




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PHILOSOPHIZING AND POWER: EAST–WEST ENCOUNTER IN THE FORMATION OF MODERN EAST ASIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY



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Philosophy claims that its goal is to search for truth. The history of philosophy, however, demonstrates that this search for truth has not been free from the power dynamics of respective eras. In this article, I claim that the formation of modern East Asian philosophy is one occasion in which the power structure of the time was visibly reflected. The East–West power imbalance at the beginning of the modern period was both implicitly and explicitly imbedded in the formation of modern Buddhist philosophy in East Asia. To demonstrate this point, I will examine the life and thought of two East Asian Buddhist thinkers, Paek Sönguk 白性郁 (1897–1981) and Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919), as paradigmatic examples of modern East Asian Buddhist philosophy. By doing so, I hope to bring together two seemingly unrelated aspects of the East–West encounter in modern East Asian philosophy. That is, the beginning of philosophy in modern East Asia was inevitably influenced by the power imbalance between the East and the West. On the other hand, the forced encounter of the Eastern “thought” tradition with the Western genre called “philosophy” generated a new mode of philosophizing, which is also shared by some contemporary Western philosophers in their criticism of an institutionalized form of philosophy.

Paek Sönguk and the Formation of the Genre of Buddhist Philosophy in Korea

The expressions “philosophy” and “religion” were introduced to East Asia during the mid-nineteenth century,¹ when Eastern intellectuals became exposed to Western ideas. The case of Korea is no exception. The 1920s marked the beginning of modern philosophy in Korea. The concept of “modern” in this case is debatable. When we consider the 1920s as the beginning of modern Korean philosophy, the rationale is that modern Korean philosophy is related to the influx of Western philosophy into Korea.² Kang Yöngan, a scholar of Korean philosophy, identified three reasons for claiming that modern Korean philosophy began in the 1920s. First, the first generation of Koreans who studied Western philosophical texts in the West returned to Korea during this period.³ Second, the first philosophy department in Korea was established in 1926 at Kyöngsöng Imperial University (established in 1923).⁴ Third, in the 1920s, philosophy journals, including *Sinhüŋg* 新興 (1929–1937), were established and began publishing academic philosophical writings as well as philosophical writings aimed at the general public.⁵ Taking these events as the beginning of

modern Korean philosophy in the 1920s, Kang states that the “first generation of Korean philosophers” differed in the way that they engaged with philosophy compared to the generation before them, including Chŏng Yagyong 丁若鏞 (1762–1836), Ch’oe Han’gi 崔漢綺 (1803–1879), and Yi Injae 李寅梓 (1870–1929). Kang writes:

Those who studied at universities with philosophy as their major were following the Western way in the subject matter of their philosophy and the style of writing, even though they might have studied traditional Korean thought when young. . . . As physics or mathematics was a new discipline imported from the West, so was philosophy a completely new scholarly domain.⁶

As Kang states, an institutionalized study called “philosophy” was a new field in East Asia. Moreover, the encounter between the Western genre of “philosophy” and the Eastern mode of thinking generated a new way of philosophizing and also brought new questions to philosophers in both the East and the West. Before we deal with the nature of the new philosophy, and the broader issue of philosophizing and power in that context, let us examine the life and philosophy of two East Asian thinkers as case studies. We will begin with Korean Buddhist philosopher Paek Sŏnguk.

Paek Sŏnguk: A Korean Philosopher’s Life

Among modern Korean Buddhist figures, Paek Sŏnguk holds a unique position in that he studied in Europe instead of studying in Japan, as most Korean Buddhists did at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.⁷ Korean society frequently identifies Paek as the first Korean to earn a German degree in philosophy. However, the Buddhist philosophy he published in his dissertation and articles after returning to Korea has not been seriously examined. Some claim that Paek failed to publish significant philosophical works that might have given him serious recognition,⁸ but I argue that the lack of scholarship on Paek is symptomatic of the limited and biased view of the genre of philosophy, as we will discuss later.

A brief biographical sketch is in order here. Paek was born in Seoul. He lost his father at the age of ten and his mother the following year.⁹ He was raised by his maternal grandparents, who also seem to have partly supported his studies in Europe.¹⁰ In 1910 he joined the Pongguk Monastery (奉國寺) under Ch’oe Haong 崔荷翁, on whom we do not have much information. Paek finished his study at Kyŏngsŏng Pulgyo Chungang Hangnim 京城佛教中央學林 (Kyŏngsŏng Central Buddhist School) in 1919 and went to Shanghai with the intention of participating in the Korean independence movement through the Shanghai Provisional government of Korea. In Shanghai, Paek met Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), the future president of the Republic of Korea. Rhee suggested that Paek study in Europe,¹¹ and Paek followed his advice. In 1920 Paek journeyed to France and entered a school in Beauvais, a city located about seventy kilometers north of Paris, where he studied German and Latin.¹² In 1922, he went to Würzburg University in Germany and finished his dissertation on “Buddhistischen Metaphysik” (Buddhist metaphysics) in 1925. Paek returned to Korea in September of that year¹³ and began teaching at Pulgyo Chungang Hangnim (which became Dongguk University in 1946). He also briefly served as the president

of the Buddhist Newspaper Company. In September 1928 he went to Mt. Kŭmgang, probably to focus on his Buddhist practice. His life on Mt. Kŭmgang continued until around 1938, when he was allegedly forced to leave due to pressure from the colonial government. Paek took public positions from around 1945 until 1961, when he completed his term as the president of Dongguk University. In 1962 he started Paeksŏng Nongjang 白性農場 (Paeksŏng Farm) in Sosa, Kyŏnggi Province, where, together with his followers, he practiced farming and meditation. Paek's teaching at Paeksŏng Nongjang was based on the *Diamond Sūtra*, a key text in Zen Buddhism. His teaching at Paeksŏng Nongjang became the foundation for a new Buddhist group named the Diamond Sūtra Recitation Group, founded in 1975. This group exists today, and their Buddhist practice is focused on the recitation of the *Diamond Sūtra*.

Based on this biographical information, we can divide Paek's life broadly into four periods. Up to 1928 he was a working scholar. From 1928 to 1945 he devoted himself to spiritual cultivation on Mt. Kŭmgang and in other places. From 1950 to 1961 he became a public figure in the political and business sectors, serving as the Minister of Interior Affairs and the president of Dongguk University. From 1962 until his death in 1981, he once again became a full-time practitioner at Paeksŏng Nongjang.

