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
## Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā on the Meaning of Metaphysics

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# HEIDEGGER AND MULLĀ ṢADRĀ ON THE MEANING OF METAPHYSICS



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## *Introduction*

The aim of the present study is to analyze the general outlook of Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā with regard to the meaning of metaphysics, occupying as it does a central position in their respective philosophies. It should first be made clear that “metaphysics” refers to First Philosophy or the *scientia divina* (*al-ḥikma al-ilāhiyya*) in the philosophical system of Ṣadrā.<sup>1</sup> The English word “metaphysics” can be traced back to its etymological source in the Greek plural noun-phrase *ta meta ta phusika* (that which is beyond nature), which became *metaphysica* in Medieval Latin. The word was used both as a title for Aristotle’s seminal work *Metaphysics* and as the name of the “science” that was its subject matter. The term for metaphysics in every modern European language (French: *la métaphysique*; German: *Die Metaphysik*; Spanish: *la metafísica*) is an adaptation of the Latin word to the orthographic and phonetic requirements of that language.<sup>2</sup> Although in the Arabic tradition the word metaphysics is rendered *mā ba’dā al-ṭabī’a* (that which is beyond/after nature), in reality it means “the science of divine affairs.” However, unlike Arabic, the European words (including English) derived from *metaphysica* are free from any such internal indications of their meaning. What is important to note in all this is that both Heidegger and Ṣadrā inherited the common historical meaning of the word “metaphysics” as it had been developed in the Aristotelian tradition. Second, the meaning of metaphysics can be understood in the sense of its subject matter, method, issues and important questions, and goals, all of which ultimately determine the general outlook of any given philosophical system.

## *Basic Starting Points*

Any comparative study must first begin by delineating the problems that confront its subject of inquiry. As the present article investigates two philosophical systems that are significantly different from each other in terms of their historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts, it is necessary to lay bare the basic starting points from which the investigation will be carried out. Thus, I will first list some of the key reasons explaining why a comparative treatment of Heidegger and Ṣadrā’s metaphysics is possible/meaningful.

1. Both of our philosophers share a common received history of philosophy, namely the Greco-Islamic tradition stretching from the Presocratics and extending

to the great medieval philosophers, such as Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198). (In Heidegger's case, he received the Islamic tradition of philosophy primarily through the Christian scholastics with whom he was so familiar.) Thus, the historical starting point of both of these thinkers seems to be common, although one should accordingly keep in mind the differences in their conceptions of philosophy and the history of metaphysics.

2. Both Heidegger and Ṣadrā deemed it necessary to make "being" the central issue of their philosophy, and each of their respective philosophies is recognized as "existential philosophy."<sup>3</sup> Both endeavored to delve into the "meaning" of being, and also used it as a hermeneutic device to account for almost all other key philosophical concepts, such as reality, time, temporality, human being, being-in-the-world, and so on. Furthermore, as Heidegger claimed to restore the meaning of being, which, according to him had been forgotten since the time of Plato, Mullā Ṣadrā, too, is said to have revolutionized the notion of being (*wujūd*), as he broke free of the dominant Avicennan existent-centered (*mawjūd* instead of *wujūd*) metaphysics and the long-standing substance-based metaphysics of Aristotelianism.<sup>4</sup> Mullā Ṣadrā went as far as to argue that if one remains ignorant of "being," one will remain ignorant of all other fundamental sciences, and that an understanding of being is foundational to all categories of cognition (Ṣadrā 1984, *al-Mashā'ir*, pp. 4–5).

3. As with Heidegger, Ṣadrā's approach to the problem of being is also "phenomenological,"<sup>5</sup> seeking as it does to overcome simple binaries between subject and object.<sup>6</sup>

4. Heidegger and Ṣadrā both stand at the end of two distinct philosophical traditions,<sup>7</sup> and so where they go with the question of being has everything to do with how they inherited their traditions.

Now I will highlight some of the fundamental differences in the approaches of both Heidegger and Ṣadrā in the domain of metaphysics, thereby problematizing these "comparative" points listed above. (We will delve into the details of these and related points later in this article.)

1. Even though both Heidegger and Ṣadrā make "being" their fundamental project, their analyses of being lead them to arrive at conclusions that are substantially different from one another. Thus, in the case of Heidegger, an understanding of being leads one toward the notion of "being-toward-death," while in the case of Ṣadrā it leads one toward "being-toward-beyond-death."

2. The concept of the "primacy of being" or *aṣālat al-wujūd* in the philosophy of Ṣadrā requires one to accept the premises of the "self-evident nature" (*badīhiyya*), "univocality" (*ishtarāk ma'nawī*), and "universality" (*kulliyya*) of "being" in the first place (Ṣadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 1:35–39, 1:119). However, Heidegger rejects all of these key premises of being (*wujūd*) and regards them as the historical "prejudices regarding being" to which philosophers have slavishly clung (Heidegger 1993, p. 42).

3. Heidegger does not accept the principle of "multiple worlds" extending beyond the physical realm, whereas for Ṣadrā the hierarchy of multiple worlds, namely

the physical, the imaginal (*'ālam al-mithāl*), and the Divine, is a basic feature of his cosmology.

4. The concept of “infinity” bears no particular philosophical significance for Heidegger, while the being of the Absolute as the “Infinite by virtue of [Its own] infinity” (*mā lā yatanāhī bimā lā yatanāhī*) is an essential aspect of Ṣadrā’s thought (Ṣadrā 2003, *al-Shawāhid*, p. 135).

5. Ṣadrā’s philosophy regards concepts such as “soul,” “intellect,” and the interior levels of the human self as possessing gradational realities, while in Heidegger’s project of existentialist philosophy, such points of view carry no significance (Ṣadrā 2003, *al-Shawāhid*, pp. 299 ff.). With these points in mind, it is important to emphasize that the purpose of this study is not to suggest that any comparison of Heidegger and Ṣadrā would be futile. Rather, the goal here is to clarify the general outlook of these two philosophers concerning the meaning of metaphysics. Taking into account the fundamental differences that exist between the Heideggerian and Ṣadrāian notion of metaphysics, the way will then be paved for future fruitful comparative explorations of their respective philosophies.

