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DAYA KRISHNA ON SOME INDIAN THEORIES OF NEGATION: A CRITIQUE

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Contrary Thinking, an anthology of selected essays by Daya Krishna, contains, among others, two essays that deal with problems pertaining to negation: "Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover from It?" and "Some Problems Regarding Thinking about *Abhāva* in the Indian Tradition." These essays comprise part 5 of this book, and the editorial introduction to this part concludes with the following remark:

With characteristic philosophical irony, Daya Krishna raises the problem that non-being itself is non-existent and that negation is nothing at all. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 113)

In both these essays, we find some observations by Daya Krishna regarding the views about negation (*abhāva*) that are admitted by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, and the way in which some of these views were criticized by Dharmakīrti, the noted Buddhist logician. According to Daya Krishna, many philosophical problems that one encounters in the Indian philosophical tradition are connected with the admission of negation (*abhāva*) as a separate category (*padārtha*), as is evident from the following remark made by him:

The problems raised by the negative predication created real havoc in Indian Philosophy, and no one can understand India's philosophical dilemmas unless one sees the roots and genesis of this problem. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 121)

Daya Krishna has tried to substantiate this claim by attempting to show the untenability of the doctrines about *abhāva* that were, in his opinion, supported by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. What is somewhat surprising is that none of his statements regarding the theories of *abhāva* alleged to be held by these two schools is supported by any reference to the primary sources, or even to some reliable secondary sources. What is not so surprising is the fact that most of the views about *abhāva* that have been stated, criticized, and rejected by Daya Krishna cannot be found in any standard text of Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Incidentally, it should also be noted that while these papers perfunctorily refer to the dissenting views of the Buddhists and Advaita Vedāntins, the views of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, who had challenged many of the epistemological and ontological doctrines regarding *abhāva* that were held by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, have not been mentioned at all; and as a result, these papers do not give an adequate account of the fierce debate regarding various aspects of *abhāva* that took place in India. In some cases, the views regarding *abhāva* that were held by the earlier Naiyāyikas were rejected by later Naiyāyikas, and these two papers have not taken any note of

such disagreements either. There are also some non-philosophical statements that are not factually correct. In some cases, improper understanding or the literal translation of some Sanskrit terms has led to a lot of misunderstanding.

The present essay aims at pointing out some of such lacunae and inaccuracies. An exhaustive review of these papers is *not* being undertaken here, so that the length of this essay can be kept within reasonable limits. But first, we prefer to give a short account of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views about *abhāva*, and also the manner in which such views were criticized by others, so that one may understand where and how Daya Krishna has misrepresented these views.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit seven *padārthas*, and any real entity in this world must be included in one or another of these *padārthas*. They are: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity/ultimate differentiator (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*), and negation (*abhāva*). None of these *padārthas* can be reduced to any other *padārtha*, and there is nothing that can exist without being included in one of the *padārthas*. Thus, this classification of *padārthas* is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The first six are called *bhāva padārthas*; that is, they are positive in nature. Such entities are revealed in affirmatory awarenesses like 'X is Y' or 'X has Y.' *Abhāva* or negation is admitted as the specific or distinctive object of an awareness in which something is denied of something else. Such awarenesses can be of four types: (1) 'X will be produced in Y,' (2) 'The destruction of X is located in Y,' (3) 'X is absent in Y'/'X is not in Y,' and (4) 'X is not Y'/'X is different from Y.' The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools had adopted an uncompromising form of realism, and, in their opinion, every cognition must have an object, and one cognition can be distinguished from another cognition by virtue of its object.

Corresponding to the four types of awareness mentioned above, four types of *abhāva* have been admitted by Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. These are (1) *prāgabhāva*, that is, the absence of an effect prior to its production; (2) *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, that is, the absence of a thing after its destruction; (3) *atyantābhāva*, that is, the permanent absence of something in something else; and (4) *anyonyābhāva/bheda*, that is, difference/lack of identity. *Prāgabhāva* does not have any beginning, but it has an end. *Pradhvaṃsābhāva* has a beginning, but it does not have any end. The two other types of *abhāva* are permanent or eternal; that is, they have neither any beginning nor any end. Moreover, every *abhāva* (whether absence or difference) must negate some real, that is, non-fictional entity, which is known as the counter-positive or negatum (*pratiyogin*) of that *abhāva*, and it must also reside in some other real thing, which is known as its locus or substratum (*adhikaraṇa/anuyogin*). One *abhāva* can be distinguished from another *abhāva* with the help of its *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*, and for this reason, no genuine or real *abhāva* can have a fictional entity either as its *anuyogin* or *pratiyogin*.

Each of the first three types of *abhāva* can be perceived, provided that its *pratiyogin* is perceptible, and excepting the *pratiyogin*, all the other causal factors that can produce the perception of that *pratiyogin* are present, so that it can be claimed that in such a situation, if the *pratiyogin* had been present, then it would have been perceived, but as it is not being perceived it must be absent. Such non-apprehension,

which is a precondition of apprehending a negation, is known as *dṛśyānupalabdhi* or *yogyānupalabdhi*. The fourth type of *abhāva*, however, can be perceived if its *anuyogin* can be perceived. Accordingly, we can have perceptual awarenesses like ‘a cloth will be produced in these threads,’ ‘these potsherds are characterized by the destruction of a pot,’ ‘there is absence of color in air,’ and ‘this pillar is not an evil spirit’. But one cannot perceive the absence of an imperceptible entity—nor can one perceive the absence of even a perceptible entity, if the prevailing conditions are not conducive to the perception of that entity. Thus, one cannot perceive the absence of a particular atom on a table, nor can one visually perceive the absence of a pot in a dark room. Perception, however, is not the sole means of cognizing an absence—one may know the absence of some imperceptible entity with the help of inference if some proper inferential mark of that absence is known to us.

