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
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## Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies (review)

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was widely accepted throughout Islamic philosophy that in knowledge the knower, the object of knowledge, and the act of knowing are equivalent to each other. This cannot be literally true since if we are trying to know God, we cannot be said to be the same as Him, or even in contact with Him, so huge is the difference between us and the divine. On the other hand, as Anqarawī says, in a sense we are all part of the unity of creation, and what we know is equivalent to us as knowers and to the acts of knowing also. Here he abruptly closes the discussion, since this has proved to be dangerous territory for Sufism, with its tendency to wander between a transcendent and immanent conception of God.

This very helpful book is an important contribution to our understanding of a significant thinker and a period of thought that is not nearly as well known as it should be. The text that Kuşpınar establishes seems sensible to me and his editing decisions plausible also. It is very good to have the original text included with the translation, but a shame that they could not have been printed on facing pages. The technical apparatus, such as the account of the various manuscripts and the indexes, are helpful, although I would have welcomed an index of Qur'ānic passages and *ḥadīth* (sayings of the Prophet) also. But this is a short book and so it is not difficult to find one's way around the text. All in all, this is an impressive and well-produced book that could easily be used in courses on Sufism with students who have some grasp of Arabic. For those who do not, it will no doubt inspire them to acquire it!

*Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies.* By Erin McCarthy. Foreword by Thomas P. Kasulis. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. Pp. xviii + 115. Hardcover \$55.00, ISBN 978-0-7391-2049-1. Paper \$24.95, ISBN 978-0-7391-2050-7. eBook \$49.99, ISBN 978-0-7391-4786-3.

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*Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies* by Erin McCarthy is a concise, clear beginning to a discussion that has recently been gaining interest: comparative feminist philosophy. In this book McCarthy ably lays much of the groundwork necessary for such a discussion and also makes a good argument for its importance. On McCarthy's account, comparative feminist philosophy, and ethics in particular, fills problematic holes in the dominant Western (and arguably masculine) ethical framework. These holes are highlighted by the framework's difficulty accounting for subjects and situations in which embodiment, the emotions, and interpersonal relationships play a primary role. That is to say, by overly emphasizing public verifiability, detached knowledge, and external relationships, the dominant ethical framework has missed the significance of personal objectivity, affective knowledge, and intimate relationships. McCarthy's introduction of comparative feminist ethics is not intended to usurp this dominant framework, but to highlight its insufficiencies and offer a complementary perspective.

McCarthy introduces her book within this wider framework, but her discussion focuses on the idea of the embodied self as it is elucidated by the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) and contemporary feminist philosophers, including Virginia Held and the French philosopher Luce Irigaray. McCarthy's discussion is based on the premise that Watsuji's idea of the relational self and Irigaray's emphasis on feminine embodiment are both intimacy-oriented accounts (to use Thomas P. Kasulis' terminology). An intimacy-oriented account contrasts with the integrity-oriented account that characterizes much of Western philosophy, focusing on the self as a "bodymind" rather than as a disembodied rational mind. The benefit of turning to the intimacy-oriented account is its inclusion of voices and perspectives that have historically been silenced by the integrity-oriented account, including women, the body, the emotions, and (one might argue) non-Western cultures.

The first half of this work is dedicated to an examination of the relational, embodied self of Watsuji Tetsurō, especially in terms of how it differs from better-known continental accounts. This is needed both to clarify Watsuji's position and to explain why Heidegger's or Husserl's idea of the self is not the best one for McCarthy's project. In relation to Heidegger, McCarthy argues that while Heidegger "moved toward a recognition of the importance of relations for the self . . . his concept of self still remained largely individual" (p. 20). She writes that although Heidegger defined the self as in the world, he also defined the self as solitary, which "makes it difficult to see how authentic being-with plays out" (p. 21). Therefore, the authenticity of the solitary self is an independent authenticity, one determined by the self's own being-toward-death. In other words, Heidegger's concept of the self is that of a self in the world that nevertheless runs along its own independent, temporal axis.