#### *A Note on Problems in Previous Scholarship*

Some scholars (e.g., see Açıkgenç 1993, Munfarid 2005, and Kamal 2006) have endeavored to prove that there exists a great deal of similarity between the philosophies of Heidegger and Ṣadrā. Muhammad Kamal, for example, attempts to show how the doctrine of the “primacy of being” (*aṣālat al-wujūd*)<sup>8</sup> in Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy (*al-ḥikma al-muta’āliya*) bears close resemblance to the concept of *Dasein* in Heidegger’s philosophy (Kamal 2006, pp. 42–49).

Now if the meaning of being implies different things for both Heidegger and Ṣadrā, then we may justifiably ask how useful an exercise it would be to study their ontologies alongside one another. In Ṣadrā’s philosophy, the “primacy” (*aṣālat*) of being (*wujūd*) stands in contrast to the primacy of quiddity (*aṣālat al-māhiyya*) or the perspectival standpoint of being (*ītibāriyyat alwujūd*), whereas in Heidegger’s philosophy “being” is not situated over and against “quiddity” as such, since he is not concerned with the traditional “existence-essence” distinction that is so characteristic of medieval philosophy from Avicenna onwards. In accordance with his position that says that “being is given as a gift to man,” Heidegger’s starting point is the existential condition of modern humanity.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, although Açıkgenç 1993 is insightful in many regards, it too suffers from artificial comparisons of categories that imply different things in different contexts. A case in point is the comparison of “the modalities of being” in both Ṣadrā and Heidegger (Açıkgenç 1993, pp. 81 ff.), which requires an altogether different “methodology” if it is to be compared at all, since the context of this concept is markedly different in each case.

The failure to make such basic distinctions so essential to a proper comparative study of both Heidegger and Ṣadrā seems to be the norm rather than the exception. A most pertinent example in this regard is an article by Muḥammad Asadī, one of Iran’s most prominent Heidegger scholars. Since Heidegger has gained much

prominence in contemporary Iran, it would be appropriate to bring in an Iranian perspective on his philosophy. In Asadī's investigation (2008), he attempts to tackle a problem akin to that of the subject matter of the present article. However, Asadī relies almost exclusively on one specific Heideggerian treatise, namely his *Letter on Humanism*. The particular background to this short text aside,<sup>10</sup> Heidegger of course dedicated a number of key works to the problem of metaphysics, such as *Was Ist Metaphysik*; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Einsamkeit-Endlichkeit-Welt*; *Einführung in die Metaphysik*; and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Thus, Asadī does not portray an accurate picture of Heidegger's understanding of the meaning of metaphysics, particularly his treatment of the central question of "why there are beings rather than nothing." Asadī would also have to account for Heidegger's evaluation of traditional Western metaphysics, as his treatment of being in particular is formulated in response to his critical perspective on the "history of being" from Plato until his own time. Moreover, Heidegger scholars normally distinguish between the "earlier" Heidegger and the "later" Heidegger.<sup>11</sup> However, this, too, is absent from Asadī's study. Additionally, although his study contains some useful points concerning the notion of "ontotheology"<sup>12</sup> in Heidegger, other key features of his thought, such as the "oblivion" of being, the meaning of being, and the significance of the problem of "nothingness," are passed over in silence.

A final point is in order here. One of the key differences that previous scholars have failed to take into account is the fact that Heidegger's ontology is fundamentally critical of, and therefore unconcerned with, any God-like notion entering into the discussion of metaphysics. That is to say, Heidegger maintains that if one has faith in a "religion" or in "God," she will be unable to partake in concrete metaphysical discussions. Since metaphysics for Heidegger begins with the question of "why are there beings rather than nothing" or "why is there anything at all rather than nothing," a commitment to belief in a deity would preclude the possibility that these questions be authentically probed without relinquishing one's theological beliefs (Heidegger 2000, pp. 7–8). For this reason Heidegger says that Christian philosophy is a "square circle." This kind of assessment, which actually colors all of Heidegger's incomplete and hence misinformed reading of the history of medieval philosophy (for which, see below), would clearly also apply to someone like Ṣadrā.<sup>13</sup>

### *The Subject Matter of Metaphysics and its Justification*

Heidegger approaches the subject matter of metaphysics from different angles that complement one another. In his view, metaphysical inquiry must represent a holistic point of view and should be based on the intrinsic standpoint of the existent/being that questions. He regards such an inquiry to be inseparable from the individual who questions, and hence his saying, "we are questioning, here and now, for ourselves" (Heidegger 1993, pp. 239–241). In the previous section it was pointed out that for Heidegger metaphysical inquiry originates from the existential condition of modern humans, and with this statement he is elaborating on the same issue. It is important to note that when Heidegger mentions "for ourselves" he implies our "ego," whereas

a theocentric philosopher like Ṣadrā would supplant the notion of the ego with a universal reality (*ḥaqīqa kulliyya*) of the self, which has its root at the very center of the divine reality (Ṣadrā 2007, *Īqāz*, pp. 29–31). At any rate, Heidegger conceives of the subject matter and queries of metaphysics in multifarious ways:

Metaphysics is a questioning in which we inquire into beings as a whole, and inquire in such a way that in so doing we ourselves, the questioners, are thereby also included in the question, placed into question. (Heidegger 1995, p. 9).

Metaphysics is comprehensive questioning. The questions: what is world, finitude, and individuation constitute such comprehensive questioning. (Heidegger 1995, p. 24).

Metaphysics-metaphysical knowledge is a comprehensive questioning in this twofold sense: [1] that beings as a whole are in each case conceptually included in every metaphysical question; and [2] that whoever is involved in metaphysical questioning is in each case caught up in the question as well, and is fundamentally affected by the act of questioning and the object of questioning. (Heidegger 1995, p. 50)

In the account above it can be seen that Heidegger accepts “*being qua being*” (that is, “being as a whole”), which is the traditional Aristotelian subject matter of metaphysics, as the fundamental concern of metaphysics. However, what is new in his definition of the subject matter of metaphysics is that (1) the questioner, who intends to investigate the nature of being *qua* being, is always caught up in her own “act of questioning,” whereas in ancient philosophy it is not clear how the one who is questioning metaphysically is herself put into the question by this act of questioning (and it is precisely this point that gives Heidegger and his readers the possibility of understanding what is new in modern metaphysics in terms of its metaphysical content), and (2) the focal concerns of metaphysics are world, finitude, and solitude, which will be discussed at length in the section below on the three fundamental prejudices regarding being.