While the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas admit the existence of *abhāva* and its four types, they deny the claim that *abhāva* can be known through perception. In their opinion, nothing can be perceived unless there is some operative relation (*sannikarṣa*) between that entity and the sense organ that is supposed to apprehend it, and no satisfactory account of such a relation can be given in the case of negation. A sense organ may at best make us aware of the locus (*adhikaraṇa/anuyogin*) of an *abhāva*. Thereafter, the absence of some entity is cognized by *dṛśyānupalabdhi* or *yogyānupalabdhi*, mentioned earlier. Since the awareness of *abhāva* is not produced by any sense organ, such awareness cannot be perceptual. Hence, the awareness of *abhāva* is always mediate or indirect (*nityaparoḥṣa*). This view is also shared by the Advaita Vedāntins, though they do not admit the permanence of any *abhāva*.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas maintain that one need not admit negative entities for explaining how we can have experiences like ‘X is absent in Y’ or ‘there is no X in Y,’ or how we can use negative expressions in accordance with such experiences. In such cases, what happens is that we are aware of Y alone, even though X would have been apprehended had it been there, or we may equate it with the cognition of Y alone that occurs under the condition mentioned above. Thus, when we say that I am apprehending the absence of a pot on the ground, I am actually aware of the bare ground (*kevalabhūta*) or the ground alone (*bhūta*). Now, the bare ground and the awareness of such a ground are positive entities, and since they are adequate for explaining the experiences or linguistic usages mentioned above, there is no need of postulating negative entities over and above the positive ones. The so-called negative entities are thus identical with their bare loci, or the awarenesses of such loci.

The Buddhists have adopted a more radical position. In their opinion, the so-called negative entities are imaginary constructions (*kalpanānirmāṇa*), since they cannot withstand any critical examination (*vicārāśatva*). One can never be aware of an *abhāva* unless it is qualified by an *anuyogin* and a *pratiyogin*. This cannot happen unless the *abhāva* is related to its *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*. But none of the logically possible alternatives about such relations can be admitted in the case of *abhāvas*. Hence, awarenesses like ‘there is the absence of X in Y’ must be erroneous. If an object is revealed *only* by erroneous cognitions, then that object cannot be real. If something is unreal and also an object of our cognition, then it must be imaginary.

The non-apprehension of an entity in a certain locus enables us to use expressions like 'X is not in Y' or 'S is not Y'—we need not postulate negative entities in order to account for such linguistic behavior.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views about *abhāva* were thus subjected to severe criticisms. But counter-replies to such criticisms were also given by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. The essays by Daya Krishna have not taken into account such controversies, which went on for a long time. They also do not put forward any new objection against some views that were *actually* maintained by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. On the other hand, these essays have ascribed to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools certain views regarding *abhāva* that were never admitted by these schools. We now point out some of the factual inaccuracies and unfounded ascriptions in these two essays. Quoted below are the relevant passages where such inaccuracies are found, and also why we treat them as inaccuracies.

I

The acceptance of *abhāva* (absence) as an independent *padārtha* having ontological reality of its own has been a peculiar feature of the Indian philosophical tradition that has not been paid sufficient attention until now. It is well known that it took a long time for it to be accepted, and given ontological reality of its own in the tradition, as it was Śivāditya who is credited in the Vaiśeṣika tradition for having formulated it as the seventh *padārtha* in the Vaiśeṣika system, which earlier had accepted only six of them. . . . (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 125)

It is somewhat misleading to say that in the Indian philosophical tradition, *abhāva* has been accepted as an independent *padārtha*. As we have already pointed out, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists did not admit that *abhāva* is an independent *padārtha*. It is not also a fact that Śivāditya Miśra was the first Vaiśeṣika author to admit *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha*, and that before him only six *padārthas* were admitted in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Unless *abhāva* is admitted as an entity, no sensible meaning can be given to *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (i.e., some aphorisms that are ascribed to Kaṇāda) like “*kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ*” (1/2/1) and “*na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ*” (1/2/2), which state the views that in the absence of the cause there can be no effect, but one cannot claim that since the effect is not there, the cause is also not there. There are many such aphorisms (e.g., 1/1/12, 1/1/16, 1/1/17, 5/2/19, 6/1/9, and 7/2/17) that assume the existence of *abhāva*. Udayana, who wrote important works on the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, has shown in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* that *abhāva* cannot be identified with any of the six positive *padārthas* (that is, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya*). The relevant passage is as follows:

sa tāvannobhayavādisiddhadravyādiṣvanyatamaḥ, teṣāṃ ghaṭena saha sambhavāt, abhāvavyavahārakāle'pi ca keṣāñcit asambhavāt, bhūtaladharmāṇāṃ ca teṣāṃ ghaṭenāvināśādānāvṛteṣca. tadatiriktaṃ tu daśamaṃ dravyam, pañcaviṃśatitamo vā guṇaḥ, saṣṭhaṃ vā karma, sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā na sambhavantyeva, tasya

dravyādyatmatvena tadavinābhāvidharmāpatteḥ. anāpattau vā tattvā-nupapatteḥ.
(*Nyā-yavārttikatātparyaparīśuddhi*, p. 129)

The view that the Vaiśeṣika school initially admitted only six *padārthas* is perhaps based on the fact that commentators like Śaṅkara Miśra have admitted the sentence “*dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānaṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmaivaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānānīḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*” as *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1/1/4, where only six *padārthas* (*dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa*, and *samavāya*), which are positive in nature, have been enumerated, and that the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (I) of Praśastapāda also mentions initially only these six *padārthas* (*dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ saṅghāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmaivaidharmyatattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ—Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 4). But that does not conclusively prove that while Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda admitted only six *bhāvapadārthas*, subsequent authors added *abhāva* to this list of categories. First of all, the aphorism “*dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇa 0*” has not been explained in two earlier commentaries—one by Candrānanda and another by an unknown author, and its genuineness is somewhat suspect. Besides, while it says that the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) results from the knowledge of these *padārthas*, it does *not* say that there are *only* six *padārthas*. The same is true of the initial statement in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*.

Moreover, commentators on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* like Vyomaśīva and Udayana, both of whom are earlier than Sivāditya Miśra, have clearly stated that *abhāva* has not been mentioned in this list, because *abhāva* cannot be described, identified, or specified without reference to the other six categories that happen to be the counter-positives (*pratiyogins*) and the loci (*adhikaraṇas*) of the different *abhāvas*, and not because it is something non-existent or fictional ([1] “*atha abhāvaḥ kasmānopasaṃkhyāyate? bhāvopasarjanatayā pratibhāsanāt. tathā hi—nāprasiddhasadbhāvasya nārikeladvīpavāsinastadabhāvapratitiriti. bhāvaparijñānāp-ekṣitvādbhāvasya na pṛthagupasaṃkhyānam. jñāte hi bhāve tadabhāvaḥ pratiyata eva.*”—*Vyomavati*, vol. 1, p. 14; [2] “*abhāvastu svarūpavānapi pṛthannoddiṣṭaḥ, pratiyoginirūpañādḥīnanirūpaṇatvāt, na tu tucchatvāt.*”—*Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 4–5).