Watsuji's idea of *ningen*, or human being, responds to this by stressing the spatial nature of the self's being in the world, and therefore the relations with others that occupy this space and help to determine the self. McCarthy notes that while Watsuji developed his idea of *ningen* using Heideggerian concepts, he goes beyond Heidegger's account by addressing both the temporal and spatial aspects of the self. Thus, Watsuji considers the way in which the self is characterized not just by solitary independence, but also by interrelated "betweenness." This preserves the relationality of the self with others at the same time that it recognizes the temporal dimension that conditions the self's individuality.

McCarthy argues that while this account of the self brings Watsuji closer to Edmund Husserl, there are important differences between the two. Namely, despite Husserl's recognition of the role of the community in the definition of the self, he still considers the community to be a collection of individuals. In other words, Husserl, like Heidegger, also misses the significance of the way in which "betweenness" blurs the boundaries between the self and others and makes it difficult to consider the self as a discrete entity. For Watsuji, the lines between self and others are permeable, and the distinction between the two is empty of content. In other words, there is interpenetration between my consciousness and that of the people I relate to, and this means that my consciousness is fundamentally connected to your consciousness. Husserl, according to Watsuji (and McCarthy), was unable to see this dimension of the self.

Furthermore, McCarthy presents Watsuji's view that even though Husserl provides a role for the body in his concept of self, he does not recognize the way in which it is part of the integrated whole that is the self. Indeed, McCarthy's consideration of Husserl's phenomenology makes clear that Husserl maintained a strict distinction between the mind and the body, despite his concern to overcome Cartesian dualism. Additionally, this distinction is what leads him to fail to recognize the sort of interpenetration between self and other that is advocated by Watsuji. In other words, if it is true that the mind is in a significant way separate from the body, then, according to Husserl, the other person's mind is outside the limits of my direct understanding. I can only surmise the states of other people's minds—I can never experience them fully.

According to McCarthy, Watsuji is able to move beyond this dualistic bypass by alleging that the body is in fact an "embodied subjectivity" whereby "we see that the body's action is not merely the outer manifestation of an inner subjectivity" (p. 41). That is, Watsuji's philosophy is one that espouses nondualism of self and other, along with nondualism of bodymind. Watsuji argues that when we interact with other people, we never experience them as simply physical or psychological entities. We have an experience of the whole person, and in this interaction we do not separate the body from the mind, or the self from the other. Furthermore, it is this holistic experience that grounds Watsuji's ethics. By cultivating our bodymind, we can become more ethical beings.

McCarthy relates Watsuji's embodied self and subsequent ethical theory to a feminist embodied ethics of care. According to feminist theory, traditional philosophy is characterized by an overemphasis on our rational, independent, autonomous nature (that which is considered to be masculine) at the expense of our affective, interrelated, and supportive side (which is thought of as feminine). Indeed, it is both our embodied and relational selves that have been underrepresented. Therefore, feminism and care ethics attempt to reintegrate these aspects of our selves into the overall philosophical framework that has developed without them. McCarthy seems right to point out the ways in which this movement accords with Watsuji's own attempts to incorporate what he sees as the Japanese understanding of the embodied, relational self into the predominantly Western philosophical framework. Both attempts are aimed not at usurping the current philosophical framework, but at augmenting and adjusting it with an eye toward a more complete picture.

The strength of this comparison, according to McCarthy, lies in the feminist account of embodiment's ability to respect difference at the same time that it recognizes interdependence. In other words, the danger of an ethics that blurs the distinction between self and other is one in which the subordinate self is lost in the dominant other, as can be seen in manipulative romantic relationships. In Watsuji's ethics in particular, there does not seem to be a clear way to ensure that the interpenetration of self and other is not a relationship of exploitation. Care ethics, according to McCarthy, provides an antidote to this situation by arguing that relationships must be evaluated and assessed to ensure that they are reciprocal. This ties in with Watsuji's notion that the bodymind must be cultivated—the embodied self and one's relations

with others are not necessarily ethical. We must work to ensure that our selves and our relations embody care and concern.

McCarthy recognizes that the preeminent advocate of care ethics, Virginia Held, may not be receptive to this sort of comparative project, given that many Asian societies are traditionally patriarchal structures that are antithetical to feminist concerns. However, McCarthy argues that the benefit of comparative work with feminist philosophy is that it both expands the feminist point of view to include other marginalized voices and works to address the lack of feminist awareness in the more traditional philosophies it considers. Given McCarthy's work in this book, her point is well taken, and hopefully this will invite more voices to join the discussion.