It may be noted here in passing that another great philosopher, Avicenna, defines metaphysics as the science that deals with the most general of all things, that is, with being itself. For him, the goal of metaphysics is to analyze the principles that govern “beings as such,” and through this analysis the philosopher is led to the existence of the first principle (*al-aṣl al-awwal*) and its relation to possible beings (*mumkin al-wujūd*) (Avicenna [Ibn Sīnā] 2005, *al-Shifāʾ*, pp. 10–12). In addition, Heidegger reasons that an inquiry concerning “nothing” in itself brings us face to face with metaphysics. Thus, it is not surprising that in his book *What Is Metaphysics* he devotes long chapters to the problem of “nothing,” and at the end of the book invites his readers to cogitate on the question “why are there beings at all instead of nothing.” He concludes that *an inquiry concerning the issue of nothing eventually leads us to the problem of being*. To wit, there is a subtle link between the issue of nothing and the fundamental question of metaphysics, “why are there beings at all instead of nothing.”

On the other hand, for Ṣadrā metaphysics encompasses metaphysics in both its general sense (*ilāhiyāt bi-l-maʿnā al-aʿamm*) and its specific sense (*ilāhiyāt bi-l-maʿnā*

*al-akhāṣṣ*). Before we proceed to analyze the philosophical justification of the subject matter of metaphysics in Ṣadrā, it should be kept in mind that the definition of metaphysics in Islamic philosophy has been adapted from Aristotle's manifold formulations of it.<sup>14</sup> It is known that the subject matter of every science is determined by the essential (intrinsic) accidents (*al-'awāriḍ al-dhātī*) of that very science, which are predicated of the subject directly and without any intermediary (Ṣadrā 2003, pp. 141–142). Considered thus, topics including the primacy of being, modulation in the loci of manifestation of being (*tashkīk fī maẓāhir al-wujūd*),<sup>15</sup> the modulated unicity of the reality of being (*waḥdat tashkīk ḥaqīqat al-wujūd*), necessity and possibility (*wujūd wa imkān*), unity and multiplicity (*waḥda wa kathra*), temporality and eternity (*ḥudūth wa qidam*), *materia* and the disengaged from matter (*mujarrad wa mādda*), cause and effect, potentiality and actuality, and so forth all can be considered essential (intrinsic) accidents of *wujūd*. Now the question that ensues from this is that if the philosophy of Heidegger, too, rests on being and the fact that he is well acquainted with peripatetic philosophy, then why are the essential accidents of being that have just been delineated above not discussed at all in his philosophy? The only answer that can be given to such a question is that although Heidegger discusses being, his *goals* and *methods* are a world apart from those of the peripatetic philosophers.

The subject matter of metaphysics, according to Ṣadrā, is the reality of being or the existent (*ḥaqīqat al-wujūd aw mawjūd*) (Ṣadrā 2003, *al-Shawāhid*, p. 145). The concept of the existent (*mawjūd*), which is taken to be the subject matter of metaphysics, and other concepts (as mentioned above) that are predicated of it as its essential accidents, all indicate the external world as an “accident” of accidents and quiddities (*māhiyyāt*). It was mentioned before that the category of quiddity plays no significant role in the Heideggerian perspective; also, the notion of being that he expounds is a “be-ing” of beings (Sheehan 2001). In addition, unlike Ṣadrā, Heidegger does not distinguish between the concept and reality of being, whereas such a distinction plays a crucial role in the Ṣadrīan perspective (Izutsu 1971, pp. 19–22). We may notice here as well that the subject matter of metaphysics in Ṣadrā is absolute being (*al-wujūd al-muṭlaq*), and not the absoluteness of being (*muṭlaq al-wujūd*). This is because the absoluteness of being does not have any particular rulings (*aḥkām*) and can embrace both the absolute and determined (*muqayyad*) being. On the other hand, the absolute being is a being that is not limited by any particular determination, and although it is negatively conditioned (*bi-sharṭ-lā*) in relation to all conditionings and determinations, it is nonetheless a condition unto itself by virtue of its being “negatively conditioned.” Thus, the subject matter of metaphysics is the reality of being, without its being limited by the condition of quantity, physicality, or temporality. Ṣadrā broaches several reasons for the philosophical justification of the subject matter of metaphysics.

We may add here that Ṣadrā's discussion of the subject matter of metaphysics can be traced back to the Euclidean paradigm of proof methodology (Avigad et al. 2009). This paradigm allows one to begin from axioms and self-evident principles such as the *a priori* nature of the intuition of the concept of being. Using such prin-

ciples, Ṣadrā postulates and constructs syllogisms to demonstrate the subject matter of metaphysics. Among his numerous reasonings, two of the most important ones are discussed below.<sup>16</sup>

#### *Proof I*

Minor premise: there is a general rule and criterion concerning every science that states that “the subject matter of every science depends on the essential [intrinsic] accidents (*al-‘awāriḍ al-dhātī*), which are predicated of it directly and without any intermediary.”

Major premise: when analyzing the problems of philosophy we find that all the predicates and rulings (*maḥmūlāt wa aḥkām*) of them, in one way or another, without considering any restrictions and conditions, relate to being *qua* being (*wujūd bi-mā huwa wujūd*).

Conclusion: Therefore, the subject matter of metaphysics should be being *qua* being. (Ṣadrā 2003, *al-Shawāhid*, p. 182; cf. Āmūlī 2007, 1 :228–230).

#### *Proof II*

The subject matter of every science should be demonstrated in a science that lies hierarchically above it. Metaphysics is a *prima scientia* and its subject matter (that is, “being”) is the most self-evident of all. Therefore, the subject matter of metaphysics should be being *qua* being (Ṣadrā 2003, *al-Shawāhid*, p. 184; cf. Āmūlī 2007, 1 :233–234).

In analyzing Ṣadrā’s reasoning, it becomes evident that he does not depart from the traditional Aristotelian notion of metaphysics, although his formulation adds certain nuances to it. On the contrary, even though Heidegger was familiar with the Aristotelian canon, he justifies his notion of metaphysics from the standpoint of phenomenology and the existential human condition.<sup>17</sup> His reasoning is based on the concept of nothing and the question that he frequently repeats, namely “why is there anything at all rather than nothing.” However, Heidegger adds that all things eventually end up in “being,” and without considering “being” a philosophy would not be a philosophy (Heidegger 1996, introduction).

