




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TWO KINDS OF ONENESS: CHENG HAO'S *LETTER ON CALMING NATURE* IN CONTRAST WITH ZHANG ZAI'S MONISM



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Introduction

Two kinds of life experience of oneness (or unity), frequently described, as well as disputed, by the major figures in the history of Neo-Confucianism during the Song-Ming period—for example Zhang Zai (1020–1077), Cheng Hao (1032–1085), Zhu Xi (1130–1200), and Wang Yangming (1472–1529)—are the focus of the present article. The fundamental characteristic of this experience is a serene feeling of being profoundly united with all things; specifically, the term ‘oneness’ is herein utilized to refer to a state in which Heaven, Earth, and a myriad of things form one body (*yiti* 一體) with the human individual.¹ To further illustrate this notion, I offer a new reading of Cheng Hao’s groundbreaking essay *Letter on Calming Nature* (*Dingxing shu* 定性書), a letter to Zhang Zai, in which I argue that, in this very debate with Zhang, one may discern various conceptions of oneness. In addition, my argument shows how Cheng’s refutation of the inner-outer distinction may prove a better starting point for self-cultivation and moral psychology when compared to Zhang’s; this reading characterizes Cheng’s ethics as therapeutic, and as a moderate version of ethical realism based on a non-objectifiable first-person experience, not to be confounded with any radical version of realism.²

In the history of Chinese philosophy, the most influential sources for the idea of ‘forming one body with Heaven and Earth and myriads of things’ can be found in the Daoist text *Zhuangzi*, and the Confucian text *Mencius* of the Warring States period. The former text states: “Heaven and Earth grow with me, and the innumerable things are one with me” (*Zhuangzi*, chapter 2). According to *Zhuangzi*, his opponent Hui Shi also says: “love the innumerable things impartially, [since] Heaven and Earth form one body” (*Zhuangzi*, chapter 33). *Mencius*, *Zhuangzi*’s contemporary, states: “All things are already complete in oneself. There is no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere” (*Mencius* 7A:4, in *SB*, p. 79), a saying quoted by Cheng Hao when he articulates his understanding of oneness in his famous passage in *On Understanding Ren* (Humanity) (*Shi ren pian* 識仁篇).

In Western philosophy, the ontological term ‘oneness’ or ‘unity’ is often associated with monism in metaphysics. Monism—in contrast to dualism, pluralism, and nihilism—holds that there exists only one element or substance, of which the many are either parts or merely appearances. A. C. Graham, for instance, uses the concepts

of monism and dualism to differentiate between Cheng Hao's thought and Cheng Yi's. This metaphysical dimension, however, is not the focus here, but rather the *experience* of "forming one body." A similar phenomenon is richly documented in the Western philosophical tradition. Even Hegel, as reported by Wilhelm Dilthey, states that love is "a feeling of the whole" (*Empfindung des Ganzen*), in which all separation and limited conditions disappear (Dilthey 1959, p. 95). Nietzsche, in *The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music*, describes the Dionysian principle as a collapse of the clearly delineated boundaries of things into a frenzied, joyful, ecstatic experience of the living whole (Magnus and Higgins 1996). Max Scheler, in his treatment of sympathy and love, views a common stream of life experience as being more original than an "inner and private experience"—*qua mine* as contrasted with that of others (Scheler 1954, p. 246). Such would hold back the threat of metaphysical solipsism, and also bar against an ethics of egotism or egocentricity (cf. p. 58). Simultaneously, Scheler urges the Western world to learn from the Asian ethos, and to cultivate a sense of emotional identity with the living universe (cf. pp. 105–106). However, Scheler's knowledge about the Asian ethos of oneness was very limited. While he mentions Buddhism and Laozi, he does not explore this issue in Confucianism, let alone the rich diversity in each school.

Given that such experiences tend to be mystical and ineffable, these different senses of experiential oneness have their respective religious implications. Here, however, I aim to describe the experiences of oneness themselves, according to Cheng and Zhang, using plain language, comparing them with mundane daily experiences. As a corollary, making metaphysical postulates or religious claims cannot be the objective here. In my textual study of Cheng's arguments against those of Zhang, I treat these experiences of oneness as *descriptive* ways of displaying a phenomenon, rather than as metaphysical deductions. Cheng's approach to oneness is best described as *therapeutic*, since oneness is inaccessible to direct description; rather, it may be achieved by means of a therapeutic method that removes the barriers of perceived or unreal separations. This therapeutic approach is exemplified in Cheng's *Letter on Calming Nature*, where Cheng is less concerned with a metaphysical demonstration of oneness than with removing Zhang's conceptual obstacles impeding his perception of the authentic phenomenon. I label Zhang's and Cheng's conception of oneness '*contemplative oneness*' and '*perceptive oneness*,' respectively.

By 'two kinds of oneness' I do not mean to imply that these are two contrasting but somehow compatible (or even complementary) interpretations of the same 'oneness'; rather, they are distinct kinds of oneness, so radically different in content and approach that Zhang and Cheng could only agree on verbal or formal commitment. This point has long been overlooked in the scholarship on these two figures, since the focus has been almost exclusively on Cheng Hao's admiration of Zhang Zai's essay *Western Inscription* (*Ximing* 西銘)—a poetic expression of oneness. Yet, apart from this verbal commitment, Cheng rejects almost all of Zhang's philosophical formulations concerning this issue. Indeed, what Cheng admires is not so much Zhang's thought or approach as his rhetorical skill (YS, vol. 2, part 1, p. 39). It may

be tempting to hold that they are at least referring to the same ‘thing,’ no matter how much their interpretations may differ. Yet the meaning we give to ‘two kinds of oneness’ is similar to the way in which we say that there are many distinct kinds of ‘philosophy’—if, apart from the formal commitment that philosophy is “love of wisdom,” there is no more substantive agreement in ideas and approaches (even their views of love and wisdom could differ). Philosophy may simply be the way one philosophizes—hence differing substantively. By the same token, despite the verbal commitment that ‘oneness’ is “unity of the inner and outer,” the contents of oneness lie exclusively in its interpretations, and these differ substantively.³

In section 1 below, I briefly introduce Zhang’s idea of oneness as the background for the discussion of the *Letter on Calming Nature*.⁴ Section 2 presents my textual analysis of this letter, focusing on Cheng’s refutation of Zhang’s inner-outer distinction and of his approach to contemplative oneness. This is corroborated by other texts by Cheng, especially his *On Understanding Ren*. Finally, I describe how these two kinds of oneness emerge from their respective intellectual backgrounds, especially against Buddhism. I submit that Cheng’s view of oneness is a moderate version of ethical realism, in contrast to any radical version thereof—such as ethical collectivism or theoretical metaphysical monism.

