Introduction

The aim of this essay is to situate the thought of Tetsurō Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. I argue for Watsuji’s current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I will show, Watsuji can potentially offer a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. This is because Watsuji challenges the internalist and cognitivist presuppositions informing the currently dominant “Theory of Mind” paradigm that is driving much social cognition research. Additionally, I show that Watsuji’s alternative model is not merely confined to the realm of phenomenological description but that it also receives robust empirical support from a number of different sources. I thus hope to open up aspects of Watsuji’s thinking that have yet to be fully appreciated.

First, I do some interpretative work and explore Watsuji’s conception of embodied intersubjectivity. I focus in particular on Watsuji’s conception of what I term the “hybrid” body as well as his distinctive treatment of interpersonal space—what Watsuji terms “betweenness” (aidagara). Next, I connect these notions to current treatments of social cognition within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I make explicit several of the ways that Watsuji challenges the core cognitivist and internalist presuppositions behind the Theory of Mind paradigm, and I draw upon experimental work from, among other sources, developmental psychology and gesture studies to support Watsuji’s alternative characterization of embodied social interaction.

Watsuji on Embodied Intersubjectivity and Social Space

Watsuji is fundamentally a moral philosopher. His most important book, Rinrigaku (A study of ethics), is a three-volume work in which he argues at length that, as first philosophy, ethical inquiry is logically prior to both humanistic and scientific inquiry (Maraldo 1997, p. 560). However, Watsuji conceived of ethical inquiry as a phenomenologically oriented inquiry into the nature of ethical agency. He was unconcerned with formulating general principles divorced from the flux and flow of situated moral life. He does not offer an ethical system in the traditional philosophical sense (i.e., virtue, utilitarian, deontological, etc.); rather, he was critical of such
approaches as both abstracted from everyday life and as unfairly positing the disembodied and isolated ego as the primary unit of analysis. Watsuji instead concerned himself with exploring how ethical practice is enacted within concrete human relationships. He assumed what we might term a firmly situated approach to ethical inquiry, that is, an approach urging the primacy of action and of our embodied and affectively charged face-to-face encounter with others. He writes at the beginning of *Rinrigaku* that any ethical consideration “which abstracts away from the practical connections between person and person” (i.e., everyday situatedness and embodied encounter) is inadequate in that it overlooks the intercorporeal basis of ethical agency (Watsuji 1996, p. 9). Given this staunchly embodied and situated approach to ethical inquiry, Watsuji is motivated to develop a highly original consideration of the experiential structure of social space: the interpersonal “betweenness” (*aidagara*) coupling self and other in a dialectical relation of activity and passivity.

Yasuo Yuasa observes that one of Watsuji’s most important philosophical contributions is his repeated insistence that “human relationships are, in truth, the relationships of our carnal interconnections in space” (Yuasa 1987, p. 48). The body and space together form the origin and center of Watsuji’s ethics. Moreover, Watsuji repeatedly emphasizes the way that our agency provides the principle of coordination establishing the mutuality of our relationships within shared social space. Watsuji insists that the human spatial relations he is concerned with “are not objective relations that established through subjective unity, as is the case with spatial relations between subject and object. Rather, they are act-connections between person and person like communication or association” (Watsuji 1996, p. 10). It is within these dynamic act-connections that ethics become concretized, embodied within various forms of ethical praxis that allow us to manage and negotiate human relationships. Watsuji concludes that “the locus of ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person” (ibid.). This “in-betweenness” (*aidagara*) or lived social space, as the space of action, thus has an intrinsic qualitative character and interactive dynamic that differentiates it from geometric space. Spelling out this character of social space will, accordingly, occupy the bulk of Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis.

Much of Watsuji’s thinking turns on a phenomenological analysis of the body that inhabits and negotiates social space. The body, Watsuji acknowledges, is a physical object situated in the world alongside other physical objects, “an organism of the sort that physiology expounds” (Watsuji 1996, p. 59). As such, the physical body is our point of contact with the world. It is what allows us to interact causally with the world, to do things in it and to it—and at the same time, to be casually affected by various things that the world does to us. But the body is also more than “mere physiological object” (p. 61). Echoing a point explored at length by phenomenological thinkers such as Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, the body is additionally, and co-equally, a subjective body: a lived, first-person perspective on the world. The body thus has an irreducibly “dual structure,” according to Watsuji (p. 19). It is simultaneously an object as well as an *experiential dimension*, a bodily subjectivity. What this means, in other words, is that the lived body is not strictly speak-
ing a *content* of consciousness (such as, e.g., the visual perception of a tree or the memory of a childhood experience). Rather, the lived body is our anchored first-person perspective on the world—the anchored perspective that grounds our egocentric frame of spatial reference by which we are disclosed to ourselves as bodily subjects situated in the world. And what is perhaps most philosophically intriguing is that the body simultaneously realizes both of these modalities; it is *hybrid*. As Watsuji puts it, “whether considered theoretically [i.e., as a “mere physiological object”] or practically, a human body is subjective through and through, so long as it is an element in the activity of a subject” (p. 65). But there is yet another irreducible dimension of embodiment that requires further elucidation: the *sociality* of the body. Watsuji appeals to interpersonal interactions and offers several vivid phenomenological descriptions to make his point.

He begins by noting that, within interpersonal contexts, the body of another is never encountered as pure object (i.e., as a “biological organism” or “mere material solid”). In a passage worth quoting at length, Watsuji asks:

Is it true to say, when we meet a friend and exchange greetings, that we take for granted that the greeting of our partner is a movement of a physiological body? Is it true to say, on seeing my friend run toward me while calling my name, that I pay attention only to such things as the vehement movement of muscle and the vibration of vocal chords? Everyone knows that this is not the case. In the movements of the human body, that is, in its behavior, we catch a glimpse of the expression of an acting subject, rather than the mere object of physiology. Here, in the way in which a human body exists in daily life, we see not so much a physiological process as expressions of certain practical act-connections. Whether the person whom I asked to help me attain a job says “yes” or “no” by shaking her head vertically or horizontally is nonsense from a purely physiological standpoint, but it is of great practical significance. Through such practical act-connections, the human body is viewed, as it were, as an individual “person” and not as a mere biological organism. (Watsuji 1996, p. 60)

When we encounter another bodily subject, for example when we encounter a friend standing beside a bronze statue, we do not encounter our friend as a material solid having the same form as the statue but instead greet and emotionally engage with our friend as a dynamic expression of bodily subjectivity. In other words, “it is not that I first touch her hand as a material solid and afterwards come to infer that this material solid is put into motion by my friend’s mind. Rather, from the outset, I touch my friend herself” (Watsuji 1996, p. 64). According to Watsuji, this immediate connection with another is possible because the physical body is an expressive vehicle that externalizes, via “practical act-connections,” aspects of another’s subjectivity in such a way that I have immediate perceptual and emotional access to them. Though other aspects of their subjectivity remain transcendent—the first-person perspective entails a certain exclusivity or privileged access, after all, in that I can think and feel things that no one else need know about—it is nevertheless the case that the body, as an expressive vehicle, makes manifest other aspects of their subjectivity within the in-betweenness of social interaction. The physiological body, simultaneously a bodily subjectivity, is therefore always saturated with expressive significance. This idea is
crucial for understanding the potentially radical import of Watsuji’s model of the social body.