#### *The Criticism of Traditional Metaphysics and the Problem of Onto-Theology*

At the core of the Heideggerian critique of traditional metaphysics rests the assumption that philosophizing involves “free questioning” or simply “free thinking,” and in the Middle Ages, because of the ubiquity of religious beliefs and orientations proper to it, philosophy in the true sense could not exist (Heidegger 1995, pp. 45–48).<sup>18</sup> He frankly states that “fundamentally there was no philosophy in the Middle Ages” (*ibid.*, p. 45). If we accept such a judgment, it would imply that great figures such as Avicenna, Suhrawardī (d. 1191), Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274), Mullā Ṣadrā, Maimonides (d. 1204), Ibn Gabirol (d. 1058), Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Duns Scotus (d. 1308), St. Anselm (d. 1109), and William of Ockham (d. 1347) were not really



“philosophers.” In a similar vein, titles such as Islamic or Arabic philosophy and Christian or Jewish philosophy are but names empty of content. It is worth mentioning that Heidegger was acquainted with Islamic philosophy, as he mentions it in his writings (Heidegger 1995, p. 44; Corbin 1981; Akbarian and Neuve-Eglise 2008). However, it is clear from his opinions that although he knew Latin well, he did not pay serious attention to the works of Muslim philosophers. For instance, he states (mistakenly) that the existence-essence distinction is an Aristotelian idea, whereas now it is well known that this is an Avicennan innovation.

According to Heidegger, although in traditional metaphysics (roughly from Plato onward) the topic of being *qua* being is discussed, the crucial issue of how the questioner himself is included in the inquiry has never been investigated. However, it is only in modern philosophy (indicating his own philosophy) that a comprehensive questioning that also encompasses the “inquirer” can be seen (Heidegger 1996, p. 31). In his view, the question of the “meaning of being” has been forgotten by the tradition, and traditional philosophers have failed to heed the difference between “ontic” and “ontological.”<sup>19</sup> It is for this reason that when they ask the question “what is being?” (or “what is that which is?”), they simultaneously ask: which being is the highest (or supreme) being, and in what sense is it the highest being? This duality in the question of the Being of beings can be united under the title “onto-theology.”<sup>20</sup> Heidegger’s main contention is that metaphysics thinks theologically when it “thinks of the totality of beings as such . . . with regard to the supreme, all-founding being” (Heidegger 1969, pp. 70–71, 139). He asseverates, for the reasons mentioned above, that the meaning of being in the metaphysics of traditional philosophers becomes a muddy affair, and the main problem thus remains veiled. As traditional metaphysicians do not account for the difference between ontic and ontological, they are in a quest for an ultimate reality and consequently innovate innumerable names for it according to different “historical molds” (*prägung*): *Phusis*, *Logos*, *Hen*, *Idea*, *Energeia*, Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, Will to Power, and *Ousia*, the proto-substance, which are but fallacious.

From the preceding paragraphs it is not hard to deduce that concepts such as the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*) or the absolutely unconditioned being (*wujūd lā bi-sharṭ maqṣamī*) in Islamic philosophy, too, will be rendered futile from the Heideggerian standpoint. On the other hand, Ṣadrā as well, from his own standpoint, may ask how the Heideggerian claims that state that traditional philosophers did not account for the “questioner” in the inquiry of being and the meaning of being are justified. This question is particularly pertinent since Heidegger’s claims are ambiguous. May it not be said that all the essential accidents of being are also predicated of the “philosopher” (who is the inquirer), as *being qua being* encompasses all beings? If so, then how can Heidegger claim that the questioner is not included in the act of questioning? In addition, Ṣadrā reckons that the concept of being has a corresponding reality, and he analyzes it from various angles (Ṣadrā 1984, *al-Mashā’ir*, pp. 10 ff.; see also Lāhijī 2007, pp. 125 ff.). Furthermore, does not his conclusion, which is based on the premise that being is a unified hierarchic reality (*haqīqa wāḥida dhī marātib*), lead us to shed light on the meaning of being? Also, Heidegger does not

consider that Avicenna's philosophy testifies to the emergence of a phenomenological philosophical tradition that takes the question of being to be the most central concern of philosophical investigations. He does not account for what is "the other" within the history of Western metaphysics. In his investigation of the phenomenology of being in Avicenna and Heidegger, El-Bizri concludes that Heidegger's claims about the oblivion of being in traditional metaphysics need to be reevaluated, as they emerge from his incomplete reading of the history of metaphysics. It is significant that Heidegger ignores Avicenna's treatment of the problem of being and the centrality of that question within all the subsequent developments of Avicennan phenomenological ontology up to Mullā Ṣadrā (El-Bizri 2000, p. xlviii).

### *The Three Fundamental Prejudices Regarding Being*

In the previous discussion we saw that Heidegger claims that philosophers in the Western tradition have rather disregarded the meaning of being. Now since Heidegger wants to expatiate on the meaning of being, he provides reasons as to why traditional philosophers have failed to heed the meaning of being. This, he says, is owing to the prejudices regarding being that they held. First, philosophers claim that being is the most "universal" concept.<sup>21</sup> Curiously, even though Heidegger claims that this is a "prejudice" regarding being, he himself accepts that the universality of being is other than the universality of genus, and that the universality of the former "surpasses" the universality of the latter in degree. That is to say, "being" does not delimit the highest region of beings insofar as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and species. He, like the medieval philosophers, takes being to be a *transcendens*. In *Being and Time* he states:

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no genus of an entity; yet it pertains to every entity. Its "universality" is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character that an entity may possess. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple*. . . (Heidegger 1996, p. 38)

Thus, his claims, namely that philosophers' statements concerning universality are ambiguous and that Aristotle did not clarify the relation between being and genus, are rather idiosyncratic. He further states that although one says accordingly that "being" is the most universal concept, it cannot mean that it is the clearest of all concepts and that it needs no further discussion. According to Heidegger, the concept of "being" is rather the most obscure of all.

What is rather surprising from the preceding claim is that it is unclear as to which of the philosophers states that the universality of being implies that it is the clearest of all concepts. The Persian philosopher Sabzawārī says that "the concept of being is the clearest of all things, yet its reality is the most hidden of all" (Sabzawārī 2005, p. 56). That is, the meaning (implying its reality) of being is the hardest of all to apprehend. Also, philosophers such as Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā believe that "being" does not fall under the so-called Aristotelian categories (see, e.g., Ṭūsī 2012, pp. 588 ff.). Although Heidegger acknowledges the preceding statement, he insists

that it is a “prejudice” regarding being. Moreover, he does not demonstrate how the argument of the traditional philosophers is logically untenable.