1. Zhang Zai’s Contemplative Oneness

Zhang’s writing has been difficult to understand even for thinkers of his own time. Although I aim to convey his thought as clearly and systematically as possible, I attempt to preserve his original style, as well as the interconnections of key terms as they appear in his writings; for, if these were lost, it would be difficult to discover how Zhang’s thought is related to Cheng’s. Meanwhile, Cheng’s criticism of Zhang in turn sheds light on our understanding of Zhang’s thought.

At the outset of Zhang’s philosophy is a cosmological view. He deems Buddhism nihilism, claiming that nothing is as real as *qi* 氣 (vital force). He also uses *qi* as a key concept uniting contrasting concepts such as the void (*xu* 虛, or *wu* 無, nothingness) and the real (*shi* 實). *Qi* is originally pure, invisible, and penetrable, but when it condenses and forms things it attains particular shapes and properties, which are opposites of one another. This cosmology bears on ethics when Zhang links the *xing* 性 (nature) of humans to the pure and penetrable capacity of *qi* in humans. The heavenly nature in humans is compared to water frozen in the shape of ice (Zhang 1978, 6:22). This endowment enables human understanding to penetrate the “outer,” pure nature, no matter how finite and determined by fate (*ming* 命) one’s “inner” quality might be.⁵ What makes Zhang’s view even more intriguing to the topic at hand is that he believes “there is actually no inner or outer in *qi*.” This inner-outer distinction merely applies to human beings, or other concrete things that have shapes. Yet *qi* unites the inner and outer. Thus, in order to understand human nature, one must understand Heaven (Zhang 1978, 6:21), for in Heaven *qi*’s pure capacity for penetrating is not limited by physical constraints, thus serving as an ideal model of the human moral and spiritual capacities.

Such a cosmological view of unity seems to be a form of theoretical metaphysics, having little, if anything, to do with an existential experience of oneness. One might ask: How does one get to know this pure, penetrating unity of *qi* in the void, if all that could be perceived are merely things with particular forms or qualities? There are two possible answers. One could be to concede this point, while insisting that we should nonetheless conjecture about the pure unity; otherwise, how could one explain opposite things forming a harmonious whole, and then changing into each other?—Such is a thoroughly theoretical approach. The other method could be to show that we really have a special capacity in our spiritual or moral awareness to “penetrate” or perceive this oneness. Perhaps Zhang was struggling with these two approaches. Whereas most of his writings are metaphysical, some passages about self-cultivation indeed suggest the second approach. These two approaches are connected in his teaching of “broadening the heart-mind” (*xin* 心) beyond the limit of the senses, embracing infinity in the deepest thought. This is why I suggest the term ‘contemplative oneness.’

Zhang’s view of heart-mind in his *On Broadening Heart-mind* could be summarized as follows.⁶

Thesis 1. *Genetically*, Zhang understands “heart-mind” as the “unity of *xing* 性 (nature) and awareness.” Nature (including human nature) is the unity of *qi* and the void that is originally pure and penetrating. This suggests that the pure, penetrating capacity of awareness comes from *qi* and the void. Hence, Zhang says: “if one is concerned with fulfilling the capacity of the heart-mind, one manages to do it only when he knows whence the heart-mind comes.”

Thesis 2. *Contrasting heart-mind with the senses*, such as the eyes and ears, both the heart-mind and the senses unify the inner and the outer. Their difference is that the senses are confined to finite objects, while the heart-mind transcends this realm in identifying with Heaven. The heart-mind would fail to broaden itself if it were meant only to “preserve images” taken from perceptions. Another source of failure lies in biased or narrow heart-mind (*cheng xin* 成心), consisting of mere opinions (*yijian* 意見). It is noteworthy that Zhang does not regard the senses themselves as the source of ethical failures. In terms of the inner-outer unification, Thesis 2 could be elaborated on two points.

First, the *senses* are seen as the *primitive* unity of the inner and the outer: perhaps surprisingly, Zhang assumes that, although the senses are always considered a burden of the heart-mind, it is nonetheless the crucial point to *open up to see* (*qi* 啓 means both ‘to open’ and ‘to see’) that virtue which unifies the inner and the outer (耳目雖為性累, 然合內外之德, 知其為啓之之要也). The original unity of the inner and the outer through the senses is an accomplishment of Heaven,⁷ because the human *shen* 身 (body, self) is itself composed of the heavenly *shen* 神 (spirit, psyche, a wondrous capacity residing in *qi* [成吾身者, 天之神也]). Hence, the original openness of the self is owed to Heaven; that is, this inner-outer unity in the senses is pre-given to us even before we open our—in this view narrow—minds to see it. This original insight turns into illusion when it is owed to our own artificial efforts of “exploring knowl-

edge by our bodies/selves” (因身發智), and would in turn be transformed into an illumination were we to dispel the mode of thinking that centers on the self.

Second, the *ideal* unity of the inner and outer is through the *heart-mind proper*. The primitive openness at first manifests itself in the senses, but never limits itself to this realm. Sight and hearing “unify” the inner and outer precisely as far as the respective senses are able to reach. “If one knows how to unify the inner and outer beyond the limits of the senses, one’s knowledge surpasses that of other people by far.” This is accomplished in a higher form of contemplative “knowing through wholeness (*cheng* 誠) and enlightenment (*ming* 明).” Zhang coined a new term—“*cheng ming suo zhi*” 誠明所知 (what is known through wholeness and enlightenment)—from a pair of terms in the pre-Qin classics—as, for example, in the *Zhongyong* (Doctrine of the mean)—using it to refer to an “original knowing through Heavenly virtue” (*tian de liangzhi* 天德良知), which cannot be reduced to “petty knowledge of the senses” (Zhang 1978, 6:20). In *On Broadening Heart-Mind* he states that the knowledge of the senses comes from their interaction with things, while “what is known through virtue” does not emerge from the senses. The defining characteristic of such a form of knowing is, negatively, not to fetter the heart-mind by the senses, and positively, to consider everything under Heaven as part of one’s own self, to the extent that there is nothing outside the heart-mind. In this way the ideal heart-mind identifies with the heart-mind of Heaven.