All the information above can be found in the scholarly work on Paek, but, apart from this summary, not much is known about his early life. The five letters included in the *Collected Works of Paek Sŏnguk* (*Paek Sŏnguk Paksa munjip* 白性郁博士文集) give us a glimpse into his life and intellectual interests during the last phase of his stay in Germany. These letters are dated from late 1924 to January 1925 and are addressed to T'oegyŏng Kwŏn Sangno 退耕權相老 (1879–1965), who from 1924 to 1931 was the editor-in-chief of the journal *Buddhism* (*Pulgyo* 佛教), to which Paek contributed articles. The letters show that Paek suffered from financial difficulty as well as poor health while in Germany. In a letter dated to 1924, Paek states, "I took the examination for the doctoral degree but was not able to pay 600 marks (approximately 350 yen), and since my tuition for the summer was also overdue, I have been pestered [by the school authorities]."¹⁴ Paek hoped that he could get money in some way so that he could return to Korea. He seems also to have considered the idea of staying in Germany. He said that if he could manage to stay there for the next four to five years, he might be able to find a teaching job and make a living. Despite serious financial difficulties, Paek seems to have worked hard at writing down his ideas. Paek let Kwŏn know that he had been working since that July on an article titled "A Buddhist Thinkers' Philosophy that Finds Evidence in the Fundamental Principle of Natural Science."¹⁵ Like many other intellectuals of his time, Paek was interested in finding a correspondence between Buddhism (or religion in general) and science. His interest in science and Buddhism later took form in an article, "Taeip so ūi illi" 大入小의一理 (The principle of the big getting into the small), published in 1928.¹⁶

In December of 1924 Paek began working as a coal miner in the Saarland. His letter dated December 18, 1924, states that he had been staying at an acquaintance's house in Berlin for fifteen days before moving closer to his work. He expressed satisfaction with his employment primarily because it gave him financial security. Paek

worked at the mine to earn money for living expenses, but he also saw this as an opportunity to test his ideas in the real world. He stated that interactions with other coal miners gave him time to reflect upon why socialism had been necessary in Europe.¹⁷ He stated that he obtained his job through a classmate,¹⁸ and this was not the first time Paek received help from his friends and acquaintances in Germany. The friendship and fraternity he felt with people at the university deeply moved him and made him think about the importance of “human solidarity.” Paek realized that he should think broadly, look beyond regional culture, and envision a world culture.¹⁹

Paek’s career as a coal miner did not last long. A letter dated January 1, 1925, indicates that he had already moved back to Berlin for health reasons. Short as it was, Paek held a positive view of his time at the coal mine, seeing it as an opportunity to learn firsthand about the lives of miners and the meaning of social reform.

Before his Berlin days, while staying in Shanghai, Paek had also expressed an interest in social reform. In his essay “The State of Affairs in Shanghai and My Impression,” written in 1920,²⁰ Paek stated that the city of Shanghai was in a state of depravity, that there was no production in that city, only consumption, a situation that people deplored. Paek feared that this might be the end of China, but he also stated that he still saw the future of China in various forms of social movements taking place in Shanghai, including “student movements,” “Enlightenment movements,” “cultural movements,” “civil diplomacy movements,” and “education of the general public movements.” Paek noted that even though the people participating in these movements were not in the mainstream at the time, their lectures and writings published in the newspapers showed that they had the potential for bringing about change. He learned from them that “a revolution by a small number of people cannot establish a republic; only through a revolution supported by the minds and hearts of a majority of the people would a revolution be able to accomplish its goal.”²¹ The social revolution expressed in his early writings did not appear in his later writings, however. Instead, his more formal political career was from the late 1940s until the end of the 1950s.

Buddhist Metaphysics

In his dissertation “Buddhist Metaphysics” Paek tried to link the Western philosophy he studied in Europe to the Buddhist philosophy he had studied and practiced since childhood. In the preface to *Pulgyo sunchŏn ch’ŏrhak* 佛教純全哲學 (Buddhist metaphysics), a Korean version translated by Paek himself from his dissertation in German that was published as a series in the journal *Buddhism*, Paek gives two reasons for his selection of the topic for his dissertation. First, Paek stated that he frequently received from his professors questions such as “What is Buddhism?” and “What is the intellectual world in Asia like?” and “Does Asian philosophy also have Greek philosophy as its foundation?”²² Paek felt it necessary to respond to these questions and clarify the nature of Asian philosophy. Second, people assumed that Buddhism should be considered a philosophy, but the nature of Buddhist philosophy had yet to be explored.²³

That people assumed Buddhism to be a philosophy without crucially thinking about what this involved tells us that, as with Inoue Enryō, as we will see in the

second half of this article, Paek's philosophical investigation of Buddhism was partly motivated by the question of genre. In other words, what is philosophy? What is religion? How do we distinguish the two, and, more importantly, how do we categorize East Asian traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism on the basis of a categorization basically generated in the West? Paek does not directly engage with the question of the nature of philosophy or religion, but he addresses it through his discussion of the meaning of "metaphysics," or what he calls "pure philosophy." Paek defines Buddhist philosophy as a "philosophy of consciousness that studies from an objective perspective, away from the individual's subjective position, the truth gleaned from actual reality."²⁴ He refers to it as "metaphysics," stating that "Buddhist pure philosophy is a discipline that studies the truth of the entire universe."²⁵

What is his concept of metaphysics? Paek identifies *abhidharma* as Buddhist metaphysics and renders it in Korean as "Buddhist pure philosophy" (佛敎純全哲學). Given the discussions that Paek developed in his dissertation, *abhidharma* in this case does not refer to a specific school at a specific time period in the history of Buddhism, as it is usually used in the Buddhist scholarly tradition. Paek interprets it as meaning literally *abhi* (about) *dharma* (the law, the teaching, or truth); hence, it refers to Buddhist philosophy. The goal of *abhidharma*, he claims, is "not just to resolve religious problems, but is a discipline that studies the truth that pervades the entire universe." Making a distinction between South Asian and East Asian Buddhism, Paek states that Buddhism from South Asia to Mongolia has more of a mystical character, and East Asian Buddhism is more philosophically oriented. He thus declares: "Current East Asian Buddhism is a religion that is based on philosophy."²⁶ He further states, "Pure philosophy does not exist exclusively as a theory; personal practice (直接實習) is a strong point unique to Buddhist philosophy."²⁷ Here we find a shared aspect between Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō (as we will see later) in their evaluation of Buddhism as a philosophy. Both men point out that Buddhism belongs to both philosophy and religion, and that Buddhist philosophy is unique as a philosophical system in that it contains a practical dimension. Both men emphasize that philosophy and religion are not two separate genres in East Asian traditions and that the amalgamation of philosophy and religion makes the tradition of Buddhism unique.

What is this "truth of the universe" that Paek refers to, in the context of Buddhist metaphysics? At the core of Paek's understanding of Buddhist philosophy lies the Buddhist concept of the middle path. In discussing Buddhist metaphysics, Paek identifies the "truth of the universe" as "one," like one flavor. Paek seems to assume that there exists an inevitable gap between the reality of the world (the objective world, or the truth of the universe)—the truth of the universe as one—and the subject-object dualism as it is experienced by the individual in his or her understanding of the world. An individual is the subject, and the individual things in the world are the objects. They might be "one" in the ultimate sense, but diverse existence in the world also indicates that this one is many. Resolution of this inevitable gap between the one and the many, the subject and the object, Paek claims, is possible through "direct experience" (*chajŭng* 自證), which he posits as the unique aspect of Buddhism as a philosophical system.