The second prejudice concerning being, according to Heidegger, is the statement that the concept of being is indefinable. This conclusion is drawn from its highest universality. This is so as one cannot undertake to define *being* without beginning in this way: “It is . . .” This beginning may be expressed or implied. Thus, in order to define *being*, one must say, “It is . . .” and hence employ the word to be defined in its definition (Pascal 1912, p. 169). So far, Heidegger accepts the statement of philosophers, whereas from another standpoint he raises the objection that the indefinability of being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it rather demands that we look at that question thoroughly (Heidegger 1993, p. 43). According to Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s objection regarding the second prejudice of being misses the point. In his view, the verb “to be” and the noun “being” cannot be defined in the traditional way of a *definitio per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*, and surely this does not exempt one from analyzing their meanings (Phlipse 1998, pp. 33–38). If this were the case, then how could Heidegger, whose primary concern is the meaning of being, extract any meaning from “being?” It is worth noting that Ṣadrā in his *Asfār* (1989, 1:78–86, 1:318–23) analyzes at length the concepts of predicative (*rābiṭ*) and relational (*rābiṭa*) being, and, more recently, Hā’irī Yazdī (2006, pp. 11–20) too discusses the problem of “is” (Persian: *ast*) and “to be” (Persian: *hast*) in order to clarify this matter. The problem of “to be” can be resolved by making recourse to logic and semantics, but Heidegger does not address this issue from these angles.

The third prejudice regarding being relates to its being a self-evident concept. Everybody seems to understand what statements such as “The sky *is* blue” or “I *am* happy” mean. According to Heidegger, this average comprehensibility only demonstrates the incomprehensibility of being. The fact that we live already with an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is at the same time shrouded in mystery proves the fundamental necessity of recovering the question of the meaning of “Being.” In truth, the third prejudice hints at a subtle point. The difference between propositions such as “God exists,” “the world exists,” and “man exists” is noteworthy, and Muslim philosophers including Ṣadrā, in order to avoid *petitio principii*, propose two types of universals: the univocal universal (*al-kullī al-muṭawāṭī’*) and the modulated universal (*al-kullī al-mushakkik*). As famed theologians such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) failed to discern different types of universals, they called philosophers into question (unjustifiably) for failing to demonstrate how God, too, can “exist” in a similar sense that a creature exists. (For an elaborate discussion on this issue see, e.g., Ṭūsī 2012, p. 271, and Bihištī 2011, pp. 204–208.) It is apparent from the reasoning of Heidegger that he, too, did not pay attention to the lesser known universal—that is, the modulated universal—which can resolve the apparent inconsistency of the propositions he raised. Nevertheless, to his credit, Heidegger points out the subtle nuances in the aforementioned propositions, which, to my knowledge, nobody had done before him in the history of Western philosophy. It should be noted in the end that all three of the prejudices

regarding being are crucial if we are to accept the Ṣadrīan notion of the “primacy of being.”

### What Is the *Scientia Divina* (*al-ḥikma al-ilāhiyya*) or Metaphysics

The meaning of *scientia divina* or *metaphysica* is familiar to those who are at home with the Neoplatonic corpuses, especially those of Plotinus. It becomes easy, then, to realize that Mullā Ṣadrā adds nothing substantially new to the definition of metaphysics. Thus, Ṣadrā’s definition—following a long tradition in Islamic metaphysics—of philosophy as the art of “becoming God-like” (*al-tashabbuh bi-l-bārī’*), or what he would call “deiformity” (*ta’alluh*) (Ṣadrā 1989, 1:3–18), is very much akin to the notion of *theosis* (cf. Edwards 2000, pp. 1–50, and Rizvi 2013). Becoming God-like is the well-known definition of philosophy in Plato and Platonism (Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b). And Ṣadrā defines philosophy as perfecting the soul (*istikmāl al-nafs*) by grasping the inner reality of entities or by knowing things as they are in themselves through rational demonstration, and not through opinion or adherence to authority (Ṣadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 1:20). For Ṣadrā, the implication of perfecting the soul entails partaking of knowledge in the intelligible world by disciplining the soul, which is immersed in material bodies and hence in all its attachments (*ta’alluqāt*) (ibid., pp. 20–22). The philosopher endeavors to gain nearness to the Real (*al-ḥaqq*) by acquiring the knowledge of intelligible forms that ultimately reside in God’s knowledge. For this reason, knowledge of the Divine is an essential aspect of philosophy (*ḥikma*), as Ṣadrā says in his book *The Origin and the Return* (*al-Mabda’ wa-l-ma’ād*):

Without doubt the cognition of the Essence of the Real (*dhāt al-ḥaqq*), and the hierarchy of Its existence which possesses perfect attributes . . . can be considered the best subject for the *scientia divina* (*al-ḥikma al-ilāhiyya*). (Ṣadrā 2011, p. 21)

Thus it can be inferred that metaphysics is the heart of philosophy, when philosophy is taken in a general sense (i.e., the overall process of philosophizing). The heart of philosophical knowledge for Ṣadrā, then, is the attainment of the knowledge of the Real, His names and attributes, and His acts. What is at issue is that in the Ṣadrīan perspective reality is considered in terms of being (*wujūd*) and its reality (*ḥaqīqa*). Thus, the perfection of soul, too, is a particular mode of being. But knowledge of being as a concrete state of consciousness cannot take shape until the soul is able to disengage (*tajrīd*) itself from matter (*mādda*). The human soul is a combination of both baseness and perfection. It was formed out of the elements and compounds, and its outward nature is base in relation to other substances and entities. However, the essence of the human soul possesses a perfection that stretches to the very limit of the transcendent One (Ṣadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 1:21–24; cf. Rizvi 2013). So metaphysics requires the honing of both theoretical and practical faculties in order to attain what Ṣadrā calls “illuminative presence” (*ḥuḍūr ishrāqī*) (Ṣadrā 1984, p. 24). The soul, due to its immersion in matter, cannot attain such a lofty state of “presence” unless it has disengaged itself from material (worldly) attachments. Although

theoretical or speculative philosophy may enable one to gain knowledge of being through rational argumentation, it will only result in mental knowledge in contrast to presential knowledge, as “modes of consciousness” will not correspond to the “modes of being” in such a condition. Hence, such a philosopher will remain trapped in an existential impasse.