Udayana and Śrīdhara (another commentator on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* who also happens to be earlier than Sivāditya Miśra) have also enumerated the different types of *abhāva* admitted in the Vaiśeṣika system ([1] “*utpattivināśacintāyāṃ prāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvayor vaidharmye cetaretarābhāvāntābhāvayostatratatra darśayiṣyamāṇatvāditi.*”—*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 5; [2] “*tadevaṃ siddho’bhāvaḥ. sa ca caturvyūhaḥ—prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, itaretarābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvāśceti.*”—*Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 555–556).

II

Dharmākīrti’s thinking on the subject does not regard *abhāva* as something known by perception, as the Naiyāyikas argued later. Rather, according to him, it had to be placed under *anumāna*, that is, inference; as its *hetu* was *anupalabdhi*. . . . The argument in

simple terms is that in case something was there, it would have certainly been perceived, assuming of course that all the necessary and sufficient conditions of perceptibility were fulfilled. But as something is not being perceived, that is, is not available to that which it should have been available, it may be inferred that it is not there.

Dharmākīrti's contention should be seen in the light of the later Nyāya thinking on the subject that treats absence as directly perceived, perhaps because it does not want to distinguish between *anupalabdhi* and *abhāva*, treating the former as redundant or as an unnecessary postulation that did not serve any useful purpose. Perhaps the Nyāya argument was that the distinction between *anupalabdhi* and *abhāva* was spurious and no distinction could be made in terms of experience between the two. How could one possibly distinguish between "non-availability" on the one hand, and "absence" on the other? (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 125)

Our comments on this long passage are as follows. First, it is not a fact that only the Naiyāyikas later than Dharmākīrti admitted the perceptibility of *abhāva* in order to counter the view that *abhāva* is known through inference. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, both of whom are much earlier than Dharmākīrti, have admitted the existence of *abhāva* and also its perceptibility in many cases. It may also be noted that sometimes these two authors employ the term 'asat' as a synonym of the term 'abhāva,' even though 'asat' is often also employed for signifying fictional entities like a hare's horn. That Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara are not using the term 'asat' in the latter sense is evident from the contexts in which they have employed it.

Moreover, that Vātsyāyana admits the perceptibility of *abhāva* in certain cases follows from what he says in general about the knowability of *abhāva*, but Uddyotakara states categorically that *abhāva* can be an object of perception, and he has also specified the type of operative relation (*sannikarṣa*) that obtains between an *abhāva* and the sense organ apprehending it, which is one of the factors required for the perception of *abhāva* ([1] "evaṃ pramāṇena satī gr̥hyamāṇe tadiva yanna gr̥hyate tannāsti. yadyabhaviṣyadidamiva vyajñāsyata. vijñānābhāvānāsti. tadevaṃ sataḥ prakāśakaṃ pramāṇamasadapī prakāśayatīti"—Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 2; [2] "tayoḥ khalu sadasatorbhāvo dvirūpaḥ, vidhīyamānaḥ, pratiśidhyamānaśca. yadekatra vidhīyate, tadanyatra pratiśidhyate. tadyathā gandhavatī pṛthivī, agandhā āpa iti . . . svatantraparatantropalabdhyanupalabdhi-kāraṇabhāvācca viśeṣaḥ, sat khalu pramāṇasyālambanaṃ svatantraṃ bhavati. asat tu paratantraṃ pratiśedhamukhena pratipadyate . . . tatrāsadbhedāḥ svāntryeṇa na prakāśanta iti nocyante. caturvargāntarbhāvād vā bhāvaprapañcavadabhāvaprapañco'pyupadiṣṭo veditavya iti. bhāvopadeśādevābhāva upadiṣṭo bhavatīti. ataśca nocyata iti."—Nyāyavārttika, p. 9; [3] "sannikarṣaḥ punaḥ ṣoḍhā bhidyate. saṃyogaḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ, saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśceti . . . śabde ca samavāyaḥ . . . tadgateṣu ca sāmānyeṣu samavetasamavāyāditi. samavāye cābhāve ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvāditi. so'yaṃ sannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣasya kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti lakṣaṇatvenocyate."—Nyāyavārttika, p. 29).

Daya Krishna's surmise that Naiyāyikas accepted the "direct perceptibility" of *abhāva*, since they did not want to distinguish between *anupalabdhi* and *abhāva*,

does not also have any basis. First of all, it should be noted that the Naiyāyikas do not admit the perceptibility of all instances of *abhāva*. If an entity X is perceptible, then alone the *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, and *atyantābhāva* of X can be perceived when all the causal factors other than X that are necessary for producing the perception of X are present. The non-apprehension of X (*anupalabdhi*) can establish the absence of X if only one can claim that, under the situation under consideration, had X been present, it would have been apprehended; but since it is not being apprehended, it does not exist; that is, its *abhāva* exists (*yadi syāt tarhi upalabhyeta, na copalabhyate, tasmānnāsti*).

Such an *anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension is known as *yogyānupalabdhi*, and it happens to be one of the *prerequisites* of perceiving the three types of *abhāva* mentioned above. So far as difference or lack of identity (*anyonyābhāva*) is concerned, its perceptibility depends on the perceptibility of its locus (*adhikaraṇa/anuyogin*), and not on the perceptibility of its counter-positive (*pratiyogin*). That is why we can perceive the absence of a pot, and not the absence of an atom, since the latter is imperceptible; we can also perceive that the person called Caitra is not (or, is different from) an evil spirit (*piśāca*), even though the latter is imperceptible. *Anupalabdhi per se*, that is, mere non-apprehension of something, does not establish the non-existence of what is not being apprehended. Thus, the fact that we cannot visually apprehend a pot in a dark room does not result in the perception of the absence of that pot in that room. Hence, *anupalabdhi* and *abhāva* have to be distinguished, and they have been duly distinguished by the Naiyāyikas. It may be added here that according to the Naiyāyikas, when we perceive an *abhāva*, *yogyānupalabdhi* plays the role of an auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*), while the sense organ is the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*). For the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, however, when we look at the ground and say “there is no pot on the ground,” the instrumental cause of this cognition is *yogyānupalabdhi*, while the visual sense organ is the auxiliary cause. Accordingly, for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, our awareness of *abhāva* is never perceptual (*pratyakṣa*); it is always indirect (*nityaparokṣa*) in nature.