In the context of oneness, Zhang uses the term *he neiwai* 合內外 (unifying inner and outer), while seldom mentioning the term *yiti* 一體 (forming one body). Crucially, *ti* 體 (n. ‘body’ or v. ‘to embody,’ ‘to experience’) is also used as a verb in this context. It means embracing or experiencing something as forming part of the self/body; for example, at the beginning of *On Broadening Heart-mind* he says, “broaden the heart-mind, and you can experience (*ti*) all things under Heaven.” An ideally broad heart-mind will identify with the heart-mind of Heaven and Dao in this way, since the essence of Heavenly Dao is to embrace everything, including one’s own self, as part of the Dao.

Zhang suggests several, apparently original, ideas about oneness deserving of further development; his articulation thereof seems to be based on metaphysical considerations. It is perhaps not clear in what sense even a specific sight caught by the eyes may count as an inner-outer unification, or how one might manage to broaden the heart-mind, and in what sense it actually embraces myriad things under Heaven so as to form a body. Yet one thing is clear: he arrives at this point through the sharp contrast between the senses and the heart-mind, and his suggestion for leaping into oneness is by way of metaphysical contemplation.

2. Cheng Hao’s Letter on Calming Nature: *His View of Yiti and Critique of Zhang Zai*

The quintessence of Cheng’s philosophy lies in his idea of *yiti* (forming one body) or *yiben* (one root). His *On Understanding Ren* points out that “the ideally humane

person forms one body with all things without any differentiation” (仁者渾然與物同體). “Such a Way (Dao) is not opposed to anything” (此道與物無對), and “cannot be adequately described as broad” (大不足以名之). Two crucial aspects are not to be overlooked: first, Cheng’s rejection of using “broad” to describe Dao is actually a critique of Zhang’s way of broadening heart-mind (大其心); second, Cheng’s contention that Dao opposes nothing is yet another critique of Zhang in that the latter, in his teaching of the Dao and self-cultivation, opposes the way of peaceful contemplation to the external things to the extent that he would be caught in the problem of being disturbed by external things when seeking to attain inner peace. In this section, I argue for this interpretation through a close analysis of Cheng’s *Letter on Calming Nature*, because it is this reply to Zhang that clearly defines the boundary between his own and Zhang’s view of oneness and inner-outer unity. Due to its clearly argumentative and therapeutic manner, I propose to discuss this text before returning to *On Understanding Ren*.

2.1 Zhang’s Question in Letter on Calming Nature

This letter is an answer to Zhang’s question on how to calm (*ding* 定) one’s nature (*xing* 性), even when one is in action, that is, when dealing with things. This term, *dingxing* (‘to calm nature’), is borrowed from Zhang’s own terminology. According to a general Confucian tradition represented by the *Yueji* (On music), one’s nature is originally calm, but may be disturbed when one’s senses are interacting with external things. Zhu Xi suggests that in this context *dingxing* actually means *dingxin* 定心 (to calm the heart-mind) (Zhu Xi 1986, vol. 95, p. 2441). In Cheng’s general usage, *xing* refers to a source of ideal activity that a human being is endowed with. Cheng also identifies *xing* with *qi*, whose essence is the life-giving force (YS, vol. 1, p. 10).

Cheng quotes Zhang’s question that “in calming *xing* (nature), [the person who calms *xing*] cannot be without action [or at least intention to act], but then he is still burdened with [the disturbance of] external things” (定性未能不動，猶累於外物). My translation differs from those of Wing-tsit Chan and Alan Chan. The former reads: “nature in the state of calmness *cannot be without* activity and *must still suffer from* the influence of external things” (SB, p. 525; emphasis mine). Alan Chan translates this as: “In stilling one’s nature, one *cannot* render it unmoving, for it remains burdened by external things” (Alan Chan 2008, p. 190; emphasis mine). Both of them take *dong* 動 (activity, in action) to be a state of *xing*—that is, *xing* is *restless*—whereas I take *dong* to refer to the state of a person who is in action. Thus *wei neng bu dong* 未能不動 means the state of a *person* trying to calm his nature when he is *in action* (or at least when having intentions or thoughts). The former sense is negative ethically, while the latter is neutral. To further elaborate: Wing-tsit Chan and Alan Chan, as well as A. C. Graham (Graham 1958, p. 102), treat Zhang’s saying as a single statement negating the possibility of *dingxing* (‘to calm nature’ to attain its ideal unmoved state), due to disturbances on account of external things. Yet I take it to mean that Zhang thinks *dingxing* to be possible but difficult. Inner peace is easier to attain in contemplation, for instance by means of Zhang’s broadening of the heart-mind to embrace infinity; but departing from the beautiful vision of one-

ness, and in order to take action, one's attention has to be focused on particular things (cognitively), and even be carried away (affectively). It seems as if the previous insight collapses into trivial things, burdensome to Zhang—and that is why he consults Cheng.

Cheng's representation of Zhang's position may have misled modern readers. Cheng's rhetorical question—"in this way, does not the sage respond to things?" (是則聖人豈不應於物哉?) (emphasis mine)—seems to suggest that Zhang would have gone so far as to entirely avoid dealing with external things for the sake of inner peace.⁸ Yet such an extreme statement seems implausible, given the context; for in consulting Cheng about calming nature, Zhang simultaneously acknowledges the necessity of dealing with external things. It is noteworthy that, after describing the problem, he asks Cheng "how can one deal with it?"⁹ In his reply, Cheng is actually aiming at helping Zhang solve his problem—namely to find a method for preventing external things from hampering one's experience of ideal oneness even in action. He could not have treated Zhang as an ascetic monk, doing nothing but meditating all his life. This letter certainly merits closer attention, for by over-simplifying Zhang's position, Cheng's refutation may seem trivial in turn.