McCarthy then moves to a consideration of Luce Irigaray's feminist philosophy in light of the foregoing consideration of Watsuji. Much of this section works to establish lines of similarity between Watsuji and Irigaray: integration of mind and body, cultivation of bodymind, embodied subjectivity, and interpenetration of self and other. Given Irigaray's own interest in traditional Eastern philosophies, the abundance of similarities is perhaps not surprising. What is new in this discussion is McCarthy's comparison of the idea of self-negation in Watsuji and Irigaray. Watsuji alleges that part of what it means to be a self is to negate the independent self in order to allow the self's in-betweenness to be made manifest. Indeed, the movement between these two poles is exactly what Watsuji recognizes as the embodied, relational self—it is not static, but rather a moving, fluid self.

Irigaray also recognizes that to be a human being is a process of becoming. In her terminology, this is a process that needs to take place between genders, whereby the distinction between male and female is transcended by "a constant articulation between the genders" (p. 84), in which one must negate his or her own gendered self in order to embrace that of the other. As with Watsuji, there is no end result of this process, as it leads to an open space in which self and other are continuously negated and yet also continuously embraced. McCarthy argues that Irigaray complements Watsuji in this sense by giving him the tools needed to recognize the role of difference in relationships. That is, in this continuous relationship between self and other, neither self nor other is eliminated—the identity of each party is preserved at the same time that it is negated. This allows for recognition of gender differences (as well as cultural differences and differences in ability) at the same time that it creates a space in which these differences are transcended. As McCarthy points out, this is not the creation of a universal space that disregards difference, nor the presumption that contrasting ideologies and cultures will necessarily clash. Rather, it is a philosophy that creates a space "for real dialogue, founded in care and communion that respect difference" (p. 97).

McCarthy argues that the development of this open space is necessary for human flourishing and ethical conduct. In the final section of the book, she considers one way in which this philosophy can have practical effects in everyday life. She relates her experiences as an educator, and how she has worked to create an open space in the classroom that incorporates affective, communal relations into what has usually

been a rational, individualistic environment. While much of this section is a departure from the philosophical considerations of the preceding chapters, McCarthy elucidates the connections that she sees between them. Indeed, it is in this final chapter that many of McCarthy's claims gain purchase, as she offers a real, embodied, relational example of the sort of space she hopes to create.

It could be argued that there are places in this final chapter in which McCarthy does not go far enough in explaining just how it is that the type of embodied ethics she has been advocating is enacted. She writes about her initial worries that caring for the souls of her students was at the expense of their intellectual development, and while she says that she eventually came to see that "fostering nondualism and taking care are integral to the intellectual development of my students" (p. 98), this point may not be as clear to her readers. The worry here is that while McCarthy has provided a fine argument for the importance of nondualism and embodiment in philosophical thought, this argument may not extend all the way to the sorts of practices McCarthy wishes to promote. That is to say that while contemplative education does seem to be valuable, and education systems are certainly in need of reformation, more work needs to be done to explain how the concepts of bodymind and nondualism facilitate such reformation. This is not necessarily a deficiency of McCarthy's work here as it is a call for further investigation.

This book is a first step in the direction of a comparative feminist ethics, and McCarthy has done a commendable job of marking out the way. As McCarthy argues, non-Western and feminist philosophies have much to learn from each other, and a more nuanced dialogue between them will provide a needed challenge to more traditional assumptions about the relationship between the body and the mind, and the ways in which this relationship grounds our ethical life.

*Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power.* By Yan Xuetong. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Edited by Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe. The Princeton-China Series. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. viii + 300. Hardcover \$29.95, ISBN 978-0-691-14826-7.

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Many readers of *Philosophy East and West* will find this collection of three essays by Chinese foreign policy analyst and international relations theorist Yan Xuetong 阎学通, accompanied by three corresponding commentaries by other Chinese scholars and followed by Yan's response, interesting for a number of reasons. Despite the different perspectives and norms of international relations (IR) theory, Yan is offering a reading of ancient Chinese texts most of which are read also by philosophers, and is specifically interested in their philosophical ideas. Philosophical Pragmatists would approve of Yan's objective of learning from ancient Chinese thought to "enrich contemporary international relations theory and present findings relevant to China's