III

The assertion of a negation raises the problem of the ontological status of negation, which is being affirmed as a *predicate*. The assertion of the *positive* content, on the other hand, raises the problem of the ontological status of that of which something is predicated—that which is usually designated as subject in philosophical literature. Ontologically, the subject is supposed to take precedence over the predicate and hence is called “substance,” a term denoting that which alone is supposed to be ontologically real, presumably because it is that to which the properties belong, or that which possesses them. But the question what this possessing or belonging is does not seem to have been asked or answered in a clear manner. Can the substance be bereft of all the properties, or can the properties be there even if there were no substances to belong to? This is the central question that does not seem to have been asked or debated or even answered in the Western discussion of the subject.

The Buddhists had done long ago what Kant failed to do, that is, give up the notion of substance and opt for a pure property- or quality-based understanding of things, and thus had exorcised the “substance-ghost” whether in its Lockean or Kantian version from their philosophical thinking, for ever. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 120)

It seems that in these passages the words ‘substance’ and ‘*dravya*’ have been treated as synonyms. A number of properties belong to a *dravya* (e.g., *guṇa*, *karma*, and *sāmānya*), and some of these properties (namely *guṇa* and *karma*) cannot also exist in isolation, that is, without being located in some *dravya*. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school does not maintain the view that *dravya* alone is ontologically real, because all the seven *padārthas* admitted in this school are considered to be equally real. Philosophers like Spinoza may consider ‘Substance’ to be the only ontological real, but this is not true of *dravya*, which has been admitted in the Indian tradition. Apart from Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, a few other schools (e.g., the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, as well as Jainism) admit the existence of *dravya*, and all these schools have specifically stated the relation(s) through which a *dravya* can be related to its properties. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, if two *dravyas* are such that neither of them is a constituent part (*avayava*) of the other, (e.g., a man and the stick in his hand), then the relation between them is one of contact (*saṃyoga*). If, however, the relation between them is that of part and whole (e.g., a cloth and the threads out of which it is made), then the whole is located in its part(s) through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Properties like *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, and *viśeṣa* are related to the *dravya* in which they are located through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). The relation known as *samavāya* and negations (*abhāvas*) located in *dravya* are related to the latter through some self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha/viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhava*).

The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas largely agree with this view, though they do not admit *viśeṣas* and *abhāvas* as independent *padārthas*. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the relation between a thing and its inseparable properties is some sort of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*), and this is also true of the relation between a *dravya* and its inseparable properties like quality. Thus, the statement of Daya Krishna that “the question what this possessing or belonging is does not seem to have been asked or answered in a clear manner” is not true of the Indian tradition, though it may be true of the Western tradition.

Again, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, an impermanent *dravya*, which happens to be the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the *guṇas* and *karmas* located in it, remains devoid of these properties at the first moment of its existence, since otherwise it would not be a cause of the *guṇas* and *karmas* that may characterize it later on. Moreover, some among the properties that belong *only* to impermanent substances (e.g., the universal property pothood [*ghaṭatva*] that characterizes every pot) are themselves eternal, and they can exist even when all their instances are destroyed. Many of these views have also been criticized by rival schools like Buddhism. While such central questions may not have been posed or discussed or answered in the Western discussion of the subject, this is not true of the Indian tradition.

It is true that the Buddhists criticized vehemently the notion of *dravya* as admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. They also rejected the relations of inherence (*samavāya*) and identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*). Thus, in effect, they rejected all the views about *dravya* that were admitted in the Indian tradition. In the accounts of Indian philosophy written in English, *dravya* has uniformly been translated as ‘substance.’ But unlike the ‘substance’ admitted by Locke, the *dravya* admitted by the Indian schools is not unknown and unknowable—something that is merely postulated as the locus of primary and secondary qualities. We cannot also equate any of the doctrines of *dravya* developed in the Indian tradition with the Kantian doctrine of substance. For Kant, substance is one of the “Categories of Understanding,” an a priori concept that is presupposed in our judgments. As per the Indian tradition, many of the *dravyas* (though not *all* of them) can be perceived, and many of them are concrete entities that exist independently of our awareness of them. We simply do not know how the Buddhists would have reacted to the views of Locke and Kant regarding substance. While it is true that the Buddhists tried to provide a “pure property-or-quality-based understanding of things,” and did away with the concept of *dravya*, whether they succeeded in exorcizing the “substance-ghost” from the Indian philosophical tradition as a whole is a moot question. The objections that were raised by Buddhist philosophers like Āryadeva, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita were answered point by point in the *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, while the shortcomings of a “purely property-or-quality-based understanding of things” were amply exhibited by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (pp. 87–88, 332–354) and also by Udayana in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāparīśuddhi* (pp. 126–128) and *Ātmattvaviveka* (pp. 710–737).

IV

Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, brought forth the discussion by asking what was meant by the affirmative assertion of a negative predication and answered that what was positive was the non-availability (*anupalabdhi*) of something that, if it [had] been there, would have been available to the senses, and thus, known.

The fact that it is not being perceived when all the conditions of “perceptibility” are fulfilled becomes the *ground* or *hetu* for the assertion of its absence. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 121; emphasis added)

Daya Krishna has obviously overlooked the fact that Dharmakīrti has admitted eleven kinds of *anupalabdhi* that enable us to assert in certain situations that a certain thing is not present somewhere, or is non-existent, or is different from something else. Seven among these eleven kinds are cases where, on the basis of the presence of some positive entity that is apprehended by our senses, the absence of something is asserted. These are stated below with examples.

- (a) *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*—There is no cold touch here, because fire is apprehended here (*nātra śītasparśaḥ, pāvakopalabdheḥ*).