Paek explains that we can understand the Buddha on three different levels: “When the Buddha refers to a person, it indicates the ‘one who attained awakening’; when the Buddha refers to things, it implies ‘wisdom,’”²⁸ and when the Buddha is mentioned as a religious dimension, this refers to “the state of ultimate sacredness,”²⁹ that is, the personality that Gautama Siddhartha had achieved through practice over the course of his numerous lives. The designation “Buddha” is applied neither only to human beings nor to any other sentient being; it is a state that is applicable to any being in the world. Paek emphasizes this characteristic of the Buddha by citing the passage, “There exists no difference between the mind, the Buddha, and the sentient being.”³⁰ Paek states that “Buddha” was not originally a term meant to refer to an enlightened human being; rather, it was meant to refer to an object, and the usage was extended to a human being who had attained enlightenment.³¹ Earlier, we mentioned that Paek explained that the world, in the ultimate sense, is one, but we experience the world through a dualist postulation of the subject (the self) and objects (others). The oneness of the subject and objects begins to make sense once we see the world as a manifestation of the truth. The Buddha, as an enlightened being, is one who can see this one truth of the world. Paek thus states that the Buddha is “the subject aspect of truth” and dharma (or things in the world) is [are] “the objectivity that encompasses truth.”³²

The subject is the subject from the perspective of the subject. When the subject is seen by others, the subject is one of the objects in the world external to the subject. Each object is the subject from its own perspective, and each subject is an object when seen from a non-subject’s perspective. Things in the world are expressions of the truth, dharma, and when a being reaches a mental level equal to dharma, the being becomes awakened, that is, a Buddha. The subjectivity of the truth is the person him- or herself,³³ and the dharma is the reality of the world as it is, without being created by any creator. Here Paek makes a distinction between the subject as an individual person and the subject as part of the dharma. The former is a being subject to subjective desires, such as greed, anger, and ignorance, whereas the subject as the truth of dharma is the subject as in the subject-*qua*-object. In this sense, Paek underlines the fact that, in Buddhism, the Buddha is not the creator of the dharma; in Buddhist practice, one’s faith is not related to a creator but to truth itself.

The subject will become the dharma, the truth, once the subject overcomes the subjective illusion and understands his or her position in the whole spectrum of the world. Paek describes the ultimate being, the Buddha, as “the subject within the truth” (*chilli sogē innūn chugwan* 眞理속에있는主觀). Since the Buddha is the subject within the truth, and because there exists no difference between the Buddha, the mind, and the sentient being, the idea that the ultimate being is a being ontologically “wholly other” is not tenable in Buddhism.³⁴ The Zen Buddhist claim that “sentient beings are the Buddha” (衆生卽佛) and the adage of the Korean Zen master Pojo Chinul 普照知訥 (1158–1210) that “The mind is the Buddha” (卽心卽佛) are explained through Paek’s Buddhist metaphysics in this manner.

Paek identifies Gautama Siddhartha as a social reformer whose goal was to realize social freedom.³⁵ A goal of Buddhism, for Paek, is to promote equality, and the

idea of equality is well demonstrated by the fact, Paek argues, that Gautama Siddhartha “did not discriminate whether one is God, humans, or animals, on the ground that ‘all beings have the Buddha nature.’”³⁶ The social concern Paek reveals in his definition of Buddhist philosophy reminds us of his reflection on his experience as a coal miner; it also reminds us of his evaluation of the situation in Shanghai as being pregnant with potential social reform from various groups dedicated to social movements. However, Paek’s discussion of Buddhist metaphysics also leads us to the question of how he might connect Buddhist social engagement with the other aspect of his definition of Buddhism: pure metaphysics. In what sense is his metaphysics related to social philosophy? We find this in his discussion of science.

Buddhist Social Theory, Religious Practice, and East–West Encounter

Paek’s Buddhist social theory reflects his belief in the compatibility between Buddhism and science. In the essay “The Principle of the Big Getting into the Small,”³⁷ Paek discusses how the seemingly illogical philosophy of Buddhism is in fact reflected in modern science and should be the basis of social understanding. The logic he refers to here is the idea that the smallest thing in the world can encompass the largest. In the “Logic” section of “Buddhist Metaphysics,” Paek already dealt with the different ways that logic functions in Western and Buddhist philosophies. Defining Buddhism’s famous four-cornered logic (*catuskoṭi*) as “affirmation, negation, negation of affirmation, and negation of negation,”³⁸ Paek explains that what seems illogical to some Western philosophers in fact demonstrates the representational limits of language.³⁹ In “The Principle of the Big Getting into the Small,” Paek further explores this logic in connection with his cosmology. Rejecting the ideas of his contemporaries, who consider Buddhism to be a thing of the past that is incompatible with modern science, Paek emphasizes the commonalities between the main concepts of modern science and the Buddhist logic of causation, which developed into the Buddhist idea of emptiness as practiced in Chan Buddhism.

To illustrate the relationship between the “big” and the “small” and their mutual containment, Paek compares the solar system to an atom.⁴⁰ The solar system is the “basic structure of the building called the universe.” Despite its magnitude, the principle underlying this system is the same as that of an atom. Paek states, “Both the big and the small are based on one principle. That is, whatever their structure, or functions, might be, both a small atom and the great solar system are constructed on one principle. And this logic is the Huayan logic that in a particle of dust is contained the entire world.”⁴¹

Paek emphasizes that we should apply these scale-independent principles to our understanding of human society. The big, for human society, is a nation-state, and the small is an individual. Both nation-states and individuals have three domains: spiritual (精神生活), economic (經濟生活), and legal (法律生活).⁴² “Spiritual life aims to save people from the meaningless and tasteless life caused by the confusing reality of legalism and economism. That is, spiritual life helps people understand that it is not that human beings exist for the law or for the economy, but that such institutions exist for the benefit of human beings so that they can lead humane lives.”⁴³ The

meaninglessness of the law and economics does not mean that they are useless. They are purely functional and irrelevant to the meaning of existence. Paek claims that the role of the spiritual domain is different from the roles of law and economics. The spiritual domain includes academic research, religion, the arts, and education.⁴⁴ Paek argues that since the law and economics have only functional values, they are not responsible for providing direction in life. But the role of the spiritual domain is to provide direction to people, and when the spiritual domain loses its direction the result is social oppression. Paek considers the gender discrimination rampant in both the West and the East as an example of such oppression.⁴⁵ Paek does not clarify how the spiritual domain can be completely separated from the economic and legal domains. This separation might have led to the limits of his philosophy with regard to the sociopolitical dimensions of Buddhist metaphysics. In this sense, the spiritual cultivation he practiced with his followers demonstrates a more concrete form of applying Buddhist metaphysics to real life.