2.2 Cheng's First Thesis

This is the generally accepted reading of Cheng's first thesis, "所謂定者, 動亦定, 靜亦定, 無將迎, 無內外":

By calmness of nature we mean that one's nature is calm whether it is in a state of activity or in a state of tranquility [or rather, whether one is in action or not]. One does not lean forward or backward to accommodate things, nor does he make any distinction between the internal and external. (*Letter*, in *SB*, p. 525; my interpolation)

Most interpreters read this passage as stating Cheng's own idea in disagreement with Zhang's. By contrast, I would suggest that this is Cheng's statement of their common ground, which he then uses to argue against Zhang's diagnosis of the problem—for Zhang's diagnosis involves a conceptual framework of inner-outer contrast that contradicts Zhang's own verbal commitment. Three reasons might be adduced to support this reading. First, Cheng's great admiration for Zhang's *Western Inscription* (*Ximing* 西銘) shows that they already share a commitment—at least verbal—as to the unity of all things (*YS*, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 15, 39). Second, as shown in section 1 above, one may discern many expressions of inner-outer unity in Zhang's *Correcting Youthful Ignorance* (*Zhengmeng* 正蒙). Third, my reading makes the meaning of *dong* 動 (activities, in action) in the *Letter* consistent in either usage, that is, in Zhang's "wei neng bu dong" 未能不動 and in Cheng's "dong yi ding" 動亦定; accordingly, readers would not have to take Cheng to be simply shifting the meaning of terms in order to win a debate.

2.3 Cheng Hao's Reductio ad Absurdum

From the preceding discussion follows the insight into Cheng's construction of his argument:

If one considers external things as one's outer [i.e., forces from outside], pulling one's self to follow them, this is to think of one's own *xing* [nature] as having the inner and outer [i.e., my *xing* could be staying within or be pulled out]. (*Letter*; my translation and interpolation)

This contradicts Cheng's and Zhang's commitment to the unity of the inner and the outer. Zhang, in his metaphysical contemplation, does acknowledge the ideal inner-outer unity—that is, the ideal person sees nothing as outside the heart-mind. Still, in his diagnosis of the problem of external disturbances, he assumes this inner-outer framework. We may habitually compare minute intentional activities to motion, in order to render them comprehensible; but this might be misleading. The second move of this argument would be to reduce this picture to absurdity:

And if one believes that one's own *xing* follows things to the outer, then when it is in the outer, what is it inside? Such [Zhang's diagnosis of the problem of disturbance to inner peace, in terms of the inner and outer] is intended to get rid of external temptations, but [Zhang] fails to realize that *xing* does not have [an] inner and outer. (*Letter*; my translation and interpolations)

This means that the inner-outer distinction does not apply to *xing* (nature) or *xin* (heart-mind). To illustrate: Goethe said he lost his heart in Heidelberg, and Li Bai, a poet of the Tang dynasty, in bidding farewell to a friend, wrote, "wild winds blew my heart away." Everyday speech suggests that a heart may be preserved within, or lost without, or may move back and forth. This customary image obscures a profounder phenomenon—namely that one may lose oneself in something, for example in music, dancing, in Heidelberg, and so on. The crucial point is that in losing oneself one is totally absorbed in this experience to the extent that one does not even recognize one's being so—not to mention distinguishing that such and such is external to oneself, hence foreign. Even when indulging in things (however non-ideal this might be perceived in ethical terms), such inner-outer distinction is absent. It would be absurd to ask Goethe or Li Bai, "but what is it that is beating in your chest?" By the same token, Cheng reduces the inner-outer framework to such absurdity when asking, "but when the *xing* is dragged by the external things, what is it inside?"

With these two argumentative steps Cheng concludes his diagnosis of Zhang's problem: "If one considers the inner and outer as two (ultimately different) roots, how can one thus speak of calmness?" Due to his own framework, Zhang's problem would be almost insoluble, for it is analytically inevitable that we must always be subject to disturbances from the outside, when treating them as pertaining to another source or root of force foreign to our own *xing*. To clarify: if a fish could consider the flow of water an external force foreign to its body, it would always suffer from disturbances; but the fish is streamlined, and so its kinetic movement and water form a perfect whole, without the fish's noticing any difference between inner and outer. Even in human activities we can experience this movement of the whole; for example, a perfect partner in dancing the waltz would be good at feeling the harmonious movement of the unity formed by these two bodies, to the extent that one gives up

one's own balance with ease, precisely for the sake of the balance of the whole. By contrast, a less experienced dancer would feel "disturbed by the external" if one stiffly keeps his own stance, objectifying his dancing partner as a source of forces foreign to himself, trying to foresee this object's (i.e., the other's) movements in order to cope with them. As Cheng maintains in several passages, our original knowledge of the world is vague but genuine. The more we intend to grasp it, the more we lose it.¹⁰ This ideal non-objectifiable unity can also be found in our lives with friends, family, and the like. In this sense, I would term Cheng's notion of unity '*perceptive oneness*,' in contrast to Zhang's '*contemplative oneness*'—the former in the sense of not simply *viewing* it as one, but of *feeling* it as one.

Indeed, it is Zhang's contemplative stance that presupposes the subject-object bifurcation, which, in turn, calls for a *reunification* through broadening the heart-mind to represent the world as a whole. Cheng, in his *On Understanding Ren*, criticizes exactly this representative-reunifying approach. After describing Mencius' joy of oneness, he comments:

If one examines himself [oneself] and finds himself [oneself] not yet sincere, it means there is still an opposition between the two (the self and the non-self) [namely the self and the external world]. Even if one tries to identify [合, to join, to reunite] the self with the non-self, one still does not achieve unity. How can one have [the] joy [of oneness]? (SB, pp. 523–524; my interpolation)

Another piece of textual evidence also shows that Cheng rejects the idea of "reunification": as discernible in section 1, Zhang's approach is "*he tian xin*" 合天心, reuniting [the human heart-mind] with the Heavenly heart-mind (Zhang 1978, 7:24); Zhang states that the "reunification of Heaven and humans" (天人合一) is the ideal goal of Confucian self-cultivation, distinct from Buddhist nihilism (Zhang 1978, 17:65). In contrast, there is the saying of the Cheng brothers¹¹ that "Heaven and the human being are originally not divided; there is no need to say 'reunite'" (天人本無二, 不必言合) (unattributed, YS, vol. 6, p. 81).¹²

I would like to conclude Cheng's critique of Zhang's position by using his own analogy. Cheng compares Zhang's way of attaining oneness to the endeavor of getting rid of the reflection of things in the mirror, and turning to the back of the mirror in a search for its source of illumination (反鑒而索照)—that is, an all-embracing function of the mirror (just like Zhang's broad heart-mind), unlimited by particular things. Zhang fails to see that the mirror's illumination lies in reflecting everything in front of it—in every *here and now*. There is no light that comes from the mirror, in the same way that the heart-mind forms one body with the world by simply perceiving, and interacting with, the world. In a word, if one retreats from things in order to conceive the world as one, one might reflectively take it to be so, but when one deals with things, the vision of oneness would be dissolved by particular intentions and actions. By contrast, if one realizes that the genuine oneness is in every seeing and doing, just as the all-embracing nature of the mirror is in its reflection, one might arrive at Cheng's perceptive oneness.