- (b) *svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*—There is no cold touch here, because smoke is apprehended here (*nātra śītasparśaḥ dhūmopalabdheḥ*).
- (c) *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*—The destruction of a positive entity that has been produced is not inevitable, since it depends on some other causal factor (*na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasypī bhāvasya vināśaḥ, hetvantarāpekṣaṇāt*).
- (d) *kāryaviruddhopalabdhi*—Here, there is no cause of cold touch whose capacity has not been impaired, since fire can be apprehended here (*nātra śītakāraṇam apratibaddhasāmarthyam asti, jvalanopalabdheḥ*).
- (e) *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*—Here, there is no touch of snow, since fire can be apprehended here (*nātra tuhinasparśaḥ, kṛśānudarśanāt*).
- (f) *kāraṇavirūddhopalabdhi*—This person does not have the chattering of teeth, horripilation, etc. (that are due to cold temperature), because of his proximity to a fire (*naitasya romahaṛṣadantavīṇādiviśeṣāḥ santi, sannihitahutavahaviśeṣāt*).
- (g) *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*—This place is not characterized by the presence of a person who has chattering of teeth, etc. (that are due to cold temperature), because it is characterized by smoke (*pravṛttadantavīṇādiviśeṣapurūṣādhiṣṭhita eṣa deśo na bhavati, dhūmavattvāt*).

In such cases, the absence of something (say X) is not being inferred from the non-apprehension or non-availability of X, but from the positive *apprehension* of some Y that is (a) by nature opposed to X, or (b) the effect of some Z that is by nature opposed to X, or (c) pervaded by some Z that is by nature opposed to X, and so on. Hence, it is somewhat misleading to say that according to Dharmakīrti, the negation of something is *always* inferred from the non-availability of that thing. Besides, we have already pointed out that mere non-apprehension (*anupalabdhimātra*) of an entity does not establish the non-existence of that entity—there must be *yogyānupalabdhi* of that entity in a certain place if we have to claim that the entity concerned is not present in that place—and a non-apprehension can be treated as a case of *yogyānupalabdhi* if alone we can justifiably claim that had that entity been present in that place, it would have been apprehended, and yet, it is not being apprehended.

V

The discussion [regarding the ground for the assertion of absence] arises in the context of inferential knowledge where Dharmakīrti had already suggested that the inferential basis of positive predicate would either be that it was included implicitly in the subject itself, or that it was causally related to it as an effect. The former he called *svabhāva hetu* and the latter *kriyā-hetu*. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 121).

This passage once again gives a wrong version of the Buddhist view. First, there is nothing called *kriyā-hetu* (the literal translation of which would be ‘action-reason’). The correct name is *kārya-hetu*, that is, a probans (*hetu*) that is the effect (*kārya*) of the probandum (*sādhya*) of the relevant inference. Second, it has not been stated that ultimately *anupalabdhi-hetu* has also been included in *svabhāva-hetu*. According to

Dharmakīrti, pervasion (*vyāpti*) between probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*), which serves as the basis of inference (*anumāna*), can be of two types: (a) “essential identity” (*tādātmya*) and (b) causal relation (*tadutpatti*). In the former case the probans is known as *svabhāva-hetu*, while in the latter case the probans is known as *kārya-hetu*. Since *anupalabdhi* and *abhāva* are not causally related, the relation between them has to be that of “essential identity.” Accordingly, *anupalabdhi-hetu* is ultimately subsumed under *svabhāva-hetu*.

VI

While discussing the consequences of the Naiyāyikas’ and Vaiśeṣikas’ admission of *abhāva* as an independent *padārtha*, that is, an entity that can exist in its own right, Daya Krishna remarks as follows:

The immediate problem was regarding the ontological status to be accorded to this new entrant to the class of “reals” to be accepted by the system. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers were more interested in the problem and already divided the realm of the ontological “reals” into two classes, that is, *sattā* and *abhāva*. These roughly correspond to what have been called “existents” and “subsistents” in the Western tradition, but the Vaiśeṣika distinction is, at least prima facie, clearer as it seems to be based on the independence of the reasoning activity of the mind, or what they call *buddhi* in their system.

Substances, qualities and actions or movements were, in the world, independent of the knowing activity of reason, while [*sic*] inherence, universality and singularity were not. The former, therefore, existed, whereas the latter came into being because of the knowing activity of reason, and hence, though intersubjectively objective, were *buddhyapekṣā*, or reason dependent, or relative to reason in their nature.

Abhāva could not belong to either of these classifications, and hence, had to be sui generis in character. It was positively existent as those which were supposed to exist, as it was perceived and yet it was also necessary to reason, as without it, reason could not be. . . . (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 121)

One scarcely comes across in the writings of an eminent author such a gross misrepresentation of the views maintained by a philosopher or philosophical school. A comparable example would be the claim that according to Locke all our ideas are innate, that according to Berkeley all our ideas are abstract, that according to Leibnitz all truths are contingent, that according to Hume the self is a permanent substance, and that according to Kant all knowledge is analytic *a posteriori*. Let us see how the passages quoted above give a totally distorted account of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views about *padārthas*.

1. First of all, it should be remembered that *abhāva* was not a “new entrant” to the class of reals admitted in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. It has already been pointed out that quite a few *Nyāya-sūtras* and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* would remain unintelligible unless *abhāva* is admitted as a *padārtha*. Besides, both these schools admit *asatkāryavāda*, which maintains that prior to their production, positive effects are non-existent in their respective material causes, and such a doctrine cannot be admitted without also admitting prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*). Again, both these

schools maintain that when an individual soul is liberated, it ceases to be characterized by any suffering. Such cessation of suffering is not intelligible unless one admits posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*). Moreover, the *sādharmya-vidharmya prakaraṇa* in Vaiśeṣika texts points out the similarities and dissimilarities between the different *padārthas* and their subdivisions. Two dissimilar things must also be different, and they cannot be dissimilar unless there is some property that is present in one of them and absent in the other. In this way, *anyonyābhāva* and *atyantābhāva* are also presupposed by the discussion of even the positive *padārthas* admitted in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. The adherents of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools were not so stupid as to overlook such obvious facts.