Vivid descriptions aside, what sort of argument does Watsuji give to support this claim about the bodily basis of intersubjectivity? There are several. However, for the sake of brevity, I will focus on what I take to be Watsuji’s main argument. Clarifying Watsuji on this point lends insight into his broader picture of how the body inhabits and negotiates social space, so it is worth spelling out with some precision. Additionally, it will indicate how Watsuji’s analysis is relevant for current philosophical and cognitive scientific debates in social cognition.

To begin with, it seems that Watsuji is here endorsing what has recently been termed a “direct perception” view of social cognition (e.g., Gallagher 2008, Hobson 2002, Reddy 2008). Surveying contemporary discussions of this view would take us too far afield. But we can note simply that, according to the direct-perception view of social cognition, the basis of interpersonal understanding consists of empathic perception: an immediate perceptual grasp of another person’s feelings and intentions. Distinct from sympathy—which involves a care or concern for others, such as the inclination to comfort parents grieving over the loss of a child—empathic perception is rather a more fundamental—indeed the fundamental—mode of access to another person as a person. Prior to cultivating sympathetic feelings of concern for another, we must first experience them as a subject; we must perceive them as minded. Empathy is therefore a basic, irreducible mode of perceptual (i.e., intentional) directedness toward another’s subjectivity (Zahavi 2008, p. 517). Importantly, it does not entail that one necessarily feel precisely what one perceives another to be feeling (e.g., I can directly perceive another’s grief at losing a child even if I, in that moment, do not feel grief of a similar character or intensity). In empathic perception, the other’s feeling remains transcendent in this sense, however immediately I am able to recognize it. Nevertheless, what is relevant to this discussion is that the thoughts and emotions of others are directly, which is to say perceptually, accessible. There is thus no need to posit an intellectual process or mechanism that mediates my experience of another’s subjectivity. Rather, it is within the experiential immediacy of empathic perception, Watsuji argues, that we experience “bodies viewed as expressions of the subjective or as persons in their concrete qualities” (Watsuji 1996, p. 61).

What justifies Watsuji’s direct-perception view of social cognition? His main argument leans heavily on the analysis of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler (1954). As with Scheler, there seem to be two core aspects to Watsuji’s argument: (1) the rejection of analogical inference as our primary means of understanding others (i.e., a cognitivist model of social relations), and (2) a rejection of the internalist view of the mind as an entity wholly realized within the head. Watsuji challenges head-on the notion that we never have direct access to the mind of another and insists, to the contrary, that we in fact do. Thinking of subjectivity as (at least partially) externalized within the practical act-connections of social interaction thus eliminates the need to posit a mediating mechanism of any sort. And the positive contribution of this view, Watsuji argues, is that by questioning the primacy of a sharp inner versus
outer distinction as it relates to the embodied subject, we are in a better position to develop a “correct understanding of the human body”: the human body formulated as a subjective body, that is, the expressive vehicle externalizing aspects of our “inner” life (Watsuji 1996, p. 65).11

First, Watsuji rejects the idea that some variety of analogical inference forms the basis for interpersonal understanding (Watsuji 1996, pp. 59–65). According to this cognitivist view of social relations, we first perceive the body and expressive behavior as movements of a “biological body” or “mere material solid”—for instance, we perceive “such things as the vehement movement of muscle and the vibration of vocal chords”—and, in a step-wise process, secondarily infer the existence of some sort of animating subjectivity behind them (p. 60). Our inference here is warranted, this view further holds, because we recognize these observed movements as motor possibilities for us, that is, movements that we, too, can make and which are causally motivated by our own subjective states. For example, I see particular gestures and behavior in another as indicating anger, and I recognize that I also make similar gestures and exhibit similar behavior when experiencing anger. Thus, I infer (as a sort of inference to the best explanation, since I cannot actually experience another’s subjectivity, the line of argument continues) that there is a similar subjectivity “behind” those gestures and behavior, providing both their causal origin and communicative intention. But again, I can never be certain of another’s subjective life; I only have access to their publicly observable behavior. I can only know with certainty my own subjectivity since minds are, in principle, localized in the head and thus given with an irreducible first-person privilege.

Some variation of this argument from analogy motivates much of the ongoing discussion falling under the “Theory of Mind” framework (see, e.g., Premack and Woodruff 1978) in current social cognition research. According to this framework, social cognition is fundamentally a kind of “mind reading” facilitated by one of two mediating mechanisms: the predictive theories of Theory Theory (TT) (e.g., Premack and Woodruff 1978, Baron-Cohen and Frith 1985, Carruthers 1996) or the simulative models of Simulation Theory (ST) (e.g., Heal 1986, Gordon 1996, Dokic and Proust 2002, Goldman 2006). Though they differ in their details,12 both TT and ST rest on the “Myth of the Hidden” (Torrance 2009). They assume that mental states are the sorts of things that are, in principle, hidden inside individual skulls, and therefore that we can only ever attain indirect knowledge of other’s thoughts and feelings by first (1) perceiving external behavior and then (2) inferring to inner states via theorization, simulation, or some combination of the two.13 I return to the Theory of Mind framework in more detail later.

