




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A Review of Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind by Dan Arnold

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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

A Review of *Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind*. By Dan Arnold. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 311. ISBN 978-0-231-14546-6.

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In his challenging and sophisticated book *Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind*, Dan Arnold draws parallels between classical Indian and contemporary Western approaches to the description of the mind, and marshals these arguments, once synchronized, to defend an anti-reductionist, Neo-Kantian view. To begin with, Arnold shows how the seventh-century Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti resembles modern cognitive scientists in that both attempt to explain the mind causally. This resemblance holds, Arnold claims, in spite of the fact that Dharmakīrti argues vehemently against physicalism—the very view that a causal explanation is taken by modern cognitive scientists to vindicate. On the flip side of this argument is another resemblance: Arnold shows how Dharmakīrti’s critics among the Mīmāṃsā and Madhyamaka traditions resemble modern, Neo-Kantian critics of physicalist, causal approaches to the mind. A crucial dispute among medieval Buddhist and Orthodox (Hindu) thinkers is therefore shown to have replayed itself among late-twentieth-century English-language philosophers. Arnold reveals this fascinating, convincing parallel through deft and insightful readings of both Indian and modern materials, and he uses the comparison to deepen our understanding of both sides.

Arnold’s work deserves close scrutiny by all who have an interest in Buddhist epistemology or in the potential significance of Buddhist philosophy for contemporary debates on the nature of the mind. It is a rich, nuanced analysis, informed by state-of-the-art engagements with Indic and Western materials. Here I will lay out Arnold’s central claims, exemplifying them with only a few of his multiple lines of approach. I will then suggest some new directions that this conversation might take.

The main concepts supporting Arnold’s intricate parallel construction are drawn from the motivating insight of the “Pittsburgh School” of philosophy—the work of Robert Brandom and especially John McDowell, which extends Wilfrid Sellars’ famous critique of the “Myth of the Given.”¹ Central to this critique is the observation that the realm of causality, in which we describe natural, lawful reactions among events, is entirely distinct in nature and kind from the “logical space of reasons” in which thought and language operate. There is no possibility of describing ideas caus-

ally, it is said, because what operates causally is by its nature nonconceptual, whereas only what is conceptual is available to thought. As Sellars points out, to be *convinced* is entirely unlike being *caused*. Consequently, the commonsense notion that there might be empirical evidence—the evidence of the senses—that is simply “given” to experience through some objective, causal process and then manipulated in thought is impossible. What appears in experience must be structured *for* thought, or it could never be an object of thought. McDowell famously claims that conceptuality is “pervasive”—that human experience, including perception and action, is shot through with conceptualization.

Arnold provides a thoughtful, creative examination of this thesis, arguing, in particular, that it has damaging implications for Jerry Fodor’s naturalistic, computational theory of the mind. As Arnold emphasizes, thought, like language, must be “intentional” in the sense (from Brentano) that it is always “about” something—and, as he writes:

it is perhaps especially the closeness of the relation between linguistic and mental ‘aboutness’ that makes it so difficult to give (what many would take to define a scientific approach to any matter) a thoroughly causal account of the mental; for the way that things like sentences relate to what they are about does not (to say the least) readily admit of causal explanation. (p. 8)

Language and consciousness share the quality of being intrinsically relational; consciousness *just is* a subject taking up some object of awareness, and linguistic meaning *just is* the words being what they are about. Since this relationality is ineliminable and yet *not a causal relationship*, the intentional, subject-object structure inherent to all thought and language may be taken to show that no merely causal explanation could be a sufficient explanation.²

One of Arnold’s compelling, original contributions is to elucidate a parallel between two pairs of concepts. On the one hand is this modern division between the natural/lawful and the intentional “logical space of reasons.” On the other hand is the famous Buddhist epistemological division between the two means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): perception (*pratyakṣa*), which avails itself of real, causally efficient, momentary particulars; and inference (*anumāna*), which engages only with unreal, conceptual-linguistic constructs. The latter division was first explicated by Dignāga (sixth century), but Arnold’s emphasis is on Dharmakīrti (seventh century), whom he considers more of an empiricist and therefore more comparable to modern physicalists. It was Dharmakīrti, after all, who explained that every real entity is defined by its ability to effect a causal result (*arthakriyā*), and for whom real entities *can* causally impinge upon the conceptual realm via the impressions they make upon sensory organs. If the parallel holds, though, and these realms are discrete, as the Pittsburgh School contends, then this causal impingement cannot be effected. There is no way to get knowledge from perception, if perception is merely causal. Arnold’s argument focuses on the junctures at which Dharmakīrti attempts to bridge the causal story from the natural to the conceptual realms, and finds weaknesses exploitable by In-dologically valenced versions of the Pittsburgh School’s arguments.