On the other hand, a true aspirant of philosophy will try to free herself from carnal desires and material ambitions by ascetic practices (*riyāḍāt*) and by following the precepts of the Divine Law (Ṣadrā 1987, *Tafsīr*, 1:2–4). She will strive to become God-like by adorning her character with God’s quality traits (in accordance with a famous Prophetic tradition). In short, virtues and morals cannot be separated from philosophy (*ḥikma*). Thus, it should not come as a surprise when Ṣadrā exhorts his readers in the *Asfār* that before they begin to read this book they should “purify” their souls from vain desires and mindless fancies (Ṣadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 1:12–18). In order to purify one’s soul or achieve what is known as catharsis, one needs to perform various “spiritual exercises” related to both the body and the heart, and this process corresponds exactly to what Pierre Hadot calls “philosophy as a way of life.”<sup>22</sup> It is worth mentioning here that for most Greek and Roman or even Indian philosophers such a method (i.e., catharsis) had always been a primary condition for the acquisition of metaphysical knowledge. (For an elaborate documentation of how philosophy in ancient Greece was a “method for living a virtuous life,” see Hadot 1995.)

Although Ṣadrā never specifies whether he had a Sufi/spiritual master (*shaykh*), he nonetheless emphasizes that without guidance and learning, it will be very difficult to practice a philosophical method, that is, the techniques of spiritual exercises (Ṣadrā 1987, *Tafsīr*, 1:2–3; cf. Rizvi 2013, p. 143). On the other hand, it is evident from the work of Heidegger that catharsis is not a prerequisite for the understanding of *Dasein*, and he does not have much to say on attaining virtues as a necessary condition of philosophy.<sup>23</sup> From the standpoint of Heidegger, all of Ṣadrā’s errors would lie in the fact that the latter takes the reality of being to be a “self-subsistent reality by itself,” whereas *Dasein* or the Being of beings of the former is not an independent entity on its own. Statements concerning the purification of soul are pointless from the Heideggerian perspective.

Ṣadrā makes it clear that the soul of a person is an eternal unit, and it acquires perfection by gaining the likenesses of the intellects (*‘uqūl*) and God. He argues that the worlds are stratified into three distinct layers of existence: physical (*jismānī*), imaginal (*mithālī*), and intellectual (*‘aqlānī*). Furthermore, all beings are located in these three distinct modes of existence (*wujūd*) (Ṣadrā 2011, *al-Mabda’*, p. 150). However, when he discusses the issue of the universal human (*al-insān al-kāmil*), he mentions a fourth mode of existence—the divine imperium. This is to explicate the truth that the universal human is the reflection of the greatest name of God, “Allah,” which encompasses all other countless divine names, and embraces existence at all levels (Ṣadrā 2008, *al-Mazāhir*, pp. 83–85).<sup>24</sup> In Ṣadrā’s ontology *wujūd* is a gradational reality (*al-ḥaqīqa al-mushakkika*) that self-determines itself due to its unconditioned nature, and consequently becomes conditioned into various “forms/

existents” that after mental analysis are identified as quiddities (Şadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 2:6, chaps. 28–29).

As for the concept of infinitude (*lā yatanāhī*), it can be said briefly that the reality of being is at once delimited (*muqayyad*) and infinite, and the absolutely unconditioned being (*wujūd lā bi-sharḥ maqṣamī*), by virtue of its being unconditioned, constitutes the reality of all things. That is, no entity can be devoid of the “light” of being; otherwise it would be non-existent. The infinite assemblies of entities are but shadows of it (Şadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 6:85–89). To conclude, for Şadrā the fundamental meaning of metaphysics rests on the perfection of the soul, the hierarchy of being, and the concept of infinitude, whereas for Heidegger, as we shall see, such concepts do not possess much philosophical value.

### *The Three Fundamental Concerns of Heidegger’s Metaphysics*

It is not the aim of this section to expound on the fundamental concepts in Heideggerian metaphysics, as this study began with an objective to delineate the meaning of metaphysics only. As such, this section will briefly touch upon the fundamental concerns in the metaphysics of Heidegger so as to gain a general outlook on it. In his various works, Heidegger mentions the world, finitude, and solitude as the fundamental concerns of metaphysics (see, e.g., Heidegger 1995, pp. 169–277).<sup>25</sup> However, it should be remembered that all these concepts ultimately lead us back to the problem of *Dasein*. After analyzing these notions, it will be observed that the “general outlook” of Heidegger differs from that of Mullā Şadrā significantly. Heidegger asserts that the “world” is not the external world we experience in our ordinary life. According to him, “world” means the sum totality of beings; for example, when humans behold light they realize that they are beings among other beings. The world here implies the totality of beings per se (Heidegger 1995, pp. 174 ff.). Heidegger states that material objects such as stones do not have a world, while animals other than humans are poor in world. However, it is only the human being who has a world in a genuine sense. The human being in one sense is part of the world but in another both the lord and servant of the world. Such an outlook emanates from the phenomenological view that he espouses in his *Being and Time*. As for “finitude” he states:

Finitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but *is our fundamental way of being*. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive ourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is the innermost process of our being finite, i.e., it is our innermost becoming finite. Finitude only is in truly becoming finite. (Heidegger 1995, pp. 71–74)

In Heidegger’s view, finitude is our fundamental mode of being, and in becoming a finite being or in realizing that our existence is finite there occurs solitude with respect to our *Dasein*. In order to understand the concept of “solitude” in the Heideggerian sense, it should be noted that all the aforementioned notions are interconnected. When they come together they find a unity. According to Heidegger, this

solitude is rather that solitariness in which each human being first of all enters into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to world. In the opinion of Heidegger, it is not sufficient that we simply ask ourselves these three fundamental questions about world, finitude, and solitude. Rather, we need to strengthen our way of being by assimilating in our *Dasein* the deep truths hidden in these notions. To add a contextual basis to the discussion of them, it can be mentioned that Heidegger asserts that the traditional notion of the self—composed of body-soul-spirit—does not reveal much about ourselves. For, in his view, this “overlooks the question of the *being* of this unified extant” (Heidegger 1999, pp. 34–35).