On the face of it, this sort of internalism seems to square with common sense. Where else could minds be if not in the head? But both Watsuji and Scheler offer several reasons why this view—including both its internalist as well as its mind-reading presupposition—is problematic. To begin within, Scheler points out that the analogy-based view of social cognition is circular (Scheler 1954, pp. 239–240). Scheler notes that we are conscious of our own movements from the inside, as it were, “as intentions to move” discharged in different forms of expressive behavior
But the movements of others are experientially given in a different mode of presentation: namely, they are “represented by the visual image of such movements” (ibid.) given from an external observational standpoint. Thus, there is “no sort of immediate resemblance or similarity to the data encountered in our own case” (ibid.), and any inference to the contrary is unwarranted. And yet we do experientially encounter others as minded; furthermore, at times we do employ analogical reasoning to sort out what it is we think they are up to (e.g., if we’re suspicious of their motives). But in these cases, Scheler insists, we only make analogical inferences when we already take another’s inner life for granted and are rather trying to interpret the meaning of a particular episode of expressive behavior. Analogical inference thus cannot be our primary or basic means of understanding others but instead requires a more immediate form of interpersonal understanding.

Watsuji similarly insists that the observational stance necessary for analogical inference is a derived form of interpersonal relatedness—for, “to deal with a human being as a mere physiological object, we must deprive her of various other qualifications in order to construct an abstract framework of understanding” (Watsuji 1996, p. 61). But he argues further that “this distinctive way of looking at things arises only within a position in which the practical attitude has become completely eliminated and thus not in accordance with actual everyday reality” (p. 64). Within the in-betweenness of our everyday face-to-face interactions, the other is, to the contrary, always already encountered as an expressive unity, a bodily subjectivity (p. 65). Analogical inference in social contexts is thus a derived form of understanding based on a more primitive connectedness in which the others’ feelings and intentions are given directly (i.e., perceptually).

Both Scheler and Watsuji further reject the internalist assumption lurking behind the analogical inference model of empathy. This is, perhaps, the most philosophically radical aspect of their respective views. Scheler speaks of the “expressive unity” (Ausdruckseinheit) of the embodied mind and of interpersonal engagements as “patterns of wholeness” in which aspects of another’s inner life are given directly and non-inferentially (Scheler 1954, pp. 261–264). In his most well known statement of the view, he writes:

For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical sensations’, and that there is certainly no sensation of another person’s mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. (Scheler 1954, p. 260)

According to Scheler, expressive movements such as facial expressions and gestures give us direct and immediate perceptual access to the mind of another. This is because bodily expressivity, at least at times, extends aspects of another’s subjectiv-
ity into the social space of embodied encounters. More radically, the expressive dynamics of our bodily subjectivity—including various bodily and body-related traits such as gesture, posture, facial and whole-body expressions, et cetera—play an essential role in driving certain forms of thought and feeling. Mind is thus distributed throughout our bodily subjectivity, considered as an “expressive unity.” And what this means, then, is that, quite often, we do have direct perceptual access to the mind of another as it manifests within the visual-spatial dynamics of their bodily expressivity. This direct bodily and perceptual access forms the ground of interpersonal relatedness.

Watsuji affirms this claim, paying special attention to “the spatiality of human being” to support his view here—and in particular his notion of “subjective spatiality,” which he says is the “essential characteristic of human beings” (Watsuji 1996, p. 157). The most complete treatment of this notion comes in chapter 9 of the English translation of Rinrigaku, titled “The Spatiality of a Human Being.” Watsuji first observes that culture, which he defines as the effort to collectively establish structures for managing the flow of communication and information, is characterized by its “spatial extendedness” (p. 155). In other words, “[a]ll expressions that indicate the interconnection of the acts of human beings—for example, intercourse, fellowship, transportation, communication—can be understood only with a subjective spatiality of this sort” (p. 157). The structures we employ to manage the flow of information and communication comprise the “nervous system of society” (p. 160). Yet they are not mere things. Rather, they carry human intentions and dynamically organize the relationships of those who create and use them. They are infused with meaning. In this way, then, they scaffold the material space of intersubjectivity—in other words, they extend into what we might call the “meaning spaces” of social relationships—and exhibit their own sort of “subjective extendedness” (p. 165).

However, this “subjective extendedness” also defines interpersonal dynamics on a more immediate face-to-face level. According to Watsuji, as we have already noted, the self is hybrid. The self has an intrinsically “dual structure” in that it is, simultaneously, a physical body as well as an embodied subjectivity: an experiential perspective on the world that is at the same time a physical presence in the world. But this hybridity also extends crucially to its social existence. For the embodied self, Watsuji argues, is additionally a public as well as a private entity—and its very nature is subsequently established in light of this tension, and within the shared spaces of social interaction. This idea is clarified with Watsuji’s analysis of the Japanese term ningen and the compound ningen sonzai. The term ningen is a Sino-Japanese compound that translates roughly as “human being” (Watsuji 1996, p. 14). But a more nuanced rendering is possible, Watsuji insists. Engaging in Heideggerian-style etymology, Watsuji notes that ningen already suggests sociality and interpersonal relatedness in that the character nin (or hito), or “person,” implies two individuals supporting one another, while gen (or aida) means “betweenness” or “relatedness” (Watsuji 1996, pp. 9–27; see also Shields 2009, p. 267, and Odin 1992, p. 480). Thus, the poles of singularity and plurality, private and public, inner and outer, are built into the compound ningen, Watsuji argues, reaffirming the basic hybridity of
human being. Watsuji notes further that human *sonzai*, or “existence,” consists of *son* (“the self-sustenance of the self”) and *zai* (“to remain within human relations”) (Watsuji 1996, p. 21). Human existence (*sonzai*) is thus “the self-sustenance of the self as betweenness” (ibid.). Put otherwise, to be a self is to actively negotiate this perpetual tension or “dialectic,” as Watsuji refers to it, between individuality and sociality. This negotiation unfolds within the space of betweenness, the space of “subjective extendedness.”