Paek made two full retreats to engage in Buddhist practice, the first from 1928 to 1938 and the second from 1962 to his death in 1981. According to Kim Wönsu, who practiced under Paek for four years starting in 1967 at Paeksöng Farm, Paek went to Mt. Kūmgang to attain supernatural powers like the ones the Buddha attained. Paek thought that such power would enable him to predict the future of Korea.⁴⁶ While practicing on Mt. Kūmgang, Paek considered the *Huayan jing* 華嚴經 (Flower garland sūtra) to be the core of the Buddha's teaching and focused his practice on this sūtra by chanting "*Taepang kwang Pul Hwaö̃m kyö̃ng*" 大方廣佛華嚴經 (Chin. *Dafangguangfo huayan jing*), the original title of the *Huayan jing*.

Kim Kiryong, another of Paek's disciples, offers some details about Paek's teaching and practice there. Kim joined Paek sometime in 1928 or 1929⁴⁷ and studied with him for ten years at Chijang Hermitage on Mt. Kūmgang.⁴⁸ Kim identifies Paek's four major teachings during this period as follows: (1) Read the sūtras and understand the Buddha's teaching. (2) Birth in this world indicates that one still has evil karma to remove with the help of the Buddha, so one must pray to him. (3) Chant the name of the Buddha all the time. (4) Even the Buddha cannot make one enlightened; one should practice *Sö̃n* (meditation) and attain enlightenment oneself.⁴⁹ This emphasis on Huayan Buddhism while at Mt. Kūmgang led to the recitation of the *Diamond Sūtra* later in Paek's life when he practiced and taught at Paeksöng Farm.

In presenting Paek's philosophy, I have talked about his life in some detail. In the Western philosophical tradition, a philosopher's biography is not generally regarded as part of the investigation of his or her philosophy. Martin Heidegger's treatment of the issue is a well-known example. On the opening day of his seminar on Aristotle, Heidegger made this remark: "Regarding the personality of a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at a certain time, that he worked, and that he died. The character of the philosopher, and issues of that sort, will not be addressed here."⁵⁰ Taking a completely different position on the relationship between a philosopher's life and his or her philosophy, Jacques Derrida once defined philosophy as "psychology and biography together, a movement of the living psyche."⁵¹ In other words,

philosophy is already based on our lived experiences, whether or not we can detect them in someone's philosophy. This seems very much the case when we examine East Asian thinkers at the beginning of the modern period, when East Asia accepted and tried to learn from the philosophy of the West. Paek's modern Buddhist philosophy is a transnational philosophy, a result of his migration from Korea to Shanghai to France to Germany and back to Korea. During this migration, the Eastern philosophy of Buddhism encountered Western philosophical questions. This also indicates something of the power structure involved in the encounter between East and West at the beginning of modern Buddhist philosophy in East Asia. Paek's discussion of Buddhist philosophy is structured around major topics in Western philosophy, an indication of the preemptive authority and power of the West in the construction of philosophical discourse in modern East Asia. Paek was not the only philosopher to go through this experience. We see a similar circumstance in the encounter between East and West in the modern Japanese thinker Inoue Enryō.

Another Beginning: Inoue Enryō

There has been a tendency in the West to begin a discussion of modern Japanese philosophy with Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), the founder of the Kyoto School (Kyōto Gakuha 京都学派). However, if we are to examine the initial reaction of Japanese thinkers to Western philosophy, it seems more appropriate to consider the Japanese thinkers of the generation before Nishida. In this context—for reasons that I hope become clear as we proceed—the life and writings of Inoue Enryō offer us a good example with which to start.⁵²

Inoue Enryō: A Japanese Philosopher's Life

Inoue Enryō⁵³ was the eldest son of Inoue Engo 井上円悟, a resident priest of Jikōji 慈光寺 temple, affiliated with the Ōtani 大谷 branch of Jōdo Shinshū 浄土真宗大谷. Between the ages of ten and fourteen, Enryō studied the Chinese classics with a physician named Ishiguro Tadanori at a private school in the village of Katagai.⁵⁴ In the spring of 1878, when he was twenty-one, Enryō went to Tokyo to study and was financially supported by Higashi Honganji 東本願寺. From October of 1878, he studied at a preparatory school affiliated with Tokyo Imperial University. During his three years there, Enryō was exposed to the diverse works of Western philosophical thinkers.⁵⁵ An American lecturer named Ernest Fenollosa (1853–1908), who taught Western philosophy and Classical Chinese thought,⁵⁶ had a special influence on Enryō.

In 1881, Enryō began his studies at Tokyo Imperial University. While there, he met a Sōtō Zen priest named Hara Tantan (1819–1892), who would influence him greatly. According to Kathleen M. Staggs, a scholar of Japanese religion, "Hara was the first person to teach Buddhism as an academic discipline in a non-religious Japanese institution of higher learning."⁵⁷ In 1885, Enryō graduated from Tokyo Imperial University after completing his thesis on the third-century B.C.E. classical Chinese thinker Xunzi. Enryō was "the first Buddhist priest in Japan to receive a

Bachelor of Arts degree and he was the first graduate of Tokyo Imperial University to specialize in philosophy."⁵⁸

After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, Enryō had two career options: he could either work for the government or he could be a teacher at a secondary school run by Higashi Honganji. He reasoned that he could perform his job better as a lay person than as a priest connected with a Buddhist sect, and at his request Enryō was released by Higashi Honganji from his priestly position.⁵⁹ After this transition, he further declined to be engaged with any Buddhist sect and became a researcher in Indian Buddhism at Tokyo Imperial University. He soon fell ill and needed to suspend his research.⁶⁰ While sick, Enryō began to outline his idea of creating an academy for the study of philosophy.⁶¹

Enryō's idea of creating an institution to teach philosophy became a reality when, in 1887, the Tetsugaku Kan 哲學館 (Philosophy Academy) was officially launched. After permission was granted in 1903, it became the Private University of Tetsugaku Kan in 1904 and subsequently Toyō University in 1906.⁶² Enryō's dedication to the Philosophy Academy demonstrated his belief that philosophy could and should play a central role in educating and enlightening people. It was also his way of "practicing" philosophy and religion. In an essay, "My Intention to Found the Philosophy Academy" (哲學館開設の要趣), Enryō states the following:

The Academy studies that which is most superior among the various disciplines, which is philosophy. If philosophy is not studied, it is impossible to develop a superior intellect and to progress to superior enlightenment. I take this to be self-evident. Herein, the necessity of philosophy should be admitted. Philosophy is the study that searches for the principles behind all things and determines their laws. From politics and law above to the numerous sciences and technologies beneath, all receive their principles and laws from this discipline [i.e., philosophy]. Therefore one certainly does not praise philosophy too much if one calls it the central government in the world of study, the learning that unifies the myriad forms of learning.⁶³

From June 1888 to June 1889, Enryō traveled to Europe and then to America.⁶⁴ During this trip, he explored a new curriculum and educational goals for the Philosophy Academy. One goal included implementing Japanese thought, Chinese philosophy, and Buddhism to the curriculum in addition to Western philosophy.⁶⁵ He regularly lectured on Buddhist philosophy at the Academy, and his lecture notes were subsequently published. After this first trip, Enryō made two more international excursions, one from 1902 to 1903 and another from 1911 to 1912. Enryō also shared his idea of enlightening people through education in philosophy during his lecture tours, which he began in 1890 and continued in 1896 and 1904. He then conducted his lecture tour on an annual basis from 1906 until his death in 1919.⁶⁶ He collapsed while delivering a lecture in Dalian, China, and died the next day.