2.4 Cheng's Perceptive Oneness: Emotions from a Non-first-person Standpoint in the Letter on Calming Nature

Cheng continues by comparing the all-embracing oneness of an ideal person to that of Heaven and Earth:

The constant principle of Heaven and Earth is that their mind is in all things, and yet they have no mind of their own. The constant principle of the sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation, and yet he has no feelings of his own. Therefore, for the training of the superior man [also translated as 'noble person,' or 'gentleman'] there is nothing better than to become broad [*kuoran* 廓然] and extremely impartial and to respond spontaneously to all things as they come. (*SB*, p. 525; my interpolations)

I agree with Wing-tsit Chan's translation of *wuxin* 無心 and *wuqing* 無情 as having no mind or feelings of one's own; more exactly, they mean having no extra intention, or feelings that involve the perspective of one's self.¹³ This non-first-person (or, perhaps, 'de-egocentric') perspective is, in the first place, meant to be therapeutic with a view to ethical problems. To take Cheng's own example: the emotion 'anger' is most easily aroused, but most difficult to restrain. As a result of anger, one tends to overreact—for instance, one shows anger when facing an insult, due to the resentment one feels toward the person who intends such humiliation; and, no matter whether or not one takes action, anger itself is—in this view—harmful to the one who so suffers from this anger. Cheng's therapy for such anger is the following: one immediately ignores or forgets one's anger for a while, taking the point of view of a mere bystander, looking at "the right and wrong of the matter according to principle" (*Letter*, in *SB*, p. 526), in order to then respond in a proper manner, and to an appropriate degree—that is, according to the approbation as would be given according to a third-person point of view. In this way one is detached from the fixation to the egocentric point of view, thereby reducing the influence of excessive anger amplified by resentment.¹⁴ In this way, one may simultaneously have emotions (that is, proper emotions) and not have emotions (that is, remaining detached and balanced in emotions by adopting a third-person point of view). Cheng also says: "treat things by things themselves, not by the self, and then there is no self [in mind]" (以物待物不以己待物則無我也) (*YS*, vol. 11, p. 125). A saying of the Cheng brothers compares irritations to the winds shaking the bamboo (*WS*, unattributed, vol. 7, p. 393). Although one may have anger, in responding to the irritations one does not hold onto any resentment.

Cheng's instance of anger aptly explains the above-quoted saying that the ideal person has no feelings of his own, but only feelings in accord with principle, and is impartial in "all things," the same as the heart-mind of Heaven. In the *Letter*, Cheng says:

The sage is joyous because according to the nature of things before him he should be joyous, and he is angry because according to the nature of things before him he should be angry. Thus the joy and anger of the sage do not depend on his own mind but on things. (*SB*, p. 526; my interpolations)

This amounts to saying that one is indeed capable of having emotions from a non-first-person standpoint (i.e., impartial, detached), while remaining sensitive to the things and the world in which one is involved at the same time. By implication, such would mean that the genuine emotions (perhaps 'emotions proper') are the (ethically) proper emotions, and to have *emotions proper* is, at the same time, to have no emotions (of one's own, *wuqing* 無情, namely to have nothing the common view would deem 'harmful passions'). This view, if tenable, would have a thought-provoking impact on ethics.

First, the traditional view—at least since Plato and Stoicism—is that the emotions, or more exactly the passions (*páthe*), cloud the rational part (*lógos*) of the soul in moral decisions, being like an ailment in moral and spiritual life.¹⁵ For Cheng, by contrast, emotions aid rational decision, being healthy per se, far from the notion that they are chaotic and irrational. In its ideal, authentic state, emotions are just the way one 'naturally' interacts with the world, without the burdens of disturbances and self-seeking behavior. What is more—as is shown in the following discussions of *On Understanding Ren*—emotions also keep one sensitive to the world, rendering ethically relevant facts salient.¹⁶

Second, the idea of emotions as impartial deserves further exploration. From a psycho-physiological standpoint, emotions are subjective responses to stimuli. With or without modification of one's conception of value, such responses are always from a particular person's point of view, determined by his or her psycho-physiological disposition. In spite of this, I would argue that Cheng's idea is tenable. For what is crucial here is that one can actually take another point of view to feel the world apart from one's first-person outlook. For instance, one may become indignant at other people's suffering from injustice—one tends to feel pain when one sees people injured by traffic accidents. Moreover, in a certain sense some emotions come into being only when one adopts another's point of view; for instance, some victims of catastrophe burst into tears only after they find comfort in the consolation of others, because their panic and pain may then transform into a certain kind of emotion (e.g., sorrow, gratitude, remorse).

Cheng's idea of impartial emotions is a new development in Confucian ethics, which from the outset emphasized that the human heart-mind could go beyond one's narrow self-concern and feel what others feel. In this sense, caring for others is as genuine and immediate as caring for oneself. Modern scholars also compare this view to the phenomena of empathy and sympathy.¹⁷ This idea had already appeared in Mencius' famous example suggesting that everyone would feel alarm and distress upon seeing an infant about to fall into a well. In such a case one does care about, and for, the infant simply from the infant's point of view—although it is also true that one's knowledge of danger is drawn from one's own experience.

The teaching of both Zhang and Cheng is in line with this thought of seeing or feeling that all things in the world are part of the self.¹⁸ The critical point of difference is that whereas Zhang stresses that it *should be considered* so, Cheng points out that it *is* so, that everyone already *feels* this way. As Cheng's follower Wang Yangming puts

it: the phenomenon of *yiti* (forming one body) exists, available to everyone (no matter how good or bad a person's individual ethical quality may be)—“Not that I opine or surmise it so” (非意之也).¹⁹ The additional conceptions only block this original insight of *one body* (*yiti* 一體), especially when one confines the self to what pertains to one's own *physical body* (形骸).