2. The alleged division of “ontological reals” into *sattā* and *bhāva* is not to be found in any Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika text. *Dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya* are called *bhāvapadārthas*, that is, positive entities. *Sāmānya* (or universals) again admits of a twofold division into *parasāmānya* and *aparāsāmānya*. (Some texts also admit a third type, namely *parāparasāmānya*). *Sāmānyas* can be arranged in a hierarchical order in accordance with their extension, and at the top of this hierarchy we have *parasāmānya*, which resides through the relation of inherence in all *dravyas*, all *guṇas*, and all *karmas*. This *parasāmānya* is called *sattā*, and it pervades all the other *sāmānyas*. The *sāmānyas* that are pervaded by *sattā* are called *aparāsāmānyas*.

Next in the hierarchy are (a) *dravyatva*, (b) *guṇatva*, and (c) *karmatva*, which are present in all *dravyas*, all *guṇas*, and all *karmas*, respectively. If A and B are two such entities such that A pervades B, and there is also no entity C that is pervaded by A and that also pervades B, then B is said to be *directly* pervaded (*sākṣātvīpya*) by A. The three universals *dravyatva*, *guṇatva*, and *karmatva* are directly pervaded by *sattā*. *Dravya* can be of nine kinds, namely *pṛthivi*, *jala*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, *dik*, *kāla*, *ātman*, and *manas*. Among them, *ākāśa*, *dik*, and *kāla* have single instances, while the others have multiple instances, and are characterized by universals like *pṛthivītvā*, *jalatva*, and so forth, respectively, and such universals are directly pervaded by *dravyatva*. There are twenty-four types of *guṇa* (e.g., color [*rūpa*], taste [*rasa*], smell [*gandha*], touch [*sparśa*], and sound [*śabda*]), and accordingly we have twenty-four universals like colorhood (*rūpatva*) and so forth, which are directly pervaded by the universal *guṇatva*. Some of the qualities may again be of various types. For example, color (*rūpa*) can be divided into blue (*nīla*), yellow (*pīta*), red (*rakta*), and so forth, each of which has multiple instances, and accordingly one has to admit universals like blueness (*nīlatva*), yellowness (*pītatva*), redness (*raktatva*), and so forth, which are directly pervaded by colorhood (*rūpatva*). Universals like blueness (*nīlatva*) are at the lowest rung of the hierarchy that obtains among the universals, since there is no universal that is directly pervaded by blueness (*nīlatva*).

Now, some authors prefer to apply the name *aparāsāmānya* to all such *sāmānyas*, which do not pervade any other *sāmānya*, whereas the universals that are placed below *sattā* but above some such *aparāsāmānya* are called by them *parāparasāmānya*. Thus, *dravyatva*, *guṇatva*, and so forth are, in the opinion of these authors, examples of *parāparasāmānya*. While *sattā* resides in *dravyas*, *guṇas*, and *karmas* through the direct relation known as inherence (*samavāya*), it is located in universals other than

itself, and in particularities through the indirect relation known as *sva-samavāyī-samavetatva*, and in inherence and *abhāvas* through another indirect relation known as *sva-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Thus, the claim that the Vaiśeṣikas have divided reals into two groups, namely *sattā* and *bhāva*, makes no sense, since *sattā*, which is a universal, is itself a *bhāvapadārtha*; and a division or classification, in order to be acceptable, must be non-overlapping, a principle of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers were fully aware.

3. It is not also a fact that in Vaiśeṣika tradition the word *buddhi* stands for “the reasoning activity of the mind.” The term *buddhi* has been employed a number of times in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, but no precise definition of *buddhi* has been given in these aphorisms. *Buddhi* has been included in the list of seventeen qualities (*guṇas*) enumerated in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. The *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśastapāda states that the words *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jñāna*, and *pratyaya* are synonyms (*buddhirupalabdhirjñānaṃ pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ*—*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (I), p. 170), from which it becomes evident that *buddhi* should be translated as ‘cognition.’ This becomes all the more evident when we consider the subdivisions (or different types) of *buddhi* admitted by Praśastapāda. In his opinion, *buddhi* can be of various types, since the objects that are revealed by it can also be of various types. It can be initially classified into two broad groups, namely *vidyā* and *avidyā*. *Avidyā*, again, can be of four types: doubt (*saṃśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*), ‘non-ascertainment’ (*anadhyavasāya*), and dream (*svapna*). *Vidyā* is also of four kinds—perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*), inferential cognition (*laiṅgika*), memory (*smṛti*), and the intuitive knowledge of sages (*ārṣa*) (*sā cānekaprakārā, arthānantyāt pratyarthaniyatatvācca. tasyāḥ satyapyane kavidhatve samāsato dve vidhe—vidyā cāvidyā ceti. tatrāvidyā caturvidhā—saṃśayaviparyayānadhyavasāyasvapnalakṣaṇā . . . vidyā’pi caturvidhā—pratyakṣalaiṅgikasmṛtyārṣalakṣaṇā*—*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (I), pp. 170–183). Can one really treat perception or dream, for example, as instances of “the reasoning activity of the mind”?

4. The claim that “substances, qualities and actions or movements were, in the world, independent of the knowing activity of the reason, whole [*sic*] inherence, universality and singularity were not,” and that “the latter came into being because of the knowing activity of reason” is equally unfounded. It should be kept in mind that the Vaiśeṣikas were staunch supporters of a variety of naive realism, and in their opinion all objects of our cognitions can exist independently of being cognized. Besides, universals (*sāmānyas*), particularities (*viśeṣas*), and inherence (*samavāya*) are admitted to be eternal (*nitya*), and, hence, the question of their “coming into being” does not arise in the first place. All the *padārthas*, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, are objective—one need not add here the adjective “intersubjectively.” One possible reason for presenting the patently incorrect view may be the misunderstanding of the statement in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* to the effect that one of the common properties of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya* is *buddhilakṣaṇatva*, that is, the fact that cognitions alone provide the evidence in favor of their existence or reality (*sāmānyādīnaṃ trayāṇāṃ svātmasattvaṃ buddhilakṣaṇatvam akāryatvam akāraṇatvam asāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ nityatvamarthaśabdānabhidheyatvañceti*—*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (I), p. 21). The intended meaning of this expression has

been given by Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī*, where he has pointed out that *sāmānyas* are admitted solely on the basis of uniform cognitions (*anugatabuddhi*), *viśeṣas* are admitted solely on the basis of awareness of difference (*vyāvṛttabuddhi*), and *samavāya* is admitted solely on the basis of a cognition of the form ‘something is here’ (*iḥabuddhi*). This distinguishes them from *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karma*, whose existence can be established with the help of some other types of evidence as well (*buddhimātram amīṣām lakṣaṇam pramāṇam, na dravyādivat pramaṇāntāram asti, anuvṛttabuddhirv yāvṛttabuddhiriha iti buddhiritiyeva hi sāmānyāditraye pramāṇam iti*—*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 21).