The Question of the Genre: Philosophy and Religion

As one of the first generation of Japanese thinkers educated in Western philosophy, Enryō felt it necessary to clarify the distinction between philosophy and religion.

Enryō's engagement with the question of genre is more systematic than Paek's. At the beginning of his lecture "Buddhist Philosophy," which was delivered as one of a series of lectures on metaphysics (*Junsei tetsugaku* 純正哲学), Enryō states that "One of the questions currently facing us is whether Buddhism is a philosophy or a religion."⁶⁷ Enryō argues that any attempt to define Buddhism as one or the other reveals a biased view, since, from his perspective, the uniqueness of the Buddhist tradition lies in the fact that it encompasses both philosophy and religion. In order to make this claim, Enryō clarifies the distinctive natures of philosophy and religion.

At the core of his distinction between the two lies the idea of the knowable world (*kachiteki sekai* 可知的世界) and the unknowable world (*fukachiteki sekai* 不可知的世界).⁶⁸ After discussing each by identifying its characteristics,⁶⁹ Enryō points out three things: (1) "philosophy goes from the knowable to the unknowable, and religion begins from the unknowable and proceeds to the knowable";⁷⁰ (2) "[p]hilosophy admits the unknowable, whereas religion tries to explain its existence";⁷¹ and (3) philosophy is based on the "function of the intellect (*kokoro no chiryoku* 心の知力), whereas religion is based on the functions of the feelings and emotions."⁷² Enryō's distinction between philosophy and religion begins in a rather conventional way, identifying philosophy with logic and principle, and religion with emotions, faith, intuition, and revelation. However, in the end, he claims that philosophy requires as much faith as religion. Philosophers need faith in their theories and philosophies, as much as believers need faith in the objects of their belief.⁷³ He also claims that any religious tradition contains philosophical aspects, since it tries to explain the unknowable rationally.

Such blurring of the lines makes us question the nature of philosophy and religion. Behind this discussion lies the Buddhist logic of nonduality. From the Buddhist perspective, the transcendent noumenon does not exist as the "wholly other," as Rudolf Otto puts it in his *The Idea of the Holy*.⁷⁴ The unknowable for Enryō is not an ontological or onto-theological concept. The noumenal aspect of the world is unknowable for Enryō because existence, from the Buddhist perspective, is an interaction of innumerable causes and conditions.

Science, Logic, and Philosophy as Cultivation

In one of his early works, "An Evening Conversation about Philosophy" (*Tetsugaku issekiwa* 哲學一夕話) (1886), Enryō states that the core of philosophy encompasses both philosophy and science: "In short, we can say that genuine philosophy (純正哲学) is the science of the pure principles in philosophy and science. It investigates the principle of truth and the basis of all learning."⁷⁵ He calls philosophy "the central government in the world of science" that controls all the disciplines.⁷⁶ An example of how philosophy and science work together in Enryō's paradigm appears in his discussion of cosmology. In his essay "Philosophy of Struggle" (*Funtō tetsugaku* 奮闘哲学) (1917), Enryō explains the structure of the cosmos through its vertical and horizontal dimensions. According to his theory, the vertical dimension is represented by the temporal dimension. Enryō proposes that the cosmos goes through cyclic movements; there were worlds before this world and there will be other worlds after

this one. The world, Enryō claims, emerged from a nebula, which he calls the “great change” of the world, and then returns to it. Because change recurs, current events will influence the next world. It is not difficult to see that the Buddhist concepts of transmigration and karma had an influence on Enryō’s idea of the cosmos.

Enryō explains the horizontal dimension of the cosmos through mind and matter. Mind and matter, and, further, materialism and idealism, the absolute and the relative, are in opposition and maintain dualism. However, Enryō states that if we examine the mind extensively, we reach the conclusion that the opposite stances of the mind and matter are simply two sides of the same thing:

[T]hinking in terms of straight lines means pursuing the argument that matter is always matter, and mind is always mind. Such thinking cannot avoid contradictions. One should know that small and large are extremes: small is one extreme and large the other extreme; the same holds true of one and many, of difference and sameness, of self and other, and of being and nothingness. People may call these contradictions, but if one realizes that the truth of the cosmos is that large and small, one and many, sameness and difference, self and other, being and nothingness are all mutually inclusive, then one can awaken to the truth that contradictions are not just contradictions. What appears as a contradiction from the general standpoint of philosophy harbors the truth within itself. Thus, I have no hesitation in saying that contradiction is truth.⁷⁷

Enryō calls this a “theory of mutual containment and inclusion.”⁷⁸ The idea and the expression unmistakably represent Huayan (Kegon) Buddhism. Fazang 法藏 (643–712), the systematizer of Chinese Huayan thought, discusses this idea of “mutual containment (*xiang ji* 相卽) and mutual inclusion (*xiang ru* 相入)” in detail in chapter 10 of his *Five Teachings of Huayan Buddhism* (*Huayan wujia zhang* 華嚴五教章).⁷⁹ One example Fazang offers for explaining the idea of mutual containment and mutual inclusion is that of a numeric system. Imagine that the numbers one through ten are the entirety of the numeric system. How does the identity of each number become possible? It is only through mutual containment and inclusion; that is, in the number one there exist all the other nine numbers because, without the nine numbers, the number one cannot function as the number one. The same is true with all of the remaining nine numbers. This is what Paek explained through his logic of the big entering the small. The entire numeric system of one to ten (the big) needs to get into the one number (the small) in order for any number in the numeric system one through ten to function. Ŭisang 義湘 (625–702), the founder of Korean Huayan 華嚴 (Hwaōm) Buddhism, discusses this idea of mutual containment of opposites in his “Ocean Seal Chart” (*Haein do* 海印圖, also known as *Hwaōm ilsŭng pōpkye do* 華嚴一乘法界圖), in which he explores the Huayan maxim: the one is all and all is the one.⁸⁰ The mutual containment of one and many, of the small and the big, or of the contradictory opposites, is the Buddhist idea of nonduality, as Enryō explains it.