2.5 To Perceive the World as One: Cheng Hao's On Understanding Ren Revisited

As has been shown, in the *Letter*, Zhang's problem of calming nature (*dingxing*) lies in his own inner-outer dichotomy, against which Cheng argues by *reductio ad absurdum*, inviting Zhang to see that the heart-mind of a human being could have impartial and detached emotion *proper*, and so perceive things just as the heart-mind of Heaven would. Such a perceptive capacity of oneness is Cheng's *ren* 仁 (humaneness/humanity). One may even conjecture that Cheng thinks that Zhang's problem boils down to a failure to understand *ren*, for the Cheng brothers state that the reason why one does not manage to calm (*ding* 定) the heart-mind is mostly due to one's not being *ren* 仁 (humane) (大率把捉不定皆是不仁) (unattributed, *WS*, vol. 1, p. 352). With this clue, one may consider Cheng's *On Understanding Ren* as a more direct and descriptive version of oneness developed from the notions implied in the *Letter*.

This passage suggests that learners should first of all understand the nature of *ren*, all other virtues being expressions of *ren*. The nature of *ren* is such that “the man of *ren* forms one body with all things without any differentiation” (*SB*, p. 523). To understand *ren*, and to perceive it with sincerity and wholeness, is set forth as the way (Dao) of cultivation. Cheng states that such a way “is not opposed to things,” which, I would argue, is intended to refute Zhang's opposing of externally disturbing things to the inner peace of contemplative oneness.²⁰ Then Cheng says, “it is not sufficient to name such a Way as broad” (*da* 大), thereby arguably targeting Zhang's notion of ‘broadening’ the heart-mind. Another reason why *On Understanding Ren* could be considered as Cheng's critique of Zhang is that this passage is indeed recorded by Lü Dalin, Zhang's disciple (*YS*, vol. 2, part 1, p. 13). According to *Song-Yuan xue'an*, Lü learns from Zhang the way of “guarding [against disturbances] and seeking [principle],” Cheng thus imparted to him a natural way of cultivating *ren* that dispenses with such strenuous efforts (c.f., Huang, Huang, and Quan 1992, vol. 4, p. 375).

What is it like to be *ren* in this way? Crucially, the term *ren* is also used in Chinese medicine. A body is considered not *ren* (sensitive) when it cannot feel its limbs. Cheng suggests that, in the same way, we consider a person ‘not *ren*’ (不仁, not humane/sensitive) when he is insensitive and uncaring regarding others (*YS*, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 15, 33–34; vol. 4, p. 74).

In *On Understanding Ren*, Cheng quotes Mencius' famous “all things are already complete in oneself,” and claims that “all the operations (*yong* 用) between Heaven and Earth are our operations”—with *yong* meaning ‘to function for.’ For this usage of the term *yong*, we find textual evidence in Cheng Yi, who states: “Winds and thunder, et cetera are functions for Heaven and Earth, just like ears, eyes, and the limbs are functions for the human beings. They are the function of the human beings” (*YS*, vol. 18,

p. 222). An unattributed saying describes the ultimate *ren* as Heaven and Earth forming *one* body—with the innumerable things between them forming parts of this body (YS, vol. 4, p. 74). The foregoing section has argued that Cheng Hao thinks one may have emotions or heart-mind from a non-first-person standpoint. Based on all these ideas, Cheng Hao states that everything is part of oneself, to the extent that one's own physical body is part of the entire body of oneness, and equally among other functioning beings.²¹ One may fail to see the unity of all things as a result of considering everything from one's own, narrow, ego-centric point of view, deeming only one's physical body as one's body (將自家軀殼上頭起意) (YS, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 33–34).

In Cheng's *Letter*, his final diagnosis of the ethical problem is "ego-centricity and a calculating mind" (自私而用智). I submit that here *zisi* 自私²² (ego-centricity) does not merely mean selfishness; more profoundly, what it suggests literally is to be centered on the private ego as contrasted with the external whole.²³ After all, a learner of virtue might be against selfishness, but still unable to rid himself of the mode of thinking solely from the standpoint of his self, as contrasted with that of others. The *Letter* seems to convey that Cheng may be thinking that Zhang is in this position. The ego-centric point of view separates the self and the world, evaporates their original affective connections, and reduces one's interaction with the world to a mode of cognitive correspondence; that is, in every action one must cope with external things according to their principles. The cognitive act of representing the principles precedes the affective act. This, in turn, burdens the agent with the disturbance from external things and with the trouble of seeking solutions. Cheng's approach is to step back from this trap of ego-centricity, and to preserve one's tacit and genuine connection with the world. As Cheng puts it, in Mencius' terms: "for our innate knowledge of good [*liangzhi* 良知] and innate ability to do good [*liangneng* 良能] are originally not lost" (*On Understanding Ren, in SB*, p. 524; my interpolation). One may attain this knowledge if one attentively observes the things near at hand, preserving this attitude toward all things constantly. The nature of this original knowledge is not correspondence; rather, it is a joyful unity with the world. If Zhang's model of ethical knowledge could be labeled the '*correspondence model*,' then Cheng's model might be termed (using his own words) the "*one-root model*."

It is difficult to articulate this original knowledge and joyful unity any further, since Cheng provides no more clarification or examples in his *On Understanding Ren*. He uses Mencius's example that all infants love their parents and respect their elder brothers, such being their innate knowledge and capacity. Based on the analysis made above, one may discern that the oneness of human interconnection manifests itself in the affective acts of an infant, even before the infant develops its cognitive capacity of representation. Mencius's notion of family life is characterized by this joyous union of human relationship. A passage from Max Scheler may be of service here: "When the mother wakens at the slightest sound from her child (but not in response to much stronger stimuli from other sources), the stimulus does not merely evoke the image of an utterance from the child which then has to be understood" (Scheler 1954, p. 28). The mother does not treat the sound from the child as a signal whose significance for action is yet to be determined (i.e., first of all to represent the

situation, to check whether it is ethically relevant, and then to assess its value, eventually motivating herself to act); rather, the interconnection of the mother and the child immediately moves the mother to action. From these cases, we may see that the original knowledge is immediately given, prior to any cognitive act. The oneness manifested in this genuine knowing cannot be comprehended in Zhang's mode of correspondence and contemplation.

From this joyful union of human relationships and beyond, we may conclude that the Confucian form of "feeling of oneness" (*Einsfühlung*) is not what Max Scheler describes as the Indian Buddhists' *Einsleidung* ('suffering together'); rather, it is closer to the Ancient Greek *Mitfreuung* ('enjoying together') (Scheler 1954, p. 89; German edition, p. 99)—and yet, a more peaceful than a tumultuous joy.