The fact that Daya Krishna has used the term *buddhyapekṣā* in this paragraph raises the suspicion that here he may also have been misled by an improper understanding of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* “*samānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*” (1/2/3). A superficial reading of this aphorism may suggest that *samānyā* and *viśeṣa* are dependent on *buddhi*, or relative to *buddhi*. But that no such thing is expressed by this aphorism becomes clear when we consider the next two aphorisms. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1/2/4, which reads “*bhāvo’nuvṛttere va hetuvāt sāmānyameva*,” expresses the view that *bhāva* (i.e., *sattā*, the universal that is placed at the top of the hierarchy of all universals and that inheres in all substances, qualities, and movements) should be treated only as *sāmānyā*, since it can generate *only* uniform cognitions, while *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1/2/4, which reads “*dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṅca sāmānyāni viśeṣāśca*,” expresses the view that *dravyatva*, *guṇatva*, and *karmatva* should be treated as *sāmānyas* and also as *viśeṣas*. *Dravyatva*, which is the eternal property that uniformly inheres in all *dravyas*, should be treated as a *sāmānyā* or universal, since it produces uniform cognitions like ‘this is a *dravya*,’ ‘this is also a *dravya*,’ and so on, while it should also be regarded as a *viśeṣa* or distinguishing mark, since it differentiates *dravyas* from the other *padārthas*, all of which lack this property. Similar arguments can be given for *guṇatva* and *karmatva* as well. On the same ground, one can treat all *aparāsāmānyas* or *parāpārasāmānyas* (i.e., *sāmānyas* other than *sattā*) as instances of *sāmānyā-viśeṣa*. This is pretty obvious from the following remarks of Prasastapāda, Udayana, and Śāṅkara Miśra:

(a)
sāmānyam dvidham paramaparañcānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam. tatra param sattā, mahāviśayatvāt. sā cānuvṛttere va hetuvāt sāmānyam eva. dravyatvādyaparam, alpaviśayatvāt. tacca vyāvṛtteri hetuvāt sāmānyam sad viśeṣākhyām api labhate. (*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Prasastapāda [I], p. 15)

(b)
... sattāyām antyesu viśeṣeṣu caikaikanimittavaśādekaikā samjñā, iha tu nimittadvayasamāveśāt samjñādvayasamāveśa ityarthaḥ. (*Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana, p. 17)

(c)
paramapi sāmānyam aparam api, tathā’parantu sāmānyam viśeṣasamjñām api labhate, yathā dravyamidamityanuvṛttapratyaye satyeva nāyam guṇo nedaṃ karmeti viśeṣapratyayaḥ, tathā ca dravyatvādīnām sāmānyānām eva viśeṣatvam. (*Upaskāra* of Śāṅkara Miśra, p. 79)

In this connection, it should also be admitted that the term *viśeṣa* has been used in more than one sense in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, namely particularities that are present in eternal substances, and distinguishing marks irrespective of their loci. Authors like Praśastapāda have employed the expression *antyaviśeṣa* (i.e., ultimate differentiator) specifically for particularity. Once we keep in mind the distinction between *viśeṣa* and *antyaviśeṣa*, expressions like *sāmānyaviśeṣa* will not cause any confusion.

5. By now, it should be clear that there is no reason whatsoever for regarding *abhāva* as sui generis on the alleged ground that it “could not belong to either of these classifications [e.g., *bhāva* and *sattā*],” since there is no basis for admitting this queer classification. Moreover, once we admit the claim that *abhāva* had to be admitted as “positively existent” (whatever that may mean) on the ground that it can be perceived, the claim that substances, qualities, and actions are “existents” while universals, particularities, and inherence are “subsistents,” which was made by Daya Krishna in an earlier paragraph, would no longer be tenable, because the *Vaiśeṣikas* (and also *Naiyāyikas*) admit the perceptibility of universals, and *Naiyāyikas* admitted the perceptibility of inherence as well.

VII

If absence was to be an object of direct apprehension, the role of senses in it could not be easily determined. Moreover, *the apprehension of absence implied prior presence of the object that was now absent*, and this could be at least of two types. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 122; emphasis added)

While the first statement in this paragraph is true to some extent, since there was a lot of controversy about the perceptibility of *abhāva*, the second statement, though true of *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, is not true of *prāgabhāva*, *atyantābhāva*, and *anyonyābhāva*, as will be evident from our earlier account of these four types of *abhāva*.

VIII

(A)

[I]n case there are things that can never come into being [*sic*] because of their very nature, then that would have to be granted absolute absence, and *Naiyāyikas* did just that in the case of that which was said to be impossible in the Western tradition. “Impossible” was that which could not be, and never would be.

Naiyāyikas [*sic*] called this *atyantābhāva* and if any student of Quine questions this, he has only to ask himself about the ontological status of “null-calls” [*sic*] in logic and mathematics, and whether these disciplines will be possible without postulating its reality. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 122)

(B)

The *Naiyāyika* formulates this notion in its concept of *atyantābhāva* or absolute absence, that is, whose opposite can never obtain in principle. The examples it [?] gives are not very clear regarding the “ground” on which such an impossibility is being asserted. . . . The examples given in the tradition such as *vandhyāputra* (barren woman’s son), *śaśāśṛṅga*

(hare's horn), or *akāśakusuma* (a sky flower) may perhaps be understood in some such way. (Contrary Thinking, p. 126)

(C)

Atyantābhāva for example relates to that whose existence is logically impossible and hence, whose absence has to be regarded as always there. (Contrary Thinking, p. 129)