Immediately after Enryō emphasizes the Buddhist logic of nonduality and states that it would be difficult for a Westerner to understand this logic, he proposes his idea of “a philosophy of action”:

To know this logic of mutual inclusion is to know that my body includes the nation and our nation contains the world. So, too, it should also be clear that hope for the perfection of the world means doing one's best for the development of the nation, just as hope for the development of the nation means attending to the "cultivation" of one's own person. Never forgetting that one's body contains the nation, and one's nation contains the world, one should push on and work hard. That is my position: a philosophy of action.⁸¹

This leap of logic from Buddhist nondualism to nationalism may be unexpected, but Enryō was not the only thinker to make this leap in twentieth-century Japanese philosophy. Also, in the evolution of Enryō's career this was not the first time that Enryō incorporated a nationalistic trend in his discussion of philosophy. That training in philosophy could and should include a significant component for an individual to serve his or her own nation was Enryō's maxim from the beginning of his career. One well-known example is his 1887 publication *Revitalization of Buddhism* (*Bukkyō katsuron* 仏教活論), in which he claims that the love of truth and the protection of one's nation are one and the same (*gogoku airi* 護国愛理).

I will not dwell on the issue of nationalism here, but would like to bring attention to another aspect of Enryō's philosophy, namely his emphasis on philosophy as "spiritual cultivation." From early in his career until his death, Enryō devoted his life to education, especially to education in philosophy. He established the Philosophy Academy, which eventually evolved into a university. In his "My Mission in Philosophy" (哲学上における余の使命), Enryō states this mission as follows: "First, the popularization of philosophy," and "Second, to put philosophy into practice." Here, putting philosophy into practice is not one *aspect* of applied philosophy. Instead, for Enryō, practical application is the *goal* of philosophy. His nationwide philosophy lecturing tour was one demonstration of Enryō's belief that learning philosophy should not remain at a purely theoretical level; rather, education and cultivation must be learned through philosophy.

For both Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō, then, philosophy and religion are combined in a way such that the former offers us a theoretical principle and the latter its practical application in daily life. Paek adopted the traditional model of creating a practitioners' group for his practice on Mt. Kūmgang and Paeksöng Farm. Enryō, on the other hand, took a more "modern" view, seeing education in philosophy as a means of spiritual cultivation.

Philosophy, Power, and East–West Encounter

The Burden of Modernity and the Law of Genre

Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō had different life experiences and developed different philosophies. However, at the core of their visions of philosophy and their views on Buddhism we recognize the influence of the era that drove their philosophical orientations and the way that they interpreted and understood Buddhism. We can call one such driving force the "burden of modernity."

Enryō merits the distinction of being the first person to earn a philosophy degree from Tokyo University, and Paek of being the first Korean to earn a philosophy degree in Germany. Both were among the first generation to study Western philosophy in their respective countries and to attempt to understand and interpret Buddhism in connection with and within the framework of Western philosophy. They seem to have felt it necessary to prove that traditional East Asian thought (in their case Buddhism) was as “philosophical” as and superior to any Western tradition. Both Paek and Enryō claimed that philosophy and religion are combined in the East Asian tradition. Philosophy contains religion, and religion is a practical application of the ideas and theories that are proposed in philosophy: this combination, for them, demonstrates the superiority of the Asian philosophical tradition. As if to prove this idea by their own example, both men devoted a certain period of their time to putting into practice the philosophy that they promoted. From 1962 until his death in 1981, Paek dedicated his time to Buddhist practice and created a group known as the Diamond Sūtra Recitation Group. Enryō made lecture tours, delivering talks aimed at enlightening people through education in philosophy. He visited various corners of Japan, expanded his concepts to East Asia, and died while giving a lecture in Dalian. Enryō’s dedication to education was his way of practicing the philosophy that he professed. Both Paek and Enryō were convinced that the superiority of Buddhism as a philosophy lies in the practical dimension of philosophy; that is, Buddhist philosophy incorporates both philosophy and religion, whereas in the Western tradition, they believed, philosophy refers only to theory, and thus lacks an “ethical dimension.”

To define a genre means to define its identity. As Jacques Derrida articulated well in his essay “The Law of Genre”: “As soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm. . . . [O]ne must not risk impurity.”⁸² As with any construction and categorization of identity, the construction of genre is a social action. However, the constructed nature of genre is erased by its repeated use in the community where the genre was created or adopted: repetition naturalizes genre. Furthermore, this naturalization of a created identity cannot take place without the subordination of power. When facing the question of genre and of philosophy in the context of the Asian intellectual tradition, Paek felt that it was necessary to respond to the non-naturalness of the philosophical genre as it was understood and defined in the West. Buddhist philosophy, for Paek, could be a part of the genre of philosophy, but at the same time, from Paek’s perspective, it would expand the limits of philosophy by involving direct personal experience. The logic of Buddhist philosophy does not accord with the logic of Western philosophy, and Buddhist logic has its own reasons for that, even though it would take a long time for the Western academic world to accept this, if it ever did.⁸³ As Derrida says, “a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text; there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging.”⁸⁴ By the same token, there is no culture that does not have a tradition of philosophizing. A text or a system of thought might not look like a specific type of “philosophy” as it has been institutionally understood, but, at the same time, it par-

ticipates in the making of philosophy through its own unique way of questioning, understanding, and thinking about the world and existence.

In understanding Buddhism in the context of the Western philosophical tradition, Paek and Enryō emphasized the practical application of Buddhism as its ethical dimension. As we look back at this claim from the perspective of the present time, there is an ironic twist in the position of Buddhism with regard to ethics. American Buddhist scholarship has, for some time, claimed that Buddhism and ethics are an odd couple and that Buddhism must provide a better blueprint for ethics in order for it to survive in the West.⁸⁵ Buddhist logic was one of the sources for the West's distrust of Buddhist ethics. As Paek and Enryō clarified, Buddhist logic challenges the dualist postulation and claims for the nonduality of opposites. From the perspective of Western normative ethics, the lack of clear distinction in one's identity problematizes the role of ethics in making a clear value judgment between what is right and what is wrong. From the perspective of Paek's and Enryō's Buddhist philosophy, a realization of nonduality should be the driving force behind one's ethical behavior.⁸⁶ Both Paek and Enryō tried to incorporate science into their discussion of Buddhist philosophy. The science that Paek and Enryō discussed, together with Paek's Buddhism and Enryō's discussions of Buddhist philosophy, might not be the most effective way of viewing science in connection with Buddhism, but given the zeal for the connection between Buddhism and cognitive psychology and neuroscience in our time, their claim that Buddhism and science are compatible has turned out to be partially correct.⁸⁷

With regard to traditional Buddhist philosophy, the Huayan Buddhist idea of "mutual containment and mutual inclusion" played a significant role for both Paek and Enryō in the development of their philosophy. Why Huayan Buddhism? Did it have anything to do with the nature, or burden, of modernity? Reflecting on the role of Buddhism in modern Japan, Sueki Fumihiko explains this in terms of the contradictory demand that it is necessary to secure space for the individual and, at the same time, to find something that transcends the individual.⁸⁸ Sueki states that this contradictory demand of the modern spirit made it inevitable that modern Japanese thinkers would resort to nationalism, which projects the nation as that which transcends the individual. Philosophically, Sueki contends, that which transcends individuality was portrayed through nothingness and, in practical terms, the nation. Whether the simultaneous awareness of the importance of an individual and the necessity of overcoming individuality should necessarily lead to nationalism is a question that requires further discussion. But the idea that the conflicting demand for individuality and that which transcends the individual might be the basis of Paek's and Enryō's interest in the Huayan logic of identity indicates another way in which Buddhist logic is connected to the reality of the time.

Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, and Cross-Cultural Philosophy

The marginalized position of non-Western philosophy in both Western and Eastern academia is not a secret—as noted in a report published by the American Philosophical Association:

It was not a long time ago when Asian philosophy was excluded from the philosophy discipline in most American universities or colleges and was only taught by history, religion or Asian study faculty. The situation has started to change, although there is still a long way to go to make Asian philosophy widely accepted or respected in US academia. Asian philosophy is still marginalized, but much less than before.⁸⁹

The report's purpose was to celebrate the changing position of Asian philosophy in American academia, but it is also a testimony to the marginalized position of non-Western philosophy in the Western academic world. The discussion of Buddhist philosophy presented by Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō, the first generation of philosophers in East Asia in the modern sense of the term "philosophy," demonstrates a basis for this discrimination against Asian philosophy. When Western philosophy presents itself as a default standard for philosophy and philosophizing, other, non-Western, philosophies suffer from the evaluation of "missing" qualities that keep them from being counted as philosophies. Postmodern philosophers were not blind to the problems of such a hegemonic approach to philosophy, as we read in Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, among others.

Writing an introduction to an anthology on famous philosophers, Merleau-Ponty states: "Philosophy's center is everywhere, its circumference nowhere."⁹⁰ And that is because "there exists no one philosophy that contains all the philosophies."⁹¹ Whether it be Eastern or Western, if a philosophy is a way to find truth, truth will take a variety of formats, especially when we base our search for truth in lived experiences. Challenging the idea that there exists a specific philosophy that can be qualified as a philosophy, Jacques Derrida proposes that a "right to philosophy" is an intrinsic right of human existence, like any other human rights to which our generation has been sensitive. Derrida even claims, "Philosophy is the most easily shared thing in the world. No one can forbid access to it. The moment one has the desire or will for it, one has the right to it."⁹² What this suggests is that both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida encourage us to revisit the centuries-old perception that Western philosophy is "the" philosophy.

As we look back at the beginning of modern Buddhist philosophy as presented in Paek's and Enryō's writings, we notice that both Paek and Enryō were at least capable of identifying the different ways of philosophizing between East and West, which includes different understandings of logic and of the relationship between philosophy and lived experience; they were eager to promote what is fundamental to Buddhist philosophy as a way of philosophizing that is as legitimate as its Western counterpart. This challenge seems to have lost its rigor as the Asian world has become more Westernized and Western power and culture have become the norm of our time. In this sense, Paek Sönguk's writings offer Korean philosophy an occasion not only to think about its relation to Western philosophy but also to be self-critical about its own understanding of philosophy and Korean philosophy's relation to the very definition of philosophy and philosophizing.

The marginalization of non-Western philosophy in both Western and Eastern academia is still the norm.⁹³ The changing world order and accompanying shift in our understanding of cultural interactions have gradually made an impact on the way

we conceive the nature of philosophy, the mode of philosophizing, and the fundamental assumptions that are innate in the traditional philosophical discourse. The formation of modern Buddhist philosophy in Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō shows how, at the beginning of modern Buddhist philosophy, the power imbalance between Eastern and Western philosophies played a significant role in the formation of Buddhist philosophy in particular and the genre of philosophy in general.

A comparative examination of the life and thought of Paek and Enryō enables us to see that this forced encounter between Western philosophy and traditional Eastern thought brings to light a dimension of philosophy that has been much neglected in modern philosophical discourse: philosophy's relation to self-cultivation. Making a distinction between "philosophical discourse" and the "philosophical way of life," Pierre Hadot has stated, "Philosophical discourse, then, originates in a choice of life and an existential option—not vice versa."⁹⁴ As a scholar of ancient philosophy, Hadot applied the primacy of the "philosophical way of thinking" over "philosophical discourse" to ancient philosophy. But the idea can also be found in twentieth-century Continental philosophy. Asking whether Europeans with limited or no knowledge and experience of China and Chinese language could understand Chinese philosophy, Merleau-Ponty stated that cultural differences must be real, but if we approach philosophy as that which is based on life experience, Chinese—or any non-European—philosophy should shed light on the dimensions of human experience that Westerners might not have been aware of. The lived experiences of human beings, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot say which is superior or inferior, or which counts as philosophy and which does not. Instead, they offer us "a variant of man's relationship with being which would clarify our understanding of ourselves."⁹⁵

In the life stories and philosophies of Paek Sönguk and Inoue Enryō, we see specimens of what Hadot, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida identified as the way of philosophy. This does not support the philosophical discrimination that Asian philosophy has suffered in Western academia. Instead, it reveals how cross-cultural philosophy can enrich our understanding of the nature of philosophy and its relation to our daily experience.

Notes

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- 1 – The East Asian word equivalent to the English "philosophy," 哲學 (Jpn. *testugaku*, Chin. *zhexue*, Kor. *ch'ŏrhak*), came into existence in the late nineteenth century when Japanese philosopher Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897) used the expression in his book *Hyakuichi shinron* 百一新論 (A new theory of the unity of one hundred ideas) (1874). Like the expression "philosophy," the word "religion," 宗教 (Jpn. *shūkyō*, Chin. *zongjiao*, Kor. *chonggyo*), was introduced to the East Asian world in the mid-nineteenth century. It was not one of the expressions

that Nishi Amane introduced but came from a translation of diplomatic letters. For a discussion on this, see Godart 2008 and Josephson 2013.

- 2 – The question of whether only Western philosophy can be counted as “modern” is an important issue, but we will not be able to cover it here. For a discussion on the formation of Korean philosophy in the early twentieth century, see Cho 2002.
- 3 – Kang 2002, pp. 25–26.
- 4 – Ibid., p. 27.
- 5 – Ibid. For an in-depth discussion of *Sinhŭng* and *Ch’ŏrhak*, see Yi 2012.
- 6 – Kang 2002, pp. 28–29.
- 7 – In the context of modern Korean Buddhism, Paek Sŏnguk may be known for his role as the president of Dongguk University, a Buddhist university in Korea (he served between July 1953 and July 1961), or for his involvement with a new Buddhist group known as the Kŭmganggyŏng Toksonghoe 金剛經讀誦會 (Diamond Sūtra Recitation Group), which he created in 1975 and whose branches continue to exist in North America and Europe. Some might remember him for his political career as the Minister of Interior Affairs (February to July 1950) or as a candidate for the vice presidency in South Korea (1952 and 1956). Others may even remember him as a successful businessman. Despite the visibility of his activities, Paek Sŏnguk’s position as a philosopher and his writings on Buddhist philosophy in connection with Western philosophy have mostly been ignored.
- 8 – See Kim Yŏngjin 2012 for a recent publication on Paek.
- 9 – Kim Wŏnsu 2008, p. 16.
- 10 – Kim Kiryong 1957, p. 400. Paek states that during his one year studying in Paris and his one year in Germany, he was supported by his friend (Paek 1957, p. 378).
- 11 – Kim Wŏnsu 2008, p. 17.
- 12 – Paek 1957, p. 3.
- 13 – September 11, 1925 (*Tonga ilbo* [Tonga daily news]).
- 14 – Paek 1957, p. 385.
- 15 – Ibid.
- 16 – For a discussion of this article, see Park 2017.
- 17 – Paek 1957, p. 384.
- 18 – Ibid., p. 383.
- 19 – Ibid.