Arnold's criticisms focus on some noted lacunae in Dharmakīrti's account of "exclusion" (*apoha*) and "self-awareness" (*svasaṃvitti*). The *apoha* doctrine is the Buddhist epistemologists' account of concept formation in the absence of real universals. Arnold fruitfully likens the *apoha* doctrine to Jerry Fodor's project of explaining meaning—intentionality—in causally describable syntactic terms. The Sellarsian thesis would say that this cannot, in principle, be done—so it is Arnold's clever strategy to interrogate how the Buddhist claims to do it.

For Buddhists, all concepts are constructions mistakenly superimposed across discrete individuals, so it is incumbent upon Dharmakīrti to provide an account of how apparently (but not really) similar individuals can *causally* generate a unified concept, especially one that works for all practical purposes. Different things named by a single word are not *really* similar, but somehow *appear to be* similar, and can be treated as similar. How can this be? A gem among the many pleasing revelations in Arnold's work is his discovery that both Dharmakīrti and Jerry Fodor appeal to "sameness of effects" as a way to explain the apparent unity among particulars in a generality. Dharmakīrti famously argues that just as different remedies can be used to cure a fever, so different entities can cause the same appearances. This answer troubles Arnold, because it seems to imply that there is a real unified entity, the fever (or, more properly, the reduction of a fever), which is causally related to the diverse remedies. But this does not entirely fit the problem; if the objects of perception are each different, what allows Dharmakīrti to suggest that the appearance is *the same*? Dharmakīrti's brief, somewhat hand-waving answer to a counterargument of this kind is that, due to our karmically generated delusions, we *take the discrete things* as similar. Although not noted by Arnold, this answer is akin to the causal "triggering" of innate cognitive faculties theorized by Robert Hannah as an account of intuition in Kant.³ It is a difficult point in Dharmakīrti as well as Kant, and there is some disagreement among contemporary scholars over how best to account for Dharmakīrti's apparent nonchalance on the question, especially given that Dharmottara and other commentators took the issue to be crucial and problematic.

For his part, Arnold believes that this reply reveals a fatal flaw: Dharmakīrti's *apoha* doctrine, as stated, depends on his accepting that similarity, or unity across many, appears only *phenomenally*, as "taken by a subject." This suggests to Arnold that "the reference of words is thus finally based in something eminently subjective" (p. 140). The problem is that, if we have to appeal to intentional acts of *judging* things to be similar as part of the ostensibly *causal* story of the initial emergence of the concept that unites those things, we can hardly claim to have shown how *judging itself* arises causally. On the contrary, we must either admit that intentionality is intrinsic to experience, or we involve ourselves in an infinite regress, for each judgment of similarity will be "caused" by a previous intentionally constructed judgment, and so on. The failure to close the gap between the cause and the judgment here, and at other junctures in the *apoha* and *svasaṃvitti* arguments, appears, to Arnold, as evidence of a doomed project. As one interesting example, Arnold points out that when Dharmakīrti writes of the choices called "speakers' intentions" (*vivakṣā*) enacted to apply meaning to words—the origin story of linguistic meaning—it is unclear how

much this is meant to refer to the initial, historical creation of linguistic entities; how much to the individual's acquisition of language; and how much to a selection of available terminology in a given verbal act. If meaning is beyond causality, then this vagueness, Arnold implies, may be symptomatic of an attempt to describe the indescribable.