To return to social cognition, Watsuji’s conception of the hybrid embodied self, as well as the dialectically constituted character of *ningen sonzai*, is the key to his rejection of the internalist premise that subjectivity is confined to the head. Approvingly citing Scheler’s contention that the spatiality of subjectivity is tied to “the subject’s capacity for movement,” Watsuji further insists that, given that “*ningen* is fundamentally individualistic and social and that a mere solitary person . . . is also an abstraction,” it follows that “the self-movement of the subject . . . must be an activity affiliated with human relationships” (Watsuji 1996, pp. 174–175). In its expressive form, the entire body—and not simply the brain—is a social organ. Therefore, the interactive dynamics of embodied encounters—for example gesture, posture, touch, gaze, vocal and bodily expression, coordination, activity and passivity, et cetera—are carnally based, practical action-connections that establish the “subjective extendedness” of the social self. Additionally, the dynamics of bodily expressivity within social contexts serve as the material scaffolding both structuring the lived space of betweenness (i.e., by making aspects of one’s “inner” subjectivity available for direct perception) and motivating the back-and-forth dialectic of interpersonal engagement. Watsuji writes:

> [W]hen *I* as the subject of practice stands face to face with *Thou*, *Thou* stands face to face with *I* as the subject of practice. One’s physical body exhibits personality in every part and, hence, lures another’s personality in its every motion. It strengthens opposition through hostility and gives birth to unity through affection. It exemplifies what it means “to be outside” through coolness and draws toward “the inside” through friendliness. (Watsuji 1996, p. 156)

The animate, expressive (i.e., self-moving), and hybrid body is in this way the vehicle by which aspects of subjectivity are spatiality that is externalized within the betweenness of human relationship. For, “[t]he spatiality of this subject must consist in the subjective betweenness of human being” (Watsuji 1996, p. 175). Therefore, “[w]ithout taking into consideration spatial extendedness, we are unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the personal relationship between self and other” (p. 166). But crucially, Watsuji concludes, this relationality is fundamentally a *carnal* relationality since “[b]odily connections are always visible wherever betweenness prevails” (p. 62). In sum, subjectivity is quite literally a distributed, and not merely an intracranial, phenomenon, perceptually available within the social space of interpersonal betweenness. As hybrid, that is, as fundamentally a bodily subjectivity, the expressive body’s formal structure ensures this intersubjective accessibility.
Embodiment, Expression, and Empirical Support

Watsuji’s model of the hybrid social body potentially serves as a balanced corrective to some of the core Cartesian assumptions motivating much current social cognition research. As we have seen, Watsuji argues that our basic sociality is established at the level of a felt bodily connectedness. Moreover, Watsuji’s notion of “betweenness” is meant to affirm that the process of social interaction unfolds not within the individual heads of subjects separated by an unbridgeable epistemic gulf but rather within the expressive dynamics of face-to-face engagement. For Watsuji, sociality is thus fundamentally a bodily, and not an intellectual, phenomenon, enacted within the second-person betweenness of concrete human relationships.

To see why this is relevant to current debates, I return to the Theory of Mind paradigm. Again, this framework for thinking about the basis of social cognition rests on the core assumption that mental states are hidden inside individual skulls, and that we can only ever attain indirect knowledge of others’ thoughts and feelings by first perceiving external behavior and then inferring to inner states via theorization, simulation, or some combination of the two. For instance, Alan Leslie writes, “One of the most important powers of the human mind is to conceive of and think about itself and other minds. Because the mental states of others (and indeed ourselves) are completely hidden from the senses, they can only ever be inferred” (Leslie 2004, p. 164). Given this presupposition, Theory of Mind casts interpersonal understanding in predominantly mentalistic terms; social cognition is thought to be a project of developing the requisite mechanisms to overcome (or at least lessen) the epistemic distance between one’s own mind and those of others. These mechanisms are what allow one subject to represent what is happening in the mind of another, a process of mental state attribution by which we are subsequently able to predict and explain their behavior.

As mentioned briefly above, within current social cognition literature one finds two proposed mechanisms for overcoming this epistemic gulf: the theories proposed by Theory Theory (TT) and the simulations advocated by Simulation Theory (ST). According to TT, interpreting and predicting behavior is the product of innate or acquired theories about how minds work, how mental states interrelate, and how mental states causally motivate behavior (Premack and Woodruff 1978, Baron-Cohen and Frith 1985, Carruthers 1996). These theories are what allow us to make inferences about another’s mental life, and to anticipate and interpret their behavior based on these inferences. ST, on the other hand, urges that this sort of inferential theory-making is unnecessary by virtue of the immediate access we have to our own cognitive and emotional resources. According to ST, we exploit the rich inner resources of our own mental life to imaginatively model the mental states of others as if we were in their situation, yielding a practical understanding of another’s motives and intentions (Heal 1986, Gordon 1996, Dokic and Proust 2002, Goldman 2006). The debate is certainly more complex than this. However, what this gloss conveys is that what “[c]oncepts such as theory of mind, simulation, or mentalisation all have in
common [is] that they conceive of social understanding as a putting into operation a ‘theory’ or ‘model’ of how people act” (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 466). This sort of process is required since minds are localized in the head and given with an exclusive first-person privilege.

It is precisely at this point that Watsuji offers his challenge. Again, recall his crucial insistence on the irreducibly hybrid nature of the embodied mind, that is, his insistence on the “dual structure” of our bodily subjectivity (Watsuji 1996, p. 19). According to Watsuji, once more, we are individual and social, private and public, selves—and we concretely embody these poles simultaneously from the moment we are born. This hybridity is particularly manifest in episodes of social engagement, where we have immediate perceptual access to aspects of another’s subjectivity in and through the material expression of the body. Moreover, Watsuji implicitly critiques knowledge-based models of sociality (e.g., TT and ST) by insisting that the basic structures of sociality rest on a primitive felt bodily connectedness. In this carnal sense do we “exist in our daily life in the being in betweenness” (p. 7).

What does this mean, exactly? I want to turn to several lines of empirical research from developmental psychology and gesture studies to further clarify and support Watsuji’s claims. First, consider the claim that sociality cannot have the same structure as knowledge (i.e., inference-based mind reading) but that it rests, rather, on a more basic form of bodily expressivity and felt intimacy. As neonate mimesis research seemingly indicates (see, e.g., Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1997; Kugiumtzakis 1999), even newborn infants—prior to the development of language, other-directed theories, or the imaginative capacities required for simulative routines—are drawn to the expressive qualities of the human form, particularly the face. They emerge from the womb ready to perceive and respond to the expressive movements of other human agents by engaging with and mimicking facial expressions. Moreover, infants almost immediately recognize and respond to communicative intentions. They recognize faces as emotionally salient in a way that other objects are not, and they exhibit an interpersonally sensitive “embodied attending” (Downing 2000, p. 256) by initiating various preparatory movements intended to solicit social interaction with caregivers (Trevarthen 1992).