- 20 – Ibid., pp. 220–221.
- 21 – Ibid., p. 221.
- 22 – Ibid., p. 13.
- 23 – Ibid., p. 14.
- 24 – Ibid., p. 16.
- 25 – Ibid., p. 20.
- 26 – Ibid., p. 19.
- 27 – Ibid., p. 20.
- 28 – Ibid., p. 27.
- 29 – Ibid., p. 28.
- 30 – Ibid.
- 31 – Ibid.
- 32 – Ibid., p. 29.
- 33 – Ibid., pp. 30–31.
- 34 – The transcendental being as the “wholly other” is Rudolf Otto’s definition. See Otto 1923. I discussed this issue more in detail in my article on philosophy of religion from the East Asian Perspective; see Park forthcoming.
- 35 – Paek 1957, p. 15.
- 36 – Ibid., p. 16.
- 37 – Ibid., pp. 101–144.
- 38 – Ibid., p. 24.
- 39 – Ibid., p. 26.
- 40 – Ibid., pp. 106–122.
- 41 – Ibid., p. 122.
- 42 – Ibid., p. 132.
- 43 – Ibid.
- 44 – Ibid., p. 128.
- 45 – Ibid., p. 132.
- 46 – Kim Wönsu 2008, p. 18.
- 47 – Kim Kiryong 1957, p. 389.
- 48 – Ibid., p. 399.
- 49 – Ibid., p. 392. Further details on the daily routine of practice are on pp. 392–393.

- 50 – Heidegger 2009, p. 4.
- 51 – Derrida and Ferraris 2001, p. 34.
- 52 – In an understanding of modern Japanese philosophy, the importance of thinkers working before the establishment of the Kyoto School has begun to receive attention from scholars of Japanese philosophy. Studies especially on Inoue Enryō have been revived by the establishment of the International Association for Inoue Enryō Research (国際井上円了学会) founded in 2012. The journal *International Inoue Enryō Research* (国際井上円了研究) offers valuable new information on Inoue Enryō.
- 53 – Enryō’s childhood name was Kishimaru 岸丸; Enryō was the name he earned after ordination. Hereafter he will mostly be referred to by his ordination name, “Enryō,” while for Paek Sönguk the family name “Paek” will continue to be used.
- 54 – Staggs 1979, p. 166.
- 55 – Ibid., pp. 169–170.
- 56 – Ibid.
- 57 – Ibid., p. 173.
- 58 – Ibid., p. 176.
- 59 – Ibid., p. 177.
- 60 – Ibid., p. 178.
- 61 – Inoue 1987–1990, vol. 25, p. 766.
- 62 – Ibid., 25:774–775.
- 63 – Ibid., 25:750.
- 64 – Inoue, “Inoue Enryō ryakunenpu,” Inoue 1987–1990, vol. 7, p. 767.
- 65 – Staggs 1979, pp. 209–210.
- 66 – Inoue 1987–1990, 25:768–778.
- 67 – Ibid., 7:107; English translation, Heisig et al. 2011, p. 610.
- 68 – Inoue 1987–1990, 7:109; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 620.
- 69 – The knowable world is the world of phenomena (*genshō sekai* 現象世界), while the unknowable world is the world of noumena (*jitsudai sekai* 実体世界, the unknowable). Knowable objects or events, “phenomena” (*genshōteki sekai* 現象の世界), are “finite,” “relative,” and have “distinctions.” The sum of unknowable objects and events, the “noumenon” (or the world of reality, *jittai sekai* 実体世界), are “infinite” (無限), “absolute” (*zettai* 絶対), and thus “the same” or “equal” (*byōdō* 平等).
- 70 – Inoue 1987–1990, 7:109; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 621.

- 71 – Ibid., 7:109; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 621. Translation modified.
- 72 – Inoue 1987–1990, 7:109; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 621.
- 73 – Inoue 1987–1990, 7:111; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 623.
- 74 – Otto 1923, p. 25.
- 75 – Inoue 1987–1990, 1:34.
- 76 – Ibid., 1:256.
- 77 – Inoue 1987–1990, 2:238; Heisig et al. 2011, pp. 625–626.
- 78 – Heisig et al. 2011, p. 265.
- 79 – Fazang 1924–1932.
- 80 – Üisang 1979, p. 1a.
- 81 – Inoue 1987–1990, 2:340; Heisig et al. 2011, p. 627.
- 82 – Derrida 1980, p. 57.
- 83 – For discussions on the different logics between West and East, see Park 2006. For a discussion of Paek’s discussion of logic, see Park 2017.
- 84 – Derrida 1980, p. 65.
- 85 – For example, in the first issue of *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, James Whitehill wrote: “Buddhism must begin to demonstrate a far clearer *moral form* and a more sophisticated, appropriate *ethical strategy* than can be found among its contemporary Western interpreters and representatives, if it is to flourish in the West” (Whitehill 1994, p. 2; emphasis in original). Several years later, Daniel Palmer expressed a similar position on the meaning of Buddhist ethics, especially in the context of Zen Buddhism: “If Buddhists cannot develop dialogical responses to these concerns [for social issues], then Buddhism in all likelihood will remain on the periphery of Western cultural practices, representing only an *exotic curiosity* and not a vital resource” (Palmer 1997, pp. 133–134; my emphasis).
- 86 – We notice that in discussions of Buddhist ethics and especially in the context of Engaged Buddhist ethics, the relationship between Buddhist logic and its ethical dimension plays an important role. See Keown 1999, King 2009, Wright 2009, Park 2008.
- 87 – An interest in Buddhism and science is one of the most recent developments in Buddhist studies. See Austin 1999; Wallace 2003 and 2007.
- 88 – Sueki 2004, pp. 10–11.
- 89 – American Philosophical Association 2002.
- 90 – Merleau-Ponty 1960, p. 207; Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 128.
- 91 – Merleau-Ponty 1960, p. 207; Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 128.

- 92 – Derrida 1990, p. 43; Derrida 2002, p. 23.
- 93 – Korean philosophers today still agonize on the problem of doing philosophy in the context of the power imbalance between the Eastern and Western forms of philosophy. See, e.g., Lee 2007.
- 94 – Hadot 2002, p. 3. Buddhist scholar James Apple interprets the Buddhist tradition of self-cultivation according to Pierre Hadot's distinction between "philosophical discourse" and "philosophical way of life."
- 95 – Merleau-Ponty 1960, p. 226; Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 139.

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