Where *apoha* attempts to reduce the irreducible, *svasaṃvitti* begs the question. Given that it is not possible to account causally for the intentional, meaningful nature of mental events, Arnold writes, "Dharmakīrti must somewhere along the way presuppose experiences that are just intrinsically 'meaning-conferring'" (p. 159). Arnold's analysis of the doctrine of "self-awareness" (*svasaṃvitti*) in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti seeks to show that in this concept the Buddhist epistemologists acknowledged that awareness is always intrinsically intentional ("anything known can finally be only *first-personally* known" [p. 171]). Awareness is an authoritative cause of knowledge, he says, only because it is directly and indubitably manifest; and *being manifest* requires a viewer—the Kantian synthetic subject—who is *aware of* the manifestation. Arnold believes that the epistemologists acknowledge the need for this transcendental subject when they adopt "self-awareness" as intrinsic to every mental event. But this ought to be unavailable to a Buddhist causal explanation of mental events. To affirm it is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it, too.

An available alternative, Arnold urges, is the one that is advocated by the Indian Mīmāṃsā critics of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who argue that the intentionality—the meaningfulness—of linguistic utterances is ineliminable. Dharmakīrti's references to the linguistic elders who assign the arbitrary meanings of words does nothing to satisfy the need for meaningfulness itself. Echoing Wittgenstein's famous argument against private language, the Mīmāṃsā respond that any such story will always assume that the linguistic elders already have some kind of language. Dharmakīrti has no explanation for how meaning comes into being *for the first time*—and yet, clearly, we have language. Thus, as the Mīmāṃsā believe, language is eternal. Where Dharmakīrti appeals to our beginningless karmic conditioning here, this may be taken to undermine his own attempt to appeal to meaning-conferring events of naming.⁴

Finally, a supporting point is made by the Mādhyamika who, under Arnold's reading, denies the internal coherence of any claim that seeks to reduce linguistic meaning to a causal story. Arnold sees the Mādhyamika saying that any argument at all—any attempt to convince someone of anything—must appeal to a semantic, intentional level of description. If the argument claims to reduce the semantic to some other, more fundamental level of description, this is a "performatively incoherent" move—because it would reduce away its own compelling "reasons." There are no terms to appeal to that one might use to explain, or explain away, the conceptual, "conventional" realm, which are not rooted in, and part of, that very realm. This pragmatic, transcendental argument avers that we implicitly assume an ineliminable intentionality as a condition for the possibility of any argument at all. This is a new reading of Madhyamaka, and it thoughtfully extends Arnold's previous work.

Whether or not one wishes to agree with his interpretations, one could hardly criticize Arnold for being insufficiently bold, creative, or ambitious. In a book that takes seriously a naturalist interlocutor, Arnold comes close to adopting the view that language is eternal and any reductionism about meaning is incoherent.⁵ Some will read this as a kind of *reductio* that applies to his own position, as if he has argued that arrows can never reach their targets. But Arnold is careful to preclude this interpretation of his work; he believes sincerely that his cross-cultural philosophical arguments have shown that any merely causal explanation of the mind would leave out something crucial: the “realm of sense.”

These are deep, relevant engagements with Buddhist and Western philosophy. Arnold’s work breaks new ground, and meets a very high standard. The remainder of this review, then, in which I will provide a critique of Arnold’s central claims, is intended to open up a conversation about this powerful work, but not at all to undermine its significance.

My feeling is that there is a better light in which to show the Buddhist epistemologists. Arnold’s reading of Dharmakīrti draws from Prajñākaragupta when he writes that *svasaṃvitti* is ultimate, hence “indubitable”; and his view (unintentionally) resembles a Geluk reading, similar to that of the Tibetan epistemologist Chaba Chökyi Senge, when he assumes that what is “given” in perception is “the same” as what is known. But these are not the only readings available. The interpretation of Dharmakīrti *provided by Arnold*, then, may in fact be subject to the critique he mounts (I will leave it to other experts to decide) *without* necessarily defeating Dharmakīrti himself. For, it ushers in quite a different Dharmakīrti to read him through the lenses of Vasubandhu, the original Sautrāntika/Yogācāra Buddhist epistemologist, and Sakya Paṇḍita, Chaba’s chief critic; and it seems to me that a Sakya approach, bolstered by Yogācāra, might add something significant to this discussion. Dharmakīrti’s Yogācāra credentials, I think, ought to inoculate him against many of Arnold’s critiques and, if Arnold’s parallel is to hold, in fact (ironically) provide leverage against the use of the Pittsburgh School to critique modern cognitive science.