These engagements teach the infant about different aspects of its bodily subjectivity, the body considered as a social vehicle. Additionally, they affirm the unique experiential and expressive status of the face and form of other social agents (more on this in a moment). Infants thus immediately seem to feel and respond to the affective pull of these initial encounters (Hobson 1993, 2002; Reddy 2003, 2008; Reddy and Trevarthen 2004). Moreover, they are motivated to explore their own bodies and expressive capacities when they enter into the affective ethos of face-to-face imitative encounters. And the types of response they exhibit indicate a genuine sociality to these episodes, that is, a context-sensitive interpersonal relevance that goes beyond mere mimicking. As psychologist Vasudevi Reddy observes, “When interacting with people, newborn infants don’t just imitate, they respond. They respond with interest or disinterest, with attention or avoidance, and, at least within weeks, with reciprocal
rather than imitative actions” (Reddy 2008, p. 59; emphasis mine). In other words, there is a genuine back-and-forth to these encounters—a “dialectical” structure, to use Watsuji’s favored term—that teaches the infant early lessons about her hybrid (i.e., private and public) embodied self, as well as the emotionally and communicatively significant character of face-to-face encounter. They play an active role in the construction of shared meanings.\(^{16}\)

For instance, both infants and caregivers seem to derive pleasure from these interactions. Increased smiles are observed before, during, and after imitative exchanges (Kugiumutzakis et al. 2005). Additionally, infants exhibit a greater heart rate (suggesting heightened attentiveness and anticipation) when attempting to provoke interactions with adults than they do when simply responding to adults’ interactions (Nagy and Molnar 2004). From the start, we automatically attune to the facial expressions of others with our own mimetic response (Schilbach et al. 2008), and this mimetic response to the nonverbal behaviors and gestures of social partners continues into adulthood (Chartrand and Bargh 1999). This is possible because, even as infants, we are already relatively sophisticated perceivers, attuned both to the timing and emotion quality of gestures and bodily expressions (Nadel et al. 1999) as well as to the emotive values carried by the harmonic and melodic parameters of the human voice (Trevarthen 2002). From the moment they are born, infants “vocalize and gesture in a way that seems ‘tuned’ to the vocalizations and gestures of the other person” (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997, p. 131). This and other evidence indicate that the face-to-face betweenness of these early encounters is already swimming in emotion (Kugiumutzakis et al 2005), “orchestrated via a corporal choir of visual, auditory, tactile, and kinetic modalities” (Zeedyk 2006, p. 322). Crucially, however, these engagements are enacted in a non-mentalizing way—that is, without the intervention of theorizing or simulation. They rest instead on bodily expression and invoke a perceptual capacity that is “fast, automatic, irresistible, and highly stimulus-driven” (Scholl and Tremoulet 2000; see also Gallagher 2008, pp. 538–539). We perceive others as expressive agents and respond accordingly.

Again, this line of research strongly suggests that there is something experientially significant about even the earliest preverbal encounters with the face and expressive form of another person within imitative episodes (see also Beebe et al. 1985, Papousek 2007, Stern 1985, Trevarthen 1979). Within mimesis—and because of our basic perceptual capacity to experience the gestures and movements of others as expressive of emotion, intention, and agency—the bodily encounter with another specifies the unique phenomenal character of interpersonal space, the bodily betweenness that Watsuji insists is fundamental to understanding the basis of human relationships. This is a crucial addition to current discussions. For the interpersonal mechanisms (e.g., theories, simulations, etc.) posited by the Theory of Mind paradigm offer “how” explanations (Reddy 2008, p. 59). That is, they purport to explain how different sorts of imitation occur (e.g., via the formulation of theories or simulative models)—even though, as we have seen, their “how” story requires that a more primitive preverbal level of felt connectedness already be in place. Nevertheless,
these “how” stories do not explain why imitation occurs, that is, the meaning of this phenomenon. This latter issue is a question about motivation: what first motivates this primitive bodily response to the experience of another person?

Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis can, I suggest, be of assistance here. First, as Watsuji repeatedly insists, the face of another with its expressive form is not experienced as utterly alien, as an epistemically mysterious object that requires deliberate sorting out (contra the Theory of Mind paradigm). This way of framing of social relations presupposes that one always engages with another from an observational stance—requiring, then, an inference from observed behavior to perceptually inaccessible mental states. However, Watsuji argues to the contrary that sociality rests fundamentally not on observation but on interactive engagement. And in engagement, the expressive face and form of the body are immediately manifest as a revelation of an alter subjectivity, that is, as the simultaneous presence and withdrawal of alterity—a phenomenal revelation which subsequently gives interpersonal space its unique felt character (unlike, e.g., our spatial encounter with physical objects). Again, recall Watsuji’s insistence that “when I as the subject of practice stands face to face with Thou, Thou stands face to face with I as the subject of practice. One’s physical body exhibits personality in every part and, hence, lures another’s personality in its every motion” (Watsuji 1996, p. 56; emphasis mine). Again, this is because “[i]n the movement of the human body, that is, in its behavior, we catch a glimpse of the expression of an acting subject . . . an expression of certain practical act-connections” (p. 60).

On one hand, another’s face and expressive form are immediately experienced as a concrete presentation of an alter subjectivity; they are saturated with expressive significance. For within imitation “the other’s dynamic personal presence, emotions, and motivation are directly felt in presentational immediacy” (Kugiumutzakis 1999, p. 79). The enthusiasm with which neonates enter into imitative episodes, for instance, as well as the context-sensitive nature of their responses and solicitations, seems to indicate this. However, the Other is not wholly present in the sense that aspects of their subjectivity remain transcendent. The transcendence of another is a positive feature of early self-other experience. As Reddy argues at length, the attentive gaze of another person discloses the infant to herself as an object, namely an object for another’s subjectivity, which partially eludes her (Reddy 2003, 2008). This primitive experience of being an object for another subject forms the basis for more articulate, and later developing, forms of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is thus mediated by the bodily encounter with the face and form of another; interiority co-arises with exteriority, as Watsuji insists.

Moreover, the face, in particular—as the locus of expressiveness—remains the primary point of contact within imitation. And imitative episodes, oriented toward the expressive dynamics of the face, are therefore “an inherently intersubjective phenomenon, in which both infant and adult are actively engaging in an emotionally endowed, communicative exchange”—all before the onset of theoretical or simulative capabilities (Zeedyk 2006, p. 332). Configured thus, interpersonal space becomes
the phenomenal space of felt interpersonal intimacy. The face and expressive form of another “lure” imitation and responsive solicitations from the infant, as Watsuji puts it, because the meaning of social engagements inheres within the dynamics of the engagement itself. In other words, social understanding is not fundamentally a matter of coordinating intentions from within the epistemically sealed confines of our respective heads. Rather, bodily expressiveness is inherently meaningful—and thus inherently alluring to the infant—precisely because it is subjectivity, that is, subjectivity-in-action. In Watsuji’s favored locution, it is “subjective spatiality.” So, even within early episodes of mimesis and mother-infant interaction, “the intentionality in the mother-infant interaction does not reside in any individual mind; it emerges as a product of their social interaction. Thus, what is intentional about the mother-infant interaction cannot be explained simply in terms of the mother’s and infant’s intentions with respect to each other,” but rather in terms of the expressive character of the betweenness of embodied engagement (Gibbs 2001, p. 120).

Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis challenges the Theory of Mind paradigm in a second and perhaps more direct—and indeed radical—way. Again, as we have seen, Watsuji seems to imply that the expressive dynamics of the body serve as material scaffolding that externalizes some aspects of subjectivity, thus making the mind of another (at least partially) available for perceptual engagement. This is a strong claim, one which requires a more careful defense than is here possible. But we can unpack this idea somewhat by first noting some of the ways that various bodily and body-related expressive traits (e.g., postural adjustments, touch, hand movements, facial expressions, whole-body movements, interpersonal coordination, etc.) play an essential role in driving some forms of thinking and feeling.

As already discussed, neonates come into the world seemingly aware of how imitation and expressive movements enable the negotiation of interpersonal space and thus serve as communicative vehicles for creating empathic attunement and interpersonal intimacy. Of course, we don’t stop gesturing when we are no longer infants. If anything, our gestures become more florid and ubiquitous as we age. And they arguably take on an even greater role when they become part of the material process of thought itself. For example, in some instances, it appears that gestures don’t merely express fully formed thoughts or intentions. Rather, they appear to help us think; they play an active causal role in driving thinking and, as we will see in a moment, feeling (Goldin-Meadow 2005, McNeill 2005, Laird 2007). Susan Goldin-Meadow, for example, has conducted many studies and surveyed other research indicating that gestures occur nearly everywhere, including in some surprising contexts: for example, we gesture when talking on the phone, when talking to ourselves, and in the dark; our gestures tend to co-vary with task difficulty; we gesture more when choosing between an increased number of options; and we gesture more when reasoning about a problem as opposed to describing the problem or a known solution (Goldin-Meadow 2005, pp. 136–149). There are thus indications that gestures have more than simply a communicative (i.e., supplementary) function.
Additionally, Goldin-Meadow and colleagues (Goldin-Meadow 1999, 2000, 2005; Goldin-Meadow and Wagner 2005) have designed a number of experiments to test the hypothesis that, beyond merely serving a communicative function, gesture may play an active cognitive role in learning—for instance, by lightening the speaker’s cognitive load (i.e., informational off-loading) and thereby freeing up additional cognitive resources for, among other things, memory and recall. In one experiment (Goldin-Meadow et al. 2001), children and adults were asked to explain how they solved a math problem while simultaneously remembering a list of words (children) or letters (adults). Some were allowed to gesture freely during this task while others were asked to refrain. The result was that the latter group (i.e., those who did not gesture during the intervening mathematical test) did significantly poorer on the memory test. Gesturing seems to improve performance because it “saves speakers cognitive resources on the explanation task, permitting them to allocate more resources to the memory task” (Goldin-Meadow and Wagner 2005, p. 237).

Other research supports this notion. Children working on mathematical equivalence problems are more likely to learn successful problem-solving strategies when they mimic an instructor’s gestures (representing a correct problem-solving strategy) than if they don’t gesture (Cook and Goldin-Meadow 2006). Gesturing during the learning of a new mathematical concept, as opposed to just speaking about it, assisted retention of the concept (Cook et al. 2008). Early (i.e., prior to fourteen months) and prodigious gesturing, such as pointing, plays a crucial role in later vocabulary development (Rowe et al. 2008). And even congenitally blind individuals gesture while speaking, despite never having seen their own hands or having seen another person gesture while speaking (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 1998, Goldin-Meadow 2005). They do so in a variety of situations (Iverson 1999, Iverson et al. 2000), produce the same range of gesture forms as sighted speakers (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 2001), and gesture when speaking to others whom they know also to be blind, indicating that gesture may have a function beyond merely conveying supplementary information to speaking (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 1998, 2001). Again, much more needs to be said to support the idea that gestures play an active material role in driving thought. But these and other studies offer suggestive hints as to how Watsuji’s notion of the hybridity of the embodied mind might be confirmed by ongoing work in embodied cognition.

What about emotional and affective processes? Might aspects of these states, too, be distributed across the expressive scaffolding of our “subjective spatiality”? Consider Moebius Syndrome, a rare non-progressive congenital condition that usually results in complete bilateral facial paralysis (Cole 2009). A persistent feature of the narratives of individuals with Moebius Syndrome is that, due to their expressive deficit, the phenomenal character of various emotions and moods is somehow constricted or diminished (see, e.g., Cole 1998, 1999; Cole and Spalding 2009). Some Moebius subjects report that they have the impression of assuming a spectatorial as opposed to a participatory stance in their emotional experiences and social interactions. For instance, James, a priest in his fifties, says:
I have a notion which has stayed with me over much of my life—that it is possible to live in your head, entirely in your head. . . . I do think I get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I think sad, not really saying, or recognizing, actually feeling happy or feeling sad. Perhaps I have had a difficulty in recognizing that which I’m putting a name to is not a thought at all but it is a feeling[;] maybe I have to intellectualize mood. (Cole 1999, p. 308)

In response to Jonathan Cole’s direct query that perhaps he somehow feels emotions less due to his inability to give them bodily expression, James answers in the affirmative: “I think you’re right. These feelings are there but they are probably reduced. I’ve often thought of myself as a spectator rather than a participant” (Cole 1999, p. 308). Other examples abound.19

The idea of a reciprocal causal link between expression-as-material-scaffolding and the phenomenal character of emotional experience receives robust support in a number of empirical studies. For example, James Laird (2007) has chronicled hundreds of studies investigating the link between feeling and action. Laird defends the Jamesian view that “our feelings are the consequences of our actions” and not the other way around (Laird 2007, p. 4). The largest and most consistent body of evidence in support of this theory concerns facial expressions (p. 23). An overwhelming majority of existing studies seem to indicate that manipulation of expressive behavior produces corresponding changes in feelings. For example, multiple studies have found that when subjects are induced to adopt a particular emotion-specific facial expression (grimacing, frowning, etc.) or posture, they report experiencing the corresponding emotion (disgust, anger, etc.) (see Laird and Bresler 1992, Niedenthal 2007, and Niedenthal and Maringer 2009). Beyond this, Paula Niedenthal surveys further research affirming that (1) adopting emotion-specific facial expressions and postures influences preferences and attitudes, and (2) inhibition of bodily expression (i.e., motor movements) leads to diminished emotional experience (i.e., reduction in the experience’s phenomenal intensity), as well as interference in processing emotional information (Niedenthal 2007, Niedenthal et al. 2005). The body’s expressive dynamics, acting as material scaffolding, therefore seems to play an active role in driving both thinking and feeling.