From the preceding analysis it becomes clear that the Heideggerian outlook of metaphysics is based on a different set of notions than those to which Ṣadrā would subscribe. Categories including soul, spirit (*Geist*), and the hierarchy of the worlds do not carry much substance for the Heideggerian perspective, and even if he sometimes uses these terms he has in mind meanings that would be incomprehensible from a Ṣadrīan perspective. But this makes sense perfectly, as Heidegger believes in the finitude of being and the non-existence of the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*). Just as Ṣadrā’s interpretation of the notion of metaphysics would be unacceptable to Heidegger, the Heideggerian philosophical worldview, too, would be alien to Ṣadrā, for whom philosophy begins with the trace of “transcendence” (see, e.g., Ṣadrā 1989, *al-Asfār*, 1 : 14). Heidegger’s views concerning religion or god(s) are clear from his discussions about these in various published materials, although his words sometimes seem to bear contradictory shades of meaning.<sup>26</sup>

### Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to elaborate on the meaning of metaphysics in Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā. In the course of our analysis we have seen that our philosophers differ from each other considerably as to how metaphysics should be conceptualized. It should be noted, however, that the *Weltanschauung* of these two philosophers has taken shape in very different contexts. The context of Heidegger’s project was set with reference to the following factors: (1) the method of Descartes (the method of doubting), even though Heidegger disagrees with the notion of *res cogitans*; (2) the Kantian claim that the *Noumenon* cannot be known even though such a claim is self-contradictory (if the *Noumenon* is unknowable and nobody has ever known it, then how is it possible to declare “it” unknowable without contradicting oneself?); (3) the philosophy of Hegel concerning the soul and Geist; (4) Nietzsche’s diatribe against Christianity (Heidegger 1991); and (5) the pioneering studies of Husserl on phenomenology. Taking into account these factors, it can be said that the starting point of Heidegger is a species of phenomenology, with minor differences with the phenomenology of his mentor, Husserl.<sup>27</sup> In this context, the subject examines the contents of her experience and consciousness in relation to the world and other entities (according to Heidegger’s own interpretation), without, however, letting beliefs—religious or otherwise—affect the process. The findings of Heidegger demonstrate that the being of the human (after she has found *Dasein*

and apprehended its meaning) is ultimately finite and after its death there is nothing more to experience or say. That is to say, in this particular philosophy, which is associated with the existential destiny of a human, there is no place for her apart from her “earthly mode of being.” When a human looks into her inner self, she only sees therein her *Dasein*, not the Throne of the All-Merciful (*‘arsh al-raḥmān*) or the Kingdom of God.

It is thus natural to imagine that such a metaphysical framework would seem thoroughly unsatisfying for a philosopher like Mullā Ṣadrā, for whom metaphysics is never separate from the divine reality. It was mentioned in the previous section that concepts such as the perfection of the soul, the hierarchy of being, *theosis*, catharsis, and infinitude possess real significance in the Ṣadrīan metaphysical perspective. The other crucial point to note is that Ṣadrā’s metaphysics is closely intertwined with his epistemology, in which mystical (epistemological) concepts including (mystical) unveiling (*kashf*), illumination (*ishrāq*), direct witnessing (*shuhūd*), and inspiration (*ilhām*) play an important part. However, concepts such as these would seem like a loose argument (*musāmaḥa*) from the Heideggerian standpoint. What is interesting to note, however, is that Heidegger was well acquainted with the Scholastic tradition, and he was a Jesuit in his early life.<sup>28</sup> In addition, he was well versed in Greek and Latin, which suggests that he was thoroughly familiar with the philosophico-mystical literature in these archaic languages. But his *Dasein* is not a self-enlisted entity. Rather it is always expressed in “relation” to something else, for instance “being-of,” “being-in,” and “being-and.” To wit, it cannot be imagined “in itself.” That is the reason why, in his *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, after the discussion of the limitations of being, he devotes many chapters to “being and becoming,” “being and seeming,” “being and thinking,” and “being and the ought” (Heidegger 2000, pp. 98–213).

The crux of the argument is that in metaphysical thinking, religion or any belief-system should not interfere. However, the implication of the aforementioned analysis should not lead us to think that these two philosophers do not have any similarities. To be sure, despite the fundamental differences in their notion of metaphysics, they come together in their analysis of a number of (sporadic) philosophical problems, the full discussion of which falls outside the scope of the present study. However, in the final analysis, based on the evidence established in the present study, it can be concluded that the general outlooks of Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā remain worlds apart.

## Notes

- 1 – Ṣadrā uses the term *scientia divina* or First Philosophy (or metaphysics) in his magnum opus *Asfār* in three different ways. Other terms such as *ḥikma ilāhiyya* (divine sophia/philosophy) or *falsafa ilāhiyya* (divine philosophy) are also used to describe the subject matter of metaphysics. However, sometimes he also combines both theology (*kalām*) and science under the same heading. For an



elaborate discussion on all this, see Arnzen 2007, pp. 202–203 and 236 ff. See also Eichner 2007, which examines and compares how Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's approach to *al-umūr al-'amma* (general metaphysics) differs from that of our author, and how theology and first philosophy are integrated in the latter's conception of metaphysics.

- 2 – See the section titled “Metaphysics” in Michael Wheeler's article on Heidegger in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Wheeler 2011; accessed on November 21, 2013). For Heidegger's own analysis of the term “metaphysics,” see Heidegger 1995, pp. 25 ff.
- 3 – For the naming of “existentialist” philosophy, see Sajjādī 2005. Although Sajjādī characterizes Ṣadrā's philosophy as “existentialist,” his use of the term differs from the general notion of “Existentialism” as understood in academic circles on both sides of the Atlantic. For a fruitful analysis of being and its scope in the thought of Heidegger, see *A Companion to Heidegger* (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, pp. 1–17). See also Kamal 2010, chap. 2.
- 4 – For a helpful discussion on how Ṣadrā's philosophy signals a revolutionary shift from “existent” to “existence,” see Izutsu 1971, pp. 24–29.
- 5 – The term “phenomenology” is used in the sense of analyzing the contents of one's consciousness and perception. It is to be contrasted with the philosophical position in epistemology that suggests that physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations, as in the case of George Berkeley, who was a phenomenalist and not a phenomenologist. For more information, see “Phenomenology,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/> (accessed on August 7, 2015).
- 6 – El-Bizri (2000) has compared Avicenna's account(s) of being with that of Heidegger, drawing on the methodology of phenomenology. The present study builds on El-Bizri's useful framework, while also making use of the pioneering comparative study between Ṣadrā and Heidegger carried out by Açıkgenç (1993). One particularly useful aspect of both of these studies is their treatment of a range of problems associated with the historiography of medieval philosophy on the one hand and the methodology of comparative study on the other.
- 7 – Both Ṣadrā and Heidegger stand at the end of two traditions in the sense that in the case of the former the *mawjūd*-based (existent) ontology of Avicenna et al. nearly reached a dead end, whereas in the case of the latter the Western philosophical tradition (Plato onward) had derailed from its focus on “being” (according to Heidegger's self-proclaimed claim).
- 8 – Ṣadrā does not use the phrase *aṣālat al-wujūd* directly in his works (however, one of his short treatises is titled *Aṣālat ja'l al-wujūd*). But he employs various derivatives (*mushtaqq*) of *aṣāla* with respect to *wujūd* such as *aṣl*, *ta'aṣṣul* (being fundamental or principal), and *muta'aṣṣil*. Moreover, he makes use of a host of terms in relation to being which mean or signify “*aṣālat al-wujūd*” including