As I understand it, the Sakya position is that, far from being “indubitable,” true direct perceptions are unavailable to conceptual cognition as such; causally structured perception is sequestered from cognition in a way that might suit the Pittsburgh School.⁶ This does not mean, however, that perceptions are not causally *related* to conceptual cognition; of course they must be, otherwise there would be no knowledge of the perceived world. But the transfer of a “mark” from the perceived object to an ordinary conceptual cognition employs the activity of conceptual construction. Hence, far from being “indubitable,” every conceptual cognition based on perception is not only subject to doubt, it is *mistaken*, because *every conceptual cognition is mistaken*. In his famous *Treasury of Reasoning* (*tshad ma rigs pa’i gter*) Sakya Paṇḍita combats the commonsense notion that the causal object of perception appears in awareness. What he says is that, essentially, the appearance is the shape taken by the *consciousness*, which is causally related to the object but not the same as it. Everything that has a causal effect is, for the lineal descendants of Vasubandhu,

momentary and impartite. So, wherever we consider ourselves to be experiencing objects that are extended in space or time (through our visual perception, for instance), we know that things do not really exist as they appear. Perception is a causal process, but by the time we think *anything at all* about its objects, they are already part and parcel of our conceptual processing.

This kind of behind-the-scenes causal story of perception giving shape to conceptualization allows one to grant a certain kind of epistemic authority to knowledge gained through perception due to perception's specifically causal nature, without falsely imagining that objects are "given" to perception as they exist. This might not entirely circumvent the critique of the Myth of the Given, but it certainly moves the target. It makes a significant difference to note that what is "given" is given in error; such a view makes it difficult to label Dharmakīrti as an empirical foundationalist. Perception is pragmatically useful in the formation of knowledge, but its supposed foundation is itself groundless, given that Dharmakīrti's final position seems to be the Yogācāra view that everything is "appearance only" (*viññapti-mātra*). To accept such ultimate groundlessness places the Buddhist project in a different light—one that fits with the pragmatist leanings of the Pittsburgh philosophers. This view also allows that, whereas the construction of concepts seems to require an "intentional" agent (as Arnold proposes in his argument against *apoha*), that implicit *subject* need not be any more real than the *concept*. That is to say, it is equally *erroneous* (1) to construct a shared identity across discrete individuals and (2) to construct a subject as the "agent" of such construction.⁷

If something like this was his view, then, we may forgive Dharmakīrti for failing to provide wanted details about the origins of language and meaning. For that is the ultimate causal story, which is "inconceivable" *both* in the sense that it is an activity to which we have no experiential access (before Buddhahood) *and* in the sense that it is by definition a preconceptual process. It is unknown and unknowable, not because it is mysterious, but because to know something is to have it in a concept. Of course, it does seem to happen that, inconceivably, meaning appears; Dharmakīrti allows that this kind of transition at least appears to happen. Yet, in an important sense, intentionality is a delusion, so we might never actually *get* the kind of meaning that common sense tells us we experience.

It may seem odd to admit that even our most basic "means of knowledge" (perceptions) are fundamentally flawed, but this is central to the Yogācāra Buddhist conceptual structure that is the anti-realist "foundation" of Buddhist epistemology. Indeed, the philosophical puzzlement over the pervasiveness of intentionality in our time reflects the main issues that troubled Buddhist intellectuals of this tradition in the first millennium. In Vasubandhu's Yogācāra, the term of art for the intrinsic, subject-and-object structure of every mental and linguistic entity—the term for what Arnold calls "intentionality"—is "duality" (*dvaya*). The Pittsburgh School assertion of the ineliminable, non-causal, "logical space of reasons" might perhaps appear to a Yogācāra as simply a mistaken affirmation that duality has an *ultimate* nature. The Buddhist view, instead, is that duality (read: intentionality) is the root cause of the false belief in a self, which is in turn the root cause of the endless suffering of *saṃsāra*.

Duality *can be* eliminated—not through logic, but through meditative practice. For it is only *how things appear*, not how things really are.

