on the demonstrative senses of the correlated pairs, *shibi*, *cibi*, and *shifei*, the first articulation of the distinction between *yinshi* and *weishi*, and the development of his "relativist" reading of Chuang Tzu's philosophy as a whole. We also see his optimistic account of an embodied wisdom that arises when the faculty of "reason" is bracketed. There is an interesting discussion of the logic of opposites and of the role of contradiction in "sophisms." This chapter ends with a translation of the "Qi Wu Lun" in the light of these notes and comments. Readers of Chuang Tzu will find it interesting to compare this early translation with his more complete translation of ten years later.

Chapter 4, "Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics," is an early essay written before his own translation of the *Inner Chapters* but not published until 1991. In it Graham reflects on problems facing any translator of Zhou dynasty Taoist texts. He focuses on Witter Bynner's translation of the *Lao Tzu* and several translations of the *Chuang Tzu*. He is concerned in particular about the attraction that the *Lao Tzu* has on nonspecialists, and presents a biting critique of Bynner's translation.

He then moves on to a discussion of translations of the *Chuang Tzu*, Giles' translation in particular. Graham identifies several factors for the lack of good translations of this text, and expands on their significance. For example, he points out that a great deal of the text is simply "unintelligible at the present stage of research," but translators feel obliged to produce some kind of translation. There is also so much that the author presupposes that remains unexpressed, unarticulated, unexplained: cultural gestures, "mystical" experiences, yogic practices, and so on. Also, the style of the original is disjointed, discontinuous and often aphoristic, and switches abruptly between verse and prose, while translators present it as a continuous and thus incoherent stream, resulting in a style that Graham ridicules as the "rambling mode." These translators, moreover, do not render the verse passages in verse form, thus obscuring the formal devices of poetic structure; they also fail to identify and render appropriately such stylistic devices as quotation and commentary. Graham argues that the text is further "disfigured by glosses, lacunae, transpositions," which force the translator "to be a radical textual critic whether he likes it or not," to make judgments about whether to discard the text, present it as fragment, or (Graham's most controversial contribution) move it to what must be its original place.

Finally, and most significantly from a philosophical standpoint, it is impossible to find modern linguistic equivalents for key philosophical terms. This is because of vastly different clusters of associations of basic terms: because of these deep differences, basic terms become untranslatable—we simply do not have words or expressions that can render intelligible the most fundamental associations of the early Chinese philosophical vocabulary. Moreover, the different associations of the terms we have readily available mislead the reader to make inappropriate inferences. In this regard, Graham applauds Watson's firm terminological consistency, a technique that he feels forces the reader to abandon familiar presuppositions, and to attempt to begin a reconstruction of where the deep differences must lie.

Chapter 5 reproduces Graham's "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought.'" It is a very concise presentation of Graham's philosophy of spontaneity, and articulates his argument that the Taoist conception of spontaneity, as he interprets it, is able to solve an age-old ethical problem. This is the problem of how to "derive" an understanding of what is ethically right from what one knows about the world. Graham tries to show that this dichotomy, the dichotomy between "is" and "ought," does not exist in ancient Chinese thinking, and that the Taoist notion of acting spontaneously actually provides a bridge between fullness of knowledge and rightness of action. Now, Graham maintains that we can understand the Taoists as asserting the primacy of the injunction "Respond with awareness," and that in the Taoist context such an injunction will automatically guarantee spontaneously ethical behavior.

His argument, distilled to its essence, is that the wisest actions are those that are performed with the greatest awareness, so that if we broaden our awareness we will respond in a wiser and more appropriate way than if we were to respond with lesser awareness. Graham believes that this injunction alone is sufficient to guarantee ethical behavior, and he thus believes that the Taoists, whom he describes as "anti-rationalists," paradoxically stumbled upon a rational foundation for ethics. Now, a closer reading of Graham's claim reveals that there is in fact more at work than the injunction "Respond with awareness," and it is these other presuppositions, I believe, that work together with the injunction to yield ethical behavior.

There are two important presuppositions. The first is the Taoist claim that there is a mode of knowing that is intuitive, an embodied mode of knowing that constitutes our natural, and primordial, relationship to our environment. It is that nonverbal, preconceptual, mode of understanding by which we are able to interact with things and participate in a physical engagement with the world and with other people. In Polanyi's language, it is a "tacit" mode of knowing that is the condition of the possibility of explicit, and of theoretical, knowledge. Thus, we discover what to do not by imposing deontological or utilitarian computational rules but by trusting our natural sensitivity and responsiveness. But our natural sensitivity and responsiveness alone are still not enough. It is Graham's understanding that part of this responsiveness includes an intuitive understanding of what is good for us and what is bad for us, what is pleasurable and what is painful. We naturally tend to do what is good for us and what is pleasurable. The more we know about what is good for us, the better and more productively we can respond.

Now, combining these two presuppositions with the injunction to respond with awareness, we can see that increasing our awareness also means deepening our understanding of what in the long run will be good for us, and it also increases our understanding of what will be good for other people. Graham believes that this same increased awareness also results in an understanding that what is good for me is not necessarily more worthwhile than what is good for others. And since we are expanding our understanding, the well-being of others is of immediate relevance. When we expand our identifications so that other people become intimately in-

volved, then we will automatically respond so as to produce the well-being of all others, even at the expense of our own.

I am not overly optimistic about Graham's solution to this problem. Graham, like the Taoists, assumes that people will always tend spontaneously toward what will produce a more "flourishing" consequence. While I believe that this is a general, and indeed a natural human tendency, I do not believe that it is universal. There is no denying that people have their destructive moments, and there is no denying that some people seem generally to have highly destructive tendencies. It is far from obvious to me that an increased understanding of the destructive consequences of their behavior would incite them to change their behavior.

The collection closes with a Colophon by Harold Roth, "An Appraisal of Angus Graham's Textual Scholarship on the *Chuang Tzu*," in which he engages in a detailed analysis and assessment of Graham's scholarship on the *Chuang Tzu*. Roth begins by noticing that Graham's translation is quite eccentric in its editing and arrangement of the text. Graham provides detailed arguments in justification of his editing and restructuring, using the methods of textual criticism of traditional Chinese scholarship, and principles of form, redaction, and composition criticism that he learned and applied from theological scholarship. Roth, in turn, provides a very detailed and informative analysis of Graham's arguments, and responds with a careful presentation of the results of his own textual research. After examining the evidence, and evaluating in detail the plausibility of Graham's rearrangements of the text, Roth then goes on to consider textual and historical problems concerning the identities and philosophical positions of the Syncretist, Primitivist, and Yangist authors, and the author of chapter 16, "Menders of Nature." He does so by examining the relationship of the ideas of these chapters to ideas expressed in the *Lū-shih ch'un-ch'iu*. This throws an interesting new light on the development of Taoist ideas through these various texts, and leads Roth to propose a fascinating hypothesis concerning the provenance of the various schools that make up the thought of the complete *Chuang Tzu* and how these chapters came historically to be incorporated into the text. But, rather than reveal the secret of his theory, I shall leave to the reader the pleasure of discovering firsthand the solution that Roth proposes.

The book ends with a complete bibliography of the writings of A. C. Graham.

Huang Di Nei Jing Su Wen: Nature, Knowledge, Imagery in an Ancient Chinese Text.
By Paul Unschuld. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.
Pp. ix + 520. \$75.00.

Reviewed by **Aerin Caley**

As a student in my final year of formal training in Zen Shiatsu, I am looking to my future. While I will soon begin my practice, I also intend to continue my studies, particularly with respect to the history of Chinese and Japanese medicine. My biggest