Conclusion

After this textual analysis, it will be fruitful briefly to evaluate Zhang's contemplative oneness and Cheng's perceptive oneness. In order to achieve this goal, one will have to contextualize their thoughts by displaying their intellectual background, so grasping what challenge they may be trying to answer. Both Zhang's and Cheng's thoughts are meant to justify the Confucian way of life and its virtues in the engagement of social relationships, against the challenges of Buddhism—considered ethical nihilism by Confucians. One may discern strong expressions of such an intellectual need in Zhang's claim that the ineffable unity is ultimately the great void or *qi*, and that there is no nothingness (Zhang 1978, 1:8), as well as in the Cheng brothers' comment that Buddhists are ego-centric in their caring only about the inner self, while escaping from secular human relationships (YS, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 24, 30). In this sense, we might categorize Cheng's and Zhang's general position as a form of ethical realism. By realism I do not mean that they see values as entities or qualities one might find in the objective world, but rather that they hold that one may find within the realms of human relationship sufficient moral reasons for normative claims.

Such a realistic claim relies on what they consider a more authentic view of the self and the world. Both Zhang and Cheng point out that it is oneness, the 'forming-one-body' with Heaven, Earth, and myriads of things. However, despite their formal commitment to this position, they differ substantially on how to approach this phenomenon. Zhang's metaphysical contemplation may seem to provide a blissful vision of oneness; but when it comes to interacting with things, this vision appears to be lost. The tension lies in his inconsistency: on the one hand, through broadening the heart-mind in contemplation, he views the world as one, as a unity of the inner and the outer; on the other hand, in dealing with things, he considers them to be external disturbances, so passing the puzzle of "how to calm the inner nature" to Cheng. In replying, the latter points out that the inner and the outer are not two roots, or sources, of forces, but pertain to the same unity of nature. His idea of impartial feelings, as proposed in the *Letter*, enables him to display a unity that is concretely perceived, which I would term 'perceptive oneness,' in contrast to Zhang's 'contemplative oneness.'

It must be pointed out that this ethics of oneness should be strictly defined as therapeutic—that is, that it only provides a way to correct a certain, in this view, misguided outlook on moral life, which hampers one from acting properly. It does not provide a radical version of ethical realism, deriving ethical norms (or even particular ethical rules) directly from the order of the universe, such as is derived, objectified, and represented from a certain ‘scientific’ point of view. It also differs greatly from those forms of collectivism that argue for the priority of the whole over the individual. Such an approach is in direct opposition to Cheng’s non-objectifiable experience of unity, wherefore I here submit that Cheng’s idea could be considered a moderate version of ethical realism. Cheng states: “although I have learned some of my doctrines from others, the *tianli* (principle of Heaven), however, is what I realized in my own experience” (*WS*, vol. 12, p. 424). As one of the founders of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, Cheng himself claims that his original insight is precisely the *first-person experience* of the principle of Heaven, whose content is oneness.²⁴

Notes

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Abbreviations are used in the Notes as follows:

SB *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. See Wing-tsit Chan 1963 below.

WS *Henan Cheng Shi waishu* 河南程氏外書. See Cheng and Cheng 1981 below.

YS *Henan Cheng Shi yishu* 河南程氏遺書. See Cheng and Cheng 1981 below.

- 1 – A. C. Graham translates *yiti* 一體 as “one undivided substance” (Graham 1958, p. 100), or “one ‘body’ or ‘substance’ (*t’i*)” (p. 98). While *ti* 體 in the Song period is already a philosophical term, and is often translated as “substance,” I use “body” rather than “substance,” in order to emphasize that it is perceptual rather than merely conceptual. By the term *ti* 體 Cheng Hao seems to mean a unity in which one feels other things as undivided from oneself (to use his example: just as a healthy body feels the limbs as parts of it; see section 2.5 herein).
- 2 – For instance, ethical collectivism or theoretical metaphysics concerning the unity of all things from a purely objective standpoint.

- 3 – I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for his/her comment and for alerting me to the need for further clarification of my own position.
- 4 – Zhu Xi states that Cheng Hao wrote the *Letter on Calming Nature* at the age of twenty-two or twenty-three (Zhu Xi 1986, 93 : 2359). This would make it earlier than Zhang Zai's mature work *Correcting Youthful Ignorance* (*Zhengmeng* 正蒙) (Zhang 1978). It could be argued whether or not it is proper to use Zhang's later work as a background for Cheng's early essay. This seems reasonable. First, before their exchanges of ideas, Zhang had formed his own position apart from Cheng's—as Cheng states in the *Letter*, Zhang has considered this issue thoroughly, or, rather, has “ardently pondered” it (Chan 1963, p. 525). Second, in the *Zhengmeng* (Zhang 1978) his position is also different from that of Cheng's. As is shown below, the view in the *Zhengmeng* explains why Cheng would criticize him in the *Letter*. It is more reasonable to assume that both in Zhang's own later work and in his early discussion with Cheng, Zhang's position is consistent, since there is no sufficient evidence to doubt that Zhang changed his mind after reading Cheng's *Letter*.
- 5 – In his own terms: “*xing* [‘nature’] penetrates to the outer part of *qi*, and *ming* [‘determination,’ ‘fate’] prevails in the inner part of *qi*” (性通乎氣之外命行乎氣之內) (Zhang 1978, chap. 6, p. 21).
- 6 – *Da xin pian* 大心篇, in Zhang 1978, 7:24–26; the following quotations are all from the same chapter and pages, unless otherwise indicated.
- 7 – In the early Zhou period, Tian 天 (Heaven) was believed to have control over the natural world and human affairs; it was considered just, and loving the people. In the middle Zhou, however—mainly due to natural disasters and political disorder—widespread dissatisfaction led to criticism of this conception of Tian (as recorded in the *Book of Odes*). Later, the role of Tian as sovereign over the natural and political realms was further cast in doubt, and diminished in importance in some schools of the pre-Qin period, with the result being a more naturalistic view of Tian. In this latter sense, Tian could be loosely translated as ‘Nature.’ In the Song period, Tian maintains its ultimately ideal and transcendent dimension, while it is generally not considered as having the will to interfere with natural phenomena or human activities. No matter whether it is related to *li* (principle) or to *qi* (life-giving force), Tian accounts for the coming into being of things, but without any sense of creation or intentional action.
- 8 – For Zhu Xi's interpretation, see Zhu Xi 1986, 95 : 2442.
- 9 – Two words that suggest this question mark, 何如 and 何也, do not appear in the *Er Cheng wenji*, but they do appear in *Reflections on Things near at Hand*, the *Er Cheng cuiyan*, and the *Song-Yuan xue'an* (Records of doctrines in the Song-Yuan) (Huang, Huang, and Quan 1992, vol. 3, p. 661).
- 10 – This is a conclusion Cheng draws from his own experience. An anecdote relates that “once when Ming-tao [Cheng Hao] was sitting unoccupied in a granary at

Ch'ang-an, he looked at the pillars in the long corridor and counted them in his head. Still not quite certain [已尚不疑 means 'then he did not yet suspect'], he counted them a second time and the results did not agree. He was reduced to getting someone to count them calling the numbers aloud one by one. Then it turned out that he had counted them correctly the first time; and he realized that the more one exerts the mind to grasp something, the more uncertain is its hold" (YS, vol. 2, part. 1, p. 46; translation from Graham 1958, p. 104, with my interpolation).