Finally, as mentioned above, Arnold argues repeatedly that it is incoherent to affirm a self-undermining argument, to state that language fails. He makes use of Wittgenstein's elegant arguments that we cannot coherently doubt everything. (Wittgenstein says, in *On Certainty* § 343, "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.") This is, again, a valuable application of modern conversations to the Buddhist case; but it is hardly acceptable to end the discussion there, as if this indication of a performative incoherence has struck a decisive blow to an unprepared adversary. Quite to the contrary, this very problematic—the self-undermining nature of Buddhist doctrine—is a central theme of Mahāyāna texts. Yogācāra scriptures and treatises acknowledge that their own doctrines are not, finally, meaningful in the way they appear to be—even when spoken by a Buddha. And this is not some obscure position, some uncomfortable family secret swept under the rug. The self-referential, self-undermining irony of the emptiness of language appearing in language is stated front and center throughout the Mahāyāna. It is thematized in the famous doctrine of "skillful means" (*upāya*).

Here is not the place to investigate this position in detail, but it may be noted that for Yogācāra, the famous Three Natures doctrine declares that every reality is inconceivably, but truly, *both* a "dual" construct (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) and causally conditioned (*paratantra-svabhāva*). The statement that both characteristics—the "dual"/intentional and the causal—are intrinsic to every reality is not taken as *invalidating* the Yogācāra view, but rather as facing up to the only available, if discomfiting, truth.

Arnold revealingly overstates his case, I think, when he says, "Mādhyamika arguments against the coherence of any supposed explanatory primitives thus aim to show that one cannot, without self-contradiction, say *what there really is* instead of the reasoning persons we take ourselves to be" (p. 229). One who adopts a Yogācāra view—that language is a flawed instrument and the final reality is inconceivable—should never claim to be affirming *what there really is*; as I have already stated, even the causal story and the epistemic means are merely conventional.⁸ Furthermore, if it is self-contradictory to deny that we are "reasoning persons," does this mean that the Buddha mistakenly contradicted himself when he affirmed "no-self" (*anātman*) and taught that our "actions" (*karma*) were *caused* by "ignorance" (*avidyā*)? Shouldn't a Mādhyamika agree that the Buddha spoke such expressions through "skillful means" (*upāya*), which might suggest "self-contradiction" to some, but would liberate others from suffering? Skillful means is, in this way, a formula for differentiating better from worse *within* the conventional realm—which was plausibly Dharmakīrti's intent as an epistemologist.

Another way of making this point would be to note that it is standard Buddhist doctrine to say that we are "deluded beings," not "reasoning persons." Of course, there is no inherent contradiction here; "reasoning" is not necessarily "reasonable." Even a false consciousness is still a consciousness *of* something, and even a self-serving justification motivated by subconscious desires is a mental event with a

subject-object structure. But it does seem rather contrary to a Buddhist view of unenlightened beings to say that there's no better description of what's happening than the ordinary way "we take ourselves to be." And the Yogācāra tradition, with its view that all things are "only apparent" (*viññapti-mātra*), extends the understanding of ignorance in basic Buddhism into a full-blown anti-realism about every moment in our thought stream.

Thus, two crucial questions remain. First, is it plausible to read Yogācāra, and/or Dharmakīrti, as saying that, while it *seems* that all thoughts are intentionally structured, in fact *they are not*? And second, is there sense in such a view? It would mean not only that everything we think and say is mistaken—so far no obstacle for the Buddhist—but also that we are wrong when we imagine that we are thinking what we are thinking. Thought is only cause and effect; there is no real subject, and awareness is *not really intentional*. We know that we can be deluded about why we act (for instance, when we hide our selfishness even from ourselves), and why we are convinced by one argument but not another (for instance, when we hide our biases even from ourselves). It is a short step from these truisms to the Buddhist reductionist observation that the ostensible subject of our ostensibly intentional states may in fact play *no role at all* in the unfolding of ongoing mental life—or if it has a role, it is only as a fictional actor declared, after the fact, to have reasoned, and acted.⁹

Setting aside the question of whether it is good Buddhism, though, we might wonder whether there is still logic behind Arnold's critique that it is self-contradictory to put forward a claim that undermines something intrinsic to the nature of a claim. This seems like an unassailable critique, but not all logicians would agree. For instance, Graham Priest (2002, p. 252) has argued that talk about the limits of language and thought always ushers in a contradiction of this kind; thus, this is not an acceptable criticism, unless Arnold wishes to hold that language and thought have no limits (which seems unlikely).