How does this relate to social cognition? Simply put, the visual-spatial dynamics of gesture and bodily expressivity (i.e., Watsuji’s “subjective spatiality”) provide real-time perceptual access to thinking and feeling in action. In this way, an epistemically demanding cognitive-inferential process (e.g., the theory-building and simulative projection advocated by the Theory of Mind paradigm) is transformed into a less demanding process of direct perception and interactional engagement. This is because the embodied presence of the Other reveals aspects of their subjectivity as manifest in their concrete presence. And the core internalist supposition informing the Theory of Mind paradigm (as well as the philosophical “Problem of Other Minds” framework standing behind it) is in this way drawn into question. For, while I may not have full epistemic certainty about what another person is thinking and feeling at a given moment—their partial transcendence is always assured, given the hybrid nature of the embodied mind—I nevertheless have phenomenal access to aspects of their

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subjectivity as they are manifest within the interpersonal betweenness that defines our face-to-face interaction. Accordingly, “our everyday experience of others reaches the other subjectivities themselves, without divesting them of their alterity” (Overgaard 2007, p. 140). As we have seen, Watsuji repeatedly insists that we ought to give explanatory prioritization to the extended human form—and not simply the brain—when investigating the basis of social understanding and interpersonal relatedness. The expressive body as a whole, in relation to other expressive bodies, is thus the locus of our sociality. His phenomenological characterizations of betweenness and the hybridity of the embodied mind (i.e., its subjective spatiality) thus offers a productive challenge to the philosophically prejudiced picture of the “embrained” (as opposed to embodied and embedded) mind that frames much current work on the mentalizing basis of social cognition.

Concluding Thoughts

I have argued that Watsuji has much to contribute to current social cognition debates. First, I looked at Watsuji’s conception of embodied intersubjectivity and social space—focusing, in particular, on his model of the hybrid body and its role in negotiating the betweenness of social relations. I then offered some tentative indications as to how these notions might offer a fresh critical perspective on the dominant Theory of Mind paradigm. In support, I marshaled several different lines of empirical research to buttress what I argued are Watsuji’s most important and philosophically distinctive claims about the bodily basis of social understanding. To truly find a place for Watsuji in this discussion, much more work clearly needs to be done. Despite his prominence in Japan—and unlike, for instance, figures such Kitarō Nishida and Keiji Nishitani—Watsuji is not widely known, even to those working in comparative and continental philosophical circles. This should change. There has lately been a rapidly growing interest in phenomenology from those working outside the continental tradition (e.g., analytical philosophers and empirical researchers within the various cognitive sciences), motivated by the recognition that careful descriptions and analysis of the structures of subjectivity need be part of any robust approach to mind. As I have tried to demonstrate, Watsuji was a creative and original phenomenologist in his own right—indeed independently of his ethical philosophy. His work offers rich theoretical resources, making him well suited to find a place alongside other phenomenologists within ongoing debates. The humble aspirations of this essay will have been realized if this discussion serves to bring more attention to his potential contribution.

Notes

1 – Watsuji was an extremely prolific author. However, the discussion that follows will focus exclusively on one text, Rinrigaku. There are several reasons for this. First, it is generally taken to be Watsuji’s most important work and thus worthy of its own treatment. Second, though other texts, such as his Climate and Cul-
ture: A Philosophical Study (Watsuji 1988), contain rich phenomenologically motivated discussions of embodiment, Rinrigaku exceeds them in terms of both the scope and sophistication of its phenomenological analysis. Additionally, Rinrigaku’s focus on the dynamics of face-to-face social engagements—and the various concepts deployed to elucidate this engagement, such as “betweenness” and “subjective spatiality”—make this text an especially fruitful source for engaging with similar treatments of social cognition in cognitive science. A comprehensive treatment of Watsuji’s model of intersubjectivity would need to speak to how Watsuji conceives of the role of culture in shaping subjectivity and social relations; this is the main theme of Climate and Culture. But since this goes beyond the scope of the present essay’s concerns, I will set this aspect of his thought aside. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.

2 – By “agency,” Watsuji is referring to “[a]ll expressions that indicate the interconnection of the acts of human beings—for example, intercourse, fellowship, transportation, communication,” as well as the more immediate structures of our face-to-face engagements (Watsuji 1996, p. 157). More on this as we proceed.

3 – Watsuji argues further that most Western European ethics originate from an individualistic and rationalistic metaphysics stressing the primacy of the former (i.e., “the consciousness of the isolated individual”) while neglecting the foundational status of the latter (i.e., the relational “in-betweenness of person and person”). See Mayeda 2006 for further analysis.

4 – Readers already familiar with Watsuji’s work will notice that in what follows I say little of the Buddhist background of his thinking—and in particular, the relation between aidagara and “emptiness.” To be clear, a full appreciation of Watsuji, including his ethics, requires an awareness of the Buddhist context in which many of his core ideas are developed. I have simply passed over this aspect of Watsuji’s thought since my emphasis is elsewhere. For discussions of Watsuji and his relation to Buddhism, see LaFleur 1978 and Shields 2009. See also Kalmanson 2010 for an insightful treatment of Watsuji, Levinas, and the Buddhist notion of “no-self.”

5 – Kitarō Nishida, the founder and arguably most important figure of the Kyoto School of twentieth-century Japanese philosophy, speaks similarly of the animate body as the “union point” in which embodied self and world co-penetrate. According to Nishida, the body cannot be reduced to a mere assemblage of biological parts of behavioral capacities. This is because such a characterization fails to acknowledge the deep way that the body is functionally interwoven into its biological, cultural, and historical contexts via the things that it does and has done to it. See Kopf 2001 and Krueger 2008.