In these three passages, one finds an unbelievably blatant misrepresentation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views. As we have already noted, every genuine or real *abhāva* must have a locus (*anuyogin*), as well as a negatum or counter-positive (*pratiyogin*), and both the *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin* must also be real entities. If any one of them turns out to be a fiction on account of impossibility, then the relevant *abhāva* would also be a fiction. This has been clearly stated by Vācaspati Mīśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, where he has said that every genuine *abhāva* is determined by a pair of reals, and not by a single real entity (*sadbhyām abhāvaḥ nirūpyate naikena satā*—p. 141). While commenting on this line, Udayana has remarked that the identification or specification of an *abhāva* has to be done in terms of *both* its negatum (*pratiyogin*) and locus (*adhikaraṇa*) and not in terms of any *one* of them (*abhāvaḥ . . . niṣedhyaniṣedhādhikaraṇābhyām eva nirūpyate, na tvekena satā niṣedhyena niṣedhādhikaraṇena vā*—*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāparīśuddhi*, p. 194). In his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Udayana has also said that since no one ever apprehends the hare's horn, our non-apprehension of a hare's horn does not establish the absence of a hare's horn (*na hi śāśaśṛṅgam ayogyānupalabdhyā kaścinniṣedhati. na ca prakṛte yogyānupalabdhiṃ kaścinnanyate*—p. 229). How does then one negate a hare's horn? In answer, Udayana points out that an *abhāva* that has an unreal entity as its negatum would itself be unreal, and an unreal *abhāva* cannot be established by any accredited source of knowledge (*kathaṃ tarhi śāśaśṛṅgasya niṣedhaḥ? na kathañcit . . . na cāyamapāramārthikapratyogikaḥ paramārthābhāvo nāma, na cāpāramārthikaṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ nāmeti*—p. 234). How, then, should we understand the sentence "there is no hare's horn"? In answer, Udayana says that what this sentence means is that there is no horn in a hare (*kastarhi śāśaśṛṅgam nāstītyasyārthaḥ? śāśe adhikaraṇe viśāṇābhāvō stīti*—p. 236). Both the horn and the hare are genuine entities, and, hence, one can speak of the absence of horn in a hare.

IX

Thinking has to use what has come to be called the joint method of agreement and difference, and this assumes that things are sometimes present and sometimes absent. Nayāyikas [*sic*] called these *kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī*, and the acceptance of their reality created insurmountable problems for the definition of concomitance, whether causal or noncausal, that is required for any satisfactory definition of inferential knowledge of *anumāna*. (Contrary Thinking, p. 123)

Here, again, we find a number of statements that are patently wrong. *Kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī* are two forms of inference, and in the first of them the invariable relation between the probans and probandum can be established only through agree-

ment in presence (*anvaya*), while in the second, such concomitance can be established solely through agreement in absence (*vyatireka*) between the probans and probandum. The “insurmountable problems for the definition of concomitance” that Daya Krishna speaks of have not been specified by him, and are also unknown to us.

X

Was difference, then, necessary to knowledge and if so, was “difference” a kind of “absence” also? Nayāyikas [*sic*] saw the problem and the difficulty, but opted for understanding the notion of difference in terms of mutual absence, that is, “the absence of one in the other.” The standard example is that of the jar and the cloth, or *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, but one may choose one’s own examples, as the world is full of them. (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 123)

In this paragraph, *anyonyābhāva* or difference has virtually been reduced to a pair of *atyantābhāvas*, and this has perhaps resulted from the literal translation of *anyonyābhāva* as “the absence of one in the other.” That this is patently wrong can be shown very easily. Take, for example, a group of qualities inhering in a substance. The qualities are certainly different from the substance that happens to be their locus. Thus, there is an *anyonyābhāva* that obtains between them. But while the substance is absent in these qualities, the qualities are not absent in the substance. Once we admit the version of *anyonyābhāva* given above, we would have to say that there is no difference between a substance and its qualities.

XI

If *abhāva* was to be treated as an object of perception then, in the context of the Nyāya analysis of perception it would involve necessarily [?] and hence *abhāva* when perceived *would have to have both an individual and a universal element in it*. A universal of absence or *sāmānyābhāva* would thus arise, which also would have to be granted the status of that which is apprehended through perception. Nyāya thus would have a double problem on its hands as, at least in Gautama’s definition *indriyārthasannikarṣa* is necessary for perception, and it would be difficult to establish how there can be such a *sannikarṣa* with something that is absent, and one would apprehend that which is a “universal” of absence or, in Nyāya terminology is *jāti*. (*Contrary Thinking*, pp. 127–128; emphasis added)

In this paragraph, there are at least two wrong statements. First, it has been stated that if *abhāva* has to be perceived, then there must be some universal that characterizes it, which is not true. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, universals are also perceptible, but universals are not characterized by any other universal, as such a supposition would result in an infinite regress. Moreover, *sāmānyābhāva* is an *abhāva* of the form ‘there is no pot on the ground’ (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*), as contrasted with the *vīśeṣābhāva* or *abhāva* of some qualified specific object, for example ‘there is no blue pot on the ground’ (*bhūtale nīlaghaṭo nāsti*). There is simply no “universal of absence,” because universals inhere in their loci, and nothing can inhere in an *abhāva*.

XII

The Nayāyikas [*sic*] however, had [a] different problem with these types of absences as, firstly, they have to be objects of perception and, secondly, the 'absence' has to have a locus where it can be located. Where can the *prāgabhāva* [be] said to be? (*Contrary Thinking*, p. 129)

Here, again, Daya Krishna commits the mistake of assuming that every *abhāva* must be perceived. If the negatum of an *abhāva* is imperceptible, then so is the *abhāva*. Again, the *prāgabhāva* of an entity is located in the causes where that entity would be located after its production. *Prāgabhāva* is not "a not-yet existing entity," as has been said on page 132 of *Contrary Thinking*—it is the absence of an entity that has not yet been produced.

Contrary thinking is indeed essential for ensuring that philosophical thinking does not become ossified, and criticism of time-honored doctrines is also to be tolerated and even encouraged, so that some novel views are put forward for consideration. But such criticism should be done in a responsible manner, without distorting in any way the views that are chosen for criticism. The stalwarts of Indian philosophy have ruthlessly criticized their opponents—but one can never accuse them of misrepresenting the views of their opponents in any significant way. In many cases their accounts of the theses that they want to refute are so accurate and intelligible that they often help us in understanding the views of their opponents, and such accounts are invariably supported by adequate quotations from the texts of their opponents. We note with some degree of sadness that such practices have not been adopted by Daya Krishna in the essays reviewed here.

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