Perhaps, instead, this is just the nature of *saṃsāra*. The irreducible nature of intentionality may just be a fundamental characteristic of all consciousness—Buddhists certainly admit it as a fundamental characteristic of all *deluded* awarenesses. If Dharmakīrti and the cognitive scientists seem, therefore, inherently unreasonable, it may be because there is no way to reason our way out of delusion. Arnold's claim that you cannot be "convinced" to believe that you do not really believe *anything* may be accurate, as far as it goes (p. 230). But perhaps you can still be *caused* to renounce your mistaken beliefs. The Buddhist tradition hopes that meditation may reveal a nondual awareness, and cognitive science hopes to develop a sufficiently robust causal explanation of cognition to convince even the most recalcitrant skeptics. Even with no one to be convinced and no one to do the convincing, perhaps one day Arnold and Dharmakīrti will no longer disagree.

In the end, then, even if Arnold has yet to marshal Dharmakīrti's best defenses against his critiques, his work provides a wealth of creative, and immensely stimulating, argumentation. It should prompt a serious and sophisticated conversation about Buddhist epistemology and its significance for contemporary philosophical approaches to the nature of the mind.

Notes

I am grateful to Jeffrey Stout and Richard Nance for extremely useful comments and conversation that helped me to think through and articulate the ideas in this review. Errors that remain are my own.

- 1 – See, for instance, McDowell 1996 and Schear 2013.
- 2 – Readers familiar with the Buddhist Yogācāra philosophical tradition will note that my expression “subject-object structure” bridges Arnold’s “intentionality” with the Yogācāra term “duality” (*dvaya*), which is often glossed as referring to subject and object. As I will note below, the intrinsic relationality of intentionality—what prevents it from being described as causal—is cited by Yogācāra authors as the epitome of samsaric delusion.
- 3 – Hanna 2006; mentioned in Pippin 2013, pp. 91–92.
- 4 – I do not recall this final point being put in this way in Arnold’s book, but it is a natural result of combining his arguments.
- 5 – Arnold does not fully adopt either of these Indic positions, but he does defend the irreducible nature of linguistic meaning and he does claim that to deny that linguistic reference operates as it appears to operate ushers in a performative contradiction.
- 6 – By “the Sakya position” I am referring, specifically, to the position as articulated in Sakya Paṇḍita’s *Treasury of Reasoning* (*Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter*). On this text and the view articulated in this paragraph, see Hugon 2008 and Gold 2014.
- 7 – There is a danger here of the devil in the details. First, notice that this view affirms the epistemic authority granted to perception without implying that what we perceive—the object of a cognition caused by perception—really exists in the way it appears to exist. This means that, if we are to maintain the notion of epistemic means (*prāmāṇya*), it must be understood relativistically, as a way of preferring or grading certain kinds of knowledge—which are always imperfect—over other kinds of knowledge. Second, we must be sure to distinguish clearly between the causal story of perception, which is its authorizing warrant on the one hand, and our *taking* perception as an authority on the other. The latter would clearly be an intentionally structured mental event, uncaused and therefore *unreal*, from a Yogācāra perspective. We do not, really, *take* perception as an authority—there is no taker, and nothing to take. A full consideration of whether Sakya Paṇḍita’s reading of Dharmakīrti in fact meets these requirements would draw us too far afield. My intent here is only to signal the direction of a reading through which Dharmakīrti might have a creditable response to Arnold’s critique.
- 8 – Of course, there are terms such as *dharmadhātu* and *tathatā*, which *name* what is beyond our conceptual structures, but they are described *via negativa*.

9 – Thus, the Yogācāra tradition may be compared, in this way, with Dennett 1991. I mention the subject because of the Buddha’s emphasis on the no-self doctrine, but of course the Yogācāra tradition was equally concerned to point out the fictional character of our experiential *objects*, the other side of the “dual” relation of intentionality.

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Response to Jonathan Gold’s Review of *Brains, Buddhas, and Believing*

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I have enjoyed spirited philosophical conversations with Jonathan Gold for well over a decade now, and I always learn from them; I am grateful, then, to the editors of *Philosophy East and West* for the opportunity to share something of our long-standing conversation in this forum, just as I am grateful to Professor Gold for his characteristically generous and insightful engagement with my book. While the philosophical and interpretive alternatives he develops in response to my book’s critique of