6 – This observation about the body’s double modality leads Nishida to refer to the body as having an “ambiguous” or “self-contradictory” nature. Likewise, Watsuji will insist that the body, as both subject and object as well as personal
and public, exhibits a “contradictory” relation with itself and with the world (Watsuji 1996, p. 58).

7 – The body can, of course, become an explicit object of or content for consciousness. For example, I can look with disdain at my flabby midsection, attend to a pain in my back, or become aware of someone staring at a blemish on my face. But these are derived modes of self-consciousness grounded in a more experientially primitive *pre-reflexive* bodily self-consciousness (Sartre 1956; see also Legrand 2007).

8 – As Shaun Gallagher notes, the direct-perception approach to social cognition comes very close to suggesting that there is in fact no problem of other minds (Gallagher 2008, p. 535).

9 – A full account of interpersonal understanding needs to emphasize the extent to which our understanding of others is often mediated by pragmatic and contextual information that extends beyond face-to-face engagement (Gallagher 2008, Schutz 1967). Very often we draw upon contextual information (i.e., physical, social, and/or cultural) to interpret another’s actions and intentions, and to supplement the information present in their utterances and expressive behavior. Watsuji’s *Climate and Culture* emphasizes this aspect of our sociality. His argument that geography and climate, too, are essential mediating factors in motivating social understanding is a novel thesis worthy of extended consideration, and it can be seen as a useful supplement to the more immediate face-to-face orientation of *Rinrigaku*. Again, however, for the reasons mentioned previously, I have intentionally focused on the latter at the expense of the former. But Watsuji would likely insist that both perspectives need to be integrated in a comprehensive account of intersubjectivity and social relationships.

10 – Scheler also endorses a perceptual-based view of empathy and even refers to his own model as a “Perceptual theory of other minds,” which he says captures how we normally encounter one another within everyday “communal” life (Scheler 1954, p. 220). Despite a resurgence of interest in phenomenology, particularly in the context of current philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Scheler’s work on the phenomenology of emotions and social relations remains unjustifiably neglected. For discussion of Scheler’s contemporary relevance, see Zahavi 2008.

11 – Watsuji writes further: “Insofar as individual consciousness is thought to reside ‘inside a brain,’ the society is located ‘outside of it’ or, more precisely, ‘between’ one brain and another” (Watsuji 1996, p. 166). But Watsuji insists that this is problematic, in that “[s]ociety cannot consist of merely those nonspatial ‘meanings’ held in [individual] consciousness. Society can arise only between one subject and another in and through practical communication and, hence, through dialogue, communication, and transportation” (p. 167)—within the material spaces of in-betweenness, in other words. Thus, material structures of in-betweenness—including the expressive body, tools, clothing, shelter, rituals,
and norm-governed practices, et cetera—provide essential enabling conditions for the development of consciousness and social relations. For a contemporary neurobiological account of consciousness and culture in step with Watsuji’s view, see Wexler 2008. See also Noë 2009 for a philosophical defense of this “externalized” account of consciousness, culture, and self.

12 – See Goldman 2006, pp. 3–22, for a helpful introduction to the debate. See also Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 171–196, for various phenomenologically motivated criticisms of the Theory of Mind framework, as well as Leudar and Costall 2009 for other critical perspectives.

13 – See Zahavi 2007 for discussion of how the argument from analogy informs the Theory of Mind framework and straddles both TT and ST.

14 – In step with Scheler and Watsuji here, Merleau-Ponty likewise insists that “[w]e must reject this prejudice which makes ‘inner realities’ out of love, hate, or anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 52–53). Wittgenstein also seems to hold a similar view (Overgaard 2007).

15 – Watsuji was deeply influenced by his reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time. But he was also critical of what he took to be Heidegger’s unwarranted neglect of Dasein’s spatiality (i.e., the social context that Dasein always inhabits) in the wake of his persistent focus on Dasein’s temporality. See Mayeda 2006 for extensive discussion of Watsuji’s relation to Heidegger, including some critical analysis of Watsuji’s reading of Heidegger on this point.

16 – For a discussion of the musical and narrative character of these early exchanges see Malloch and Trevarthen 2009 and Krueger forthcoming a.


18 – For example, a recent study indicates that doodling can potentially enhance one’s ability to process, parse, and recall information (Andrade 2010).

19 – One reviewer objects that Moebius cases do not lend much insight into the social nature of emotions since the person with Moebius Syndrome is not able to feel their emotions, due less to a lack of interaction with others than to an inability to (facially) act them out for him/herself. In other words, it is not clear how Moebius Syndrome is a truly intersubjective deficit. This is a key point. First, Moebius Syndrome is mentioned here to motivate Watsuji’s embodied conception of “subjective spatiality”—the idea that some affective and emotional process depends essentially upon the material scaffolding of bodily expression and thus quite literally extends (partially) beyond the head. However, bodily expression—or lack of it—is always situated within interpersonal contexts, and consists of a temporally complex, mutually modulating process in
which my behavioral responses to events in my social milieu elicit and shape the very events they are responsive to. This is particularly highlighted in instances of face-to-face interaction. The fact that, from birth, MS patients present a frozen, emotionally indecipherable countenance (i.e., one that others cannot immediately “read”) alters others’ ability to socially engage with them in a direct and transparent way—which in turn modulates the character of the Moebius subject’s (synchronous) responses as well as the developmental trajectory of their (diachronic) social training. So, the important point is that, for the person with Moebius, this failure of the face’s expressive function, along with the corresponding modulation of how others treat them by virtue of this expressive deficit, impedes their development of the repertoire of embodied-expressive social skills that most of us take for granted—things like coordinating eye gaze patterns, generating and responding to expressive contingencies (e.g., facial expressions, movement, touch, etc.), and modulating our own and others’ affective responses. This is because the bodily character of the social milieu in which most of us learn these skills—face-to-face engagements—is, for the person with Moebius, fundamentally altered from birth. For example, some young children with Moebius Syndrome are often assumed to be retarded because of difficulty in feeding, drooling, and dysarthric speech (Meyerson 1990). And for those whose faces do not conform to the norm, the negatively altered character of interpersonal space becomes a source of stress, anxiety, and anguish, which negatively affects (in addition to the embodied skills mentioned above) both personality functioning and mental health (Cooke Macgregor 1990). Moebius Syndrome cases are thus instructive because they do, in fact, seem to indicate that both the embodied expression of emotional states, as well as their social sharing, may be necessary for their being experienced (Cole 2010).

References