*aṣl kulli shayʿ*, *al-aṣl fī-l-mawjūdiyya wa al-taḥaqquq*, *alta ʿaṣṣul fī-l-kawn*, *bi-dhātihi mawjūd*, *al-mawjūd bi l-dhāt wa al-aṣāla*, and so on. See Ṣadrā 1989, 1:39, 49, 334, 340; 3:257, 277; 6:14, 147; and see Ṣadrā 2000, pp. 4, 9, 10, 35, 52. It should be noted that *aṣāla* derives from its root *a-ṣ-l* and can mean true/real, authentic, original, fundamental, or principal. Furthermore, Ṣadrā presents some thirty-five to forty arguments in favor of *aṣālat* of *wujūd* and refutes all the claims of *aṣālat al-māhiyya* or *iʿtibāriyat al-wujūd*, which are documented and investigated in Fayyāḏī 2011.

- 9 – Heidegger 1993, pp. 310–314. To fully understand the significance of this argument, we would have to take into account the context in which Heidegger’s philosophy developed, namely the evolution that took place in Europe from Descartes, Kant, and Hegel to the time of Heidegger himself, not only in philosophy but also in “science,” which had exerted a great deal of influence on all subsequent philosophical thinking in Europe and, by virtue of Colonialism, abroad as well. An elaborate treatment of all these factors is beyond the scope of the present article, but it is indeed helpful to bear them in mind as we move along. For some key background discussion, see Kuhn 1985, chaps. 4 and 7; Kuhn 1996, chaps. 8, 9, and 13; Gilson 1982, pp. 176–183, 198–202, 223–237. An interpretation of this process from a Muslim perspective can be found in Nasr 1996, pp. 80–96, 126–136.
- 10 – Heidegger’s *Letter on Humanism* was written with the sole purpose of responding to the queries of Jean Beaufret concerning particular aspects of Jean-Paul Sartre’s well-known work *Existentialism Is a Humanism*.
- 11 – Contrary to some scholars, Asadī reckons that the thought of the “later Heidegger” does not differ significantly from that of the “earlier Heidegger.” For a useful discussion on this, see Pattison 2000, pp. 1–25.
- 12 – For a solid investigation on the story of “onto-theology,” see Thomson 2000.
- 13 – Although Ṣadrā would not deny the existence of an ultimate principle, he would balk at saying that beings are simply created by an Uncreated deity. In fact, “creation” does not play a noteworthy role in Ṣadrā’s cosmology, which is ultimately based on the monorealist vision of being and its manifestation (*zuhūr*) (see, for e.g., Ṣadrā 2007, pp. 11–18).
- 14 – For more information on how the subject matter of philosophy has been adapted from the sayings of Aristotle, see the article by Maftūnī and Qarāmalikī (2003).
- 15 – I take the translation of *tashkīk* as “modulation” from Rizvi 2009.
- 16 – It should be noted that such reasoning is not uncommon in the theological and philosophical literature.
- 17 – Phenomenology was not completely absent in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, but in Husserl and Heidegger it appears as a worldview unto itself that eventually replaced the traditional paradigm.

- 18 – This is a serious claim, which is hard to understand. If there were no philosophy during the Middle Ages, would it be plausible to imagine the emergence of modern philosophy? The other thing to note is that most of the great philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, believed in some forms of religion or ultimate reality. Would Heidegger not consider them philosophers?
- 19 – See, e.g., Heidegger 1997, p. 76, and Overgaard 2002.
- 20 – This is an interpretation peculiar to Heidegger. The implication of his words is that in order to engage in the discussion of pure ontology, the philosopher must put aside the thought of religion.
- 21 – See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, 4, 1001a, 21, and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (1947) II, 1, Qu. 94, a. 2.
- 22 – Rizvi applies the concept of “philosophy as a way of life” to Ṣadrā’s philosophical method and analyzes the nature of spiritual exercises in the Ṣadrīan context (see Rizvi 2013, pp. 133–147). For an analysis of the notion of philosophy as *ḥikma* and spiritual practices associated with it, see Yaman 2010.
- 23 – Heidegger does not pay much attention to the issue of virtue, but he does discuss ethics in general (that is, secular ethics). For a meaningful analysis, see Guignon 1993, chap. 8.
- 24 – Ṣadrā does not usually devote discussion to mystical concepts such as “the universal man” in his “philosophical” corpus, although his *Asfār* contains some allusions to them (see, e.g., Ṣadrā 1989, 2:381). But, in his more religious writings, he treats them at great length. See, in particular, Kalin 2014, *passim*, and Rustom 2012, chaps. 3–7.
- 25 – Heidegger’s translator (Heidegger 1995) explains that Heidegger first used “solitary” rather than “individuation,” but then changed his mind, settling on “individuation” instead. But it can be noted that there seems to be no real difference between his employment of either of these terms.
- 26 – On the topic of religion, the views of Heidegger are quite transparent, as has been shown in this study. Thus, when Heidegger uses the expression “god” or “gods,” he has in mind a “transformative event,” and not the God of religion. For more on this problem in his thought, see his famous last public interview, “Only a God Can Save Us” (Heidegger 1976, pp. 91–116). See also Vedder 2006, particularly the introduction and chapters 1 and 10. Vedder carries out an in-depth analysis of Heidegger’s treatment of religions, and offers an insightful interpretation of and his usage of such terms as “god,” “gods,” “God,” etc.
- 27 – For more details, see Michael Wheeler, “Heidegger,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (section 2.2) (Wheeler 2011; accessed on November 21, 2013).
- 28 – For more information on his early life and his involvement with the Society of Jesus, see Safransky 1998, pp. 8–39.

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