- 11 – Many sayings of the Cheng brothers—Cheng Hao and his younger brother Cheng Yi—were documented without attribution to either thinker. In the present article, when I quote sayings from these sources I add “unattributed” before the passage and page numbers. These quotations are either generally believed to be attributable to Cheng Hao, or to be commonly shared by the two brothers.
- 12 – Tang Junyi points out that Cheng rejects Zhang’s inner-outer reunification, giving self-cultivation another starting point—namely to forget or not to keep in mind the inner-outer boundary (Tang 1984, p. 133).
- 13 – *Youxin* (有心) and *wuxin* (無心), as with or without intention, appear frequently in Chinese texts. For example, Cheng Yi speaks of 有心 and 無心 in the context of suspecting whether others have the intention of harming themselves (YS, vol. 25, p. 326). Cheng Yi talks about “having no extra intention besides the things themselves” (事外無心), and “letting each thing be thing itself for itself” (物各付物), as a way of getting rid of disturbances when one takes on the “burden” of dealing with many things (YS, vol. 19, pp. 263–264). Cheng Yi also corrects the misleading view of 無心 as having no heart-mind or intentions whatsoever, pointing out that 無心 means merely “to have no heart-mind from the ego-centric point of view” (無私心) (WS, vol. 12, p. 440).
- 14 – For an elaboration of Cheng’s example, see Kwong-loi Shun’s *On Anger: an Experimental Essay in Confucian Moral Psychology*. In his discussion he makes use of Zhu Xi’s commentary that Yanhui’s anger is in things rather than in the self. Zhu’s idea is borrowed from Cheng Hao’s *Letter on Calming Nature*.
- 15 – My summary deals only with the sources of ideas that later became the dominant mindset. The thoughts of both Plato and Stoicism on passions are, of course, much richer than what may be presented here. Plato’s treatment of the passions varies from case to case. Here I refer to the cases in the *Republic* where Plato contrasts the rational part of the soul to the irrational passions in general. However, his conceptions of some specific emotions such as *thymos* (courage/spirit) and *eros* (erotic love) and their relation to rationality or wisdom are much more complicated. Very basically and *cum grano salis*, one might say that Stoicism deems the passions an “ailment,” while also holding that it is the interpretation of emotions that renders them problematic, thereby justifying also the need for philosophical argument as a therapeutic method in order to

correct wrong views and restore intellectual “health.” For the therapeutic view of philosophy, see Nussbaum 1996.

- 16 – David Wong argued for a similar point in his interpretation of Mencius (Wong 1991, p. 32).
- 17 – See especially Slote 1991 and Darwall 1998.
- 18 – Zhang also thinks of non-self (無我), or non-self-centered, as a way of broadening the heart-mind (Zhang 1978, 4:17–18).
- 19 – Wang Yangming, *Daxue wen* (Inquiries concerning the Book of Great Learning), in Wang 1992, p. 968.
- 20 – I disagree with A. C. Graham, who translates 此道與物無對 as “this way is not the opposite of anything,” and adds that “while things are all *Yin* or *Yang*, the Way is not relative to anything but absolute” (Graham 1958, p. 100). His interpretation is probably based on Cheng Hao’s saying that all things have opposites; for example, *yin* is opposite to *yang* (YS, vol. 11, p. 123). However, since in this saying he does not mention Dao, while no evidence shows that Cheng means a metaphysical concept by referring to Dao in *On Understanding Ren*, I would argue that one might more fruitfully compare it with the intellectual background, that is, Zhang’s approach to self-cultivation.
- 21 – Arguably, Zhang Zai also realizes this point when he suggests to “experience the body by the Way of Heaven” (以天體身), because the basis of the Way lies in experiencing things and the body [equally]” (體物體身道之本也) (Zhang 1978, 7:25).
- 22 – *Zi* 自 (self) combined with a verb means that the subject and object are identical. In ancient texts this combination was used mostly as a verb phrase (e.g., 自欺, to deceive oneself; 自省, to examine oneself; 自訟, to reproach oneself). Later, it could be used as a noun (e.g., 自尊, self-respect) or an adjective (e.g., 自信, self-confident). *Si* 私 can be used as an adjective (private), an adverb (privately, secretly), a noun (private life or less discernable acts or thoughts), or a verb (e.g., to own something, keep it private and exclude others). *Zisi* 自私 is used by Cheng in parallel with *yongzhi* 用智 (to make petty use of wits), which suggests that it is a verb phrase. It means to give excessive attention to the self, while neglecting others. Although, in most cases, *si* 私 (private) is ethically neutral, *zisi* 自私 has the connotation of selfishness, which might have been derived from the structure of the phrase, since it suggests focusing on an isolated private realm of the self, while disregarding others.
- 23 – A similar distinction between selfishness and self-centeredness is made in Philip J. Ivanhoe’s essay “Senses and Values of Oneness” (Ivanhoe 2010, p. 22), as well as in David W. Tien’s interpretation of Wang Yangming’s view of *siyu* 私欲 and oneness. Tien found this distinction in the religious writings of C. S. Lewis (Tien 2012, p. 55), while I refer to Scheler’s discussion of selfishness and

ego-centricity (mentioned in the introduction); as a result, I maintain the term 'ego-centric,' rather than 'self-centered,' for the sake of consistency.

- 24 – The essence of principle or way is *ren* 仁 (humaneness/humanity), whose content is *yiti* (one-body). I agree with Graham that in *On Understanding Ren*, “this principle” or “this way” is evidently interchangeable with *ren* (Graham 1958, p. 100).

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